PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-4012
TERRELL ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00320-JFM-1)
Argued: October 27, 2010
Decided: January 21, 2011
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and
Bobby R. BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Baldock joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Gerald Chester Ruter, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellant. Philip S. Jackson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
2 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellee.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Terrell Allen appeals from his conviction in the
District of Maryland for contravening 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
by knowingly possessing ammunition after having been con-
victed of a felony. On appeal, Allen maintains that evidence
used against him should have been suppressed and that he was
erroneously denied a Franks hearing concerning a search war-
rant affidavit. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56
(1978) (holding that, in limited circumstances, accused is enti-
tled to evidentiary hearing on veracity of search warrant affi-
davit). After the district court declined to suppress the
evidence and denied his request for a Franks hearing, Allen
entered a conditional guilty plea to a single § 922(g)(1)
offense, reserving his right to appeal the court’s adverse sup-
pression rulings. As explained below, we affirm.
I.
A.
On July 9, 2008, a grand jury in the District of Maryland
returned a single count indictment against Allen, charging that
he had contravened 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by knowingly pos-
sessing a .44 caliber revolver after having been convicted of
a felony (the "Firearm Offense"). A superseding indictment
was returned on February 17, 2009, containing a second
§ 922(g)(1) count that charged Allen with knowingly possess-
ing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony (the
"Ammunition Offense"). The revolver underlying the Firearm
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 3
Offense was seized on May 15, 2008, during a warranted
search of the Allen Family Appliance Store (the "AFA Store,"
or the "Store") located on North Gay Street in Baltimore,
Maryland. The ammunition underlying the Ammunition
Offense was seized two months later, during a warranted
search of Allen’s residence on Punjab Circle in Baltimore
County.
Allen filed pretrial motions seeking suppression of the evi-
dence underlying both counts of the superseding indictment,
and also requesting that the district court conduct a Franks
hearing on the veracity of information contained in the search
warrant affidavit leading to the seizure of the revolver. After
the court denied his suppression motions, Allen entered a con-
ditional guilty plea — reserving his right to appeal the court’s
adverse suppression rulings.
B.
The events leading to the warranted seizures of the .44
revolver and the ammunition serve as the factual predicate of
this appeal and are not in dispute. At approximately 6:00 p.m.
on May 15, 2008, Baltimore police officers responded to calls
relating to multiple shootings in the street outside the AFA
Store, which was owned and operated by Allen and his fam-
ily. Allen, along with his father, his half-brother, and a man
named Reginald Davis, were apparently attending a barbeque
outside the Store when the shootings occurred; all four were
shot and taken to nearby hospitals. Allen and Davis survived,
but Allen’s father and half-brother died.
"Shooting detectives" of the Baltimore Police Department
were the first officers to respond to the firefight near the AFA
Store.1 It was apparent to the shooting detectives that some of
1
The Baltimore Police Department maintains separate detective units
that investigate fatal versus non-fatal shootings. "Shooting detectives" are
responsible for investigating nonfatal shootings, and "homicide detectives"
are responsible for shootings that involve fatalities.
4 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
the victims would not survive, and they immediately
requested the assistance of the homicide unit, which in turn
dispatched "homicide detective" Gary Niedermeier to the
scene. Niedermeier arrived at the chaotic scene outside the
Store approximately twenty minutes after the homicide unit
was called.
At the crime scene, Detective Niedermeier observed
approximately twenty spent shell casings and fragments that
were strewn about the area, indicating that multiple firearms
had been discharged in the firefight. Niedermeier also
observed several blood trails, one of which led directly into
the AFA Store. He followed the blood trail inside the Store,
which led to a filing cabinet. One of the cabinet’s drawers was
slightly ajar, and Niedermeier opened it and observed a silver
revolver. He promptly relayed this information to the shooting
detectives at the scene.
In the aftermath of these events, the Baltimore and federal
authorities sought and obtained three separate search war-
rants: (1) the first warrant, issued on the evening of the fire-
fight, authorized a search of the AFA Store for firearms and
other evidence (the "First Warrant"); (2) the second warrant,
issued on June 3, 2008, authorized the collection of Allen’s
DNA (the "Second Warrant"); and (3) the third warrant,
issued on June 30, 2008, authorized the search of Allen’s resi-
dence for firearms and other evidence (the "Third Warrant").
The .44 revolver underlying the Firearm Offense was seized
during the search of the Store pursuant to the First Warrant,
and the ammunition underlying the Ammunition Offense was
recovered during the search of Allen’s residence pursuant to
the Third Warrant. The events surrounding the acquisition and
execution of the three warrants is essential to a proper under-
standing of this appeal.
