NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30247
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-CR-06056-LRS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RICKY DALTON WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Lonny R. Suko, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2010**
Seattle, Washington
Before: FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and SNOW, District Judge.***
Defendant-Appellant Ricky Dalton Walker pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), for which the district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable G. Murray Snow, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
court imposed a within-Guidelines 96-month prison sentence. Walker now appeals
his sentence, and we affirm.
The district court’s sentencing was free of procedural error. Because
Walker’s arguments were “conceptually simple,” the district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing a within-Guidelines sentence after hearing Walker’s
arguments and then “brief[ly]” finding these arguments insufficient. Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 358–59 (2007). The district court was not required to offer a
more extensive discussion of the section 3553(a) factors merely because the court
noted that the other section 3553(a) factors “overshadow[ed]” Walker’s
Guideline-based objections. In analyzing the section 3553(a) factors, the district
court appropriately listed each factor on the record and then properly considered
facts relevant to these factors. See United States v. Sylvester Norman Knows His
Gun III, 438 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district court’s sentence is also substantively reasonable. The court
reasonably applied the altered or obliterated serial number enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) because the serial number was partially obliterated and
the enhancement applies even when a defendant lacks knowledge of the alteration.
See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.8(B); United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 911–13
(9th Cir. 2005). The court reasonably applied the prior controlled substance
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offense enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) because Walker has made no
showing that his prior offense “is different in kind and degree from, or outside of
the norm of, other offenses . . . that similarly trigger the . . . enhancement.” United
States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Walker’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable under United States v.
Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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