United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 8, 1997 Decided February 3, 1998
No. 97-3059
United States of America,
Appellant
v.
Alvin Webb,
Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 94cr00245-01)
Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued
the cause for appellant, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S.
Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were
on the briefs.
Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellee, with whom A.J. Kramer,
Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. William G.
Spencer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an ap-
pearance.
Before: Ginsburg, Henderson, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.
Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Defendant Alvin Webb pleaded
guilty to distribution of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine.
When sentencing Webb, the district court departed down-
ward from the sentencing range specified in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines chiefly due to Webb's addiction
to drugs but also due in part to the Government's decision not
to arrest Webb earlier, when he had made small sales to an
undercover officer and would have received a lesser sentence
under the Guidelines. Because the district court relied upon
impermissible factors in reaching its decision to depart from
the Guidelines, we remand the case for resentencing within
the proper range.
I. BACKGROUND
By his own admission Alvin Webb sold cocaine base in the
500 block of Florida Ave., N.W., in Washington, D.C. for
"about three years" before finally being arrested in March
1994. An addict himself, he said "the suppliers would just
give me the stuff to give to the people.... I never received
any money. All I received was just drugs for that."
Acting upon information from a confidential informant, an
undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
located Webb and bought crack cocaine from him three times
in February 1994, in quantities of 5.3 grams, 6.3 grams, and
55.8 grams. Focusing upon the third sale, the Government
charged Webb with one count of distributing 50 grams or
more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A)(iii). Webb entered a plea of guilty and agreed that
he should be held accountable under the "relevant conduct"
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines for the first and
second sales as well. See U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3. The additional
11.3 grams did not affect Webb's sentencing range, however.
See id. s 2D1.1(c)(4) (table setting base offense level at 32 for
distribution of 50 to 150 grams of cocaine base).
At Webb's initial sentencing hearing defense counsel sug-
gested "delaying the sentencing to see if Mr. Webb can
benefit from inpatient drug treatment with the Veterans
Administration for some period of time and ... maintain
some type of employment." The court agreed to grant Webb
a continuance in order "to allow him to take certain steps so
he can meet the downward departure grounds set forth in
United States v. Harrington, 808 F. Supp. 883 (D.D.C. 1992)
based on his drug rehabilitation efforts." The court released
Webb into the custody of his brother, an investigator with the
D.C. Department of Corrections, on the condition that Webb
enroll immediately in the VA drug rehabilitation program,
which takes four to six months to complete.
After one month, Webb dropped out of the program and
out of sight. He resumed using drugs and remained a
fugitive from justice for 18 months.
Although the offense to which Webb pleaded guilty carries
a statutory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment,
the Congress has recently provided a "safety valve" that
enables a district court to impose a sentence in accordance
with the applicable Guidelines and without regard to the
statutory minimum sentence when certain conditions obtain.*
__________
* The conditions are that:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history
point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the
offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury
to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the
The district court determined--and the Government does not
dispute--that Webb may be sentenced without regard to the
statutory minimum.
The base offense level for the distribution of 50 to 150
grams of crack cocaine is 32. U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(a)(3); id.
s 2D1.1(c)(4) (table). Webb qualifies for an automatic two-
point reduction under the heading of Specific Offense Charac-
teristics, U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(6), because he meets the
"safety valve" criteria noted above and his base offense level
was greater than 25. Webb's probation officer recommended
a two-point increase for Obstructing or Impeding the Admin-
istration of Justice, U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1, because Webb had
"absconded from inpatient drug treatment, resumed drug use
and failed to return to Court for sentencing." In view of
Webb's obstruction of justice, the probation officer also sug-
gested that Webb was not entitled to any reduction for
Acceptance of Responsibility, U.S.S.G. s 3E1.1. See id. Ap-
plication Note 4 ("Conduct resulting in an enhancement under
s 3C1.1 ... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct"). With an
offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, the
probation officer calculated that Webb should be sentenced in
the range from 121 to 151 months.