1.
On May 15, 2008, the date of the firefight, Baltimore
Detective Chris Wade sought and obtained the First Warrant
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 5
from a state court judge. The First Warrant authorized the
search of the AFA Store for firearms, DNA, and other evi-
dence related to the shootings that occurred outside the Store.
Wade had not personally been to the crime scene, and much
of the information included in his affidavit had been relayed
from officers on the scene. Wade’s affidavit accurately
described the multiple victims, the many shell casings, and
various other aspects of the crime scene outside the Store. The
affidavit also related the following:
A blood trail was located going inside [the AFA
Store] on the first floor and going up the steps to the
second floor. On the first floor to the right of the
blood trail laying in plain view on top of a file cabi-
net was a . . . handgun.
J.A. 36.2 Based on Wade’s affidavit, the First Warrant was
issued and the search was executed at the Store on the eve-
ning of May 15, 2008, less than five hours after the firefight.
During the search, the officers seized the .44 revolver from
the filing cabinet, plus DNA samples.
2.
Three weeks later, on June 3, 2008, Detective Niedermeier
sought and obtained the Second Warrant, also from a state
court judge, authorizing the seizure of DNA samples from
Allen. The affidavit supporting the Second Warrant detailed
the chaotic scene outside the AFA Store following the shoot-
ings, and explained that the .44 revolver and DNA samples
had been seized during the warranted search of the Store. The
affidavit specified that Niedermeier had observed a silver
revolver in a filing cabinet at the Store before the revolver
was seized:
2
Citations herein to "J.A. __" refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the
parties in this appeal.
6 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
[Y]our affiant located a blood trail which led from
the initial scene into [the Store]. As your affiant fol-
lowed the blood trail[,] it led to a four drawer filing
cabinet . . . with the second drawer from the top
slightly open. [Y]our affiant opened the drawer and
observed a silver revolver . . . .
J.A. 60. The Second Warrant was executed on June 5, 2008,
and Allen’s DNA was obtained. His DNA matched that found
on the revolver seized from the Store and, as a result, Allen
was charged with the Firearm Offense.
3.
On June 30, 2008, ATF Agent Noah Slackman sought and
obtained the Third Warrant, from a federal magistrate judge,
authorizing the search of Allen’s residence for firearms and
related paraphernalia. Slackman’s affidavit specified that the
home on Punjab Circle in Baltimore County was Allen’s resi-
dence, detailed Allen’s prior felony convictions, recounted the
May 15, 2008 crime scene (similar to the details in Nieder-
meier’s affidavit supporting the Second Warrant), and indi-
cated that the DNA samples found on the .44 revolver
matched Allen’s DNA. The principal basis for the search of
Allen’s residence, however, was information provided by a
confidential informant (the "CI").3 According to the CI, the
May 15, 2008 shootings had been committed by a gang of
Allen’s drug distribution rivals, in retaliation for a kidnapping
orchestrated by Allen. The CI also explained that Allen had
"made statements that he intended to commit acts of violence
toward anybody related to [his rivals who committed the May
15 shootings], and in that regard members of [Allen’s] gang
3
Agent Slackman’s affidavit specified that the CI referred to therein had
provided accurate information in the past, and the affidavit included an
example of the CI recently providing reliable information. Allen conceded
in the district court that Slackman’s affidavit established the CI’s reliabil-
ity.
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 7
have been and will be armed with weapons for that purpose."
J.A. 72.
The federal magistrate judge issued the Third Warrant on
June 30, 2008, and it was executed on July 1, 2008. A box of
ammunition was seized from the Punjab Circle residence dur-
ing the search, and, as a result, Allen was charged with the
Ammunition Offense.
C.
1.
In pretrial proceedings in the district court, Allen sought
suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the three
search warrants. In regard to the .44 revolver and DNA recov-
ered from the AFA Store, Allen maintained that Detective
Niedermeier’s opening of the cabinet drawer constituted an
unconstitutional search not justified by any exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that Nieder-
meier’s observation of the silver revolver in the drawer
prompted the decision of the authorities to seek the First War-
rant. Thus, Allen asserted that the revolver and DNA (seized
pursuant to the First Warrant), as well as Allen’s DNA
(obtained pursuant to the Second Warrant), should be sup-
pressed. Additionally, Allen maintained that the conflicts
between Detective Wade’s affidavit supporting the First War-
rant and Niedermeier’s affidavit supporting the Second War-
rant — that is, the revolver being in plain view (according to
Wade) but inside a closed filing cabinet drawer (according to
Niedermeier) — justified a Franks hearing. Finally, Allen
sought to suppress the ammunition seized from his Punjab
Circle residence because Agent Slackman’s affidavit support-
ing the Third Warrant was tainted by the constitutional infir-
mities of the First and Second Warrants. Allen also asserted
that the affidavit failed to show a nexus between the Punjab
Circle residence and the items to be seized, and that the affi-
davit failed to establish probable cause.
