United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-2291
OPHTHALMIC SURGEONS, LTD.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PAYCHEX, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Ripple,* and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Daniel V. McKinnon, with whom McKinnon & Harwood, B. Jean
Rosiello, and MacFadyen, Gescheidt & O'Brien, were on brief for
appellant.
Robert K. Taylor, with whom Partridge Snow & Hahn LLP, was on
brief for appellee.
January 31, 2011
*
Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case evidences the
importance of careful contract drafting. In this breach of
contract case, the appellee's liability depends primarily on
whether one sentence in the contract is clear and unambiguous.
Specifically, appellant, Ophthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. ("OSL"), alleges
that Paychex, Inc. ("Paychex"), its provider of direct deposit
payroll services, breached its obligations under a written
agreement when, over a period of six years and without objection
from appellant, it paid an OSL employee $233,159 more than her
authorized annual salary of $33,280. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Paychex.
I. Facts and Procedural History
OSL, a Rhode Island corporation, is a medical practice
specialized in ophthalmology. Dr. William J. Andreoni has worked
at OSL as a physician and surgeon for twenty-six years. He has
been part owner of OSL since 1986 and became the sole owner of the
practice in 1993. During the mid-1980s, OSL began to grow.
Therefore, the company sought to find a better way to administer
its payroll. To this end, in 1989, OSL entered into an oral
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contract with Paychex1 for payroll processing services (the "1989
Agreement").2
In 1994, OSL and Paychex entered into a written contract
pursuant to which Paychex was to provide direct deposit payroll
services (the "1994 Agreement"). The contract is governed by New
York law. The relevant parts of the agreement state the following:
2. SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED. In addition
to the services Paychex performs for the
Client as a payroll client, client hereby
employs Paychex to process direct deposit
payroll in compliance with Automated Clearing
House regulations. One business day prior to
the client's payroll check date, Paychex is
authorized to draw from Client's bank account
as specified by Client, such amounts as are
necessary to pay its employees. Such amounts
are to be held in an account established by
Paychex until check date when funds
availability are [sic] due to the employee(s).
3. CLIENT'S RESPONSIBILITY. The Client
agrees to accept the following obligations and
responsibilities:
A. To execute all necessary
documentation so that Paychex may withdraw
funds from the Client's bank account to
process direct deposit payroll.
B. To execute any other documents
which may be required for Paychex to perform
its responsibilities under this Agreement.
1
Paychex is a New York corporation, based in New York, with
branch offices in several states, including Rhode Island.
2
Dr. Andreoni alleges that at the time of the formation of this
original contract, he met with a Paychex representative who assured
him that he would not have to worry about payroll. Dr. Andreoni
understood from this representation that Paychex would inform him
if anything warranted his attention. This is extrinsic evidence
that OSL alleges goes to the parties' intent.
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C. To have available in Client's bank
account sufficient funds for Paychex to make
the withdrawals provided for by this
Agreement.
. . .
5. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Paychex shall
only be liable for its own negligence and not
the negligence of any other person or entity
which provides services as a result of
Paychex's performance of its obligations under
this Agreement.
(Emphasis added in ¶ 2.) The contract also contains a merger
clause stating that "[t]he Client acknowledges that there have been
no other representations or warranties made by Paychex to the
Client which are not set forth in this Agreement."
Paychex's Rhode Island office handles approximately 7,000
clients. Paychex alleges that it performs its payroll processing
services based on the information its clients provide. Each new
client, through its designated payroll contact, provides Paychex
with the relevant employee information including names, addresses,
social security numbers and salary information. Paychex employees
load this information onto a computer and use this information to
process the client's payroll. Paychex submits reports and other
documents to its clients on a regular basis. These reports include
payroll journals and checks which are sent to the client prior to
the date the checks will be paid to the employees. Because Paychex
charges its clients per check processed, invoices to clients
indicate how many paychecks were issued per pay period. Finally,
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Paychex provides quarterly reports, yearly reports and W-2 earnings
statements to all clients.
