UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-30897
Charles Guidry; Charlene Guidry,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
United States Tobacco Company, Inc., et al.
Defendants,
Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc.; Smokeless Tobacco Research
Council, Inc.; Tobacco Institute, Inc.; Council for
Tobacco Research--USA, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
September 14, 1999
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, POLITZ, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Charles and Charlene Guidry appeal from
the district court’s dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction,
of their civil actions against Defendants-Appellees, Smokeless
Tobacco Council, Inc.; Smokeless Tobacco Research Council, Inc.;
1
Tobacco Institute, Inc.; and, Council for Tobacco Research--USA,
Inc. Concluding that the plaintiffs have established a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction sufficient to avoid dismissal
without an evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Charles and Charlene Guidry, residents of Louisiana, filed
suit in Louisiana state court against six tobacco manufacturers,
United States Tobacco Co., Pinkerton Tobacco Co., Conwood Company,
L.P., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Incorporated, and
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.; and four of the tobacco
manufacturers’ trade associations, Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc.,
Smokeless Tobacco Research Council, Inc., Tobacco Institute, Inc.,
and Council for Tobacco Research--USA, Inc. None of the defendants
is a resident of Louisiana, and none of the tobacco trade
associations is qualified to do business in Louisiana.
The plaintiffs alleged, principally, that each tobacco
manufacturer and each tobacco trade association made intentional
misrepresentations in Louisiana to Charles Guidry and other
residents that the products of the tobacco manufacturers sold in
the state were not addictive or carcinogenic; that when the tobacco
manufacturers and the tobacco trade associations made these
misrepresentations they knew, not only that the tobacco products
would cause addiction and cancer, but that the tobacco
manufacturers manipulated the levels of nicotine in their tobacco
products to create a highly compulsive physiological need for
2
nicotine in Charles Guidry and other residents of the state; that
Charles Guidry, while in Louisiana, relied on each defendant’s
knowingly false representations, purchased and used the tobacco
manufacturers’ products, became heavily addicted to nicotine, and
contracted cancer from the tobacco.1 The plaintiffs also allege
that the tobacco trade associations, in addition to individually
committing delictual offenses and quasi-offenses causing the
plaintiffs injury and damage in Louisiana, conspired and acted in
concert with each other and the tobacco manufacturers to conceal or
falsely minimize the addictive and carcinogenic effects of the
tobacco products from the plaintiffs, to create a false impression
that no evidence of tobacco addiction or carcinogenesis had been
found even after diligent scientific research, and to thereby
create in Charles Guidry and other residents in Louisiana the false
impression that the addictive and carcinogenic effects of the
tobacco products were much less than the defendants knew them to
be.
Service of process on the four tobacco trade association
defendants was made under the Louisiana long-arm statute, La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13:3204 (West 1991). All of the defendants removed
the case to the federal district court. The four tobacco trade
1
The particularized nominate causes of action asserted by the
plaintiffs are: fraud and deceit; intentional misrepresentation;
negligent misrepresentation, breach of express or implied warranty,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, strict
liability, and redhibition.
3
association defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss the
suit against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. The original
district court judge to whom the motion was assigned denied it
based on his findings that (1) the plaintiffs had presented a prima
facie case for specific personal jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over those defendants will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
A different district court judge, in response to the tobacco
trade associations’ motion, certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) one
part of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, i.e., whether there
was personal jurisdiction based on “the foreign defendants’ alleged
conspiracy with in-state defendants.” A panel of this court denied
certification of an appeal on the question. Guidry v. United States
Tobacco Co., No. 97-00110 (5th Cir. Jun. 17, 1997). The tobacco
trade association defendants moved for reconsideration of the
original district judge’s decision denying their Rule 12(b)(2)
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After
reassignment of all motions to a different judge, the district
court granted reconsideration and dismissed the four tobacco trade
association defendants from the suit. In its memorandum ruling the
district court assigned reasons stating that (1) specific personal
jurisdiction was lacking because the plaintiffs’ allegations of a
conspiracy between the tobacco trade associations and the tobacco
manufacturers were merely “conclusory;” and (2) general personal
jurisdiction was not present because the alleged contacts between
4
the four trade association defendants and the forum were not
“substantial, continuous and systematic.”2 The plaintiffs
appealed.
