United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 14, 2002 Decided June 14, 2002
No. 01-1151
Process Gas Consumers Group, et al.,
Petitioners
v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Respondent
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company and East Tennessee Group,
Intervenors
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
James M. Bushee argued the cause for petitioners and
supporting intervenors. With him on the briefs were Bar-
bara K. Heffernan, Debra Ann Palmer, Roy R. Robertson
Jr., Jennifer N. Waters, Edward J. Grenier Jr. and Joshua
L. Menter.
Lona T. Perry argued the cause for respondent. On the
brief were Cynthia A. Marlette, General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Dennis Lane, Solicitor, and
Laura J. Vallance, Attorney.
G. Mark Cook and Howard L. Nelson were on the brief
for intervenor Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company. Shemin V.
Proctor entered an appearance.
Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Randolph and Tatel,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.
Tatel, Circuit Judge: Petitioners challenge the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's approval of Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company's proposed method for awarding pipeline
capacity and allocating meter amendments. Finding that the
Commission engaged in reasoned decision making with re-
spect to both issues, we affirm.
I.
The Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), 15 U.S.C. s 717, et seq.,
requires that natural gas companies charge "just and reason-
able" rates for the transportation and sale of natural gas. Id.
s 717c(a). To promote compliance with this mandate, the Act
requires gas pipelines to file rate schedules with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and to notify the Commis-
sion of any subsequent changes in rates and charges. Id.
s 717c(c), (d). On submission of a tariff revision, the Com-
mission may hold a hearing to determine whether the pipeline
has met its burden to show that the amended rates and
charges are "just and reasonable." Id. s 717c(e).
This case involves a proposed tariff revision that Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Company ("Tennessee") filed with FERC in
1996. In that revision, the company proposed adopting a net
present value, or "NPV," method to allocate pipeline capacity
and to process so-called "meter amendments." Two aspects
of the revision are relevant here: whether Tennessee must
impose a cap on the length of bids for pipeline capacity, and
whether it must credit existing gas shippers' contracts for
mainline capacity in evaluating meter amendment requests.
We considered both issues in Process Gas Consumers Group
v. FERC ("PGC I") and, finding FERC's reasoning defective,
remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. 177
F.3d 995, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, we explain each issue in
turn, first outlining FERC's original position, then summariz-
ing our decision in PGC I, and finally describing the Commis-
sion's orders on remand--the subject of this petition.
Capacity Allocation
Tennessee transports natural gas through a pipeline sys-
tem stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to New England.
Historically, the company awarded "firm capacity"--transpor-
tation for which the pipeline guarantees delivery, as distinct
from "interruptible capacity," for which delivery can be de-
layed if and when the pipeline has insufficient capacity to
meet all customers' demands, see PGC I, 177 F.3d at 997 n.1
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)--on a first-
come, first-served basis. The first shipper to submit a re-
quest received the available capacity, even if the shipper only
requested service for a few days or weeks while others sought
transportation for longer periods.
Recognizing the inefficiency of this capacity allocation
method, Tennessee's 1996 tariff revision proposed adoption of
an NPV method, under which the company would announce
an "open season" whenever it wanted to sell capacity, accept a
range of bids, compare the bids by discounting the value of
each bid to the present, and accept the bid with the highest
NPV. This new system, the pipeline argued, would permit it
to award firm capacity to those shippers who value the
capacity most--that is, since rates are capped, to those
shippers offering the longest contracts.
Responding to Tennessee's proposal, various parties, in-
cluding petitioner Process Gas Consumers Group, an associa-
tion of industrial users of natural gas, warned that although
FERC sets the maximum rate Tennessee may charge for
transporting gas, the pipeline could exercise its market power
to induce shippers to bid for longer contracts than they would
in a competitive market. In other words, the commenters
worried that shippers would "us[e] long contract duration as a
price surrogate to bid beyond the maximum approved rate,"
United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1140 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("UDC"), thereby giving Tennessee insurance
against future instability in the natural gas market. The
commenters urged FERC to address this concern by capping
the duration of bids Tennessee could consider in its NPV
calculations, "to simulate the end product of a competitive
market." PGC I, 177 F.3d at 998.