In 1984, Carleen Connor began working for OSL as a
technician who earned $7.00 per hour. She later became a licensed
optician and the office manager, at which point she earned $16.00
per hour. It is undisputed that, from the mid-1990s until her
termination in 2006, Connor handled payroll for OSL and was its
office manager and designated payroll contact.
Paychex contacted Connor regularly to inquire about OSL's
payroll. As Dr. Andreoni was aware, Connor would often call in
more than one week's worth of payroll at a time. OSL alleges that
during the years that Connor requested unearned paychecks, 2001 to
2006, its employees were paid on a weekly basis.3 In 2001, Connor
began requesting that Paychex direct deposit into her bank account
more money than required to pay her annual salary. During the pay
periods when Connor requested more than her base pay, she requested
that Paychex split her pay into two direct deposit payments. At
some point, a Paychex representative told Connor that issuing her
more than one payment for a given pay period was more expensive for
OSL. Connor stated that she wanted to split her checks because a
single larger check would result in a larger tax withholding.
Paychex did not contact anyone at OSL to verify Connor's request.
3
During some years, OSL asked Paychex to run payroll using a bi-
weekly pay period.
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It is undisputed that between 2001 and 2006, Connor
directed Paychex to pay her, and Paychex did in fact pay her, a
total of $233,159 more than her authorized annual salary. It is
also undisputed that Paychex sent to OSL reports confirming all
payments made. These reports were sent to Connor's attention and
Dr. Andreoni alleges that he saw none of these reports because they
were not sent directly to his attention. OSL discovered the
unauthorized payments when another employee took over Connor's
duties.
On October 30, 2007, OSL and Dr. Andreoni, as co-
plaintiffs, filed a breach of contract action in Rhode Island
Superior Court against Paychex and Chase Bank, USA, NA. On
November 14, 2007, Paychex removed the action to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity
jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
On December 4, 2007, Paychex filed a motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for a stay pending arbitration. On
February 19, 2008, the district court denied the motion for a stay
pending arbitration and denied the motion seeking to dismiss count
one seeking damages for breach of contract, but granted the motion
to dismiss count two seeking punitive damages. The court also
dismissed Dr. Andreoni as an improper party plaintiff. On May 21,
2009, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the claims against
defendant Chase Bank, USA, NA.
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On January 12, 2009, Paychex filed a motion for summary
judgment. On February 25, 2009, OSL filed a response, to which
Paychex filed a reply on March 18, 2009. On September 9, 2009, the
district court issued summary judgment in favor of Paychex. OSL
filed a timely notice of appeal on September 17, 2009. This court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo." Fed. Ins. Co. v. Commerce Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 68, 70 (1st
Cir. 2010). The court views the facts and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Granting summary
judgment is appropriate if the moving party "shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).4
4
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States
approved amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
effective December 1, 2010.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect
continuing development of the decisional law construing
and applying these phrases.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment.
Because the amendment does not constitute a substantive change, we
find that referring to the amended rule is just and practicable.
Godin v. Schencks, No. 09-2324, 2010 WL 5175180, at *9 n.19 (1st
Cir. Dec. 22, 2010).
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B. New York Law Governing Contract Interpretation
When considering a motion for summary judgment in a
contract interpretation case, New York law requires the court to
determine whether the contract is unambiguous with respect to the
disputed question. Law Debenture Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Maverick
Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2010). The determination of
whether a contract provision is ambiguous is an issue of law. Id.
To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, the court
must "'look[] within the four corners of the document, not to
outside sources.'" JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 396
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y.
1998)). Courts must review the entire contract and "[p]articular
words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context,
but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of
the parties as manifested thereby." Riverside S. Planning Corp. v.
CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 920 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 2009)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Contract terms are ambiguous if the contract "could
suggest 'more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a
reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the
entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs,
practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the
particular trade or business.'" Fabozzi v. Lexington Ins. Co., 601
-8-
F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lightfoot v. Union Carbide
Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 906 (2d Cir. 1997)) (applying New York law).