8 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
In responding to the Allen’s suppression motions, the pros-
ecution conceded that Niedermeier "went outside the scope of
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment" by opening the filing cabinet drawer in the AFA Store.
J.A. 43. The prosecution maintained, however, that suppres-
sion of the revolver was not warranted because it would have
been discovered inevitably in any event. The prosecution also
maintained that a Franks hearing was not required because
Wade’s affidavit — which accurately described the crime
scene and blood trails leading into the AFA Store — provided
sufficient probable cause for the First Warrant, even with the
statements about the revolver excised. Finally, the prosecution
contended that Agent Slackman’s affidavit provided ample
probable cause for issuance of the Third Warrant.
2.
On May 15, 2009, the district court conducted a hearing on
Allen’s suppression motions. The prosecution called Detec-
tive Niedermeier to testify, and he related that he had arrived
at the crime scene about twenty minutes after the responding
officers requested assistance from the homicide unit. Nieder-
meier described the chaotic scene of the shootings and
recounted following a blood trail into the AFA Store. Nieder-
meier explained that he did not know whether other officers
had already been inside the Store, but that his duties include
searching a crime scene for victims and suspects. He agreed,
however, that he followed the blood trail into the Store to
gather evidence and to determine "what had happened
because these four individuals had been shot." J.A. 92.
Niedermeier explained that the silver revolver was observed
inside a cabinet drawer, and was not in plain view as stated
in Detective Wade’s affidavit. Niedermeier also said, how-
ever, that he had never spoken directly to Wade about the
revolver and had advised the other officers at the scene "just
generally" about it. Id. at 93.
After Detective Niedermeier testified, the district court
denied Allen’s motion to suppress the .44 revolver, as well as
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 9
his request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that
such relief was not warranted because the revolver would
inevitably have been found and the "inevitable discovery rule
trumps." J.A. 102. The court explained that "clearly you’ve
got a shooting scene there, you’ve got blood going inside,
clearly what you’re going to do is get a warrant. And that
would have happened, and the gun would have been found."
Id. at 100. Furthermore, and even if "you excise all [refer-
ences to the revolver in Detective Wade’s affidavit] it seems
to me that you still got probable cause." Id. at 101. After this
ruling, Allen conceded that "if the [F]irst [W]arrant stands,
then quite obviously the [S]econd [W]arrant would stand as
well." Id. at 102.
Moving to the Third Warrant, Allen requested suppression
of the ammunition seized during the warranted search of his
Punjab Circle residence. Allen maintained that the informa-
tion supplied by the CI in Agent Slackman’s affidavit consti-
tuted "puffing," and that the affidavit was facially insufficient
to show probable cause for a search of the Punjab Circle resi-
dence. J.A. 106. From the bench, the district court denied
Allen’s motion to suppress and concluded that Slackman’s
affidavit contained sufficient probable cause for issuance of
the Third Warrant:
[I]t seems to me there’s ample probable cause. I
mean, you’ve got the fact of the shootings. You’ve
got, in the streets of Baltimore, you had four people
shot, two people killed in that shooting, two other
people injured. You’ve got the DNA matching.
You’ve got the firearm . . . . I don’t think it’s puff-
ing. I wish it were puffing in the city of Baltimore,
it’s not. . . . [T]here was probable cause to believe
that Mr. Allen had a firearm, wherever he was, in his
residence. And as I say there was a particular history
of violence leading to this, which was the alleged
kidnapping. Then the shooting . . . . And I think,
frankly, the officers did exactly the right thing and
10 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
[the issuing magistrate judge] did exactly the right
thing in signing the warrant.
Id. 107-08.
On September 1, 2009, after his suppression motions and
request for a Franks hearing had been denied, Allen entered
a conditional guilty plea to the Ammunition Offense. The plea
agreement preserved Allen’s right to appeal the district
court’s adverse suppression rulings. On December 17, 2009,
the court sentenced Allen to forty-eight months in prison and
three years of supervised release.4
Allen has timely noted this appeal, and we possess jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We assess de novo the legal determinations underlying a
district court’s suppression rulings, including the denial of a
Franks hearing, and we review the court’s factual findings
relating to such rulings for clear error. See United States v.
