R G Johnson Co Inc v. Holland, Michael H.

                        United States Court of Appeals


                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT


              Argued January 28, 1999     Decided April 9, 1999 


                            Nos. 98-5109 & 98-5127


                         R.G. Johnson Company, Inc., 

                                   Appellee


                                      v.


              Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security 

                       and Michael H. Holland, et al., 

                                  Appellants


                Appeals from the United States District Court 

                        for the District of Columbia 

                               (No. 97cv00003)


     Peter Buscemi, with whom John R. Mooney, David W. 
Allen, and Carolyn O'Meara Dutrow were on the briefs, 
argued the cause for appellants UMWA Combined Benefit 
Fund and its Trustees.



     Alexander D. Shoaibi, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom 
Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, Mark E. Nagle, 
and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and Donna 
J. Fuchsluger, Counsel, Social Security Administration, were 
on the briefs, argued the cause for federal appellant.

     Mary Lou Smith, with whom William H. Howe and Rich-
ard A. Steyer were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee 
R. G. Johnson Company, Inc.

     Before Williams and Randolph, Circuit Judges, and 
Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

     Opinion for the court filed by Senior Judge Buckley.

     Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

     Buckley, Senior Judge:  The Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefit Act of 1992 directs the Commissioner of Social Securi-
ty to assign financial responsibility for coal industry retirees 
covered by certain United Mine Workers of America collec-
tive bargaining agreements either to a "signatory operator" 
that formerly employed the retiree or to a "related person" to 
the signatory operator.  Appellee R. G. Johnson Company, 
Inc. protests the assignment to it of the retired employees of 
a signatory operator whose assets and remaining business it 
had purchased seven years earlier.  The district court grant-
ed the company's motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that the unambiguous language of the statutory defi-
nition of "related person" did not apply to successors or 
successors in interest to a signatory.

     Although we cannot fault the district court's literal reading 
of the definition, we conclude that because such an interpreta-
tion would frustrate the clear intent of Congress in enacting 
the Coal Act, the phrase "related person" must be construed 
to include a successor in interest to a signatory operator.  We 
therefore set aside the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of R. G. Johnson Company, Inc. and remand the case to the 
district court.



                                I. Background


     A.The Coal Act

     The factors that led to the passage of the Coal Industry 
Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 
Stat. 3036 (codified at 26 U.S.C. ss 9701-22 (1994)) ("Coal 
Act" or "Act"), are well documented in prior litigation.  See, 
e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 
2137-42 (1998).  We recount only those that are necessary to 
place the present litigation in context.

     In 1974, the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association ("As-
sociation"), a multi-employer bargaining organization and the 
primary representative of coal mine operators in negotiations 
with the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA"), en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement that created four 
trusts to provide pension and medical benefits to miners and 
their families.  The coal operators, who as members of the 
Association were signatories to the agreement, undertook to 
fund the trusts through the payment of annual assessments 
that were based on the amount of coal they produced and on 
the number of hours their miners worked.  One of the trusts, 
the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan ("1950 Benefit Plan"), provided 
health benefits to miners who retired before 1976 while 
another, the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan ("1974 Benefit Plan"), 
covered the health benefits of active miners and those who 
retired in 1976 or thereafter.

     In 1978, the Association and the union executed a new 
agreement that restructured the 1974 Benefit Plan to make 
signatory operators primarily responsible for the health care 
of their own active employees and those who retired during or 
after 1976.  Thus, while the 1950 Benefit Plan continued to 
cover all pre-1976 retirees, the 1974 Benefit Plan, as restruc-
tured, remained in effect only to cover employees who had 
retired after 1975 and whose last employer was no longer in 
business.  The Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc., 
which represented contractors to the coal mining industry, 
entered into similar agreements with the UMWA.  These 
entitled its member companies' retired employees to partici-



pate in the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans established for 
retired miners.

     In the 1980's, the benefit plans began to suffer increasing 
financial difficulties because of the growing number of signa-
tories to the 1978 agreement that had subsequently either 
gone out of business or otherwise ceased to meet their 
continuing obligations under the agreement.  As a result, the 
remaining signatories were forced to absorb the increasing 
cost of providing medical benefits for the retirees of the 
operators who no longer contributed to the plans.

