PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-4932
KEVIN MYELL SLADE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge.
(4:08-cr-00003-FL-1)
Argued: October 29, 2010
Decided: January 27, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Shedd
joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM,
PC, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Joshua Bryan
Royster, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George
2 UNITED STATES v. SLADE
E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jenni-
fer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case deals with the propriety of imposing a leadership
sentencing enhancement where the defendant was a mid-level
drug dealer who did not supervise others. In June of 2008,
Kevin Myell Slade pled guilty without a plea agreement to
one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and
five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006). At sentencing, the district court adopted the
findings of the presentence report ("PSR"), including imposi-
tion of the so-called leadership enhancement. The court then
sentenced Slade to 365 months imprisonment, the upper end
of the guideline’s range. Because the district court improperly
imposed the leadership enhancement and this mistake consti-
tutes plain error, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
I.
The New Bern Police Department in tandem with the North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigations targeted several nar-
cotics distributors in Craven County, North Carolina, includ-
ing Slade. Investigators determined that Slade was a mid-level
drug trafficker, who supplied large quantities of cocaine,
crack cocaine, and marijuana to six indicted and unindicted
coconspirators. These individuals subsequently distributed the
controlled substances. Several co-conspirators, including
Slade’s "right hand man," sold cocaine and crack cocaine on
his behalf. Slade was also transported to various drug deals by
his cousin.
UNITED STATES v. SLADE 3
During the investigation, the New Bern Police Department
conducted multiple controlled buys from Slade as well as sei-
zures. Investigators obtained statements from numerous indi-
viduals who provided information regarding the defendant’s
drug trafficking activities. Among these individuals was Her-
man King, who informed the police that Slade always carried
guns. The government also presented testimony on behalf of
Sergeant Wilcutt who testified about Slade’s criminal history
involving guns.
On July 2, 2008, Slade pled guilty to count one of the
indictment: conspiracy. At sentencing, the district court
adopted the PSR, which held Slade accountable for drugs
totaling a base offense level of thirty four, with a two-level
upward enhancement for possession of a firearm, a three-level
enhancement for Slade’s leadership role in the offense, and a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. It then
calculated the range of imprisonment at 292 to 365 months.
After hearing from counsel and taking the allocution from
Slade, the court sentenced him to 365 months. Slade timely
appealed.
II.
A.
Slade first argues that the district court erred in calculating
the base drug amount attributable to him under § 2D1.1(a)(3)
of the Sentencing Guidelines. More specifically, he contends
that the district court considered unreliable and unsubstan-
tiated evidence in the PSR to find him responsible for the
equivalent of 20,515 kilograms of marijuana. Slade’s argu-
ment is meritless.
"We review the district court’s calculation of the quantity
of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes
for clear error." United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 210
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d
4 UNITED STATES v. SLADE
248, 255 (4th Cir. 1995)). Under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) the defen-
dant is responsible not only for his own acts, but also for "all
reasonably foreseeable acts" of his co-conspirators in further-
ance of the joint criminal activity. Id.; United States v. Lip-
ford, 203 F.3d 259, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2000). The defendant
bears the burden of establishing that the information relied
upon by the district court—here the PSR—is erroneous. Ran-
dall, 171 F.3d at 210-11 (citing United States v. Love, 134
F.3d 595, 606 (4th Cir. 1998)). Because Slade failed to object
to the drug-quantity calculation before the district court, we
review for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731-32 (1993).
Slade argues that because he was incarcerated when the
drug deals occurred—namely during several months in
2006—it was physically impossible for him to have facilitated
them. The government responds that Slade was sentenced in
August, and therefore had eight months to complete the
alleged transactions. Yet the PSR indicates that Slade was
arrested subsequent to his first arrest in January 2006, indicat-
ing that he was not incarcerated but instead out on bail. This
reading is also supported by the fact that his probation was
revoked in July of 2007, suggesting that his sentence was pro-
bation, not incarceration. Furthermore, it is within the discre-
tion of the district court to credit the testimony of these
witnesses who discussed his involvement in the drug trade.
United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 722 (4th Cir. 1993)
(district court has broad discretion at sentencing to weigh
credibility). It was not plain error for the district court to
believe witnesses over Slade’s word by, for example, believ-
ing that the transactions occurred during the periods of 2006
when Slade was not incarcerated. Finally, if the transactions
were facilitated for Slade on behalf of his co-conspirators, he
is liable as if he had sold them himself.
B.
Slade next argues that the district court improperly applied
the two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm. Under
UNITED STATES v. SLADE 5
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), a district court must increase the defendant’s
offense level two levels "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including
a firearm) was possessed." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual, § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2004). In order to prove that a weapon
was present, the Government "need show only that the
weapon was possessed during the relevant illegal drug activ-
ity." United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 233-34 (4th
Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 852
(4th Cir.1997). "We review findings of fact relating to sen-
tencing enhancements for clear error." Id. Under this standard
of review, this Court will only reverse if left with the "definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations omitted).
