United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 22, 1998 Decided July 28, 1998
No. 97-3061
United States of America,
Appellee
v.
Richard Paul Spinner, III,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 96cr00300-01)
A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant. Sandra G. Roland, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Michael Fitzpatrick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attor-
ney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown and Matthew L.
Levine, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.
Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Garland,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Garland.
Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Richard Spinner chal-
lenges his conviction on four weapons and narcotics charges.
We agree with Spinner that the government introduced insuf-
ficient evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of a
semiautomatic assault weapon, and accordingly reverse that
conviction. And because the district court permitted the
prosecutor to ask a defense witness a series of inappropriate
questions on cross-examination, we reverse and remand Spin-
ner's conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. We affirm the remain-
ing convictions.
I. Background
A. The Offense
On August 8, 1996, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Washington
Metropolitan Police Department officers and FBI agents
executed a search warrant at 636 46th Place, S.E., in the
District of Columbia. Four people were present at the time:
Richard Spinner, his mother, his 16-year-old sister, and his
17-year-old cousin.
The officers discovered three loaded guns during the
course of their search. Two of them--a .380 caliber Colt
semiautomatic pistol and a .45 caliber Sturm-Ruger semiauto-
matic pistol--were found under the cushions of a couch in the
living room. The third gun, a Colt .223 caliber semiautomatic
rifle, was found in the closet of a second-floor bedroom, inside
a rifle case. During their search of that closet, the officers
also recovered several .223 caliber magazines of ammunition,
a bulletproof vest, and two ski masks. In addition, the
officers found 1.279 grams of crack cocaine, packaged in
multiple ziplock bags, in the living room and second-floor
bedroom.
The officers recovered documents relating to Spinner from
the upstairs bedroom, including correspondence addressed to
him; receipts bearing his name; his social security card; and
a list--handwritten on an envelope bearing Spinner's finger-
print--of current prices for various quantities of crack co-
caine. Spinner's fingerprints were also found on two other
noteworthy items: a .45 caliber bullet, which was inside the
.45 caliber pistol; and a box of .44 caliber bullets found in the
closet where the semiautomatic rifle was recovered. The
officers also found two photographs that depicted Spinner in
the upstairs bedroom.
As a result of the officers' search, a federal grand jury
returned a five-count criminal indictment against Spinner.
The indictment charged Spinner with two counts of violating
18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1), which makes it illegal for a convicted
felon to possess "any firearm or ammunition." (Spinner had
a 1993 felony conviction for possession of a firearm with a
removed, obliterated, or altered serial number in violation of
18 U.S.C. s 922(k).) The indictment also charged Spinner
with possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon, 18 U.S.C.
s 922(v)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base
within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C. s 860(a); and posses-
sion with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C.
ss 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). No charges were brought
against Spinner's sister or his mother. However, Spinner's
cousin was prosecuted in a separate proceeding in juvenile
court.
B. The Trial
The government sought to prove that Spinner constructive-
ly possessed the recovered contraband. It argued that Spin-
ner had access to the upstairs bedroom, and the ability to
control the contraband that was found there. In support of
this position, it introduced into evidence Spinner's personal
papers that were found in the bedroom, as well as the
photographs depicting Spinner in the bedroom. To prove
that Spinner possessed the contraband intentionally, the gov-
ernment stressed the presence of Spinner's fingerprints on
the .45 caliber bullet, the box of .44 caliber ammunition, and
the drug price list. It also introduced evidence of Spinner's
"other crimes" pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
in order to show Spinner's intent to possess the contraband.
In particular, the jury heard evidence that prior to his arrest
Spinner had unlawfully possessed a semiautomatic handgun
with an obliterated serial number, and that he had sold 25
ziplock bags of crack to an undercover officer in front of the
house at which the search warrant was executed.
To make the case that the weapon recovered from the
closet of the upstairs bedroom met the statutory definition of
"semiautomatic assault weapon," the government introduced
the testimony of Richard A. Turner, a firearms enforcement
officer employed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. The district court permitted Turner to testify as
an expert "concerning firearms, ammunition, identification,
operation and design."
The statutory term "semiautomatic assault weapon" in-
cludes:
a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a
detachable magazine and has at least 2 of--
(i)a folding or telescoping stock;
(ii)a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii)a bayonet mount;
(iv)a flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a flash suppressor;
and
(v)a grenade launcher.
18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(B).
In response to the prosecutor's questions, Turner described
the recovered weapon, which is commonly called an AR-15
rifle, as a "semiautomatic rifle which can accept a detachable
magazine...." This testimony more or less tracks the statu-
tory phrase: "a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to
accept a detachable magazine." Next, the prosecutor asked
Turner: "And what are the features, just in general, that
would turn this [particular] weapon into a semiautomatic
assault weapon?" Turner responded:
Well, it has a telescoping shoulder stock. So that's one
feature. And then it has a pistol grip that extends
beyond the bottom of the receiver. . . . By having these
two features, it would put it into the classification of a
semiautomatic assault weapon.
(emphasis added). Here, Turner's language diverged from
the language of the statute, which refers to a "pistol grip that
protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon."
The prosecutor did not ask Turner to explain what he meant
by "receiver," nor did she ask him whether that term was
equivalent to the statutory term "action." Nor indeed did she
ask any follow-up questions about Turner's conclusion. And
while the record makes it clear that Turner had the weapon
at issue in front of him on the witness stand, it is not
apparent whether he pointed to the "bottom of the receiver"
as he spoke.
Spinner's theory of the case was that he had not lived at
the house for several months prior to his arrest, and that his
cousin solely possessed the contraband. Both Spinner's cous-
in and his sister testified that the cousin had stayed in the
upstairs bedroom frequently during the summer when Spin-
ner was arrested. The cousin testified that he had hidden the
guns, drugs and ammunition in the house himself, hoping
perhaps to sell them in the future.
To establish that Spinner was not living at the house when
the arrest took place, the defense called to the stand Spin-
ner's girlfriend, Lolita Little. On direct examination, Ms.