     In 1992, in response to the problems created by the plans' 
growing deficits, Congress passed the Coal Act in order "to 
provide for the continuation of a privately financed self-
sufficient program for the delivery of health care benefits to 
the beneficiaries of [multi-employer benefit] plans."  Coal 
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, s 19142(b)(3), 106 Stat. 3037 (1992) 
(codified as note following 26 U.S.C. s 9701 (1994)).  To that 
end, Congress found it necessary "to identify persons most 
responsible for plan liabilities in order to stabilize plan fund-
ing and allow for the provision of health care benefits to such 
retirees."  Id. s 19142(a)(2).

     The Coal Act merged the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans into 
a new multi-employer plan called the UMWA Combined 
Benefit Fund ("Fund").  26 U.S.C. s 9702(a)(2).  The Fund 
provides retirees and their dependents with "substantially the 
same" health benefits that they were entitled to receive under 
the 1950 and 1974 Plans.  Id. s 9703(b)(1), (f).

     Section 9706 of the Act requires the Commissioner of Social 
Security ("Commissioner") to assign each eligible beneficiary 
of the Fund to a "signatory operator which (or any related 
person with respect to which) remains in business," such 
assignments to be made in accordance with the instructions 
contained in that section.  Id. s 9706.  Such operator or 
person must then pay an annual premium to the Fund based 
on the number of beneficiaries for which it is responsible.  Id. 
s 9704.  Beneficiaries for whom the Commissioner is unable 
to locate an appropriate assignee become the collective re-
sponsibility of all companies to which beneficiaries have been 


assigned.  Id. s 9704(a)(3) ("unassigned beneficiaries premi-
um").

     B.Factual Background

     In 1988, a group of investors organized appellee R. G. 
Johnson Company, Inc. ("New Johnson") for the purpose of 
acquiring the operating assets, certain real estate, and the 
right to use a virtually identical corporate name from The 
R. G. Johnson Company ("Old Johnson").  New Johnson 
employed, without interruption, much of Old Johnson's work 
force;  rented space in the same building previously occupied 
by Old Johnson;  and assumed the older company's only 
remaining contract.  Following the sale to New Johnson, Old 
Johnson continued to exist essentially as a personal holding 
company for its owners.  New Johnson, for its part, per-
formed the same kind of coal mine shaft and slope construc-
tion work that Old Johnson had been engaged in since 1917.

     In 1995, the Commissioner notified New Johnson, in a 
series of letters, of the assignment to it of a number of 
beneficiaries who had been former employees of Old Johnson.  
Each of the letters contained the following statement:

     Our records and UMWA records indicate that you are 
     related to [Old Johnson] who is no longer in business.  
     This operator would have been responsible under the law 
     for the miner named below under the rules for how we 
     assigned responsibility....  Therefore, as a related com-
     pany you must assume responsibility.

See, e.g., List of Assigned Miners and Other Beneficiaries, 
reprinted in Joint Appendix 729 (emphasis added).  New 
Johnson requested review of these assignments based on its 
claim that it was not related to Old Johnson.  The Commis-
sioner conducted the review and upheld the assignments, 
explaining that "[u]nder current SSA policy, successors are 
considered another type of related person and are treated as 
a related person for purposes of making assignments under 
the Coal Act."  Thereafter, the Fund notified New Johnson of 
its premium obligations in annual assessment letters.  The 
company paid the premiums under protest and commenced 


this lawsuit seeking a declaration that it is not liable for 
beneficiaries under the Coal Act.

     New Johnson's complaint contains five counts, each of 
which presents a distinct legal argument.  The company 
moved for summary judgment based on the first two of these 
counts;  namely, that it was not a related person to Old 
Johnson as defined in the Coal Act, and that the Act did not 
provide for the assignment of beneficiaries to a successor or 
successor in interest to a signatory operator.  The Commis-
sioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  After 
considering the two motions, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of New Johnson.  It concluded that 
the plain language of the provisions of the Act defining 
"related person" did not include a successor to a signatory 
operator and that the legislative history cited by the defen-
dants "could not determine legislative intent so conclusively 
that it would overcome the plain meaning of the statute." 
R. G. Johnson Co. v. Apfel, 994 F. Supp. 10, 14, 18 (D.D.C. 
1998).