C. The Direct Deposit Agreement
The relevant language of the 1994 Agreement is "Paychex
is authorized to draw from Client's bank account as specified by
Client, such amounts as are necessary to pay its employees." OSL
posits that the district court erred by finding that this sentence
was clear and unambiguous and by failing to give meaning to the
second operative clause -- "such amounts as are necessary to pay
its employees." Specifically, OSL states that the second operative
clause is ambiguous because it can be interpreted as either
creating a duty for Paychex to oversee whether the withdrawals are
"necessary" to pay OSL's employees or allowing Paychex to withdraw
from the client's account "blindly" as long as the designated
payroll contact so ordered. Paychex, on the other hand, states
that OSL's interpretation of the contract language would completely
negate the specific authorization to withdraw funds "as specified
by Client" by requiring Paychex to question whether the requested
payroll payments are "necessary" even when the client authorized
them. According to Paychex, the simplest reading of the agreement
is that Paychex is authorized to withdraw from OSL's account only
what OSL specifies is necessary to make the payroll payments that
OSL requested and no more.
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We find that the relevant contract language clearly and
unambiguously establishes that it is the Client who has to specify
the amounts that Paychex is authorized to withdraw from the
Client's bank account. We read the second operative clause --
"such amounts as are necessary to pay its employees" -- to modify
the first and to create a limitation on the amount of money that
Paychex is authorized to withdraw from the Client's account and not
as creating an affirmative responsibility for Paychex to verify the
amounts the Client specifies.
We need not consider OSL's extrinsic evidence regarding
the conversation Dr. Andreoni allegedly had with a Paychex
representative in 1989 because we find that the provisions of the
1994 Agreement are clear and unambiguous. Law Debenture Trust Co.,
595 F.3d at 466. New York law provides that "'extrinsic and parol
evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written
agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its
face.'" S. Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 826 N.E.2d
806, 809 (N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted).
We must, however, examine the entire contract and view
the relevant language "in the light of the obligation as a whole
and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby." Riverside
S. Planning Corp., 920 N.E.2d at 363. OSL argues that the relevant
contract language describes one of Paychex's duties under the
contract because it appears in the paragraph entitled "Services to
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be Performed." Specifically, OSL alleges that the language "such
amounts as are necessary to pay its employees" creates an
obligation for Paychex to verify that the amounts that it withdraws
each pay period match the employees' salaries. OSL also asserts
that Paychex was responsible for verifying the amounts that Connor
specified because paragraph three ("Client's Responsibility") does
not list verifying such amounts as one of OSL's responsibilities.
Although the 1994 Agreement is not a model of a
comprehensive contract, we do not view the fact that the section
titled "Client's Responsibility" does not list verifying the
amounts that Paychex is authorized to withdraw as indicating that
this task is Paychex's responsibility. If we examine the whole
agreement, other sections of the contract create obligations with
which OSL must comply. For example, in paragraph four, "Client's
Default," the parties create a duty for OSL to reimburse Paychex
for all fees that it incurs as a result of OSL's failure to have
sufficient funds in its accounts. Also, OSL's payment obligations
are addressed in a separate paragraph. The fact that the "Client's
Responsibility" paragraph does not list every one of OSL's
obligations is not dispositive here.
After examining the contract as a whole, we conclude that
the writing evidences the intent to agree that it was OSL's
responsibility to specify the amounts that Paychex was authorized
to withdraw from the accounts.
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D. Connor's Authority
Although we have found that the contract creates no
obligation for Paychex to verify the information that the payroll
contact provides, we must now examine whether agency law creates
such an obligation. OSL argues that the district court erred by
ignoring a disputed issue of material fact regarding Connor's lack
of apparent authority to "specify" the withdrawal of payments
adding up to more than her authorized weekly salary. We find that
OSL's argument is without merit.5
A corporation must, by necessity, act through its agents.