Little testified that Spinner had moved in with her in late
June 1996, approximately two months before Spinner's arrest.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked her if "last May"
she had been "upset that Richard Spinner was letting his
friend use his mother's house to sell drugs." Defense counsel
objected. At the bench, the prosecutor explained that her
"good faith basis" for asking the question was a letter dated
May 13, 1996, that Ms. Little had written Spinner when he
was incarcerated for an unrelated crime. In pertinent part,
the letter, with expletives deleted, said:
I hope your thoughts be straight and stop those
m* * * * *f* * * * *s from using your mother and her
home to do this s* * * because you wouldn't do that in
their mother's s* * *, they wouldn't do that s* * * to
their mothers out of respect.
The prosecutor explained that she intended to rebut the
defense's suggestion in its opening statement that Spinner
had "changed his life around" prior to "last May" by showing
that Spinner had let his friend use his mother's house to sell
drugs. She added that the defense is "asking the jury to
believe [Spinner] changed his life and I think it's--the gov-
ernment should have the opportunity, first of all, for the jury
to know what he was doing before this." She also argued
that the challenged question was "entirely relevant to the
government's argument that Mr. Spinner knew that [his
cousin] was using, was selling drugs out of this premises."
The defense objected to the question on the grounds that it
was prejudicial, that it exceeded the scope of direct examina-
tion, and that it arguably constituted Rule 404(b) evidence for
which the government did not provide sufficient notice.
The trial judge said he would permit the prosecutor to
pursue this line of questioning because it undermined the
credibility of the witness; indeed, he even urged the govern-
ment to prosecute Ms. Little for perjury because he believed
that the letter contradicted her earlier testimony. The judge
also said that he would permit the prosecutor to proceed
because the letter was evidence of Spinner's "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts" under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence because it related to his intent to distribute the
narcotics seized from the house. The trial judge also found
good cause to excuse Rule 404(b)'s requirement that the
government provide reasonable notice of its intent to use the
evidence, remarking that "when something arises in the de-
fense case that was unexpected, that's a basis to excuse
pretrial notice."
As the district judge was announcing this ruling, the law-
yers realized that the judge mistakenly believed that Ms.
Little had testified that she had never seen drugs at the
house or seen Spinner with drugs. The judge, it turns out,
had confused Ms. Little with another witness who had so
testified. When the lawyers pointed out the mistake, the trial
judge nevertheless permitted the prosecutor to use the letter
as a basis for cross-examination. (The letter itself was never
admitted into evidence, and is not part of the record before
us.)
Responding to the prosecutor's questions, Ms. Little denied
seeing drugs around the house, and denied that her letter to
Spinner referred to drugs. She interpreted her letter to
mean that she wished Spinner would stop people from "drink-
ing and cursing and laying up in his mother['s] house." The
prosecutor also paraphrased a passage from the letter stating
that Spinner "was no better than the friends that he let take
advantage of his mother because he was greedy." Ms. Little
denied that this passage referred to drugs. Finally, the
prosecutor referred Ms. Little to a particular sentence of the
letter, and asked: "Now, you were concerned in that sentence
that if Mr. Spinner continued to do the s* * * that you
referred to, he would end up locked up or dead, isn't that
right?" Ms. Little assented, and reiterated that the refer-
ence to "s* * * " meant "cursing and drinking and laying
around the house."
The jury found Spinner guilty on all of the counts of the
indictment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
dismissed Count Five (possession with intent to distribute
cocaine) because it was a lesser included offense of Count
Four (possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000
feet of a school). The district court sentenced Spinner to 92
months of imprisonment on Counts One and Two (the felon-
in-possession counts) and Four, to be served concurrently.
The court also imposed a 60-month concurrent sentence for
Count Three, which was for possession of a semiautomatic
assault weapon.
Spinner filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Spinner argues that the evidence was not sufficient to
support his conviction for possession of a semiautomatic
assault weapon under 18 U.S.C. s 922(v). He avers that the
government failed to prove that the AR-15 meets the statuto-
ry requirements for being a prohibited weapon. Citing Sta-
ples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), he also argues that
the government failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed the required mens rea for
conviction. Staples clarified the government's obligation to
prove that a defendant knew that a given firearm had the
characteristics that brought it within the scope of the statute
rendering possession of the weapon unlawful.
1. Standard of Review
Our standard of review depends on whether Spinner pre-
served these arguments by moving for judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Our
precedents recognize that a "broadly stated" motion for judg-
ment of acquittal "without specific grounds" is "sufficient to
preserve [a] full range of challenges ... to the sufficiency of
the evidence." United States v. Hammoude, 51 F.3d 288, 291
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39,
45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (a "general claim of insufficient evidence"
was sufficient to preserve a specific point of error not raised
below). However, we review an appellant's sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge for plain error when a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal was based on specific (and different)
grounds. United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 62 (D.C. Cir.
1992); see also United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that sufficiency-of-the-evidence chal-
lenge would be reviewed for plain error if no motion for
judgment of acquittal was filed with respect to the counts of
appellant's conviction); but see United States v. Gjurashaj,
706 F.2d 395, 399 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen a defendant moves
for acquittal, even without specificity as to the grounds, it is
incumbent upon the government to review its proof as to the
facts required to establish each element of each offense
alleged.").
Spinner moved for judgment of acquittal at trial. Address-
ing the semiautomatic assault weapon charge, his lawyer
complained that "there has been no evidence submitted what-
soever to indicate any possessory interest of my client in that
firearm." He explained to the district court that "there has
been no testimony of [Spinner's] fingerprints [on the AR-15],
any testimony of [Spinner's] prior contact [with the AR-15]."
He did not, however, suggest that the government failed to
shoulder its obligations under Staples, nor did he intimate
that the government had fallen short of proving that the
recovered weapon met the statutory test for unlawfulness.
Because Spinner did not raise before the district court the
specific arguments he raises before us, we review them for
plain error under Sayan.
Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." To be "noticed" under this rule, an
error must be "plain" (or, in other words, "obvious") and
"must have affected the outcome of the District Court pro-
ceedings." United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734
(1993)). When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence chal-
lenge for plain error, we reverse only to prevent a "manifest
miscarriage of justice." United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d
21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Baber, 447
F.2d 1267, 1270 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Such a miscarriage
would exist "only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing
to guilt, or ... because the evidence on a key element of the
offense was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking."
United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted); accord United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d
1067, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Meadows, 91
F.3d 851, 855 (7th Cir. 1996). It would be a manifest miscar-
riage of justice to let a conviction stand if the government
failed to present any evidence on an essential element of the
crime. Id.; see also Beckett v. United States, 379 F.2d 863,
864 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding a manifest miscarriage of justice
where "there was no proof of one of the essential elements" of
the crimes charged).
