UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4397
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LASHAWN TERRELL FAULKNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00129-BO-1)
Submitted: December 29, 2010 Decided: February 3, 2011
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lashawn Terrell Faulkner appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. Faulkner contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to provide a
sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed. We affirm.
We will not disturb a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this
determination, we first consider whether the sentence is
unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court’s discretion is not unlimited,
however. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.
2010). For instance, the district court commits procedural
error by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence or by
not providing an individualized assessment based on the facts.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Although “[a]
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
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conviction sentence, . . . it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judge also
must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Faulkner argues that the district court failed to
provide a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed and
that this procedural error rendered his sentence plainly
unreasonable. Faulkner did not request a sentence outside the
policy statement range. Therefore, we review his challenge to
the adequacy of the explanation for the within-policy statement
range sentence for plain error. See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 546
(explaining that “a defendant need only ask for a sentence
outside the range calculated by the court prior to sentencing in
order to preserve his claim for appellate review”); United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding
error not preserved where defendant failed to seek sentence
outside guidelines range).
“To establish plain error, [Faulkner] must show that
an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
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478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Faulkner satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within [the
court’s] discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . .
unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted; third alteration in
original).
In the sentencing context, an error affects
substantial rights if the defendant can show that the sentence
imposed “was longer than that to which he would otherwise be
subject.” United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 849 (4th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“In the sentencing context, an error was prejudicial only if
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
received a lighter sentence but for the error.”). Faulkner does
not dispute that the policy statement range was properly
calculated and he was sentenced within that range. Because he
failed to present any arguments for deviating from that range,
Faulkner cannot show that the court’s failure to more thoroughly
explain the supervised release revocation sentence affected his
substantial rights. Therefore, he cannot establish plain error.
Accordingly, we conclude that Faulkner’s sentence is
not plainly unreasonable and affirm the judgment of the district
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court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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