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 465 (2010) (discussing
general principles of agency and corporations). It is undisputed
that Connor was in fact authorized to handle payroll and was the
designated payroll contact assigned to communicate with Paychex.
Connor's actual authority, however, did not extend to embezzling
funds by authorizing the issuance of paychecks in amounts in excess
5
Although the existence of apparent authority is normally a
question of fact that courts do not resolve on a motion for summary
judgment, here we find that even viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to OSL, it is clear that OSL acted in a manner that
created apparent authority in Connor. See Moreau v. Local Union
No. 247, Int'l Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO, 851 F.2d 516,
520 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's grant of summary
judgment based on its conclusion that the local unions had apparent
authority to enter into binding side agreements); Minskoff v. Am.
Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 98 F.3d 703, 708-09 (2d
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that determining apparent authority
involves a question of fact not usually resolved on a motion for
summary judgment, yet finding sufficient evidence to determine that
the agent had apparent authority as to use of a credit card).
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of her salary as this is not what OSL, the principal, instructed
her to do. The question remains, however, as to whether Connor was
cloaked with apparent authority6 such that Paychex could have
reasonably relied upon her authority to issue additional paychecks
in her name. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 cmt. a ("Apparent
authority may survive the termination of actual authority or of an
agency relationship.").7 OSL argues that Connor had no apparent
authority where OSL, as principal, did not act in a way that gave
the appearance that Connor had the authority to order the paychecks
at issue here and that Paychex is therefore liable for making the
unauthorized payments.
6
Under principles of agency, "[a]pparent authority may exist in
the absence of authority in fact . . . ." Greene v. Hellman, 412
N.E.2d 1301, 1306 (N.Y. 1980). Actual authority refers to the
manifestation that the principal makes to the agent. Id.;
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 cmt. c ("Actual authority is
a consequence of a principal's expressive conduct toward an agent,
through which the principal manifests assent to be affected by the
agent's action, and the agent's reasonable understanding of the
principal's manifestation."). Apparent authority arises when the
agent deals with third parties and refers to the manifestation that
the principal makes to the third party. Greene, 412 N.E.2d at
1306; Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 cmt. c ("Apparent
authority holds a principal accountable for the results of
third-party beliefs about an actor's authority to act as an agent
when the belief is reasonable and is traceable to a manifestation
of the principal.").
7
We find it appropriate to cite the Restatement (Third) of Agency
because the New York Court of Appeals recently relied on it when
discussing traditional agency principles. See Kirschner, 15 N.Y.
3d at 468-69. We also note that New York courts have consistently
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See, e.g., Standard
Funding Corp. v. Lewitt, 678 N.E.2d 874, 877 (N.Y. 1997); Hallock
v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (N.Y. 1984); Greene, 412 N.E.2d at
1305-06.
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We recognize that "[t]he mere creation of an agency for
some purpose does not automatically invest the agent with 'apparent
authority' to bind the principal without limitation." Ford v.
Unity Hosp., 299 N.E.2d 659, 664 (N.Y. 1973). Under New York law,
apparent authority can only be created through "'words or conduct
of the principal, communicated to a third party'" such that a third
party can reasonably rely on the "'appearance and belief that the
agent possesses authority to enter into a transaction.'" Standard
Funding Corp. v. Lewitt, 678 N.E.2d 874, 877 (N.Y. 1997) (quoting
Hallock v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (N.Y. 1984)) (emphasis
added).
We find that Paychex's reliance was reasonable and that
Connor had apparent authority because OSL put Connor in a position
where it appeared that she had the power to authorize additional
paychecks. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396,
411 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Under New York law, an agent has apparent
authority if 'a principal places [the] agent in a position where it
appears that the agent has certain powers which he may or may not
possess.'") (citation omitted). In her position as the designated
payroll contact, Connor often called in more than one week's worth
of payroll at a time without objection from OSL. Further, Dr.
