United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 18, 2002 Decided July 2, 2002
No. 01-7016
Ned Chartering & Trading, Inc.,
Appellee
v.
Republic of Pakistan and
Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv02626)
Nicholas H. Cobbs argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants.
Paul M. Tschirhart argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief was Heather M. Spring.
Before: Edwards, Henderson and Garland, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.
Garland, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Ned Chartering & Trad-
ing, Inc. brought this case against the Republic of Pakistan
and its Ministry of Food and Agriculture, contending that
Pakistan was required to pay it the proceeds of wheat ship-
ments to which plaintiff was entitled as assignee of a mari-
time contract. The district court granted summary judgment
against Pakistan for $268,000 plus interest that Pakistan had
instead paid to the assignor of the contract. Pakistan con-
tends that the district court erred in not delaying its ruling on
the motion for summary judgment in order to give it an
opportunity to take further discovery. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling without extending
the discovery period, we affirm.
I
In 1993, the Republic of Pakistan entered into a maritime
contract, known as a "charter party," with Horsebridge En-
terprises, Ltd. of Gibraltar for the shipment of wheat from
Turkey to Pakistan. Ned Chartering, a Washington, D.C.
corporation, acted as shipbroker and loaned Horsebridge the
money to charter the vessels that were to transport the
wheat. The loan agreement contained an assignment, where-
by in exchange for the loan it received from Ned Chartering,
Horsebridge assigned its right to the proceeds of the charter
party to Ned. Pakistan was to make its charter party
payments through a letter of credit drawn in favor of Ned.
Pursuant to the charter party and assignment, as the wheat
arrived Pakistan paid 90% of the amount it owed Horsebridge
directly to Ned Chartering. Pakistan retained 10%, pending
"necessary adjustment" for demurrage and additional freight
charges. Rider Clauses to Charter Party at 6 (J.A. at 55).
Before final payment was made, disputes arose between
Pakistan and Horsebridge concerning the amount of the
adjustments, and between Horsebridge and Ned Chartering
concerning the amounts due between them. Both Ned Char-
tering and Horsebridge pressed Pakistan for payment, and
Horsebridge assured Pakistan that it would indemnify the
Republic against any claims made by Ned. Ultimately, Hor-
sebridge persuaded Pakistan to pay it the amount still owed
for the final delivery of the wheat, which totaled $268,000.
By the time Pakistan paid Horsebridge, on or about October
31, 1995, the letter of credit had expired.
Ned Chartering initially sued Horsebridge, contending that
the latter owed it for payment due under the loan agreement.
Although Ned prevailed, Horsebridge turned out to be judg-
ment proof. Ned then turned to Pakistan. On October 29,
1998, it sued Pakistan and its Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture for failing to pay it the final installment under the
assignment agreement. Pakistan, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against Horsebridge. Pakistan, however, was un-
able to serve process on Horsebridge, and the district court
struck the third-party complaint on March 21, 2000. In the
meantime, the parties conducted some discovery, including
the exchange of interrogatories and document requests.
On May 11, 2000, Ned Chartering filed a motion for
summary judgment against Pakistan. Pakistan opposed sum-
mary judgment on two grounds: (1) that by the time the final
proceeds were paid, the assignment was void because the
letter of credit had expired; and (2) that it needed time to
conduct further discovery. The district court rejected the
first contention because, under the unambiguous language of
the assignment agreement, Pakistan's obligation to pay was
continuing and the letter of credit was only one means of
making payment. The court rejected the second contention
for two reasons: Pakistan had "already had sufficient discov-
ery," and had "failed to demonstrate how the further discov-
ery [it] request[ed] would produce any issues of material
fact." Ned Chartering & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Paki-
stan, No. 98-CV-2626, mem. op. at 8 (J.A. at 176) (D.D.C.
Dec. 4, 2000). Accordingly, the court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Ned Chartering.
II
In this court, Pakistan has abandoned its argument based
on the expiration of the letter of credit, and relies instead on
its second contention, that the district court should not have
ruled against it without permitting time for further discov-
ery.1 We review such claims solely for abuse of discretion by
the district court. See, e.g., Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia
Cas. Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We conclude
that either of the two reasons given by the district court for
denying further discovery was sufficient to justify its decision,
and that neither represents an abuse of discretion.