At Webb's final sentencing hearing the prosecutor asked
for a sentence in the indicated range. Defense counsel
requested a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsi-
__________
sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. s 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all infor-
mation and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense
or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no
relevant or useful information to provide or that the Govern-
ment is already aware of the information shall not preclude a
determination by the court that the defendant has complied
with this requirement.
18 U.S.C. s 3553(f); U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2.
bility (notwithstanding the enhancement for obstruction of
justice), which would have yielded an offense level of 29 and a
sentencing range of 87-108 months. The court not only
granted the requested three-point reduction but also declined
to give the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice,
apparently because the court did not regard Webb's 18-
month absence as willful. The court explained:
It's because he doesn't control his own body. That's the
problem. He doesn't control himself. He's out of con-
trol. He didn't do it to defy anybody. He hasn't done it
in a defiant act. He did it because it's impossible for
him.
The court thus gave an overall reduction of five points--two
for meeting the "safety valve" criteria and three for accep-
tance of responsibility, with no enhancement for obstruction
of justice--yielding an offense level of 27 and a sentencing
range of 70-87 months.
Although defense counsel had neither asked for a depar-
ture from the Guidelines nor proffered any ground for depar-
ture, and although the presentence report had identified "no
known factors that would warrant a departure in this case,"
the district court told Webb that even after reducing his
offense level to 27 it still had a problem with sentencing him:
Now here is my problem. My problem is that your
offense level, that these Guidelines grossly overstate the
offense level here. It's grossly disproportional to the
crime. And the crime here is addiction. As I said
before, if you were in a different economic bracket in this
country, you'd probably be out at the Betty Ford Clin-
ic.... So I've got to reduce it down because of its
disproportionality.
Thus the district court departed downward sua sponte from
the Guidelines range by some 30 months: "I'm going to
reduce it down to an offense level 22, and I'm going to
sentence you to 41 months in prison. I think 41 months is
even much too long for you."
Anticipating that it would do something like this, the court
had indicated earlier in the hearing that it expected to be
reversed. Addressing itself to the Government, the court
said: "I realize that you people hold all the weapons in this
war on drugs, and I'll give you an easy one to get me
reversed on.... I'll give you an easy one."
Two months after sentencing Webb the district court is-
sued an opinion defending its sentence upon three grounds.
First, the court explained, "The principal mitigating circum-
stance here is Defendant Webb's addiction to drugs, specifi-
cally crack cocaine." United States v. Webb, 966 F. Supp. 16,
17 (D.D.C. 1997). Second, the court stated its belief that "the
Guidelines range is disproportionate and unduly harsh in this
case, and would subject Defendant Webb to constitutional and
legal deprivations." Id. Finally, the court observed that
the government played a key role in the determination of
Defendant Webb's ultimate sentence.... If the under-
cover officer had arrested Defendant Webb after making
lesser purchases from him ... then Defendant Webb
would be facing a sentence of less severity
and opined that "[t]he sentencing court should have the right
to take this fact into account." Id.
Not surprisingly, the United States appealed the sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
The Government has expressly declined to challenge the
district court's calculation of Webb's offense level (27) and
criminal history (category I). The only issue it raises upon
appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by
departing downward from the Guidelines sentencing range of
70-87 months for the reasons it gave. We conclude that none
of those reasons justifies a departure and that, therefore, the
district court abused its discretion.
A.Addiction to Drugs
The Supreme Court has instructed a court considering a
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines first to ask itself:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside
the Guidelines' 'heartland' and make it a special, or
unusual, case?
2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on
those features?
3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures
based on those features?
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures
based on those features?
Koon v. United States, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996)
(quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.
1993)). Here the district court identified Webb's drug addic-
tion as the "principal mitigating circumstance" that, in its
view, takes this case outside the heartland of the guideline for
drug distribution. Webb, 966 F. Supp. at 17.
