IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-60730
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HENRY LEE HUGHES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:97-CR-151-1
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August 16, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Henry Lee Hughes, Jr., pleaded guilty to count 1 of an
indictment charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and has appealed his sentence. Hughes
contends that the district court erred in determining the
quantity of drugs attributable to him. We review the district
court’s finding as to drug quantities for clear error. United
States v. Torres, 114 F.3d 520, 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-60730
-2-
S. Ct. 316 (1997). The determination need be supported only by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d
545, 558 (5th Cir. 1996).
Hughes argues that the drug quantity was disputed, that the
district court failed to properly resolve the factual dispute,
and that the district court should have held an evidentiary
hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. Hughes was not prevented from
offering evidence at the sentencing hearing to rebut the
information contained in the PSR. For reasons expressed by the
district court, the information underlying the drug-quantity
calculation bore sufficient indicia of reliability and was
sufficient to support the probation officer’s finding by a
preponderance of the evidence. The district court’s fact finding
as to drug quantities was not clearly erroneous.
Hughes contends that the district court erred in refusing to
adjust his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. If a
defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for
his offense,” the sentencing guidelines instruct the district
court to decrease the defendant’s offense level by two and
possibly three points. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). The
defendant bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to the
downward adjustment. United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362, 367
(5th Cir. 1991). This court reviews a district court’s finding
on acceptance of responsibility for clear error but “under a
standard of review even more deferential than a pure clearly
erroneous standard.” United States v. Gonzales, 19 F.3d 982, 983
(5th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
No. 98-60730
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Hughes’s argument presupposes that he has been truthful
regarding the quantity of drugs attributable to him. Because
Hughes failed to admit the extent of his drug dealing, the
district court’s refusal to adjust his offense level for
acceptance of responsibility was not clearly erroneous.
Hughes contends that the district court erred in adjusting
his offense level upward by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c) because of his leadership role in the offense. Under
§ 3B1.1(c), the offense level of a defendant who was “an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
activity” is increased by two levels. § 3B1.1(c). The standard
of review is clear error. See United States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d
564, 574 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 721 (1998).
Hughes complains that the district court failed to make
express findings denying his objection to the role adjustment.
Because Hughes did not present any rebuttal evidence to refute
the facts in the PSR, the district court was free to adopt those
facts without further inquiry. See United States v. Mir, 919
F.2d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 1990). The supervision of Miller was
sufficient to provide a basis for the role adjustment. See
United States v. Powell, 124 F.3d 655, 667 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1082 (1998). Hughes has failed to show that
the district court clearly erred in adjusting his offense level
under § 3B1.1(c).
AFFIRMED.