In White, we expressed uncertainty as to how a plain error
review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument might differ
from the standard of review we apply when the argument has
been preserved. 1 F.3d at 17. When applying the latter
standard, we determine, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, whether "any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). That standard is itself
"highly deferential." United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956,
959 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In White, we expressed difficulty in
imagining a standard of review any more deferential than the
Jackson standard. See 1 F.3d at 17; see also United States
v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994).
In any event, we need not resolve whether, or in what
respect, the plain error standard might differ from the Jack-
son standard in the context of a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a conviction, because we hold that
the government failed to present any evidence on an essential
element of a crime for which Spinner was convicted. Such a
lapse would warrant reversal under either standard. See
Meadows, 91 F.3d at 855 n.6 ("[A] complete lack of any
evidence of one of the essential elements of a crime is not
only insufficient evidence, but too little evidence to avoid a
manifest miscarriage of justice.").
2. Did the Government Prove that the
AR-15 was a Prohibited Weapon?
First, we address the government's efforts to prove that
the recovered AR-15 met the statutory definition of a prohib-
ited semiautomatic assault weapon.
It is axiomatic that the government bears the burden of
proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Here, Spinner was convicted of violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. s 922(v)(1), which criminalizes the possession of
a "semiautomatic assault weapon." A semiautomatic rifle,
like that recovered from the upstairs bedroom in this case, is
such an unlawful weapon if it is able to accept a detachable
magazine and has at least two of the following features:
(i)a folding or telescoping stock;
(ii)a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii)a bayonet mount;
(iv)a flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to
accommodate a flash suppressor; and
(v)a grenade launcher.
18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(B). To obtain a conviction under
section 922(v)(1), the government must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the recovered weapon satisfied the statu-
tory requirements. In addition, as we shall discuss below, it
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Spinner
knew that the recovered firearm possessed the characteristics
that brought it within the scope of the statute. See Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
The government sought to prove that the AR-15 possessed
two (and only two) of the five enumerated statutory features,
namely a "folding or telescoping stock," and a "pistol grip
that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weap-
on." It is undisputed that the government proved that the
AR-15 was able to accept a detachable magazine, and that it
possessed a "folding or telescoping stock." Therefore, the
only issue here is whether the government has proved that
the AR-15 possessed a "pistol grip that protrudes conspicu-
ously beneath the action of the weapon."1
The government's expert on firearms testified that the
AR-15 had a "pistol grip that extends beyond the bottom of
the receiver." On appeal, the government has furnished us
with a glossary published by the Associations of Firearms and
Toolmark Examiners, which defines "receiver" as "[t]he basic
________
1In a footnote in its brief, the government halfheartedly suggests
that the AR-15 possessed a "flash suppressor," another of the
features listed in section 921(a)(30)(B). In support of this assertion,
the government refers us to the testimony of James Cairnes, a
government witness who was employed by a firearms manufacturer
as a product safety and firearms control manager. When testifying
about the AR-15, a weapon that was manufactured by his company,
Cairnes referred to a part of the weapon as "this piece here." The
following colloquy with the trial judge ensued:
THE COURT:Which piece?
MR. CAIRNS:This one.
THE COURT:So the piece you're pointing to is at the front of the--at the very tip of the
muzzle? You can't say this and that. You need to describe it so the court
reporter understands what you're
talking about.
MR. CAIRNS:I'll do my best, Your Honor. There's a flash suppressor attached to the--
THE COURT:What did you call it?
MR. CAIRNS:A flash suppressor. That's what I'm calling it. I don't know what this
particular device is.
THE COURT:Is that a term of art?
MR. CAIRNS:Yes, it's either a flash suppressor or a compensator of some sort. I have
not seen this particular kind of device on the end. So maybe I'm wrong in
giving it a name at all.
(emphasis added). Even putting aside the fact that the government
never argued at trial that the AR-15 possessed a flash suppressor,
this equivocal testimony is clearly insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the AR-15 possessed that statutory charac-
teristic.
unit of a firearm which houses the firing and breech mecha-
nism and to which the barrel and stock are assembled." It is
telling, we think, that the government has submitted a techni-
cal publication to explain the meaning of the term "receiver."
Turner clearly used the word as a term of art, and not in a
commonly understood sense. Since the prosecutor never
asked Turner to explain what he meant by "receiver," and
never asked Turner whether "receiver" was equivalent to the
statutory term "action," the jury was not given any evidence
to support a conclusion that the AR-15 possessed "a pistol
grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the
weapon." 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(B)(ii). This evidentiary vac-
uum on a key statutory element requires that we reverse the
conviction.
The government argues that the jury had the opportunity
to see for itself whether the AR-15 possessed the required
statutory features. The jury, this argument goes, could have
examined the gun during its deliberations, and seen that the
pistol grip protruded "conspicuously beneath the action of the
weapon." If the jury could have puzzled this out on its own,
why would it matter that the testimony of the expert was
deficient? In Meadows, the Seventh Circuit confronted a
strikingly similar argument, and rejected it. 91 F.3d at 856.
The weapon at issue in that case was a World War I era
pistol or revolver that the defendant had modified by adding a
stock that apparently enabled the weapon to be fired from the
shoulder. Based on the testimony of an ATF expert that the
weapon was unlawful, the defendant was convicted of possess-
ing a firearm that was made in violation of the provisions of
26 U.S.C. s 5861(c). That statute defines the weapons it
prohibits as follows:
The term "rifle" means a weapon designed or redesigned,
made or remade, and intended to be fired from the
shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or re-
made to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed
cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled
bore for each single pull of the trigger, and shall include
any such weapon which may be readily restored to fire a
fixed cartridge.
26 U.S.C. s 5845(c) (emphasis added).
At trial, the ATF expert did not define or explain the term
"rifled bore." Meadows, 91 F.3d at 853. Referring to a
dictionary definition, the Seventh Circuit explained that "the
term 'rifled' is derived from the verb 'to rifle,' which means
'to cut spiral grooves into the bore of (as a firearm or piece of
ordnance)." Id. at 856 (quoting Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary 1954 (1986)). The Meadows court con-
cluded that the absence of any testimony that the gun in
question possessed a "rifled bore"--as well as the absence of
any explanation as to what that term meant--was a fatal flaw
in the government's case. Noting that the modified weapon
at issue could well have had a smooth or a rifled bore, the
court observed that "[t]here was no indication in the testimo-
ny that the bore was rifled, or that rifling was present in the
bore." Id. at 857.
On appeal, the government argued that, notwithstanding
the lack of testimony concerning the rifled bore, the jury
simply could have looked down the barrel of the weapon
during its deliberations, and determined on its own whether
the bore was smooth or rifled. This argument failed to
persuade the Seventh Circuit. "[W]hy," asked the court,
"would the jurors have bothered to look down the barrel to
determine if the bore was 'rifled,' if they had no explanation
of what 'rifled' meant?" Id. It continued: "We do not see
why a jury would look for a feature of the weapon that
neither the parties, the witnesses, nor the judge suggested
that the jury should examine." Id. Accordingly, the Mead-
ows court concluded that there was "a complete gap in the
evidence regarding this element." Id.
Since the defendant in Meadows had not preserved this
objection by filing a proper motion for judgment of acquittal,
the court applied a plain error standard of review. See id. at
854-55. Stressing the government's failure to prove that the
weapon had a rifled bore and its additional failure to prove
that the defendant knew that the weapon had this feature
that made possession unlawful, see Staples, supra, the court
reversed, concluding that allowing the defendant's conviction
to stand would amount to a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 857.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Meadows, we also reject the
government's argument that the jury, without any testimonial
guidance, could have determined that the weapon satisfied
the applicable statutory requirements. Granted, the jury in
this case had the opportunity to examine the AR-15 during
its deliberations. But without any explanation of the meaning
of the statutory term "action," the jury had no evidentiary
basis to conclude that the AR-15 met the statutory definition
of a prohibited semiautomatic assault weapon. Indeed, not
only was the term "action" never explained to the jury, the
record reflects that the jury heard this term for the first time
when the district court delivered its instructions.2
3. Did the Government Prove the Required
Mens Rea for Conviction?
Spinner argues that even if the government had proved
that the AR-15 was a prohibited semiautomatic weapon, it
failed to prove that he possessed the required mens rea of
section 922(v). In Staples v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that under 26 U.S.C. s 5861(d), which prohibits
the possession of an unregistered automatic firearm, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant knew of the features of the weapon that brought it
within the scope of the statute. 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
The government concedes that the rationale of Staples applies
________
2Although the government's closing argument could not have
cured any evidentiary deficiencies in its case, we note that the
prosecutor used neither the statutory term "action" nor the expert's
term "receiver" in her summation. Rather, she used a third term,
arguing that "this pistol grip ... protrudes out from underneath
the frame of the weapon." "Action," "frame" and "receiver" may
indeed be synonymous in this context. But without making it clear
to the jury that these terms are synonymous, and indeed without
defining any of them, the government left the jury without sufficient
information to determine if Spinner had committed this crime.
to section 922(v) as well. Thus, the government must prove
that Spinner knew of the features of the AR-15 that brought
it within the scope of section 922(v).
Given our conclusion that the government failed to prove
that the recovered weapon met the statutory definition of a
forbidden semiautomatic assault weapon, it follows that the
government similarly failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Spinner knew that the AR-15 possessed the
required statutory characteristics. Furthermore, although
such knowledge "can be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence, including any external indications signaling the nature
of the weapon," Staples, 511 U.S. at 615-16 n.11, we think the
circumstantial evidence that Spinner knew of the AR-15's
statutory characteristics is very thin. When he was arrested,
Spinner was in the kitchen. The AR-15 was found in a rifle
case in a closet in the upstairs bedroom. The authorities
discovered no fingerprints linking Spinner to the weapon or
the ammunition inside it. Although the bedroom contained
numerous documents bearing Spinner's name (all but one of
them dated prior to the month of the arrest), it also contained
documents bearing the names of three other family members.
The government argues that "[t]he jury could have inferred
that [Spinner] had an unusually strong interest in assault
weapons based on the discovery in the [upstairs bedroom] of
a magazine advertisement for an entire book about an assault
weapon." But there was no evidence presented that Spinner
had even seen this article. Finally, both Spinner's cousin and
his girlfriend testified that Spinner had moved to his girl-
friend's house in June, 1996, two months before Spinner's
arrest. Clearly, this evidentiary record falls far short of that
in United States v. Moore, in which we found that evidence
establishing that the defendant had handled a rifle and "was
in continuous control of the weapon" was sufficient for a jury
to conclude that the defendant had the requisite mens rea for
possession of a sawed-off shotgun under 26 U.S.C. s 5861(d).
97 F.3d 561, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Given the complete lack of evidence in the record that the
AR-15 possessed "a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously
beneath the action of the weapon," 18 U.S.C.
s 921(a)(30)(B)(ii), as well as the paucity of evidence that
Spinner knew that the weapon possessed the features that
brought it within the scope of the statute, we conclude that
Spinner's conviction on this charge was a manifest miscar-
riage of justice, and we reverse it.
Because we reverse Spinner's conviction as a result of the
insufficiency of the evidence supporting it, we need not pass
on Spinner's argument that the jury instructions failed to
explain the government's obligation to prove Spinner's mens
rea under Staples. Nonetheless, in order to alert the district
courts to this issue, we reproduce the jury instructions below:
Count three of the indictment charges unlawful posses-
sion of a semiautomatic assault weapon. The essential
elements of this offense ... are, one, that the defendant
possessed a semiautomatic assault weapon and, two, that
he did so knowingly and intentionally. A person, as I
have said, acts knowingly and intentionally if he's con-
scious and aware of his act, realizes what he was doing
and does not act because of mistake, inadvertence or
accident. The term semiautomatic assault weapon
means a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept
a detachable magazine and has at least two of the
following: [elements omitted]. It has to have at least
two of those.
As the government acknowledges, "at worst, the[se] jury
instructions may have insufficiently explained the scienter
requirement regarding the relevant features of the rifle."
Without taking any position on whether these instructions
would have survived our review of them for plain error, we
encourage the district courts to explicitly instruct juries,
when appropriate, that the government must prove that a
defendant knew of the particular features of a weapon that
rendered its possession illegal. See Staples, supra.
B. Scope of Cross-Examination
Spinner contends that the district court improperly permit-
ted the prosecutor to cross-examine his girlfriend, Lolita
Little, about a letter Ms. Little wrote to Spinner two months
before his arrest in this case. As we recounted above, the
prosecutor asked Ms. Little if "last May" she had been "upset
that Richard Spinner was letting his friend use his mother's
house to sell drugs." The prosecutor based her question on a
letter dated May 13, 1996 that Ms. Little had written to
Spinner when he was incarcerated for an unrelated crime.
Without referring to Rule 404(b), the prosecutor attempted
to justify her questions by arguing that they were meant to
rebut the defense theory of the case. She referred to the
defense's opening statement in which, she claimed, counsel
argued that Spinner "changed his life around" after his
brother died in August of 1995. The letter showed--accord-
ing to the prosecutor--that "Mr. Spinner knew that [his
cousin] was using, was selling drugs out of this premises" in
May of 1996. In particular, the prosecutor argued that
Spinner, while incarcerated, was "aiding and abetting" his
cousin's drug dealing at his mother's house in May of 1996.
Based on this evidence, the prosecutor argued that "Mr.
Spinner was not a changed man."
As we have noted, the government sought to use the letter
to dispute that Spinner was a "changed man" who had
"changed his life around" after his brother's death. Using
the letter to paint Spinner as "greedy," and the kind of man
who did nothing while "those m* * * * *f* * * * *s ...
us[ed][his] mother and her home to do this s* * *," the
government clearly hoped to use the letter to convince the
jury that Spinner had not "changed his life around"; it hoped,
that is, to show that Spinner remained a criminal after his
brother died. Using evidence for this purpose is forbidden
by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
provides that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith."
We recognize that under Rule 404(b), "any purpose for
which bad-acts evidence is introduced is a proper purpose so
long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character."
United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Rule 404(b) itself lists permissible uses of such evidence:
"proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." In
addition to arguing that the letter was intended to rebut the
defense theory of the case--which, as we have explained,
amounts to impermissible character evidence--the govern-
ment also said that the statements in the letter were relevant
to the witness's credibility and bias. If the letter did under-
mine the witness's credibility, the government could be said
to have asked its questions for a reason other than to show
Spinner's character. See Miller, 895 F.2d at 1436 (using bad
acts evidence to show character is "the one impermissible
purpose for such evidence" under Rule 404(b)). Under these
circumstances, Rule 404(b) would pose no barrier to admissi-
bility. The government, however, has not satisfactorily ex-
plained how the letter served to impeach Ms. Little. The
prosecutor asked Ms. Little: "around the same time that you
wrote this letter, you were also upset that Richard Spinner
was letting his friend use his mother's house to sell drugs."
But Ms. Little had not testified to the contrary when the
prosecutor asked that question. Furthermore, we do not
understand how Ms. Little's being upset under such circum-
stances would undermine her credibility at trial.
Nor do we agree with the district court's conclusion (not
urged by the government) that the statements in the letter
would be admissible to show "intent" or "absence of mistake"
under Rule 404(b). In reaching this conclusion, the district
court apparently agreed with the government that "do[ing]
this s* * * " meant drug dealing. But it seems just as likely
to us that this reference is to using drugs as to selling them.
Such a reading, we suppose, is equally consistent with the
letter's conclusion that Spinner would "end up locked up or
dead" if he continued to do this "s* * *." Nor is it apparent
that this reference is to crack cocaine, the narcotic at issue in
this case. Nor is it clear that the reference is to narcotics at
all. Under these circumstances, the statements in the letter
have virtually no bearing on whether Spinner possessed crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute it in this case.
Even if the government had questioned Ms. Little about
the letter for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), it
failed to provide "reasonable notice" to the defense of its
intent to use the letter, as required by the rule. Rule 404(b)
provides that "the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial." Here, the district court, mistakenly thinking that the
government had asked the pertinent question in order to
impeach a perjurer, ruled that "notice was not required"
because "something [arose] in the defense case that was
unexpected...." But Rule 404(b) does not empower a dis-
trict judge to excuse the government from providing any
notice that it intends to use bad acts evidence. That rule
requires the government to "provide reasonable notice ...
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown...." The government provided no notice to the de-
fense, reasonable or otherwise, of its intention to question Ms.
Little about the letter. Without approaching the bench, the
prosecutor simply asked Ms. Little about Spinner's refusal to
stop his friends from using his mother's house to sell drugs.
On appeal, the government makes much of the fact that it had
provided the letter to the defense during discovery. But
providing such evidence to the defense in discovery is not
enough to satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 404(b),
which requires the government specifically to disclose "the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial."
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion when it permitted the
government to question Ms. Little about the letter. See
United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the admission of this
testimony was harmless error. See United States v. Clarke,
24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In deciding whether error
is harmless, we must "determine whether the error itself had
a substantial influence on the verdict." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted). In other words, "we must
determine with fair assurance that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error." Id. (internal quotation
marks, ellipses and citations omitted).
The prosecutor emphasized the letter in her closing argu-
ment to the jury, suggesting to us that the letter may have
had a "substantial impact" on the verdict. After summarizing
the evidence against Spinner, the prosecutor concluded her
remarks concerning Spinner's drug possession as follows:
[Drug dealing] is what Lolita Little was referring to in
her letter as something that if he didn't stop it he would
get locked up or dead. And she suggested he had the
ability to stop it. He had the ability to stop his friends
from doing it. And he simply didn't. And that, ladies
and gentlemen, makes him guilty of possession with
intent to distribute crack cocaine within a thousand feet
of Davis Elementary School.
In addition, the government did not have an overwhelming
case against Spinner for possession of the crack cocaine
recovered in the house: no fingerprint evidence connected
Spinner to the crack, nor was any of the crack recovered from
his person or presence. Finally, we note that, although the
district court gave the jury limiting instructions on other
evidence introduced pursuant to Rule 404(b), it did not pro-
vide a similar limiting instruction for the statements in Ms.
Little's letter, even though the court admitted them as "legiti-
mate 404(b) evidence," and characterized them as "clearly
prejudicial" to Spinner. See United States v. Moore, 732
F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (limiting instruction lessens
potential prejudice of bad act evidence).
Because we conclude that it was not harmless error for the
district court to permit the government to use the letter in its
cross-examination of Ms. Little, we reverse Spinner's convic-
tion for possession with intent to distribute cocaine within
1,000 feet of a school.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Spinner's convictions
for possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon and posses-
sion with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a
school, and remand for resentencing. Spinner has raised
additional arguments. We have given them full consider-
ation, and determine that they warrant neither reversal of his
remaining convictions nor discussion here. Accordingly, we
affirm Spinner's convictions for possession of a firearm and
ammunition by a convicted felon.
Garland, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
My colleagues reverse defendant Spinner's assault weapon
conviction because they conclude that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to sustain the charge, and reverse his narcotics convic-
tion because they conclude that the district court permitted
prejudicial cross-examination of Spinner's girlfriend. I dis-
agree with both conclusions and would affirm both convic-
tions.
I. The Gun
The majority holds the government's evidence insufficient
on the assault weapon charge because they believe it "failed
to present any evidence on an essential element" of the
crime": to wit, that the AR-15 assault rifle possessed a
"pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action
of the weapon." The government presented no evidence on
this point, my colleagues say, because the government's ex-
pert failed to mention the word "action" during his testimony.
But the expert's failure is beside the point. The government
did not need an expert's testimony to establish this element
because it had much better evidence: it had the gun itself.
A photograph of the gun is attached to this opinion. See
App. 1 (Gov't Ex. 48-C). Its "pistol grip" is quite prominent,
and the majority does not suggest that the jury would have
any trouble figuring out which part of the gun was the "pistol
grip." Nor does the majority, or the defendant, contend that
the word "conspicuously" was too vague for the jury to
comprehend. Only the meaning of "action" is in dispute.
But that dispute is simply irrelevant. The photograph clearly
shows that the pistol grip protrudes conspicuously beneath
every part of the weapon, whatever that part's name. Hence,
even if the jury had no idea what the word "action" meant, as
long as it understood the "action" to be a part other than the
"pistol grip" itself, it is hard to see how a rational trier of fact
could reach any conclusion other than that this element of the
crime was satisfied.
The majority's citation to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Meadows, 91 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1996), does
not support its conclusion, but the way in which that case
differs from this one is instructive. First, there was no
evidence in that case that the weapon at issue had a rifled, as
compared to a smooth, bore--the key statutory feature. It
was not just that the jury's attention had not been drawn to
the issue. Even by the time of the appeal, the record did not
indicate what kind of bore the weapon had. The court found
that the weapon "may have contained either a smooth bore or
a rifled bore," because "[t]he record nowhere indicates
which." Indeed, "[t]he old pistol ... may well not have had a
rifled bore." Id. at 857. That is not the case here. The
attached photograph makes clear that the AR-15 did have the
necessary element--a protruding pistol grip.
Second, the Meadows court found that even if the weapon
actually had a rifled bore, there was no way for the jury to
know that without "look[ing] down the barrel." Id. Since
the Meadows jury had no reason to know that looking down
the barrel was important, the court found no reason to believe
the jury would have "bothered" to do so. Id. But no such
"bother" was required of Spinner's jury. The expert--what-
ever else his failings--held the gun up directly in front of the
jury, and both the gun and the attached photograph (Appen-
dix 1) were admitted into evidence. As long as the jurors had
their eyes open during either the testimony or their own
deliberations, they necessarily would have seen the essential
element.
The majority also accepts Spinner's argument that even if
the government did prove the AR-15 was a prohibited weap-
on, it failed to prove he had the required mens rea. As
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), makes clear,
and as the majority agrees, the government needed to prove
only that Spinner knew the gun had the feature in question;
it did not have to prove he knew the feature was illegal. See
Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998). This
means the government needed to prove only that Spinner
knew the gun had a pistol grip protruding conspicuously
beneath the action.
How could the government meet that requirement? Surely
it did not have to present evidence that Spinner was told the
weapon's grip extended in that way. We do not expect
defendants to have their own personal ATF experts on hand
to advise them of their weapons' special features.1 Under
Staples, the defendant's knowledge "can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, including any external indications
signaling the nature of the weapon." Id. at 615 n.11. We
held in United States v. Moore, 97 F.3d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir.
1996), for example, that a defendant's knowledge that a
sawed-off rifle was shorter than the lawful sixteen inches
could be inferred from the fact that length is readily observa-
ble. No evidence that the defendant ever measured the
weapon's 13-1/16-inch barrel was required, even though the
difference between that and a 16-inch barrel is less than
obvious to the naked eye. See also United States v. Foster,
19 F.3d 1452, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The readily apparent
barrel length and general appearance of the sawed-off rifle
... are sufficient ... to establish that its owner knew the
weapon needed to be registered...."). By contrast, the
"external indication" of the nature of the AR-15 is obvious to
the naked eye and no guesses about its specific length is
required. Accordingly, the only question is whether Spinner
ever saw or handled the gun.
The majority suggests there was no such evidence. To be
sure, there was no such direct evidence: no one testified to
seeing Spinner with the gun. But the law has no preference
for direct evidence over circumstantial, see Moore, 97 F.3d at
564, and often it is the latter that is the more reliable.
Courts regularly affirm murder and bombing convictions
notwithstanding the absence of an eyewitness who saw the
defendant shoot the gun or light the fuse. See, e.g., United
States v. Kwong, 14 F.3d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1994). Indeed,
________
1The jury could well have concluded that the defendant was
something of a weapons expert himself. He previously had been
convicted of illegal possession of a TEC-9 semi-automatic pistol,
and the police found an advertisement for a book about assault
weapons in a bedroom the jury rationally could have believed was
his. See infra.
in Moore we found sufficient proof that the defendant knew
the sawed-off rifle was too short based on the fact that he had
control of the weapon through constructive possession--even
without evidence that he ever handled the weapon after it had
been sawed off. Id. at 564. Here, too, the jurors could
reasonably rely on a wealth of circumstantial evidence that
Spinner saw or handled the weapon. See Staples, 511 U.S. at
615 n.11.
First, there was more than enough evidence for a reason-
able juror to conclude that a well-armed drug operation was
based in Spinner's family home and employed the AR-15 in
its work. The house was filled with all of the accoutrements
of such an operation: semi-automatic weapons, magazines of
extra ammunition, a bulletproof vest, two black ski masks,
crack cocaine and ziplock bags. Moreover, a narcotics expert
testified, based on the evidence recovered in the search, that
the house was being used as a "stash house" from which
narcotics sales were made. In such a business, the expert
said, guns are used for intimidation and the maintenance of
control. Given this evidence, the jury was entitled to con-
clude it was no coincidence that the AR-15 was in the house,
and that instead it was an integral part of the business'
armament.
Second, there was more than enough evidence that Spinner
was a participant in the drug operation, and that as such he
would have handled or seen others handle the weapon. When
the police entered the house, he was the only adult male
present. His fingerprints were on a bullet inside a crack-
stained gun, on the container of a magazine of spare bullets,
and on a list of current crack prices. Two undercover officers
testified that they purchased twenty-five ziplocks of crack
from him at the same house nine months before. The
majority does not dispute the introduction of that evidence
which, our cases hold, is probative of the fact that Spinner
intended to possess and distribute the drugs found during the
search, and tended to disprove his claim of mere innocent
presence in the house.2 The jurors were also told that the
________
2See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 59 F.3d 1318, 1322 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 441 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
defendant previously had unlawfully possessed a semi-
automatic weapon which, again, our cases hold "make[s] it
less probable that the [weapons] found in the [house] ...
were there by mistake or without [the defendant's] intent."
United States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
accord United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 183-84 & nn.11-
12 (D.C. Cir. 1998). With this evidence, the jury could
readily have concluded that as a player in the operation,
Spinner would either have handled or seen others handle the
AR-15. See Toms, 136 F.3d at 183 (evidence of participation
in drug conspiracy sufficient for jury to conclude that defen-
dant had dominion and control over weapon not found on his
person).
Finally, there also was specific evidence that the assault
rifle belonged to Spinner or was under his direct control.
The gun was found in a half-opened case in an open closet in
an upstairs bedroom. Whoever lived in that bedroom plainly
had control over the contents of the closet. And there was
plenty of evidence for a jury to conclude that the bedroom
was Spinner's. The police found a photo of him lying on the
floor of the bedroom with his feet resting in the open closet.
Inside the bedroom were several letters to Spinner post-
marked in 1996, the last one dated just seven days before the
search. Also in the bedroom were the kinds of personal
identification a person needs for daily living, and that one
would be unlikely to leave behind after moving out. These
included Spinner's Social Security card, his check-cashing
card, two medical assistance passes in his name, and a club
membership card. (Spinner's current car registration was
found in the living room.) Spinner's fingerprints were found
in the bedroom--on a current list of crack prices. They were
also found in the closet itself--on a container of ammunition
placed right next to the half-opened case containing the
AR-15.
Our cases have repeatedly upheld jury findings of a defen-
dant's actual or constructive possession of an item of contra-
band based on far more tenuous evidence than that offered by
______________________
1994); United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
the government here.3 There is no reason to treat this case
differently. Accordingly, I would conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to show both that the AR-15 assault rifle had a
conspicuously protruding pistol grip and that defendant knew
it did.
II. The Drugs
My colleagues reverse the defendant's narcotics conviction
on the ground that the district court abused its discretion by
permitting cross-examination of Spinner's girlfriend about a
letter she wrote him. The majority concludes the district
court erred because the letter was not admissible as a prior
"bad act" under Rule 404(b). The letter did not describe a
prior bad act, the majority says, because it did not appear to
refer to prior drug dealing at all. But even if the letter were
admissible under Rule 404(b), the majority holds, the district
court still erred in permitting cross-examination because the
government failed to provide reasonable notice that it planned
to do so.
There is no need to address the question of whether the
district court abused its discretion,4 because the kind of error
________
3See, e.g., Toms, 136 F.3d at 183-84 (evidence of prior drug
dealing and that drugs were found in car was sufficient to prove
that driver had constructive possession of weapon on seat of other
occupant); In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (evidence that drugs were found near items tied to defendant
was sufficient to establish actual or constructive possession); Unit-
ed States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(evidence that defendants had keys and had just left apartment was
sufficient to establish actual possession of contraband in apart-
ment); United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 72-73 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (evidence that defendant intended to distribute drugs was
sufficient to prove defendant had constructive possession of guns
found on other occupants of car); see also United States v. Jackson,
124 F.3d 607, 610-11 (4th Cir. 1997) (evidence that firearm was
stored at defendant's mother's home was sufficient to show con-
structive possession).
4The majority states that the government undertook the cross-
examination to rebut the defendant's claim that he had become a
just described could not have been legally harmful to the
defendant. To conclude that the error was harmful, and
therefore grounds for reversal, we must conclude that it
"affected substantial rights," Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). This
"means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings."
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). I cannot
reach that conclusion here.
If the majority is correct in its description of the letter, it
can hardly have been harmful. According to the court, the
letter created either no inference, or such a weak inference,
________________________
"changed man" and no longer was involved in drug dealing. My
colleagues say that permitting such a rebuttal was an abuse of
discretion because it is barred by Rule 404(b) as an argument about
the defendant's character: i.e., a contention that Spinner was not a
changed man. But if Spinner actually had presented such a de-
fense, the government surely would have been permitted to rebut it.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not give defendants a free pass
to present claims the government is barred from rebutting. If
rebutting a "changed man" defense constitutes an effort to prove
the defendant's character (and I am not sure that it does), then
presenting such a defense must constitute such an effort as well.
That is, by claiming that he is a changed man, Spinner must be
claiming that he could not have committed the crime charged
because he had changed his character and become law-abiding.
But if that is his claim, then Rule 404(b) is not the rule that governs
this case: Rules 404(a) and 405(a) are. And those rules permit the
prosecution to cross-examine as to specific instances of past conduct
in order to rebut a claim of good character advanced by the
defendant. See United States v. Roper, 135 F.3d 430, 433 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994); 2
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal
Evidence s 404.11[2] (2d ed. 1998); 1 John W. Strong, McCormick
on Evidence s 191 (4th ed. 1992).
I do not dissent on this ground, however, because in fact the
defendant never offered any evidence in support of a changed man
defense. Defense counsel's opening statement did suggest that
defense and indicated it would be proven through the testimony of
defendant's mother. But Spinner's mother never testified and
defense counsel did not return to the argument in his closing.
of prior drug dealing that it could not be admitted under Rule
404(b).5 It is not "at all apparent," the majority says, that
the reference in the letter was "to crack cocaine.... Nor is
it clear that the reference is to narcotics at all. Under these
circumstances, the statements in the letter have virtually no
bearing on whether Spinner possessed crack cocaine with the
intent to distribute it in this case." But under these circum-
stances, the letter also could not have had a prejudicial effect.