                                II. Discussion

     As noted above, the Coal Act directs the Commissioner to 
assign a Fund beneficiary to a signatory operator or "any 
related person."  26 U.S.C. s 9706(a).  The Act defines relat-
ed person as follows:

     (A) In general

          A person shall be considered to be a related person to 
     a signatory operator if that person is--

               (i) a member of the controlled group of corporations 
          (within the meaning section 52(a) [of the Internal 
          Revenue Code]) which includes such signatory opera-
          tor;

               (ii) a trade or business which is under common 
          control (as determined under section 52(b) [of the 
          Internal Revenue Code]) with such signatory operator;  
          or

               (iii) any other person who is identified as having a 
          partnership interest or joint venture with a signatory 


          operator in a business within the coal industry, but 
          only if such business employed eligible beneficiaries, 
          except that this clause shall not apply to a person 
          whose only interest is as a limited partner.

     A related person shall also include a successor in interest 
     of any person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii).

Id. s 9701(c)(2)(A).  The statute thus creates four categories 
of related persons:  those described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), 
and those who are "successors in interest" to any person 
described in those clauses.

     On appeal, the parties pose two questions:  Does the Coal 
Act impose liability for a Fund beneficiary on a successor in 
interest of a signatory operator;  and if it does, is New 
Johnson a successor in interest of the kind contemplated by 
the statutory definition of "related person"?  As always, when 
asked to rule on an agency's interpretation of a statute it is 
charged with administering, we undertake the two-step Chev-
ron analysis.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., et al., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).  In the first instance, we must 
determine whether the intent of Congress is clear.  If it is, 
"that is the end of the matter;  for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress."  Id. at 842-43.  If, however, we find that 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the matter 
at issue, the court must defer to the agency's construction of 
the statute if it is "permissible."  Id. at 843.

     In support of its contention that the definition of related 
person applies to a signatory operator's successor in interest, 
the Commissioner argues that a signatory operator is a 
"person described" in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) because the 
words "signatory operator" appear in each of them.  With all 
respect, we find that explanation difficult to follow.  Because 
the persons described in those clauses are described in terms 
of their relationship to the signatory operator, it would seem 
evident that they cannot include the signatory itself.  To 
suggest otherwise is tantamount to saying "I am related to 
me."  The Commissioner also points to the words "In gener-
al" at the beginning of the definition of related person as 



permitting it to view the statutory language as less than 
exhaustive.  But even if we were to accept the argument that 
the catalog of related persons in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) is not 
exclusive, the Commissioner cannot overcome the fact that in 
order to be deemed a related person, a successor in interest 
must be one to a person described in those clauses.  Under 
the circumstances, we are unable to quarrel with the district 
court's conclusion that the agency's construction of the relat-
ed person definition is "tortured."  R. G. Johnson Co., 994 
F. Supp. at 14.  We agree with the Commissioner, however, 
that Congress could not have intended this result;  and we 
say this without any reliance on the inconclusive legislative 
history cited by the Commissioner.

     Congress declared that one of its purposes in enacting the 
Coal Act was "to identify persons most responsible for plan 
liabilities in order to stabilize plan funding and allow for the 
provision of health care benefits to such retirees."  Pub. L. 
No. 102-486, s 19142(a)(2), 106 Stat. 3037 (codified at note 
following 26 U.S.C. s 9701 (1994)).  In light of this objective 
and the broad reach of the provisions imposing liability on 
related persons, we can think of no reason why Congress 
would have intended to impose liability for the beneficiaries 
on, for example, a successor in interest to a Coca-Cola 
bottling company under common control with a signatory coal 
mine operator while exempting a coal-mining successor in 
interest to that operator.  When we asked counsel for New 
Johnson if she could provide any plausible reason why Con-
gress should have intended such an exemption, the only 
explanation she was able to suggest was that coal mining 
operators had more effective lobbyists in Washington than 
did their non-mining affiliates.  We find this explanation less 
than compelling.  Nor are we impressed by our dissenting 
colleague's suggestion (see dis. op. at 1-2) that Congress 
could have intended to benefit coal miners by eliminating the 
impediment to the sale of a coal company posed by the 
potential liabilities created by the Coal Act.  The problem 
with this explanation is that it assumes that Congress was not 
equally concerned for the jobs of employees of persons relat-
ed to a signatory operator, who would face the same difficul-
ties in disposing of a business.  But if Congress was in fact 



solely concerned with the protection of miners from that 
contingency, it would have also exempted from liability suc-
cessors in interest to any related person who was engaged in 
the mining of coal.

     We are faced, then, with one of those "rare cases in which 
the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."  
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  In such a 
circumstance, "the intention of the drafters, rather than the 
strict language, controls."  Id.  Accordingly, in order to "give 
effect" to Congress's intent in this case, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843, we hold that section 9701(c)(2)(A) must be construed to 
permit the assignment of a Fund beneficiary to the successor 
in interest of a signatory operator.  See Citibank v. Emery 
(In re Emery), 132 F.3d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1998) (because "the 
literal application of s 727(d) here [could not] have been 
intended by Congress," court held that the section did not 
preclude a particular suit).