The enhancement "reflects the increased danger of violence
when drug traffickers possess weapons" and should be
applied "if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3. The enhancement is proper
when "the weapon was possessed in connection with drug
activity that was part of the same course of conduct or com-
mon scheme as the offense of conviction," United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 628-29 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), even in the absence of "proof of pre-
cisely concurrent acts, for example, gun in hand while in the
act of storing drugs, drugs in hand while in the act of retriev-
ing a gun," United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 852 (4th
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It
is the defendant’s burden to show that a connection between
his possession of a firearm and his narcotic offense is "clearly
improbable." See id. at 853 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
Here, the PSR recommended application of the two-level
enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the state-
ment of Herman King, a co-conspirator who purchased or
received cocaine from Slade in 2005, that Slade "always car-
6 UNITED STATES v. SLADE
ried guns" in connection with his drug-trafficking activities.
In objecting to this recommendation in the district court,
Slade asserted that King’s statement that he "always" carried
guns during the course of his drug activities was not credible
because it was uncorroborated and because he had been
arrested for and convicted of several drug offenses where a
gun was not involved. The Government countered that, as
shown by Slade’s criminal record, he was charged with and
convicted of other gun offenses during the course of the sub-
ject drug conspiracy. The Government also presented testi-
mony from a state detective familiar with the investigation of
Slade that King’s statements to investigators concerning Slade
were reliable and not untruthful. The detective confirmed that,
during the subject conspiracy, Slade shot known drug dealers
and gave a handgun to an individual who later pled guilty in
federal court to a drug trafficking offense.
The district court credited the detective’s testimony and,
relying on it, Slade’s criminal history, and the evidence in the
PSR, overruled Slade’s objection and adopted the PSR’s rec-
ommendation to apply the two-level enhancement under
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court did not commit clear
error in applying the enhancement. Slade was a member of
the subject drug conspiracy from "at least 2003 to January
2007," and a reliable co-conspirator who interacted with Slade
in the course of that conspiracy related his knowledge that
Slade "always carried guns" in connection with his drug-
trafficking activities. Slade has not shown that it was "clearly
improbable" that the firearms were connected with the drug
conspiracy, and he is entitled to no relief on this claim.
C.
Finally, Slade’s offense level was increased three levels
because the district court determined that he played an aggra-
vating role as a manager or supervisor of the drug conspiracy.
Section 3B1.1(b) of the Guidelines provides for a three-level
enhancement in a defendant’s offense level "[i]f the defendant
UNITED STATES v. SLADE 7
was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)
and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or
was otherwise extensive." USSG § 3B1.1(b). Application of
the enhancement is warranted if the defendant was a manager
or supervisor "of one or more other participants." Id., cmt.
n.2; see United States v. Bartley, 230 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir.
2000).
Because Slade failed to object to the determination in the
district court, this Court reviews for plain error. See United
States v. Rooks, 596 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 148 (Oct 4, 2010). To prevail under this
standard, Slade must show that an error was made, is plain,
and affected his substantial rights. Id. In the sentencing con-
text, an error affects substantial rights if, "absent the error, a
different sentence might have been imposed." United States v.
Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2010).
Slade argues that the district court’s determination that he
was a manager or supervisor of the drug conspiracy was erro-
neous because the record evidence is insufficient to show that
he actually "managed" or "supervised" persons involved in
the conspiracy. (Appellant’s Br. at 16).1 We agree. Although
the Guidelines do not define the term manager, this Court uti-
lizes the dictionary definition: "‘a person whose work or pro-
fession is the management of a specified thing (as a business,
an institution, or a particular phase or activity within a busi-
ness or institution).’" United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d
1263, 1268 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1372 (1986) (emphasis omitted)).
The enhancement is appropriate where the evidence demon-
1
Slade also argues that there is no evidence that he managed or super-
vised property (Appellant’s Br. at 16), but this assertion is irrelevant, as
a defendant does not qualify for an aggravating role enhancement under
USSG § 3B1.1 in the absence of evidence that he organized or managed
participants, as opposed to property, in the criminal enterprise, United
States v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2009).
8 UNITED STATES v. SLADE
strates that the defendant "controlled the activities of other
participants" or "exercised management responsibility."
Bartley, 230 F.3d at 673-74 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
According to the PSR, which the district court adopted,
Slade was a "mid[-] to upper-level" member of the drug con-
spiracy who sold or delivered cocaine and cocaine base both
to his own clientele and to other members of the conspiracy,
who, in turn, sold the drugs to their clientele. Certain co-
conspirators also sold cocaine and cocaine base "for" Slade on
various occasions. The PSR reveals further that an unindicted
co-conspirator drove Slade to various locations to deliver
cocaine base to his clients. These are the only factual findings
supporting the role enhancement assessed against Slade,2 and
they do not justify imposition of an enhancement for a man-
agement or supervisory role.
