UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4303
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TSAIKUWN ALDAGO HAIRSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (4:08-cr-00022-jlk-1)
Submitted: December 29, 2010 Decided: January 27, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark T. Williams, WILLIAMS, MORRISON, LIGHT & MOREAU, Danville,
Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tsaikuwn Aldago Hairston appeals his convictions after
a jury trial of one count of conspiracy to distribute more than
fifty grams of cocaine base, and more than five kilograms of
cocaine powder, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846
(2006), one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2006), one count of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623
(2006), and one count of committing a criminal offense while on
pretrial release, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (2006). He
claims the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to
suppress evidence seized from a vehicle during a search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) denying his motion in limine to exclude
evidence; and (3) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Hairston’s
suppression motion, this court reviews the district court's
factual determinations for clear error and any legal
determinations de novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586,
589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). Because
the district court denied Hairston’s motion, this court
construes the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
government,” the prevailing party below. Id.
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A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception
to the warrant requirement that permits “law enforcement
officers following a lawful arrest [to] . . . search the
arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.”
United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Hairston
contends that, under Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),
the search in this case could not be justified as a search
incident to a lawful arrest because he had already been removed
from the vehicle and secured in the police car when the police
conducted the search.
However, we need not reach the Gant issue as the
evidence obtained from the vehicle search is admissible under
the inevitable discovery doctrine. In 1984, the Supreme Court
recognized the “inevitable discovery” exception to the
exclusionary rule, stating that “when, as here, the evidence in
question would inevitably have been discovered without reference
to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient
to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984).
Police officers frequently perform inventory searches
when they impound vehicles or detain suspects. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (holding
admissible evidence recovered during an inventory search of a
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shoulder bag possessed by a lawfully arrested person); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (holding admissible
evidence discovered during the impoundment of an illegally
parked automobile). Such searches “serve to protect an owner’s
property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to
guard the police from danger.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 372 (1987); see also United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733,
739 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A proper inventory search is merely an
incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding
incarceration, conducted to protect the arrestee from theft of
his possessions, to protect the police from false accusations of
theft, and to remove dangerous items from the arrestee prior to
his jailing.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For the inventory search exception to apply, the search must
have “be[en] conducted according to standardized criteria,” such
as pursuant to a uniform police department policy, Bertine, 479
U.S. at 374 n.6, and performed in good faith, Banks, 482 F.3d at
739; see also United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th
Cir. 1986).
In this case, if the officer had not conducted a
search incident to arrest, an inventory search of the car would
have been conducted, wherein the evidence in question would have
been discovered. Because the items seized would have been
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inevitably discovered, the district court was correct in denying
Hairston’s motion to suppress.
Hairston next challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion in limine to exclude the evidence of the ion scan
results that indicated the presence of cocaine on money seized
from Hairston’s person and the vehicle he was driving. Hairston
contends that the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 and that
the method used to test the money was not reliable.
“[R]elevance typically presents a low barrier to
admissibility.” United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 346
(4th Cir. 2003). Thus, evidence is relevant if it is “worth
consideration by the jury” or has a “plus value.” United States
v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 998 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rule 403 provides a “more limited bar to
otherwise admissible evidence.” United States v. Basham, 561
F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3353
(2010). Rule 403 “only requires suppression of evidence that
results in unfair prejudice — prejudice that damages an opponent
for reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an
appeal to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”
United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits the
admission into evidence of an expert’s testimony if it concerns
(1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that
(2) will aid the trier of fact to understand or resolve a fact
in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). This inquiry requires an
analysis of whether the reasoning and methodology underlying the
expert’s proffered opinion is reliable and whether such opinion
is relevant to the fact at issue. See id. at 591-95. This
court reviews the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th
Cir. 1997). “A district court abuses its discretion when it
acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion,
relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an
error of law.” United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th
Cir. 2007). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
admission into evidence of the ion scan results.
Hairston lastly challenges the district court’s
decision denying his motion for acquittal and finding there was
sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to distribute
crack cocaine, carrying a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking, and perjury. This court reviews the district
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court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009). A
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a
heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067
(4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the verdict is supported by ‘substantial
evidence.’” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.
2006) (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the
credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to convict on all three counts.
See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (discussing the elements of conspiracy to distribute
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and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine); United
States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the elements of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking); United States v. Wilkinson,
137 F.3d 214, 224 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the elements of
perjury).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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