FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL ALEJANDRO RANGEL-
ZUAZO,
No. 07-72316
Petitioner,
v. Agency No.
A90-640-428
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney
OPINION
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted
January 11, 2011—Seattle, Washington
Filed January 31, 2011
Before: Susan P. Graber and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
Circuit Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,* District Judge.
Per Curiam Opinion
*The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
1867
RANGEL-ZUAZO v. HOLDER 1869
COUNSEL
Manuel F. Rios III, Rios & Cruz, P.S., Seattle, Washington,
for petitioner Manuel Alejandro Rangel-Zuazo.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Shel-
ley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litiga-
tion, and Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for
respondent Eric H. Holder Jr.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Manuel Alejandro Rangel-Zuazo petitions for
review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of
1870 RANGEL-ZUAZO v. HOLDER
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on May 10, 2007. In its order,
the BIA affirmed an earlier decision holding that, although
Petitioner was thirteen or fourteen years old at the time of the
relevant offense, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(“FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, did not apply to Petition-
er’s conviction because Petitioner was charged as an adult and
received his conviction after reaching majority age. There-
fore, Petitioner’s conviction did not constitute a juvenile adju-
dication, and Petitioner was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The BIA further determined that Peti-
tioner was ineligible for a waiver under former section 212(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(c) (1994), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009.
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the BIA’s
decision and deny the petition.
I.
[1] Under the INA,
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an
alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered
by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been with-
held, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the
alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be
imposed.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). By its plain language, the statu-
tory definition applies to both state and federal convictions.
RANGEL-ZUAZO v. HOLDER 1871
Indeed, we have held that where a juvenile offender is
charged and convicted as an adult under state law, the
offender has a “conviction” for purposes of the INA. See
Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th
Cir. 2007); Morasch v. INS, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966).
Our sister circuits agree. See Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 561
F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Savchuck
v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 411-14 (1st Cir. 2001).
[2] Although there are factual distinctions between these
other cases and the present one, including the age of the
offenders at the time of the offenses and the nature of the
criminal acts, such factors played no role in the reasoning or
outcome of the cases, and we see no reason to distinguish
them on those grounds here. Rather, the other decisions
turned on the lawful decisions of state authorities to try the
offenders as adults. See, e.g., Singh, 561 F.3d at 1279 (agree-
ing with other circuits that “a conviction in adult court is a
conviction for immigration purposes, no matter how old the
alien was at the time of the offense”); Vieira Garcia, 239 F.3d
at 413 (“Neither we nor the BIA have jurisdiction to deter-
mine how a state court should adjudicate its defendants. Once
adjudicated by the state court, as either a juvenile or an adult,
we are bound by that determination.”).
Our conclusion also furthers the policy of uniformity in
immigration cases, which we have recognized as important on
several occasions. See, e.g., Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d
1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000); Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414
(9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Avila-Murrieta v. INS, 762 F.2d
733, 735 (9th Cir. 1985).
II.
[3] There is no equal protection violation. First, we con-
clude that a rational basis exists to treat differently offenders
who have reached eighteen years of age before conviction or
1872 RANGEL-ZUAZO v. HOLDER
adjudication from those who have not reached eighteen years
of age before conviction or adjudication. See Chavez-Perez v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying
rational basis review to federal classifications based on alien-
age). As recognized by the Washington Supreme Court, a
need for special “protection and reformation” of minors exists
that necessitates a juvenile adjudication process and which
does not apply to adults. State v. Ring, 339 P.2d 461, 463-64
(Wash. 1959) (citation omitted). After an offender turns eigh-
teen, therefore, he or she is no longer entitled to the protection
of the juvenile courts. Id. at 464.
[4] We further find there is a rational basis for Congress to
use a statutory definition for conviction that relies on the
nature of the conviction, i.e., the adult versus juvenile nature
of the conviction, rather than on the age of the offender at the
time of the offense. That is, Congress may have intended to
rely on the adjudicating forum’s judgment concerning the
seriousness of the offense as a better indicator of an alien’s
potential dangerousness than mere age. See Vieira Garcia,
239 F.3d at 414 (concluding “it is entirely rational for the BIA
to rely on the law of the convicting state to determine whether
a juvenile has been convicted as an adult.”).
III.
[5] We further hold it was not unconstitutional for the BIA
to apply the comparability requirement, as articulated in In re
Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005), remanded on other
grounds by Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), to
Petitioner’s request for a waiver of removability under former
section 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
[6] Blake did not establish new precedent, but rather con-
firmed that section 212(c) relief is available only if the ground
charged for removability (here, an aggravated felony convic-
tion relating to rape) has a comparable ground for inadmissi-
bility under section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
RANGEL-ZUAZO v. HOLDER 1873
See Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that Blake did not represent a change in the law:
“There simply is no retroactivity problem because there is no
new law.”); see also Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d
679, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the BIA in Blake
“did not establish a new rule of law, but rather applied the
previously well-established comparability standard in a differ-
ent factual context”); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 369-70
(5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that Blake contradicted
prior agency practice); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158,
163 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The principle that § 212(c) is available
in removal proceedings only where the ground for removal
has a ‘statutory counterpart’ ground for exclusion has been
firmly in place and consistently applied since at least 1991.”).
Therefore, any application of the Blake decision to Petition-
er’s case was not an unconstitutional retroactive application of
new law.
The petition for review is DENIED.