It is clear that Slade sold illegal drugs, "[b]ut being a buyer
[or] seller of illegal drugs, even in league with . . . five or
more other persons, does not establish that a defendant has
functioned as a[ ] . . . manager or supervisor of criminal activ-
ity." United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In cases where this
Court has affirmed the application of an aggravating role
adjustment under USSG § 3B1.1(b), there existed on the
record evidence that the defendant actively exercised some
authority over other participants in the operation or actively
managed its activities. See United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d
381, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming USSG § 3B1.1(b)
enhancement where the defendant "exercised supervisory
responsibility over" the activities of a call center by, inter
alia, enforcing the center’s rules, punishing non-compliant
operators, and coordinating the operators’ activities); Kellam,
568 F.3d at 147-48 (affirming USSG § 3B1.1(b) enhancement
2
The Government does not contend to the contrary. (See Appellee’s Br.
at 18-19).
UNITED STATES v. SLADE 9
where the defendant controlled the drug buys of co-
conspirators and directed the terms of payment); Bartley, 230
F.3d at 673-74 (affirming USSG § 3B1.1(b) enhancement
where the defendant directed the activities of street-level drug
dealers and advised them on drug sales techniques, set prices
and payment terms, arranged logistics of delivery, and
directed the mailing and transport of drugs); United States v.
Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 932 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming USSG
§ 3B1.1(b) enhancement where the defendant "acted as a
manager in a large criminal enterprise, supervising the prepa-
ration of marijuana for shipment and sending out his inferiors
to deliver the drugs"); United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138,
1152 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming USSG § 3B1.1(b) enhance-
ment where the defendant, inter alia, paid employees of the
drug operation and "effectively ran the operation while her
husband was ill").
Such evidence is lacking in this case. Although Slade sup-
plied large quantities of drugs to some co-conspirators who,
in turn, sold those drugs to their clientele, there is simply no
evidence that Slade exercised any supervisory responsibility
over these persons by controlling them or directing the terms
of their sales. Additionally, while an unindicted co-
conspirator did drive Slade to various locations to deliver
cocaine base to his own clientele, there is no indication from
the record that the co-conspirator did so pursuant to or as a
result of any exercise of managerial or supervisory authority
by Slade. Finally, while various co-conspirators sold drugs
"for" Slade, there is simply no evidence in the record that
Slade had any involvement in those sales beyond that of sup-
plying the drug. In short, this record does not support the con-
clusion that Slade was exercising authority over other co-
conspirators or managing the conspiracy’s activities. In light
of the absence of any evidence of Slade’s aggravating role as
a manager or supervisor, the district court erred in enhancing
his offense level under USSG § 3B1.1(b).3
3
The Government’s argument does not alter our conclusion. It claims
that the section 3B1.1(b) enhancement was properly applied because the
10 UNITED STATES v. SLADE
The district court’s error was also plain. See Olano, 507
U.S. at 734 (explaining that "plain" error is "synonymous with
clear or . . . obvious" error (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Finally, the court’s error affected Slade’s substantial
rights. Under the plain error standard, Slade has the burden of
showing that the court’s error "had a prejudicial effect on the
sentence imposed." United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580
(4th Cir. 2010). Here, had the district court correctly calcu-
lated Slade’s Guidelines range, it might have given Slade a
lower imprisonment term.4 Considering that the district court
sentenced Slade at the highest end of what it thought to be the
Guidelines range, there exists a nonspeculative basis to infer
prejudice that "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or pub-
lic reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 736
(discussing the fourth prong of the plain error test) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
In sum, although the district court did not err in its calcula-
tion of Slade’s base offense level or in enhancing that level
for possession of a firearm, the court erred in assessing an
record "contains statements that [Slade]’s driver drove him around to
deliver [cocaine base] to his client and that his ‘right hand man’ sold
[cocaine base] and cocaine for him." (Appellee.s Br. at 18). It is certainly
true that Slade’s cousin, Felicia Beckworth, drove Slade to various loca-
tions to deliver cocaine base to his clients, but there is no indication from
the PSR that she did so pursuant to any direction or exercise of supervi-
sory authority by Slade. Moreover, while Beckworth did in fact drive
Slade, the claim that she was "his" driver finds no record support. The
PSR also reveals that LoMichael Grice, an unindicted co-conspirator
described as Slade’s "right hand man," sold cocaine and cocaine base "for"
Slade. But, again, there is no evidence that Slade in any way controlled
or directed Grice’s drug sales, and the appellation "right hand man" does
not reveal anything about whether Grice was acting pursuant to or as the
result of any exercise by Slade of supervisory authority.
4
Without the three-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(b), Slade’s
total offense level would have been 33. A total offense level of 33 and a
Category V criminal history produce an advisory Guidelines range of 210
to 262 months’ imprisonment, see USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
UNITED STATES v. SLADE 11
enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(b) for Slade’s role in the
offense. The 365-month sentence is therefore procedurally
unreasonable. United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 347
(4th Cir. 2008). We therefore vacate and remand it to the dis-
trict court for resentencing.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence of the district court
is vacated and remanded for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED