UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4726
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICKY MARITIQUE RODGERS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00884-GRA-1)
Submitted: January 4, 2011 Decided: February 2, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Craig, CRAIG LAW FIRM, PC, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney,
Maxwell B. Cauthen, III, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ricky Maritique Rodgers was indicted for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (2006) (Count One), possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (2006) (Count Two), possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006) (Count Three), and
possession of counterfeit U.S. currency, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 472 (2006) (Count Four). Rodgers pleaded guilty to
Counts One and Two, and the Government agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts. The district court sentenced Rodgers to 110
months’ imprisonment. Rodgers noted a timely appeal. We
affirm.
First, Rodgers argues that the district court erred
when it sentenced him as a career offender. Rodgers concedes
that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2009)
career offender provision is applicable based on his prior
convictions, but he argues that the district court erred in
failing to depart downward because application of the provision
overstates his criminal history. See USSG §§ 4B1.1, 4A1.3(b).
We lack the authority to review a sentencing court’s
decision not to depart downward “unless the court failed to
understand its authority to do so.” United States v. Brewer,
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520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008). Rodgers has not alleged that
this exception applies. Moreover, nothing in the record
indicates the district court failed to understand its authority.
On the contrary, Rodgers’ trial counsel reminded the district
court that it had discretion to depart downward. Therefore,
this claim entitles Rodgers to no relief.
Next, Rodgers argues that the district court erred
when it applied a four-level offense level enhancement for
possessing a firearm in connection with a felony, pursuant to
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6). We review the factual findings underpinning
application of a sentence enhancement for clear error. United
States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir. 2010). In order
to support the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) firearm enhancement, “the
Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that
the weapon was possessed in connection with another felony
offense. United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 628-29
(4th Cir. 2010); see USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6).
We find that the district court did not clearly err
when it determined that the firearms recovered from Rodgers’
bedroom were connected with another felony offense. Police
recovered two handguns in close proximity to marijuana packaged
for distribution. They also recovered digital scales, white
powder residue, razor blades, baggies, and rolling papers in the
residence. The Government was entitled to rely on
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circumstantial evidence, including the type of firearms involved
and their proximity to illicit narcotics, to carry its burden.
Manigan, 592 F.3d at 629.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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