II. Discussion
The single issue presented by the appeal is whether the
district court had personal jurisdiction over the tobacco trade
association defendants. We look first to Louisiana’s “long-arm”
statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201 (West 1991). This law
extends personal jurisdiction of courts sitting in Louisiana,
including federal courts, to the limits permitted under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petroleum Helicopters,
Inc. v. Avco Corp., 513 So.2d 1188, 1192 (La. 1987); See Petroleum
2
In its memorandum ruling the district court held that neither
specific nor general personal jurisdiction could be exercised over
any of the tobacco trade association defendants. Yet in its
judgment the district court purportedly dismissed the plaintiffs’
claims against these defendants with prejudice. Under the
circumstances, the district court’s judgment can have no effect as
a dismissal with prejudice but must be considered as a dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction, which is not a judgment on the
merits. Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of the
jurisdiction of a district court, without which it is powerless to
proceed to an adjudication. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 119
S.Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999)(Ginsburg, J.). A court must find
jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, before determining
the validity of a claim. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d
169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994); Cf. Boudloche v. Conoco Oil Corp., 615
F.2d 687, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1980)(no subject matter jurisdiction);
Dassinger v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 505 F.2d 672, 674
(5th Cir. 1974)(same). Furthermore, if we were to review the
district court’s judgment as a summary judgment on the merits we
would reverse and remand for further proceedings because the
defendants are not entitled to a summary judgment on the present
record made by the parties in anticipation only of a ruling on
personal jurisdiction.
5
Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 834 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1987);
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir.
1986). Our sole inquiry, therefore, is whether the district court
could, consistent with due process, assert personal jurisdiction
over the tobacco trade association defendants.
The due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects an
individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding
judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
“‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Due process generally
demands that the nonresident defendant have “certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Minimum contacts with a forum state may arise incident to a
federal court’s “general” or “specific” jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. See Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216
(5th Cir. 1990). If a defendant has sufficient “continuous and
systematic” general contacts with the state, e.g., see Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952), the
forum may exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant
for a “cause of action [that] does not arise out of or relate to
the [defendant’s] activities in the forum state.” Helicopteros
6
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1952).
The district court determined, and the plaintiffs do not argue to
the contrary, that the tobacco trade association defendants’
contacts with Louisiana were insufficient to support general
personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs contend, however, that the state or federal
courts in Louisiana may exercise specific personal jurisdiction
over the defendants because this controversy “is related to or
‘arises out of’ [the defendants’] contacts with the forum.” See
id.(citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). We are
required to examine the relationship between the defendants, the
forum state, and the litigation, See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204, to
determine “whether the defendant[s] purposefully established
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state” so that it was foreseeable
“that the defendant[s] conduct and connection with the forum state
are such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
The analysis of specific jurisdiction may be refined further
into a three-part test: (1) Did the defendant have minimum contacts
with the forum state-–purposely directing its activities toward the
forum state or purposely availing itself of the privilege of
conducting activities therein? (2) Did the plaintiffs cause of
action arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related
contacts? (3) Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction be
7
reasonable and fair? 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069, at 174 (Supp. 1999) (citing
authorities).
Procedurally, the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal
court bears the burden of establishing minimum contacts justifying
the court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Bullion,
895 F.2d at 216; Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d 328,
332 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). When a
court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in the
present case, however, the nonmoving party need only make a prima
facie showing, and the court must accept as true the nonmover’s
allegations and resolve all factual disputes in its favor. Latshaw
v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999); Bullion, 895 F.2d at
217; Brown 688 F.2d at 332; 5A Wright & Miller, § 1351, at 117-18
(Supp. 1999).
The district court, contrary to the rule affirmed in Latshaw,
Bullion, and Brown, failed to recognize that, because there had
been no evidentiary hearing, Charles and Charlene Guidry needed
only to establish, at the pre-trial, pre-evidentiary hearing stage
of the proceedings, a prima facie showing that (1) each tobacco
trade association defendant had minimum contacts with the forum
state, and (2) the plaintiffs had a cause of action arising out of
each such defendant’s individual forum related contacts. See
Bullion, 895 F.2d at 217. Consequently, the district court passed
8
over these crucial issues and only concerned itself with whether
there was specific jurisdiction based upon a conspiracy between the
tobacco trade associations and the tobacco manufacturers and
whether there was general jurisdiction over the trade associations.
The district court did not determine whether the plaintiffs had
made a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction over each
tobacco trade association defendant based on a tort committed in
the state, individually and not as part of a conspiracy, by each
particular defendant.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at
210-11; Allred v. More & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 691 (1998); Jobe v. ATR Marketing,
Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996). From our review of the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and exhibits of record, we
conclude that the plaintiffs carried their burden of establishing
a prima facie showing that each tobacco trade association defendant
individually had minimum contacts with the forum out of which the
plaintiffs’ causes of action arose. Consequently, the district
court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ actions against the trade
associations for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint the following facts:
(1) the tobacco trade association defendants, holding themselves
out to be fair and impartial scientific research organizations,
intentionally communicated false information to Charles Guidry in
9
Louisiana concerning the tobacco products being sold by the tobacco
manufacturer defendants in the state, viz., that the tobacco
products were not capable of causing serious addictions and cancer
in humans; and that any evidence to the contrary was unreliable and
not scientifically valid; (2) Charles Guidry relied on their false
representations, repeatedly purchased and used the tobacco products
in Louisiana, and, as a result, became unalterably addicted to
nicotine and contracted cancer at the base of his tongue. The
plaintiffs supported their complaint with depositions and exhibits
which tended to corroborate that, despite the tobacco trade
associations’ knowledge of the addictive and carcinogenic risks
associated with use of the tobacco products, they published
articles or ads in national publications circulated in Louisiana
defending and encouraging the use of tobacco products by adults as
a safe, wholesome and traditional American activity; and that at
least one of the tobacco trade association defendants caused its
representatives to appear on national network television programs
and broadcast into Louisiana knowingly false representations that
the tobacco products were not addictive, that the tobacco
manufacturer defendants did not manipulate the products’ levels of
nicotine for the purpose of causing and maintaining addictions in
consumers, and that there was no reliable scientific evidence or
indication that the use of the tobacco products caused compelling
addictions or cancers.
In support of the motions to dismiss for lack of personal
10
jurisdiction the tobacco trade associations defendants presented
brief, almost identical, affidavits by their officers stating that
they had never “promoted” or “advertised” tobacco products. From
the depositions of the officers and the plaintiffs’ exhibits,
however, it is evident that at least one of the tobacco trade
associations conceded that it had placed articles or ads in
national publications sold in Louisiana approving and encouraging
the use of tobacco products; and that at least one of the other
trade associations caused its representatives to appear on national
network television programs broadcast in Louisiana and deny as
untrue and scientifically invalid representations made by members
of Congress, e.g., that the tobacco manufacturer defendants’
products were addictive and carcinogenic; that the manufacturers
knowingly manipulated and maintained addictive levels of nicotine
in their products for the purpose of creating in consumers the
physiological need for nicotine and their products as vehicles for
nicotine delivery and consumption. It is possible that the
defendants’ affidavits are not actually in conflict with the
plaintiffs’ allegations. The trade association officers, by denying
that their organizations promoted or advertised tobacco products,
may have intended to deny only that the trade associations engaged
in commercial sales or brand name advertising, and not other forms
of public or private communications. If, however, “there are
conflicts between some of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and
those alleged by the defendants in their affidavits, such conflicts
11
must be resolved in plaintiff(s’) favor for the purposes of
determining whether a prima facie case for in personam jurisdiction
has been established.” Brown, 688 F.2d at 332 (citing and quoting
United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit R.R., 495 F.2d
1127, 1128 (7th Cir. 1974)(internal quotations omitted)); Latshaw,
167 F.3d at 211; Bullion, 985 F.2d at 217.
Taking as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and shown
by the depositions, affidavits and exhibits, we conclude that the
plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that each tobacco trade
association defendant individually had sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state of Louisiana, which caused the plaintiffs to
suffer injury or damage in Louisiana, consisting of the following
intentional and nonintentional torts through each association’s
acts or omissions in the state: (1) Intentional Misrepresentation
Or Delictual Fraud. The elements of a Louisiana delictual fraud or
intentional misrepresentation cause of action are: (a) a
misrepresentation of a material fact, (b) made with the intent to
deceive, and (c) causing justifiable reliance with resultant
injury. See Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 F.3d 1058, 1068
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1131 n.33 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated
on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989)(citing La.Civ.Code arts. 1847
[superseded by La.Civ.Code art. 1953 (1985)], 2315); Ballard’s Inc.
v. North American Land Development Corp., 677 So.2d 648, 651
(La.App. 2nd Cir. 1996); Pittman v. Piper, 542 So.2d 700, 702
12
(La.App. 4th Cir. 1989); Deville v. Leonards, 457 So.2d 311, 313
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). Note that these cases involve only
economic harm. We would expect Louisiana courts to use a standard
for intentional misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm
similar to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (1965): “An
actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to
another for physical harm which results from an act done by the
other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the
representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or
should realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or
a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the
other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that
he has not the knowledge which he professes.” Cf., infra, Devore v.