Ultimately, FERC approved Tennessee's proposed switch
from the first-come, first-served to the NPV approach. Tenn.
Gas Pipeline Co., 76 F.E.R.C. p 61,101, at 61,522 (1996). In
response to the commenters' market power concerns, howev-
er, the Commission suggested that the pipeline "include a
uniform cap" on the length of bids submitted during open
seasons. Id. at 61,519. Acquiescing, Tennessee proposed a
twenty-year cap, explaining that it chose such a high cap
because "bids beyond the [twentieth] year are unlikely to
have a significant impact on the NPV analysis." PGC I, 177
F.3d at 998-99 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
Following another comment period, FERC approved the
twenty-year cap. The Commission dismissed Process Gas's
objection that the cap was too long to provide adequate
protection against the pipeline's market power on the ground
that " '[b]idders are not forced into the maximum duration [of
twenty years].... Rather, the primary issue here, is ...
when two shippers both desire new capacity should that
capacity go to a shipper who values it more, i.e., for a longer
term, than another shipper who might value it less.' " Id. at
999-1000 (quoting Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 79 F.E.R.C.
p 61,297, at 62,339 (1997)). Unsatisfied with this response,
Process Gas filed a petition for review, contending that
FERC "failed to engage in reasoned decision making" in
accepting the twenty-year cap. Id. at 997.
In our first encounter with these issues in PGC I, we found
Process Gas's argument persuasive. Noting FERC's ac-
knowledgment that "the market served by Tennessee's pipe-
line has monopolistic characteristics," we held that the Com-
mission had not adequately justified its conclusion that a
twenty-year cap would "prevent the NPV method from com-
pelling shippers to offer the pipeline longer contracts than
they would in a competitive market." Id. at 1003. We
pointed out that the data on which FERC based its approval
of the cap--"three previous Commission decisions involving
ten and fifteen year ... agreements"--in fact suggested that
"competitive market contracts typically run to no more than
fifteen years." Id. In light of that evidence, we continued,
"a twenty-year cap would allow Tennessee's market power to
induce excessively long bids." Id. We recognized the legiti-
macy of FERC's "goal of encouraging the allocation of pipe-
line capacity to parties willing to pay the most for it," but
reminded the Commission of its "need to balance th[at] goal
with its duty to prevent exploitation of Tennessee's monopoly
power." Id. at 1004. Observing that "the orders suggest ...
FERC approved the twenty-year cap because, functionally,
twenty years would amount to no cap at all," we remanded to
the Commission, directing it to "take the problem [of Tennes-
see's monopoly power] seriously and confront it with a forth-
right explanation of why a twenty-year cap would not aug-
ment that power." Id. at 1005.
FERC then took an entirely different tack. Noting that
when orders are remanded, an agency generally has "discre-
tion to reconsider the whole of its original decision," Tenn.
Gas Pipeline Co., 94 F.E.R.C. p 61,097, at 61,398 (2001)
("Rehearing Order") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), aff'g 91 F.E.R.C. p 61,053 (2000) ("Remand Order"),
FERC not only declined to impose a shorter cap on capacity
bids, but removed the cap altogether, explaining that, for
various reasons, there is little risk that Tennessee will exer-
cise its monopoly power to force shippers into excessively
long contracts. Process Gas sought rehearing, but the Com-
mission denied its petition. Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at
61,401.
Meter Amendments
The second relevant aspect of Tennessee's 1996 tariff revi-
sion involves meter amendments. PGC I explained this term
as follows:
When natural gas is shipped through a pipeline, the
points at which the gas enters and leaves the system are
called "receipt" and "delivery" points, respectively. A
firm transportation shipper selects "primary" receipt and
delivery points ... [as] part of its contract with the
pipeline. Designating a point as primary guarantees the
shipper use of the point, an important right when the
pipeline lacks sufficient capacity at the point to satisfy
demand. Firm shippers can select other points on a
secondary basis, but can only use those points if there is
sufficient capacity beyond that taken by shippers using
them on a primary basis. A change in a primary receipt
or delivery point is ... referred to as a "meter amend-
ment" because gas is measured at these points.
