UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-11269
Summary Calendar
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JOSEPH CROFTS, Individually and as Statutory Beneficiary of and
Personal Representative of Estate of Patrick Joseph Crofts, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, etc; ET AL,
Defendants,
DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, doing business as
Parkland Memorial Hospital; JEROME SHRAPPES, MD, in his
personal capacity; RON J ANDERSON, MD, in his personal and
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:96-CV-2593-D
August 3, 1999
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joseph Crofts appeals the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim against Dallas County Hospital District (“DCHD”). Crofts argues that DCHD’s failure
to properly train and supervise its employees caused the deprivation of the constitutional rights of his
now-deceased son, Patrick Joseph Crofts.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard of review as did
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the district court. See Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence of the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam). The nonmovant cannot satisfy his summary judgment burden with
conclusional allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. See id.
“To establish county/municipal liability under § 1983 . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate a policy
or custom which caused the constitutional deprivation.” Colle v. Brazos County, Tex., 981 F.2d 237,
244 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnotes omitted). A municipality’s failure to properly train its employees can
be a policy or custom giving rise to § 1983 liability. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
387, 387, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1988). However, a municipality is liable under
this theory only if it is proven that: (1) the training procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were
inadequate; (2) the municipality’s policymaker was deliberately indifferent in adopting the training
policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the constitutional deprivation. See
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 1996).
Crofts has failed to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding the first required element of his
claim, the inadequacy of DCHD’s training procedures. Crofts has failed to produce any evidence
regarding either DCHD’s procedures for training hospital personnel or the deficiencies of such
procedures. Instead, Crofts argues that the hospital personnel’s failure to comply with hospital policy
in caring for Joey is itself proof that DCHD failed to properly train its employees. This conclusional
assertion cannot satisfy Crofts’ summary judgment burden. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in granting summary judgment to DCHD.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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