Hobart Manufacturing, 367 So.2d 836, 839 (La. 1979). (2) Negligent
Misrepresentation That Results In Physical Harm. The elements of a
Louisiana action based on negligent misrepresentation resulting in
physical harm appear to be: (a) a negligent misrepresentation or
giving of false information to another, and (b) foreseeable action
taken by the other in reasonable reliance on such information, (c)
which results in physical harm to the other or to a third person
who reasonably could be expected to be put in peril by the action
taken. See Devore, 367 So.2d at 839 (agreeing with the recognition
of a negligent misrepresentation cause of action by White v. Lamar
Realty, Inc., 303 So.2d 598, 601 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1974) based on
Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316, which “afford a broad ambit of
13
protection for persons damaged by intentional and negligent acts of
others,” and indicating that Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 311
(1965) provides the standard of conduct for “negligent
misrepresentation that results in physical harm.”); accord Daye v.
General Motors Corp., 720 So.2d 654, 659 (La. 1998); Daye v.
General Motors Corp., 712 So.2d 120, 126 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1997);
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Valley Elec. Membership
Corp., 558 So.2d 731, 736 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1990). On the other
hand, in cases involving only economic harm or pecuniary loss, the
Louisiana Supreme Court and courts of appeal have applied a
standard identical or similar to Restatement (Second) Torts § 552
(1977). Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007, 1016-
18 (La. 1993); Devore, 367 So.2d at 838 n.1, 839; Cf., Beal v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co., 410 So.2d 318, 322 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1982);
Dousson v. South Cent. Bell, 429 So.2d 466, 468 (La.App. 4th Cir.
1983). (3) Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress. The elements
of the Louisiana cause of action for intentional infliction of
mental distress are: (a) extreme and outrageous conduct (b)
intentionally or recklessly causing (c) severe emotional distress
or bodily harm to another. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532,
538 (La. 1992) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46); White
v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991)(same); Cf. Moresi
v. State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1095
(La. 1990)(discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
approvingly).
14
The plaintiffs have made an adequate prima facie showing, so
far as is required at this stage of the proceedings, that they have
causes of action against each of the tobacco trade association
defendants, individually and directly, for intentional and
nonintentional torts committed by each defendant in the state, that
caused physical injuries and physically harmful effects in the
state, which arose out of or resulted from each defendant’s minimum
contacts with the forum state. The facts shown are that each
tobacco trade association defendant intentionally and negligently
communicated to the plaintiffs and other residents in Louisiana
false representations of material facts as to the addictive and
cancer-causing effects of the manufacturers’ tobacco products and
their intentional manipulation and control of nicotine at addictive
levels in the products; that each defendant intended to deceive the
plaintiffs and others in the state with respect to these material
facts; that Charles Guidry justifiably relied on each defendant’s
false representations of material facts; and that as a result of
each defendant’s false representations and his reliance on them,
Charles Guidry, in Louisiana, used the manufacturers’ tobacco
products, became severely and unalterably addicted to nicotine, and
contracted cancer from his use of the products as an addict; that
each defendant intended by its false misrepresentation to induce
Charles Guidry and other Louisiana consumers to begin or continue
to use the manufacturer’s tobacco products, to become addicted to
them, and to be exposed to an unreasonable risk of contracting
15
cancer from the tobacco products; and that each defendant’s acts
and omissions in Louisiana constituted extreme and outrageous
conduct that intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiffs
severe emotional distress and bodily harm in the forum state.
