FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUHAM POLIS MARROGI, a.k.a. No. 05-72641
Stagkouri Mandela Georgios,
Agency No. A078-542-175
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 5, 2010 **
Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Suham Polis Marrogi, a native and citizen of Iraq, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and
review for substantial evidence factual determinations. See Husyev v. Mukasey,
528 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008). We grant the petition for review and remand.
The BIA assumed Marrogi established past persecution on account of her
Chaldean Christian identity, but held changed circumstances in Iraq, namely the
fall of the Ba’ath party, rebutted her presumption of future fear. After the BIA’s
decision, this court issued two decisions involving Chaldean Christians from Iraq,
in which the court concluded that the evidence regarding the fall of Saddam
Hussein and the Ba’ath party did not provide the agency with a basis to conclude
that petitioners no longer feared religious persecution. See Hanna v. Keisler, 506
F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2007); Mousa v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.
2008). Because, here, the government failed to make a sufficient showing
regarding “whether [Marrogi] would likely fear religious persecution from others
in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq,” we remand Marrogi’s asylum and withholding
claims for further consideration of this issue. Hanna, 506 F.3d at 938; see also
Mousa, 530 F.3d at 1030. Upon remand, the Board may wish to consider whether
Marrogi’s fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable in light of the current
conditions in Iraq. See Hanna, 506 F.3d at 939.
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We also remand because the BIA failed to consider in the first instance
whether Marrogi should receive humanitarian asylum on the ground that there
exists a “reasonable possibility” she may “suffer other serious harm” if removed to
Iraq. See Hanna, 506 F.3d at 939 (stating petitioner appeared to qualify for
humanitarian asylum based on the likely future harm he would suffer as a Christian
in Iraq, but remanding for the BIA to consider the issue in the first instance); see
also Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (BIA is not free to
ignore arguments raised by a party).
Finally, Marrogi contends that her statutory right to counsel and her due
process rights were violated by the IJ’s decision to proceed with a hearing when
counsel failed to appear, and by the IJ’s bias at subsequent hearings when counsel
was present. In light of our remand, we do not reach these issues.
In light of our conclusions, we also remand Marrogi’s CAT claim.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.
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