If the references were only to "drinking and cursing and
laying up," as Ms. Little contended, it is hard to see what
prejudicial impact they could have had in a case filled with
evidence of crack cocaine and assault weapons and bulletproof
vests.
This conclusion is further bolstered by considering what
actually transpired at the trial. The prosecutor asked Ms.
Little whether certain phrases in her letter referred to drugs.
The phrases themselves did not use the word. Ms. Little said
no, repeatedly and adamantly. No other evidence as to the
meaning of the letter was offered. Although the prosecutor
did argue very briefly that the references must have been to
drugs, the judge gave the usual limiting instruction that
lawyers' arguments are not evidence and that the verdict
must be based only on evidence. We have repeatedly said
this kind of instruction can mitigate the impact of improper
________
5The inference would have to have been quite weak to justify the
majority's determination that it was inadmissible on this score. All
the government needed to prove with respect to probativeness was
that " 'the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact--[here,
that the defendant had engaged in drug transactions in the past]--
by a preponderance of the evidence.' " Clarke, 24 F.3d at 264
(quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988))
(brackets in original). Thus, the majority's determination of inad-
missibility means the inference could not meet even that minimal
threshold. Indeed, the majority's determination means the infer-
ence must have been even weaker than that. In order to reverse
the trial judge's conclusion that the letter did show prior drug
dealing, the majority had to find the inference so weak that the
judge's conclusion was an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
jury argument. See, e.g., United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d
1511, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Childress, 58
F.3d 693, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1995). With this extraordinarily
weak evidence, it is hard to see how the defendant could have
been prejudiced.
On the other hand, if a reasonable jury could have read the
letter as referring to prior drug dealing by Spinner, then
permitting the cross-examination was not error in the first
place. If the letter did refer to prior drug dealing, it would
have been admissible under Rule 404(b) to show Spinner's
intent to possess and distribute the drugs found in the
search--just as the district court held, see Trial Tr. 997-99
(Feb. 10, 1997), and just as the prosecutor argued to the jury,
Trial Tr. 1151 (Feb. 11, 1997). The majority does not dispute
this, and a host of our cases so hold. See supra note 2.
But, the majority contends, even if the cross-examination
were permissible under Rule 404(b), the district court still
abused its discretion because the government failed to give
the defense "reasonable notice" of its intent to use the letter.
Yet, a failure of notice alone cannot justify reversal. The
defendant still must have suffered prejudice. See United
States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1562 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994).
Since this contention by the majority starts from the assump-
tion that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b), the
prejudice could not have come from the failure to give the
defendant more time to argue that the evidence was inadmis-
sible. Nor could the prejudice have come from defense
counsel's lack of time to prepare the witness. What better
answer could Miss Little have given to the government's
pestering questions than the response she did give: "Not ...
drugs.... I know nothing of drug things." In any event,
although the government did not file a Rule 404(b) notice, the
letter was hardly the "complete surprise" defense counsel
claimed it to be since the government had given it to counsel
during discovery.
Finally, as against this extraordinarily weak evidence of
prejudice--whether derived from the cross-examination itself
or from the failure to give notice--we also must weigh the
evidence arrayed against the defendant. Although the gov-
ernment's case may not have been "overwhelming," it did not
have to be to establish harmless error. It only had to be
strong enough to persuade us that whatever mild prejudice
may have flowed from the cross-examination, it did not
"substantially sway[ ]" the ultimate verdict. United States v.
Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The majority finds the government's evidence thin because
"no fingerprint evidence connected Spinner to the crack."
But while Spinner's fingerprints were not on the crack itself,
they were on a list of current crack prices and on a bullet
inside a crack-laced gun. And most of the crack itself was
found inside the bedroom closet that appeared to be his.
This, together with the other evidence recounted above, was
strong evidence that Spinner was a member of the drug
operation that used his mother's home as a "stash house." In
any event, whatever inference of prior drug dealing the letter
generated, it surely was weaker than, and "harmlessly cumu-
lative" of, see Clarke, 24 F.3d at 267, the much more direct
evidence of Spinner's prior dealing properly admitted through
the testimony of the two undercover officers who bought
twenty-five ziplocks of crack from him.
And against all of this, what was the defendant's theory of
the case? It was that none of the contraband was his, and
instead all belonged to his 17-year-old cousin, Darryl Henkle.
Henkle did indeed testify that the guns, the drugs, the
ammunition, and the other indicia of drug-dealing in the
house were all his; that Spinner knew nothing of any of it;
and that he had never, ever, seen Spinner with drugs. Hen-
kle came to court to testify against his own interests, he told
the jury, in order "[t]o clear my cousin's name because he
shouldn't have to go to jail for something that I did." Trial
Tr. 868 (Feb. 10, 1997).
This must have been quite a lot for any rational juror to
swallow. The jury was advised that the 17-year-old previ-
ously had pled guilty in juvenile court to charges involving
"possession of these firearms and the drug evidence in this
case," had received a sentence of "house arrest and communi-
ty service," id., and could not "be further prosecuted," id. at
949. Mr. Henkle, then, had nothing at risk and only his
cousin to save by bravely taking all the weight upon himself.
Moreover, Henkle was caught in a bold-faced lie while trying
to do just that. He testified that he had found all of the guns
in a car owned by Spinner's brother Robert, after Robert was
shot to death in 1995, and that he had hidden them in the
house without Spinner's knowledge. There was only one
small problem: an official from the Sturm-Ruger Company
testified that the Sturm-Ruger pistol found in the house had
not even been shipped from the factory until two months
after Robert was killed.
The cross-examination which the majority and I have ad-
dressed at length took no more than a few minutes out of a
week-long trial. It was one of dozens of such evidentiary
rulings in the course of that trial. In recognition of the real-
life context in which such rulings are made, and the cost to
the rule of law if every mistake required a retrial, we review
such trial court decisions only for abuse of the court's discre-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1473
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, even where there is such an
abuse, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) instructs us that
"[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected," and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)
provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
See United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 434 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Because Spinner's substantial rights were not affected
by the cross-examination of his girlfriend, I would affirm his
conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack co-
caine.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's reversal of the
two convictions discussed above, while concurring in the
majority's affirmance of the remaining convictions.
Appendix 1 (Gov't Ex. 48-C)
[Appendix not available electronically]