When a nonresident defendant commits a tort within the state,
or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the
state, that tortious conduct amounts to sufficient minimum contacts
with the state by the defendant to constitutionally permit courts
within that state, including federal courts, to exercise personal
adjudicative jurisdiction over the tortfeasor and the causes of
actions arising from its offenses or quasi-offenses. See, e.g.,
Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753; Trinity Industries Inc. v. Myers &
Associates, Ltd., 41 F.3d 229, 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 807 (1995); Bullion, 895 F.2d at 217; D.J. Investments, Inc.
v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 547
(5th Cir. 1985); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1270-
71 (5th Cir. 1983); Brown, 688 F.2d at 1333; Simon v. United States,
644 F.2d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 1981); Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554
F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Jetco
Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1233-34 (5th
Cir. 1973), abrogated on other grounds by U.S. v. Cooper, 135 F.3d
960 (5th Cir. 1998); Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke,
343 F.2d 861, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1965); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d
248, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1962); See 4 Wright & Miller, §1069; Reese &
Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
16
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959). Even an act done outside
the state that has consequences or effects within the state will
suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those
consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended
or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s
conduct. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); Bullion,
895 F.2d at 217; Brown, 688 F.2d at 1333; Simon, 644 F.2d at 499;
See 4 Wright & Miller, §1069.
In Calder v. Jones, supra, the Supreme Court upheld personal
jurisdiction over a reporter and editor, who had written and
approved an article in Florida, in a California libel suit brought
by a California plaintiff. The Court held that the defendants’
activities, knowing that the article involved a California resident
and that it would be distributed there, brought them within the
jurisdiction of the court because they knowingly had engaged in
tortious activity outside the state that had an effect in the forum
state. Id. at 790; See 4 Wright & Miller, §1067. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the Florida journalists had intentionally aimed
their economic and emotionally harmful conduct at the California
resident:
[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted
negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly
tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.
Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an
article that they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that
17
the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in
the State in which she lives and works and in which the
National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the
circumstances, petitioners must “reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there” to answer for the truth of
the statements made in their article. An individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek
redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida,
knowingly cause the injury in California.
. . . .
We hold that jurisdiction over petitioners in
California is proper because of their intentional conduct
in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent in
California.
Id. at 789-91 (internal citations omitted).
This Court of Appeals and the Seventh Circuit have recognized
that “[t]he Supreme Court did not intend the Calder ‘effects’ test
to apply only to libel cases.” Allred, 117 F.3d at 286-87 (quoting
Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1122 (1986)). The Allred and Wallace courts concluded
that, under the particular circumstances of the case, a nonresident
defendant’s intentional act of causing process to be served by mail
on a plaintiff in his home forum state was insufficient as a
“minimum contact” for purposes of jurisdiction. “[In Calder,] the
‘effects’ of the intentional tort of libel in the forum state
(i.e., the plaintiff’s residence) are perhaps more pronounced than
the ‘effects’ of most other intentional torts.” Allred, 117 F.3d at
287 (quoting Wallace, 778 F.2d at 395 (internal quotations
18
omitted)). We conclude, therefore, and believe it was implicit in
the Allred and Wallace decisions, that the “effects” of
intentional and nonintentional torts causing death or serious
physical harm are as “pronounced” as the merely economic and
emotional consequences of libel. Thus, under Calder, the effects
of torts committed outside the forum state that cause death or
serious physical harm may also serve as minimum contacts with the
forum for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 37 and cmt. e (1988 Revision).
That a state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over
an individual who causes effects in the state by an intentional or
physically harmful tort done elsewhere, with respect to any claim
arising from these effects, has been recognized by the American Law
Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 37. In
pertinent part, Comment e. of Section 37, states: “When the act was
done with the intention of causing the particular effects in the
state, the state is likely to have judicial jurisdiction though the
defendant had no other contact with the state. This will almost
surely be so when the effect involves injury to person or damage to
tangible property.” Id. at 54 and 57 (1988 Revision). That, under
certain circumstances, the state is likely to have judicial
jurisdiction even when the defendant did not intend to cause the
particular effect in the state but could reasonably have foreseen
that it would result from his act done outside the state, is
recognized by the Restatement as follows:
19
The fact that the effect in the state was only
foreseeable will not of itself suffice to give the state
judicial jurisdiction over the defendant. Judicial
jurisdiction is likely to exist in such a case, however,
if it was somewhat more than merely foreseeable that the
defendant’s act would cause the particular effect in the
state. . . . Jurisdiction will also exist when, in
addition to the effect being foreseeable, the defendant
has other relationships with the state.