This potentially mitigating circumstance falls at the first
hurdle, however, because the Sentencing Commission has
essentially forbidden departure on that basis; the Guidelines
plainly state that "[d]rug or alcohol dependence or abuse is
not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines."
U.S.S.G. s 5H1.4. Although that directive is in the form of a
"policy statement" rather than a "guideline," it is still "an
authoritative guide" for a court contemplating a departure
from the Guidelines. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S.
193, 200 (1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically
confirmed that certain factors listed in part 5H of the Guide-
lines, including drug dependence, "never can be bases for
departure." Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044.
Webb's counsel recognizes as much and so argues that
[t]he district court here did not depart because it be-
lieved Mr. Webb's addiction made him less culpable, as is
forbidden under the Guidelines. Rather, the court de-
parted because it believed that drug use--i.e., buying
drugs to feed his addiction--was Mr. Webb's only crimi-
nal conduct.
The departure was appropriate, Webb's counsel suggests,
because "[s]mall-time purchase, possession and use are not
within the heartland of distribution cases for 50 grams or
more of crack cocaine." The problem with this position is
that Webb did not plead guilty to small-time purchase, pos-
session, or use; he pleaded guilty to distributing more than
50 grams of cocaine base in a single transaction. That
transaction places him squarely in the heartland of distribu-
tion cases for 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.
Webb argues in the alternative that the district court
legitimately departed from the Guidelines because Webb's
conduct does "not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue,"
U.S.S.G. s 5K2.11, namely, as Webb sees it, acting as the
"kingpin" or "mastermind" of a major drug operation. We
reject that argument not only because the district court did
not purport to rely upon s 5K2.11 as a basis for its departure
from the Guidelines but also because that section is manifest-
ly inapplicable. The Congress has in effect defined a "major"
drug trafficker as one who distributes 50 grams or more of
crack. Thus, the whole purpose of 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(iii) is
to prevent anyone from doing precisely what Webb pleaded
guilty to doing: selling more than 50 grams of crack.
To sum up, although the district court may be correct in
saying that Webb's "criminal conduct in this case, as well as
his abscondence [sic], can be explained by his addiction," 966
F. Supp. at 17, in the regime established by the Sentencing
Reform Act, neither the district court's speculation nor the
defendant's addiction can justify a departure from the Guide-
lines. The Sentencing Commission "has proscribed, as a
categorical matter, consideration of the factor." Koon, 116
S. Ct. at 2051. The district court's reliance upon Webb's
addiction was mistaken as a matter of law and therefore, "by
definition," an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 2047.
B.Undue Harshness
The Supreme Court also made clear in Koon that "[a]
district judge now must impose on a defendant a sentence
falling within the range of the applicable Guideline, if the case
is an ordinary one." 116 S. Ct. at 2044. Because, as we have
seen, Webb's addiction does not remove his case from the
heartland of crack distribution cases, the district court must
impose a sentence falling within the Guideline range notwith-
standing its personal opinion that "the Guidelines range is
disproportionate and unduly harsh in this case." 966
F. Supp. at 17.
We have already had occasion to explain that
disproportionality does not, in itself, provide an appropri-
ate basis for a downward departure. Unless the dispro-
portionality between crime and punishment is so extreme
that it violates the Eighth Amendment ... the sentences
established for various crimes under the Guidelines can-
not be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.
United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(emphasis deleted). We reaffirm that principle today and
hold that the district court erred by disregarding it.
Although the district court suggested that imposing a
sentence within the Guidelines range "would subject Defen-
dant Webb to constitutional and legal deprivations," 966
F. Supp. at 17, neither the district court nor Webb has
identified any such deprivation, and we do not see any. The
district court's disagreement with the policies embodied in the
Sentencing Guidelines does not authorize it to depart: "To
permit departures for that reason would be to eviscerate the
Guidelines, reestablishing the very judicial discretion in sen-
tencing that the Guidelines were designed to confine." Beck-
ham, 968 F.2d at 54 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 396 (1989)).