     Although we hold that the term "related person" does 
encompass a successor in interest to a signatory operator, we 
do not address New Johnson's alternative argument that it is 
not a successor in interest to Old Johnson within the meaning 
of the Act because that question was not before the district 
court.  It is our normal practice to "refuse[ ] to hear any 
claim upon which the district court has not had an opportuni-
ty to rule."  Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 
1994).  See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) 
("It is the general rule ... that a federal appellate court does 
not consider an issue not passed upon below.").  We have no 
reason to depart from that practice in this case.  New 
Johnson may, however, present this argument to the district 
court on remand.  See Peralta v. U.S. Attorney's Office, 136 
F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (on remand, party free to 
reassert argument raised for first time on appeal).

                               III. Conclusion


     In light of the foregoing, we set aside the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of New Johnson and 


remand the case so that the court may consider New John-
son's argument that it is not a successor in interest to Old 
Johnson as well as the others set forth in the counts of the 
complaint that were not placed before the court in New 
Johnson's motion for summary judgment.

So ordered.



     Randolph, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  The definition of 
"related persons" in the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit 
Act excludes successors in interest to signatory operators, 
and thereby exempts them from liability for the signatory 
operator's Fund beneficiaries.  See 26 U.S.C. 
ss 9701(c)(2)(A), 9706(a).  My colleagues recognize as much.  
But they believe exempting successors in interest such as 
appellee would frustrate Congress's "clear intent."  And so 
they treat the words "related persons" as if they covered 
successors although they do not.  Given the nature of the 
judicial process, this mode of judicial analysis embodies some 
severe theoretical difficulties.  My problem with the majority 
decision is more practical.  In detecting the "real" intent of 
Congress, my colleagues first eye the Act's general purpose 
"to identify [those] persons most responsible for plan liabili-
ties."  Maj. op. at 8.  With this firmly in mind, they find it 
implausible for Congress "to impose liability for the beneficia-
ries on, for example, a successor in interest to a Coca-Cola 
bottling company under common control with a signatory coal 
mine operator while exempting a coal-mining successor in 
interest to that operator."  Id.  I find this not in the least bit 
implausible.  Exempting successors in interest to signatory 
operators from liability for the signatory operator's Fund 
beneficiaries benefits miners because it facilitates the sale of 
coal companies.  Without the exemption, prospective purchas-
ers can never be sure of their risks.  Their liability would 
depend on whether, sometime in the future, the seller--that 
is, the signatory operator--ceases to "remain[ ] in business," 
a matter wholly outside their control.  See 26 U.S.C. 
s 9706(a).  (A person is in "business" within the meaning of 
the statute "if such person conducts or derives revenue from 
any business activity, whether or not in the coal industry."  
See 26 U.S.C. s 9701(c)(7).)  My colleagues say, in response, 
that Congress could have gone further and exempted succes-
sors in interest to related coal mining companies from liabili-
ty, thus facilitating the sale of these companies as well.  
Perhaps so, but Congress rarely has to go as far as its logic 
would take it.  The point remains that construing the statute 
as it was written does not render it inscrutable.



     One further observation is in order.  The quandary my 
colleagues confront here is of the Social Security Commission-
er's own making.  The problem stems from the Commission-
er's version of what constitutes "business activity."  See id. 
Borrowing from an inapposite IRS regulation, the Commis-
sioner determined that the signatory operator--"Old John-
son"--no longer engaged in "business activity" after the sale 
because it now derived its income from securities and real 
estate.  See 26 C.F.R. s 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv).  Old Johnson was, 
according to the Commissioner, therefore out of business.  
Even though Old Johnson still existed, having merely ex-
changed its physical assets for cash, the Commissioner no 
longer held it financially responsible for its Fund beneficia-
ries.  See 26 U.S.C. ss 9706(a), 9701(c)(7).  The Commission-
er was thus left groping for a "related person" to whom Old 
Johnson's liabilities could be assigned.  See 26 U.S.C. 
s 9701(c)(2)(A).  Had the Commissioner adopted a definition 
of "business activity" which permitted assignment to signato-
ry operators still in existence and earning income, the entire 
problem would have disappeared and I presume my col-
leagues would have read the Act as it was written.