177 F.3d at 1000.
The issue here concerns Tennessee's method for allocating
new primary points as they become available. Historically,
Tennessee permitted existing shippers to switch primary
points on a first-come, first-served basis as long as the chosen
new points were available and the shippers notified the
pipeline far enough in advance. When Tennessee adopted its
new NPV method for allocating mainline capacity, however,
the company indicated that it also intended to use this
method to allocate primary points. Thus, "[a] meter amend-
ment request would trigger an open season[,] and the reques-
ter would have to compete with other interested shippers on
the basis of NPV." Id. at 1001.
This new approach generated considerable controversy be-
cause in calculating the NPV of competing bids for a particu-
lar primary point, Tennessee declined to credit existing ship-
pers' preexisting promise to pay for firm capacity on the
company's mainline. That is, the pipeline proposed to assign
promised future payments an NPV of zero. Under this
system, therefore, an existing shipper wishing to switch its
primary delivery point from City A to City B could not
compete against a new shipper wanting to purchase mainline
capacity with a primary delivery point in City B: The existing
shipper's promise to continue paying for its firm capacity
would have an NPV of zero, while the new shipper's promise
to pay for as-yet unallocated mainline capacity would have a
positive NPV.
Various parties objected to the proposed change, claiming
that applying this method to meter amendments was "incon-
sistent with FERC's professed aim of assuring that [existing]
firm shippers have receipt and delivery point flexibility."
PGC I, 177 F.3d at 1001. The Commission sided with
Tennessee, however, emphasizing that " 'allocating capacity to
parties who value it the most' " would foster " 'economic
efficiency,' " and further, that nothing in the new NPV policy
would prevent existing shippers from using the desired
"points on a secondary basis." Id. (quoting Tennessee Gas,
79 F.E.R.C. at 62,337). The objecting parties sought rehear-
ing and, when FERC declined to change its position, filed a
petition for review.
Considering meter amendments in PGC I, we agreed with
the commenters that FERC's approval of the NPV method
emphasized "maximization of pipeline revenue" at the ex-
pense of "the ability of existing shippers to change primary
points." Id. at 1005. We rejected FERC's notion that
"shippers unable to obtain a point on a primary basis" could
simply use the point on a secondary basis because the latter
option would "not guarantee access to the point over any
fixed period of time." Id. at 1005, 1006. "At the end of the
day," we observed, "FERC's position is that regardless of the
ability of existing shippers to compete" for points, "it is best
to award primary point capacity on the basis of the amount of
additional revenue generated for Tennessee. If existing ship-
pers are injured, so be it." Id. at 1006. Rejecting this
approach, we remanded the meter amendment issue to the
Commission, explaining that, as we understood the situation:
Existing shippers entered into their contracts with Ten-
nessee with the expectation of a certain amount of pri-
mary point flexibility. When the pipeline proposes to
take away that flexibility altogether or reduce it substan-
tially, FERC is obligated to provide a better explanation
of why the shippers' resultant loss cannot be taken into
account in a more balanced application of the NPV
pricing system.
Id.
On remand, the Commission reconsidered its meter amend-
ment ruling but again concluded "it is just and reasonable"
for Tennessee to use an "allocation method that gives a
priority to bids [for primary points] which include a request
for the related mainline capacity." Remand Order, 91
F.E.R.C. at 61,192. In response to Process Gas's petition for
rehearing, the Commission reaffirmed its order. See Rehear-
ing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402.
II.
Seeking review again, Petitioners challenge the Commis-
sion's approval of Tennessee's procedures for capacity alloca-
tion and meter amendments, reiterating many of the chal-
lenges raised in PGC I and arguing that the Commission's
Remand and Rehearing Orders ignore that decision's express
requirements. In reviewing these arguments, we "uphold
FERC's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence
and ... endorse its orders so long as they are based on
reasoned decision making," Texaco, Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d
1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and responsive to PGC I.