Blatstein, 482 F.3d 725, 730 (4th Cir. 2007). A determination
of probable cause is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.
See United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.
1996).
III.
On appeal, Allen makes three contentions. First, he main-
tains that the district court erred in denying his request for a
Franks hearing on the inaccurate statements contained in
Detective Wade’s affidavit supporting the First Warrant. Sec-
ond, he asserts that the First Warrant is void because Detec-
tive Niedermeier’s warrantless entry into the AFA Store was
4
Pursuant to the plea agreement between Allen and the Government, the
prosecution dismissed the Firearm Offense.
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 11
not justified by exigent circumstances.5 Finally, Allen con-
tends that Agent Slackman’s affidavit supporting the Third
Warrant was insufficient to justify a probable cause finding,
and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply.
We assess Allen’s contentions in turn.
A.
Allen contends that the district court erred in denying his
request for a Franks hearing. More specifically, he maintains
that the inaccurate statements in Detective Wade’s affidavit
supporting of the First Warrant — i.e., that the firearm in the
AFA Store was in "plain view" — were included intentionally
or recklessly. With those statements excised, according to
Allen, the affidavit would not support a probable cause deter-
mination.
An accused is generally not entitled to challenge the verac-
ity of a facially valid search warrant affidavit. In its decision
in Franks v. Delaware, however, the Supreme Court carved
out a narrow exception to this rule, whereby an accused is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the veracity of statements
in the affidavit. See 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). To be enti-
tled to a Franks hearing, however, the accused must make a
substantial preliminary showing that false statements were
either knowingly or recklessly included in an affidavit sup-
porting a search warrant and that, without those false state-
ments, the affidavit cannot support a probable cause finding.
See id. Therefore, if the allegedly false statements are not nec-
essary for the probable cause finding, the accused is not enti-
tled to a Franks hearing. See id.
5
As a corollary to his contention that Detective Niedermeier’s initial
entry into the AFA Store was unconstitutional, Allen contends that the
Second and Third Warrants are tainted by this illegal entry and that any
evidence seized pursuant to those warrants was fruit of the poisonous tree.
See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 522 (4th Cir. 2008).
12 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
As we have recognized, the concept of probable cause is
not subject to a precise definition. See United States v. Rich-
ardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has explained that probable cause plainly "ex-
ist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient
to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). An assessment of
the presence of probable cause must be based on the totality
of the relevant circumstances, rather than on the technical or
rigid demands of a formulaic legal test. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983); United States v. Blackwood,
913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990). In making a probable
cause assessment, a judicial officer must simply make "a
practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair proba-
bility that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
Applying the foregoing principles, it is apparent that the
inaccurate statements in Detective Wade’s affidavit about the
revolver in the AFA Store being in plain view were unneces-
sary to the probable cause determination. Assuming that
Wade falsely or recklessly made those statements and sought
to mislead the state court judge, his affidavit nevertheless
makes an ample showing of probable cause for issuance of the
First Warrant. Specifically, the affidavit described the chaotic
scene of the quadruple shootings in the street near the AFA
Store, which was littered with shell casings and fragments,
and multiple blood trails (including the trail leading inside the
Store). This information alone — without reference to the
revolver observed in the filing cabinet — is sufficient to
establish probable cause that evidence related to the shootings
would probably be found inside. Because any inaccurate
statements in Wade’s affidavit were unnecessary for the prob-
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 13
able cause finding, the district court did not err in denying
Allen’s request for a Franks hearing.6
B.
Next, Allen maintains that the .44 revolver should have
been suppressed because Detective Niedermeier’s initial entry
into the AFA Store — following a trail of blood — was
unconstitutional. Allen argues that Niedermeier’s testimony at
the suppression hearing indicates that the true motivation
behind his initial entry into the Store was to gather evidence,
rather than look for other victims or suspects. Allen contends
that, because Niedermeier’s initial entry was unconstitutional,
everything in Detective Wade’s affidavit that flowed from the
illegal entry — the revolver and the locations of the trails of
blood inside the Store — should be excised from the affidavit.
Allen asserts that when such information is excised, the affi-
davit is facially deficient and the revolver must be suppressed.
This contention, however, suffers from the same infirmities as
Allen’s contention regarding his entitlement to a Franks hear-
ing.