Andreoni admits that, after 1989, he had no further contact with
Paychex. Even if we assume that, in 1989, the purported
conversation between Dr. Andreoni, as agent of OSL, and a
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representative of Paychex occurred8 and that during that
conversation, Dr. Andreoni informed Paychex that he wanted OSL
employees to be paid weekly for fifty-two weeks each year, OSL's
argument fails.9 This conversation does not expressly convey a
limitation on Connor's authority, especially where the conversation
did not occur in connection with the formation of the 1994
Agreement. Further, it was reasonable for Paychex to assume its
clients' needs might change and that the payroll contact would be
authorized to convey such a change.
Paychex's reliance was also reasonable because of OSL's
failure to object to the transactions that Connor authorized.
A principal's inaction creates apparent
authority when it provides a basis for a third
party reasonably to believe the principal
intentionally acquiesces in the agent's
8
We briefly consider OSL's parol evidence, not to alter the terms
of the contract, but with respect to Paychex's obligations under
principles of agency. See Wooster v. Sherwood, 25 N.Y. 278 (1862)
(parol evidence admissible where it did not tend to vary or change
the written contract); McCormack Motor Sales v. Hayes, 346 N.Y.S.2d
460, 460 (App. Div. 1973) (finding, in an action to recover
balances due on contracts, that the parol evidence rule did not
preclude proof of defendant's claims with respect to whether the
agent had apparent authority). We refer to New York law regarding
the admissibility of parol evidence because it is a rule of
substantive contract law. See Wheeler v. Blumling, 521 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the parol evidence rule is a rule of
substantive law); Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1177
(2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that the parol evidence rule is "a rule
of substantive contract law, not a rule of evidence").
9
OSL argues that these instructions limit Connor's authority such
that she could only order 52 paychecks a year for each employee.
As such, Paychex should have questioned Connor when she ordered
more than 52 paychecks for herself.
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representations or actions. . . . If the
third party has observed prior interactions
between the agent and the principal, the third
party may reasonably believe that a subsequent
act or representation by the agent is
authorized because it conforms to the prior
pattern observed by the third party. The
belief is thus traceable to the principal's
participation in the pattern and failure to
inform the third party that no inferences
about the agent's authority should be based
upon it.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.03 cmt. b (internal citation
omitted).10 In Minskoff v. American Express Travel Related
Services. Co., Inc., 98 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit
found such inaction or omission sufficient to create apparent
authority in an agent who was fraudulently using her employer's
credit card. Id. at 709-10.
We find the Second Circuit's reasoning in Minskoff
persuasive.11 Minskoff involved an office assistant, Susan Schrader
10
We find it reasonable to infer that the New York Court of
Appeals would adopt the Restatement (Third) of Agency with respect
to this issue because apparent authority based on a principal's
inaction is similar to the principle of estoppel to deny apparent
authority that the Second Circuit applied in Minskoff v. American
Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. 98 F.3d 703, 708 (2d
Cir. 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8b) (applying
New York Law regarding apparent authority); see also Restatement
(Third) of Agency Introduction (noting that this Restatement deals
with situations where an agent is claimed to have acted without the
principal's consent and acknowledging that the legal consequences
of such appearances of agency are governed principally by apparent
authority and to a lesser degree estoppel).
11
Although Minskoff involved the application of the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., which explicitly defines
"unauthorized use" of a credit card, the court determined that
Congress contemplated "primary reliance on background principles of
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Blumenfeld, who was explicitly responsible for the personal and
business affairs of a company's president and CEO. Id. at 706.
Her duties included screening her employer's mail, reviewing credit
card statements, and forwarding these statements to the company's
bookkeepers for payment. Id. Less than a year after she began
working for the company, Blumenfeld fraudulently requested that
American Express issue an additional credit card in her name for
the company's corporate account. Id. After discovering the fraud
over one year later, the company filed a suit to recover the money
the company had paid in connection with the unauthorized charges
and sought a declaration that it was not liable for the outstanding
balances. Id. at 707. The court held that, pursuant to the Truth
in Lending Act, Blumenfeld acted without actual, implied, or
apparent authority when she forged the credit card applications.