With these standards in mind, we begin with the capacity
allocation issue. In its Remand and Rehearing Orders,
FERC offers several explanations for its decision to revoke
the cap on the duration of bids for pipeline capacity. Most
important, the Commission argues that existing regulatory
controls already limit Tennessee's market power, thereby
"minimiz[ing any] danger" that the pipeline will "withhold ...
capacity from the market" to "create [the] artificial scarcity"
necessary to force shippers to bid for supercompetitive con-
tract terms. Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,398. Spe-
cifically, FERC cites its regulations (1) setting the maximum
rate Tennessee may charge for its transportation services,
and (2) requiring Tennessee to sell all available capacity to
shippers willing to pay that maximum rate. Id. Given these
regulatory limitations, the Commission contends, "the only
way Tennessee could withhold capacity to force shippers to
accept longer contract terms is by refusing to build additional
capacity" to meet increased demand. Remand Order, 91
F.E.R.C. at 61,191. But, FERC continues,
[T]here is little reason for the pipeline to exercise market
power by withholding new capacity because the maxi-
mum rates established by the Commission prevent [the
pipeline] from charging rates above the just and reason-
able rates based on its cost of service. As a result, even
if the pipeline refused to build new capacity, its annual
revenues in any given year would be capped at its annual
cost of service. All that the pipeline could potentially
accomplish by withholding new capacity is getting the
customers to sign up for longer term contracts than they
otherwise might.... But this gives the pipeline no
immediate benefit in the form of increased revenues or
profits. It just reduces its long-term risk somewhat by
enabling it to obtain contracts with longer terms. By
contrast, if the pipeline built new capacity to serve the
increased demand, it could increase its current revenue
and profits.... As a result, even without a term match-
ing cap, it would appear that a pipeline has a greater
incentive to build new capacity to serve all the demand
for its service, rather than withhold capacity (by refusing
to build new capacity) in order to create scarcity.
Id. (footnote omitted). According to FERC, therefore, to the
extent shippers are bidding for longer contract terms than
they would in a competitive market, they are motivated not
by "pipeline monopoly power" but by competition with other
shippers for scarce pipeline capacity. Id.
Reinforcing this argument, the Commission points out that
if Tennessee ever refused to build new capacity to meet
shippers' demands, the shippers "could file a complaint with
the Commission." Id. Moreover, applicable rules, see 18
C.F.R. pt. 161, prohibit Tennessee from "favoring or colluding
with its affiliates" "to manipulate the market through sham
bids," Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,398, 61,400, so
longer bids truly reflect shippers' desire to establish longer-
term contracts with the pipeline.
Finally, the Commission explains that absent a "widespread
competitive market for primary pipeline capacity," there is
"no way of estimating what contract terms [such] a ...
market ... would produce." Id. at 61,399 n.8. Any cap
would therefore be arbitrary--and imposing an arbitrary cap
could "distort[ ] efficient operation of the market" by "pre-
vent[ing] a shipper [who] is willing to offer a longer contract
term ... from doing so." Id. at 61,399. Thus, the only
efficient solution, FERC contends, is to eliminate the cap
altogether and to rely on other regulatory controls to limit
Tennessee's market power.
These several rationales for uncapping the NPV bidding
process not only satisfy our deferential standard of review but
also address our principal concern in PGC I--FERC's failure
to articulate how a twenty-year cap would prevent Tennessee
from exploiting its monopoly power. No longer relying on a
cap to accomplish that objective, FERC now explains that
other regulatory constraints adequately limit Tennessee's
ability, as well as any incentive, to induce lengthy contracts.