Even if Detective Niedermeier’s initial entry into the AFA
Store was unconstitutional, the evidence seized under the First
Warrant need not be suppressed, because "sufficient untainted
evidence was presented in the [First W]arrant affidavit to
establish probable cause," rendering the warrant valid. United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984). Detective Wade’s
affidavit — purged of all information garnered by Nieder-
meier’s entry into the store — yet details the chaotic scene of
a quadruple shooting in the streets of Baltimore, and relates
6
Allen also contends that the district court did not rule that Detective
Wade’s affidavit, purged of the inaccurate statements, was sufficient to
support the issuance of the First Warrant. The court ruled, however, that
when "you excise all [the references to the revolver in Wade’s affidavit]
it seems to me that you still got probable cause." J.A. 101. As such, we
readily reject Allen’s contention.
14 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
that "a blood trail was located going inside" the Store. J.A. 26.
Those circumstances — standing alone — provide probable
cause for a search of the Store.7 Thus, even if Niedermeier’s
initial entry into the Store was improper and all information
gained from that entry was "tainted," the affidavit supporting
the First Warrant contains sufficient untainted information to
show probable cause for issuance of the First Warrant. The
district court, therefore, did not err in declining to suppress
the evidence seized during the execution of the First Warrant.
C.
In his final appellate contention, Allen argues that the dis-
trict court erred in declining to suppress the ammunition
seized from his Punjab Circle residence. Allen contends that
the ammunition seized under the Third Warrant is inextricably
intertwined to his claim that the revolver should have been
suppressed. Allen contends that much of the information
included in Agent Slackman’s affidavit — principally the sil-
ver revolver seized at the AFA Store and linked to Allen —
is constitutionally tainted and must be excised. Such an asser-
tion fails, however, because the revolver was legally seized.
Thus, Allen’s contention that Slackman’s affidavit is defec-
tive because it contains constitutionally tainted information
must be rejected.
Allen makes three additional points concerning the Third
Warrant: (1) that Slackman’s affidavit for the Third Warrant
fails to support a probable cause finding; (2) that the informa-
tion supplied the by CI was not sufficiently corroborated; and
7
In connection with the First Warrant, the district court essentially
reached this very conclusion when it explained: "[C]learly you’ve got a
shooting scene there, you’ve got blood going inside, clearly what you’re
going to do is get a warrant." J.A. 100. Detective Niedermeier’s entry into
the AFA Store does nothing to taint the information about the crime scene
and the blood trail leading inside the store, which are included in Detec-
tive Wade’s affidavit and are, standing alone, sufficient to establish proba-
ble cause to search the Store.
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN 15
(3) that the affidavit did not show a nexus between the Punjab
Circle residence and the items to be seized. As explained
above, however, a judicial officer issuing a search warrant
must simply make a practical, commonsense determination —
based on the totality of the circumstances revealed in the affi-
davit — of whether there is a substantial likelihood that evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31; United States v. Grossman, 400
F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005). Additionally, "the nexus
between the place to be searched and the items to be seized
may be established by the nature of the item and the normal
inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence."
Richardson, 607 F.3d at 371 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In assessing the probable cause determination concern-
ing the Third Warrant, we accord great deference to the
issuing judge’s assessment of the facts presented. See Gates,
462 U.S. at 238; Grossman, 400 F.3d at 217.
Put simply, Agent Slackman’s affidavit supporting the
Third Warrant provided probable cause to believe that Allen
possessed firearms at his Punjab Circle residence. The affida-
vit related that Allen was a convicted felon; that Allen resided
at the Punjab Circle residence; that two members of Allen’s
family had been killed in the May 15, 2008 shootings on Gay
Street; and that a revolver containing Allen’s DNA was
recovered at the scene. Importantly, the affidavit also con-
tained information from a reliable CI that the shootings had
been committed by Allen’s drug rivals in response to a kid-
napping, and that Allen and his supporters were armed to do
violence against the perpetrators of the shootings. Indeed,
Allen has conceded that Slackman’s affidavit established the
reliability of the CI. See J.A. 103; Br. of Appellant 19.
According appropriate deference to the magistrate judge
who issued the Third Warrant, Agent Slackman’s affidavit
establishes probable cause for a search of the Punjab Circle
residence for firearms, and thus the nexus between the place
to be searched and the items to be seized was established.
16 UNITED STATES v. ALLEN
Accordingly, we reject Allen’s contention that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress the ammunition
underlying his conviction on the Ammunition Offense.8
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Allen’s appellate con-
tentions and affirm.
AFFIRMED
8
Because the Third Warrant is not defective, we need not reach or
address Allen’s contention concerning the inapplicability of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.