UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5179
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH JEROME SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (7:04-cr-00003-FL-1)
Submitted: January 18, 2011 Decided: January 25, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Ethan A. Ontjes, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Jerome Smith appeals the sixty-month sentence
of imprisonment imposed by the district court after finding that
Smith violated his term of supervised release prohibiting
criminal conduct. Smith pled guilty to distributing five grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2009), and possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). ∗ On appeal, Smith argues
that the sixty-month sentence is excessive and plainly
unreasonable because the district court procedurally erred by
failing to render an individualized assessment because its
statement that Smith was a very dangerous person was unsupported
by the record. We disagree.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In making this
determination, we follow “the procedural and substantive
∗
Smith was subject to a statutory maximum term of
imprisonment of five years following a revocation of supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
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considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences.” Id. at 438. In this inquiry, we take a more
deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than reasonableness review of Guidelines
sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or
substantively unreasonable, must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider Chapter Seven’s
policy statements and the statutory provisions applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the district court need not robotically tick through every
subsection, and it has broad discretion to revoke the previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum provided by § 3583(e)(3). Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57;
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Moreover, while a district court must
provide a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed, the
court “need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court’s assertion that Smith was a very dangerous
person was premised upon its finding that Smith’s repeated
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pattern of committing drug offenses indicated that he
disregarded the law. Smith’s contention that the district
court’s finding was unsupported by the record is inaccurate.
Thus, the district court did not procedurally err in determining
Smith’s sentence, which is not unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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