We think this persuasive for two reasons. First, because the
Commission already regulates the rates pipelines may charge
and requires them to sell all available capacity at those rates,
we agree with FERC that Tennessee has neither the legal
ability to withhold existing capacity nor an incentive to refuse
to build new capacity. Second, any effort by Tennessee
affirmatively to manipulate the bidding process would violate
other Commission rules and would therefore presumably be
actionable. Accordingly, as FERC argues, the fact that
shippers may at times bid up contract length likely reflects
not an exercise of Tennessee's market power, but rather
competition for scarce capacity. See Remand Order, 91
F.E.R.C. at 61,190. The data the Commission cites, more-
over, indicate that the recent trend has been toward shorter
capacity contracts and, relatedly, that the average length of
post-1997 contracts is only 5.8 years--empirical facts demon-
strating that, as FERC predicted, most of the time shippers
have been able to obtain firm capacity without submitting
excessively long bids. Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at
61,401.
Even if we were skeptical of the Commission's conclusion
regarding existing regulatory controls, however, that conclu-
sion embodies precisely the sort of prediction about the
behavior of a regulated entity to which--in the absence of
contrary evidence--we ordinarily defer. As we have re-
peatedly observed, "it is within the scope of the agency's
expertise to make ... a prediction about the market it
regulates, and a reasonable prediction deserves our deference
notwithstanding that there might also be another reasonable
view." Envtl. Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1064
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
Challenging FERC's decision to remove the cap on bid
duration, Petitioners repeatedly compare the bidding process
for new capacity--at issue here--to the bidding process for
capacity that becomes available on expiration of an existing
shipper's contract. Some understanding of the latter situa-
tion is necessary to see why this comparison falls short. Put
simply, under FERC's current rules, when an existing ship-
per's contract for firm capacity expires, the shipper has the
right "to retain its service from the pipeline under a new
contract by matching the rate and duration offered by the
highest competing bid--up to the maximum 'just and reason-
able' rate approved by FERC." Interstate Natural Gas
Ass'n of Am. v. FERC ("INGAA"), 285 F.3d 18, 51 (D.C. Cir.
2002). In a series of opinions, we have questioned FERC's
position regarding the need for and the proper length of a cap
on the duration of such "right-of-first-refusal bids," to protect
existing shippers from routinely losing their firm capacity to
new customers offering longer terms. See id. at 51-53. The
situation is currently in flux, with this court having remanded
a twenty-year and, more recently, a five-year cap to the
Commission, first "for failing to explain the length" and then
for "failing to explain the brevity." Id. at 53 (citing UDC, 88
F.3d at 1140-41).
Regardless of what cap, if any, the Commission eventually
prescribes (and adequately supports) for right-of-first-refusal
bids, however, that cap has nothing to do with the issue now
before us. True, in PGC I, we cautioned FERC that its
attempt to distinguish the right-of-first-refusal context from
new capacity allocation "seem[ed] ... a distinction without a
difference." PGC I, 177 F.3d at 1004. If the data underlying
the cap on right-of-first-refusal bids are irrelevant in the
context of new capacity allocation, we continued, "FERC has
yet to tell us why." Id. We now understand why. As
INGAA explains, the requirement to protect existing ship-
pers from pipeline market power derives directly from Sec-
tion 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act, which "generally prohibits
'natural-gas compan[ies]' from ceasing to provide service to
their existing customers unless, after 'due hearing,' FERC
finds 'that the present or future public convenience or neces-
sity permit such abandonment.' " 285 F.3d at 51 (quoting 15
U.S.C. s 717f(b)) (alteration in original). No comparable
statutory provision requires FERC to protect new shippers
from competition for limited capacity (provided the final rates
are just and reasonable). With no entrenched interests re-
quiring protection, the Commission is free to conclude that an
uncapped bidding process maximizes market efficiency by
identifying which shipper is willing to pay the most--in terms
of contract length--to obtain such capacity.