Id.,at 55, 58.(citing, inter alia, Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian,
414 F.2d 591, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1969)).
In the present case, the plaintiffs have made a prima facie
showing that the tobacco trade association defendants had
sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Louisiana and that
plaintiffs’ causes of action arose out of these minimum contacts so
as to permit the State to exercise personal jurisdiction over those
defendants with respect to this lawsuit. The trade associations
are not charged with mere untargeted negligence endangering only
economic or reputational interests. Rather, their alleged
intentional and negligent tortious actions were knowingly initiated
and aimed at users and potential consumers of tobacco products in
Louisiana, including Charles Guidry. Each defendant made false
misrepresentations of facts that it knew would have a potentially
devastating physically harmful impact on Charles Guidry and other
Louisiana residents. And each defendant knew that the brunt of
that injury would be felt by the plaintiffs, as well as other
citizens and public and private entities, in the state in which
20
they live. “Under the circumstances, [the tobacco trade
association defendants] must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there’ to answer for” the offenses and quasi-offenses
they allegedly committed. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297; Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216). An
individual injured in Louisiana need not go to New York, Delaware,
or Washington, D.C. to seek redress from persons who, though
remaining in other states, intentionally, knowingly and recklessly
caused severe physical, emotional and economic injuries to the
plaintiffs and others in Louisiana. Sufficient minimum contacts
with Louisiana were made by defendants in the course of their
alleged torts to make jurisdiction over the tobacco trade
associations proper in Louisiana.
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established such minimum contacts within the forum state, the
defendant “must present a compelling case that the presence of some
other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”
Gundle Lining Construction Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc,, 85
F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S.,
at 477). When determining the fundamental fairness issue this
court will normally examine (1) the defendant’s burden; (2) the
forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in convenient
and effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest
21
of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. Gundle Lining Construction Corp., 85 F.3d at 207 (citing
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 444 U.S. at 292).
In attempting to overcome the prima facie case that
jurisdiction is reasonable, the defendant may present evidence and
argument as to certain considerations that the Supreme Court has
indicated are relevant in deciding whether maintenance of a suit
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. The relationship between the defendant and the forum must
be such that it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend
the particular suit which is brought there. International Shoe
Co., 326 U.S. at 317. Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness
is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always
a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in
light of other relevant factors, including the forum state’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least where that
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to
choose the forum, the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies. Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd., 480
U.S. at 113; Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. These considerations sometimes serve
22
to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510,
1519 (11th Cir. 1990).
The trade association defendants have not made any showing
that litigating this matter in Louisiana presents an unreasonable
burden on them. The State of Louisiana has a substantial interest
in the litigation of these claims against foreign defendants who
allegedly committed intentional and tortious acts directed at
Louisiana that caused addiction to tobacco products and cancer in
Charles Guidry, thereby inflicting serious personal injuries on the
plaintiffs. Obviously the Guidrys have a strong interest in
obtaining the convenient and efficient relief that can only be
provided by a single lawsuit in their domicile against all
defendants allegedly liable for the indivisible injuries the
plaintiffs have suffered. Moreover, the judicial system’s concerns
for the efficient resolution of controversies preponderates in
favor of a single litigation inclusive of all defendants whose
allegedly intentional and tortious acts have coalesced to injure
the plaintiffs. In short, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
by the federal district court sitting in Louisiana, as far as can
be determined at this stage of the litigation, is reasonable and
comports with due process.
Accordingly, we need not consider or decide the complex issues
of whether the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that each of
23
the tobacco trade associations also had sufficient minimum contacts
with Louisiana because it conspired with one or more tobacco
manufacturer defendants to commit an intentional or willful act in,
or that such act had sufficient effects in, Louisiana, and that the
commission of that act caused damage to the plaintiffs in
Louisiana. In case the district court is confronted with these
issues again, however, we call its attention to several basic
principles of law that appear to be relevant but that were either
overlooked or misunderstood by the district court in its memorandum
ruling.
The governing substantive Louisiana law principles are set
forth by La. Civil Code art. 2324(A), which provides: “He who
conspires with another to commit an intentional or willful act is
answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by
such an act.” For assistance in determining the Louisiana courts’
interpretation of this provision see the discussion and citations
of the state cases in Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan,
Louisiana Tort Law, § 2-5 (1996).
