UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-11242
JANE M. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC.
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:93-CV-1970-D)
September 14, 1999
Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Jane M. Thomas (“Thomas”) worked as a sales assistant at Bear,
Stearns & Co., Inc. (“Bear, Stearns”). Thomas executed a U-4 form
allowing her to sit for the Series 7 examination to gain her
securities license. The U-4 form contained an arbitration clause.
After being fired Thomas sued Bear, Stearns alleging sexual
harassment and discrimination under Title VII and requested a jury
trial. The district court ordered her to arbitrate her claims and
the arbitration panel denied all of Thomas’ claims with prejudice.
She then moved the district court to reopen her case, vacate the
arbitration award, and grant her a jury trial. Thomas contended
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
that the enforcement of the arbitration clause in the U-4 form
denied her right to a jury trial under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, and that the NASD arbitration procedure did not adequately
protect her substantive rights under Title VII. The district court
denied Thomas’ motion and confirmed the arbitration award. Thomas
appeals relying on the same arguments she presented to the district
court.
Thomas’ argument rests entirely on her assertion that
enforcing the arbitration clause included in the U-4 form denies
her right to a jury trial for Title VII claims provided by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. As the district court noted, only the
Ninth Circuit agrees with her.2 Every other circuit to consider
the issue, including this Circuit, has held that the arbitration
clause contained in a U-4 form requiring arbitration of an
employee’s Title VII claims is enforceable.3 Additionally, these
courts relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v.
2
See Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182
(9th Cir. 1998).
3
See Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453, 455
(5th Cir. 1998); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179, 182-82 (3rd Cir. 1998); Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir.
1996); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308, 312
(6th Cir. 1991); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121
F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Metz v. Merril Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th
Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467-68
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
2
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) required the enforcement of the
mandatory arbitration clause in a U-4 form in the context of an
ADEA claim. We therefore affirm for the reasons given by the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
3