This brings us to meter amendments. Addressing that
issue, FERC's Remand and Rehearing Orders make two
principal points. First, Tennessee's FERC-approved rate
schedule only permits existing shippers to " 'elect to substi-
tute new [primary points] ... in [their] service agreement[s]
... if there is [ ]adequate capacity available to render this
new service.' " Remand Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,192 (quot-
ing Schedule 4.7 of Tennessee's Rate Schedule FT-A). Sig-
nificantly, neither this schedule nor relevant Commission
orders address potential "conflicts" between "existing and
new shippers for primary point capacity that may become
available." Id. Thus, FERC maintains, while existing ship-
pers do have "an expectation of a certain amount of primary
point flexibility," PGC I, 177 F.3d at 1006, that expectation
extends only to available primary points; nothing in an
existing shipper's relationship with Tennessee entitles it to
win contested primary points from new shippers wishing to
purchase the point and associated mainline capacity. See
Remand Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,192, 61,193 ("[W]e do not
find that [an existing shipper's] contract, the pipeline's tariff
or our policy guarantees complete portability of ... capacity
at all times."); Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402
("[T]hat Tennessee's tariff gives shippers the ability to elect
to amend primary points where capacity is available does not
decide the issue of how to choose between two shippers
seeking primary rights at a point, where there is only suffi-
cient capacity for one ... to have primary rights."). Given
this framework, the Commission continues, Tennessee has no
obligation to treat existing shippers any differently from new
shippers when awarding contested primary points. Rather,
the pipeline may design any "reasonable" point allocation
method. Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402.
Continuing from this premise, FERC's second argument is
that Tennessee's chosen point allocation method, which as-
signs existing shippers' firm capacity contracts an NPV of
zero and therefore "consider[s] only new, incremental revenue
in awarding ... points," id., is "just and reasonable," Remand
Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,192. According to the Commission,
it is entirely reasonable for Tennessee to adopt a point
allocation method that "produce[s] greater revenue for the
pipeline" by assuring the sale of additional mainline capacity.
Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402. Moreover, the sale
of such capacity increases "throughput on the system," so "at
such time as Tennessee ... file[s] a new rate case, there will
be a greater number of units of service over which to spread
Tennessee's fixed costs"--a development that will "benefit[ ]
all [of] Tennessee's shippers by allowing Tennessee's rates to
be lower than they otherwise would be." Id.; see also
Remand Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,193. The Commission also
points out that even before Tennessee adopted the NPV
method, existing shippers only had the right to change to
available primary points; they never had a guarantee that
any particular point would be available at any particular time.
Consequently, those shippers "should have been prepared to
rely on [their contractually designated] point[s] for purposes
of bringing gas supplies onto the pipeline for the term of
the[ir] contract[s]." Rehearing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402.
Finally, FERC observes that (1) even after adoption of the
NPV method, about ninety percent of existing shippers' "re-
quests to change primary points have been granted," Remand
Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,193; (2) Tennessee's system has
much greater point capacity than mainline capacity, Rehear-
ing Order, 94 F.E.R.C. at 61,402; and (3) "Tennessee must
provide for pooling of [gas] supplies at points downstream of
its primary receipt points," enabling "shippers to obtain sup-
plies that originate from many different upstream receipt
points," id. at 61,402-03. As the Commission notes, these
three factors suggest that existing shippers will rarely have
to rely solely on their contractual primary points for receipt
of gas. Id.
Again, we find these explanations adequate to satisfy both
our standard of review and PGC I. Now that FERC has
clarified the nature of existing shippers' "expectation ... of
primary point flexibility," PGC I, 177 F.3d at 1006, we
understand that Tennessee has no obligation to give such
shippers a preference in competitive bidding for contested
primary points. In the absence of such an obligation, we
think it eminently reasonable for Tennessee to adopt a point
allocation method that promotes the sale of available mainline
capacity. Not only does Tennessee's chosen method benefit
the pipeline in the short term (and existing shippers when
and if the pipeline files a new rate case), but it ensures that
available points go to shippers who value them most--those
willing to pay for associated mainline capacity.
III.
In sum, we disagree with Petitioners that the Commission's
latest orders "ignore" PGC I. Pet'rs' Reply Br. at 3. That
decision required only that FERC better explain its reason-
ing in setting a twenty-year cap on bids for new mainline
capacity and approving the NPV method for evaluation of
meter amendment requests. On remand, the Commission
fully complied with that requirement, reevaluating both issues
and satisfactorily explaining its ultimate decisions to eliminate
the bid cap altogether and to reaffirm the meter amendment
ruling. The petitions for review are denied, and the orders of
the Commission are affirmed.
So ordered.