Id. at 708 (finding that there was no apparent authority to order
an additional credit card where Congress intended that cases
involving charges incurred due to involuntary card transfers are
unauthorized under the Truth in Lending Act). However, the court
held that there was apparent authority for Blumenfeld's subsequent
use of the fraudulently obtained credit card where the company
failed to examine credit card and bank statements documenting the
fraudulent charges. Id. at 709-10 ("A cardholder's failure to
agency law in determining the liability of cardholders for charges
incurred by third-party card bearers." 98 F.3d at 708 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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examine credit card statements that would reveal fraudulent use of
the card constitutes a negligent omission that creates apparent
authority for charges that would otherwise be considered
unauthorized under the [Truth in Lending Act].").
We find Minskoff directly applicable to these
circumstances. Like the company in Minskoff, OSL failed to examine
the payroll reports that Paychex sent. That these reports were
sent to Connor's attention is not dispositive where OSL, as
principal, did not convey any instructions to Paychex that it
should do otherwise. Further, OSL's failure to object to the
"extraordinary" transactions would reasonably convey to a third
party that it acquiesced in its agent's acts. Cf. id. at 710
(noting that the company's omissions created a continuing
impression that nothing was wrong with the accounts); Bus.
Integration Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 251 F.R.D. 121, 128
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Applying the general principles of agency, we
find that [the principal's] failure to respond in any way to the
allegedly unauthorized disclosure [of its agent], . . . of which it
obviously has been aware for a long time, justifies the 'reasonable
assumption' [of assent]. . . . Silence may constitute a
manifestation when . . . a reasonable person would express dissent
to the inference that other persons will draw from silence.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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We find that by placing Connor in a position where it
appeared that she had authority to order additional checks and by
acquiescing to Connor's acts through its failure to examine the
payroll reports, OSL created apparent authority in Connor such that
Paychex reasonably relied on her authority to issue the additional
paychecks.
E. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
We understand OSL's final claim against Paychex to be
that Paychex breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when it negligently failed to check Connor's request for
paychecks that amounted to more than her allowed annual salary. We
find that Paychex did not breach the implied covenant.
New York law recognizes the existence of an implicit
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Tractebel Energy
Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir.
2007); Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413,
416 (N.Y. 1983) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205).
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 205. "[L]ack of diligence and slacking
off" has been recognized as bad faith. Id. cmt. d.
Good faith is ordinarily an "excluder" – it typically is
not explicitly defined, but is defined in contrast to examples of
bad faith. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its
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Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 820
(1982); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. d; but see
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned"). New York courts have,
however, recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing "embraces a pledge that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Tractabel
Energy Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d at 98 (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing
Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995)). Further, "[t]he implied
covenant of good faith encompasses 'any promises which a reasonable
person in the position of the promisee would be justified in
understanding were included' in the agreement . . . ." 1-10
Industry Assocs., LLC v. Trim Corp. of Am., 747 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31
(App. Div. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Courts may not,
however, use the covenant to imply an obligation that "would be
inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship."
Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 292 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
We do not think the facts of this case constitute a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. First, we have found
that Paychex has not breached any explicit contractual obligation.
Second, Paychex complied with its duty of good faith by regularly
sending reports. That Dr. Andreoni, OSL's sole owner, failed to
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check on OSL's employee or to specify to Paychex that the reports
should be sent to his attention does not suggest that Paychex
breached the implied covenant of good faith. OSL was in the best
position to monitor its finances and its employees. If there is
any negligence to be found in this case, it is OSL's own negligence
in failing to properly supervise Connor. Cf. Minskoff, 98 F.3d at
709-10 (stating that company's failure to examine its credit card
statements that would reveal employee's fraudulent use constituted
a negligent omission); Kirschner, 15 N.Y.3d at 465 ("The risk of
loss from the unauthorized acts of a dishonest agent falls on the
principal that selected the agent.") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment in appellee's favor.
Affirmed.
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