UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4130
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEONARDO DARNELL ZANDERS, a/k/a Leo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00359-GBL-1)
Submitted: January 13, 2011 Decided: February 4, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew W. Greene, MARTIN, ARIF & GREENE, PLC, Springfield,
Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, Timothy D. Belevetz, Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit bank
fraud, Leonardo Darnell Zanders was sentenced to 200 months’
imprisonment. In this appeal, Zanders raises three challenges
to his sentence, all concerning the calculation of his
sentencing guidelines range. We affirm.
This court reviews sentences under a “deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). In conducting this review, we “must first ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. Once we
have determined that the sentence is free of procedural error,
we must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
If the sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range, this
court applies a presumption on appeal that the sentence is
reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
Zanders first contends that the district court erred
by applying a four-level increase in offense level pursuant to
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (2009). A four-
level increase is provided under § 3B1.1(a) for a defendant who
is an organizer or leader of an offense which involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive. To qualify, the
defendant must have been the organizer or leader of “one or more
other participants.” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. (n.2). Factors to be
considered include:
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature
of participation in the commission of the offense, the
recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a
larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense,
the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the
degree of control and authority exercised over others.
USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. (n.4). The district court’s determination
that the defendant had a leadership role in the offense is a
factual finding we review for clear error. United States v.
Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 657 (2009).
In support of the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement, the
Government submitted several documents showing that Zanders
directed the activities of several co-conspirators. These
documents included the Statements of Facts filed in support of
and stipulated by two of Zanders’ co-conspirators, summaries of
interviews with co-conspirators, testimony of another co-
conspirator who testified at Zanders’ trial before Zanders
ultimately pled guilty, documentation of airline tickets
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purchased by Zanders for co-conspirators, and records of Western
Union wire transfers between Zanders and Clyde Austin Gray, Jr.,
another individual also identified as a ringleader. Based on
this evidence, we find that the district court did not clearly
err by finding that Zanders was an organizer or leader of the
conspiracy.
Next, Zanders argues that the district court erred by
determining that he joined the conspiracy in February 2007. The
total loss, including intended loss, associated with the bank
fraud conspiracy in this case was $1,536,498.16. Pursuant to
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), the district court enhanced Zanders’
offense level by sixteen levels based on losses of more than $1
million but less than $2.5 million. Zanders does not dispute
the calculation of loss for the entire conspiracy. However, he
contends that he joined the conspiracy in July 2007 and is not
responsible for losses that occurred before then.
Zanders admitted he began making false identifications
for Gray in February 2007 and that he knew Gray would use these
false identifications for a criminal purpose. However, Zanders
argues that he did not become involved in the actual conspiracy
until July 2007 when he asserts he knew “exactly what was going
on.”
“[O]ne may be a member of a conspiracy without knowing
its full scope, or all its members, and without taking part in
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the full range of its activities over the whole period of its
existence.” United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th
Cir. 1993). “[T]he evidence need only establish a slight
connection between the defendant and the conspiracy” to
establish that the defendant was involved in the conspiracy.
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 and 131 S. Ct. 340 (2010).
Notwithstanding Zanders’ claim that he did not know the full
scope of the conspiracy until July 2007, we find that the
district court did not clearly err by finding that he joined the
conspiracy in February 2007.
Finally, Zanders claims that the district court erred
by applying a two-level enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)
for an offense involving ten or more victims. The presentence
report identified ten financial institutions that sustained
losses as a result of the conspiracy. Zanders disputes
inclusion of two victim banks and losses at a third bank because
the Government did not know the names of the uncharged co-
conspirators who conducted some or all of the fraudulent
transactions at these institutions and referred to these
individuals by nicknames based on their appearance in bank
surveillance photos.
Although the Government did not know the identity of
these suspects, the Government linked them to the conspiracy
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because they used counterfeit identifications in the names of
victims whose identifying information was stolen by known
members of the conspiracy. Moreover, images of these suspects
from bank surveillance photographs matched photographs found
pursuant to search warrants executed during the investigation.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
finding that the unidentified individuals were linked to the
conspiracy and that the losses suffered by the financial
institutions from these individuals’ actions resulted from the
conspiracy. Furthermore, although Zanders claims that his
relationship to these individuals is unknown, as previously
stated, involvement in a conspiracy does not require knowledge
of all members of that conspiracy, Banks, 10 F.3d at 1054.
For these reasons, we affirm Zanders’ sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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