C.Government Role in Determining Sentence
The district court noted, correctly but trivially, that "[i]f
the undercover officer had arrested Defendant Webb after
making [the two] lesser purchases from him ... then Defen-
dant Webb would be facing a sentence of less severity." 966
F. Supp. at 17. The court then opined that a "sentencing
court should have the right to take this fact into account," and
upon that basis departed downward from the range specified
in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Perhaps because we had
already rejected "sentencing entrapment" as a basis for ob-
taining a lesser sentence, see United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d
1323, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the district court did not
purport to revive the theory as a ground for departure and
instead blandly described the police conduct in question as
"arrang[ing] to make an arrest only after purchasing 55.85
grams [in the third transaction], thereby ... increasing
[Webb's] minimum guidelines sentence." 966 F. Supp. at 17.
Webb likewise purports to disavow any reliance upon "sen-
tencing entrapment" or "sentencing manipulation" but main-
tains that "police conduct" may nevertheless be a permissible
factor to consider for a departure from the Guidelines.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Koon, we begin
by asking whether any feature of this case potentially takes it
outside the Guidelines' heartland. We find none: Webb
patrolled Florida Avenue offering to sell crack; that it was
the police who upon three occasions accepted his offer is
irrelevant to his culpability for those sales.
Similarly, that the police did not arrest Webb after their
first or second purchase cannot, without more, take this case
out of the heartland of drug distribution cases. Application
Note 3 to the relevant conduct Guideline (s 1B1.3) anticipates
that law enforcement agents may wait until a defendant has
made multiple sales before arresting him:
For example, where the defendant engaged in three drug
sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, ...
the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to be
used to determine the offense level even if the defendant
is convicted of a single count charging only one of the
sales.
U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3, Application Note 3. Repeat purchases
preceding an arrest are a common and legitimate law enforce-
ment tactic. As the district court acknowledged in this very
case, "the government may need to engage in a number of
transactions with low level street drug merchants in order to
find the source of the drugs." Nor is it apparent how
aggregation of the quantities of drugs that Webb sold to the
police might overstate his offense level, for he crossed the 50-
gram sentencing threshold in a single sale.
The Commission has recognized one situation in which use
by the police of a legitimate law enforcement tactic might
warrant a departure from the Guidelines: the Commission
authorizes departure when the police in a reverse sting sell
drugs at an artificially low price and thereby lead a defendant
to purchase "a significantly greater quantity ... than his
available resources would have allowed" him to buy at the
market price. U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1, Application Note 15. We
need not speculate about what other kinds of police conduct
might warrant a departure; it suffices to say that the actions
of the police in this case do not constitute such a mitigating
circumstance. There is no claim and no evidence in this case
that the police overpaid for the drugs or in any other way led
Webb to commit crimes beyond those that he otherwise would
have committed. There being nothing in the record to sug-
gest that the conduct of the police makes this case "special, or
unusual," Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045, we hold that the district
court abused its discretion by departing from the Guidelines.
III. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing account clearly shows, Judge Sporkin not
only abused his discretion in sentencing the defendant in this
case, he did so knowingly; indeed, he expressly invited the
court of appeals to reverse his decision. In this way Judge
Sporkin more than expressed his disagreement with the law
he is sworn to uphold, which he could have done in obiter
dicta; he wreaked havoc in the administration of justice in
this case. And in the end, the only result is grief on all sides:
The United States Attorney and the Federal Public Defender
each had to write learned briefs and this court had to hear
argument and write an opinion--all at considerable expense
to the public; the defendant had his hopes raised, inevitably
to be dashed; and the decision of the district court had to be
reversed. Accordingly, we remand this case for the district
court to resentence the defendant within the Guideline range
of 70-87 months.
So ordered.