The pleadings in a civil action for conspiracy must comply
with the general requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
that the complaint contain a direct, simple, and concise statement
that demonstrates the pleader is entitled to relief. See 5 Wright
& Miller, § 1233 (citing Arnold v. Board of Educ. Of Escambia
County, Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989); Burns v. Spiller,
161 F.2d 377, 377 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947)).
24
However, “a general allegation of conspiracy without a statement of
the facts constituting that conspiracy, is only an allegation of a
legal conclusion and is insufficient to constitute a cause of
action.” McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659, 663
(8th Cir. 1962)(Blackmun, J.); See also 5 Wright & Miller, § 1233
(citing other authorities to the same effect).
When a party asserts a claim in an action for civil
conspiracy, “pleading of the evidence is surely not required and is
on the whole undesirable.” Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319,
326 (2d Cir. 1957)(Clark, C.J.); See 5 Wright & Miller, §§ 1221 and
1233. “The courts have recognized that the nature of conspiracies
often makes it impossible to provide details at the pleading stage
and that the pleader should be allowed to resort to the discovery
process and not be subjected to a dismissal of his complaint.” 5
Wright & Miller, § 1233, at 257 (citing authorities). But the
complaint must contain sufficient information to show that a valid
claim for relief has been stated and to enable the opponent to
prepare adequate responsive pleadings. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 provides: “The forms
contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules
and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of
statement which the rules contemplate.” See 12 Wright & Miller, §
3161, at 548 (“Most of the forms are exceedingly short and general
in their allegations. They deserve careful study for they indicate
much better than do the bare words of the rules the revolution in
25
procedure that the rules were intended to accomplish. . . .
Pleadings similar to the Official Forms inform the adversary of the
claim or defense asserted with sufficient particularity to enable
it to prepare a responsive pleading and the discovery and pretrial
rules amply protect the parties from surprise.”). As distinguished
from conspiracy, Rule 9(b) expressly requires that “the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.” Fed.R.Civ.P 9(b). However, Official Form 13
demonstrates that even fraud may be pleaded without long or highly
detailed particularity. 12A Wright & Miller, App. D Form 13
(“Defendant C.D. on or about______conveyed all his property, real
and personal [or specify and describe] to defendant E.F. for the
purpose of defrauding plaintiff and hindering and delaying the
collection of the indebtedness evidenced by the note above referred
to.”).
Contrary to the district court’s memorandum ruling, Thomas v.
Kadish, 748 S.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984), did not control its decision
of whether the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of minimum
contacts with Louisiana by each trade association defendant based
on its civil conspiracy with the tobacco manufacturers to commit an
intentional or willful act, which was carried out and resulted in
damage to the plaintiffs in the state. In that case, Thomas
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 against
various professors, administrators, and students associated with
his attendance at a California law school alleging that they
26
“‘conspired to create a record against him while he was in
California that would disqualify plaintiff from practicing law’ in
Texas . . . and . . . joined in a conspiracy with the Texas [Bar
Examiners]’to force plaintiff to drop his California suit’ against
them.” Id. at 282. This court concluded that neither the
“conclusory allegations of conspiracy by the California defendants
based upon their acts in California, nor the alleged effects of
this conspiracy in Texas, show a claim of sufficient minimum
contacts with Texas that would support personal jurisdiction of
Texas Courts against these defendants for their acts in
California.” Id. at 282 (citing Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406
(5th Cir. 1971)(a § 1985 conspiracy complaint dismissed for failure
to state a claim because “the complaint is devoid of any factual
allegations, which taken to be true, would support the requisite
element of conspiracy by the defendants”)). Thomas v. Kadish is a
simple case in which the complaint was devoid of factual
allegations. The plaintiff alleged no background facts whatsoever
in support of his bare allegations of two very unlikely
conspiracies, one between persons in California in 1977-1980 to
create a record against him to disqualify him from practicing law
in Texas in 1981, and another between the same California residents
and the Texas Bar Examiners to force him to drop his suit against
the California defendants. Although we intimate no opinion as to
the outcome, the Guidrys’ allegations, depositions and exhibits
present a considerable amount of detailed information in support of
27
a less farfetched conspiracy scenario. Consequently, the present
case presents a dissimilar and more difficult problem for decision
that is not readily controlled by the easier no-factual allegation
case of Thomas v. Kadish.3
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the district court
dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit against the tobacco trade
association defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the district court for
further proceedings.
3
See also Black v. ACME Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685-86 (5th
Cir. 1977) (personal jurisdiction and Texas long arm statute
reached nonresident corporation alleged to have conspired with co-
defendants to depress Texas beef prices and to have purchased $1.5
million of products originating in Texas in one year).
28