A
The district court concluded that the more than eighteen
months that passed between the date Ned Chartering filed its
complaint and the date it filed its motion for summary
judgment were sufficient for the parties to complete discov-
ery. Although summary judgment should only be entered
"after adequate time for discovery," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), we grant district courts great
latitude in determining how much time is adequate, and would
be hard pressed to find that limiting discovery to eighteen
months was an abuse of discretion in this case. Pakistan
sought an extension of time "in order to identify any defenses
Horsebridge may have had against" Ned Chartering. Ned
Chartering, mem. op. at 8 (J.A. at 176). "Specifically," Paki-
stan "asserted a need to depose the president of [Ned Char-
tering], Nadeem Ikramullah." Appellants' Br. at 14. Paki-
stan offers no reason to believe that it should have taken
more than eighteen months to accomplish that kind of discov-
ery. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779,
788 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that a district court does not
abuse its discretion in denying permission to conduct addi-
tional discovery when the party has had ample opportunity to
take discovery).
__________
1 Pakistan also contends that the district court should not have
decided the summary judgment motion without holding an oral
hearing. The decision to hold an oral hearing is committed to "the
discretion of the court," D.D.C. Local Rule 7.1(f); see United States
v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A., 961 F. Supp. 287, 292 n.7
(D.D.C. 1997), and we discern no abuse of discretion here.
Pakistan does note that, at the time Ned Chartering moved
for summary judgment, the court had not yet set a discovery
deadline. The absence of a deadline, however, was not a
license to delay completion until one was set. Moreover, on
April 20, 2000--weeks before the filing of the motion for
summary judgment--the parties filed a joint report pursuant
to Local Rule 16.3, which requires counsel to meet and
discuss "a date for completion of all discovery." That joint
report established a schedule for the filing of the summary
judgment motion: Ned Chartering was to file for summary
judgment within the next two weeks, Pakistan was to have
thirty days to file an opposition, and Ned was to have fifteen
days in which to reply. See Joint Rep. of the Parties,
Appellee's Br. app. 2 at 2. The report declared that "[t]hese
dates are mutually acceptable to the parties," and recited that
"both parties have already taken some discovery and ... no
material facts remain in dispute." Id. at 2-3. The court
adhered to this schedule, and Pakistan therefore has no cause
for complaint.
On appeal, Pakistan contends that, because "attorneys are
not clairvoyant," it could not foresee the discovery it would
need until it saw Ned Chartering's summary judgment mo-
tion. Appellants' Reply Br. at 10. But Pakistan did not
mention the limits of its attorneys' predictive powers when it
agreed to the schedule of the joint report, does not now cite
anything in Ned's motion that its attorneys did not anticipate,
and suggests no reason why the relevance of "any defenses
that Horsebridge may have had against the plaintiff" was not
as apparent before Ned filed as it was afterwards.
Pakistan also notes that the district court did not strike its
third-party complaint against Horsebridge until March 21,
2000, and contends that "[i]t made no sense for Pakistan to
conduct discovery concerning [Ned Chartering's] transactions
with Horsebridge while there remained a prospect that Hor-
sebridge would become a party to the action." Appellants'
Br. at 15. Pakistan does not explain why it "made no sense"
to conduct that discovery before learning whether it would be
able to join Horsebridge. If Ned Chartering's transactions
with Horsebridge afforded Pakistan a defense to Ned's action
on the assignment, presumably they did so regardless of
whether Horsebridge was a third-party defendant. And even
if conducting discovery before the court ruled on the third-
party complaint did not make sense, Pakistan does not ex-
plain why it did not initiate discovery during the six weeks
that passed between the time the court struck the third-party
complaint and the date Ned Chartering filed for summary
judgment--nor why it failed to seek more time in the joint
report.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Pakistan
had already had sufficient time to complete the discovery it
needed to defend against plaintiff's summary judgment mo-
tion.
B
The district court also denied Pakistan's request for a
discovery extension on the ground that it had "failed to
demonstrate how the further discovery [it] request[ed] would
produce any issues of material fact." That is certainly an
appropriate ground upon which to deny a discovery request.
See Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 710 n. 3 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that "a district court may deny discovery
requests when additional facts are not necessary to resolve
the summary judgment motion"); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)
(providing that a court "may order a continuance to permit
... discovery to be had," if it should "appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot ... present by affidavit facts essential to justify the
party's opposition"). And we agree that it was applicable
here.
Under District of Columbia law, the assignment of rights
under a contract creates an interest in the assignee, and any
party that previously had an obligation to the assignor under
the contract thereafter becomes obligated to the assignee and
liable to it for failure to fulfill that obligation. See District of
Columbia v. Thomas Funding Corp., 593 A.2d 1030, 1033-34
(D.C. 1991); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts
s 317 (1979). Accordingly, Ned Chartering contended that,
because Pakistan was the obligor under the charter party,
Horsebridge's assignment of the proceeds of that contract to
Ned obligated Pakistan to pay it those proceeds. At issue
here is Pakistan's request for discovery related to "any
defenses Horsebridge may have had against" Ned Charter-
ing. Ned Chartering, mem. op. at 8 (J.A. at 176). As the
district court noted, Pakistan sought this discovery on "the
assumption that [it] would be able to utilize such defenses
against" Ned as well. Id. at 8-9. But Pakistan offered the
court no grounds for concluding that this assumption was
correct. Id. at 9.
In support of the assumption that it could assert against
Ned Chartering any defenses Horsebridge had against Ned,
Pakistan cited a maxim of District of Columbia contract law:
"It is well settled that an assignee of a non-negotiable chose
in action acquires no rights superior to those held by his
assignor and is generally subject to any setoff available to the
obligor against the assignor." United States Nat'l Bank v.
Madison Nat'l Bank, 355 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D.D.C. 1973).
But as the district court concluded, while this maxim is
supported by the cases Pakistan cited,2 it "lends no support to
the defendant['s] arguments." Ned Chartering, mem. op. at 9
(J.A. at 177). That is so because in this particular play the
parties' roles are as follows: Ned Chartering is the assignee,
Horsebridge the assignor, and Pakistan the obligor. Hence,
the above maxim establishes only that Ned Chartering (the
assignee) took no rights against Pakistan (the obligor) superi-
or to those held by Horsebridge (the assignor), which means
that Ned is generally subject to any defense available to
Pakistan against Horsebridge. See Madison Nat'l Bank, 355
F. Supp. at 169. Although this would make Pakistan's
defenses against Horsebridge relevant, Pakistan did not seek
__________
2 See Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7 (J.A. at 121) (citing
Rittenberg v. Donohoe Const. Co., 426 A.2d 338, 341 (D.C. 1981);
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Security Bank, 244 A.2d 920, 923
(D.C. 1968); Hudson Supply & Equip. Co. v. Home Factors Corp.,
210 A.2d 837, 838 (D.C. 1965); United States v. Griffin, 707 F.2d
1477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
discovery of such defenses--presumably because it already
knew its own defenses. However, as the district court rightly
concluded, neither the maxim cited by Pakistan nor any of the
cited cases made relevant the discovery of Horsebridge's
defenses--the only discovery that Pakistan claimed to be
seeking.
On appeal, Pakistan argues that the district court erred
because it erroneously construed the assignment of the char-
ter party as "an absolute assignment," when it actually "func-
tioned as a security interest" for the underlying loan from
Ned Chartering to Horsebridge. Appellants' Br. at 11. On
this theory, Pakistan contends that it was relevant to discover
whether Horsebridge had paid Ned in full for the loan. If
Horsebridge had paid Ned, that payment assertedly would
have redeemed Horsebridge's collateral and left Ned without
an interest in the proceeds of the charter party. Id. at 12
(citing D.C. Code s 28:9-506; Applied Cos. v. United States,
144 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
As might be expected, Ned Chartering disputes Pakistan's
factual assertion, contending that the assignment was in fact
"an absolute transfer of property rights," rather than a mere
security interest. Appellee's Br. at 10 (quoting the assign-
ment agreement, J.A. at 78, as transferring "all right, title
and interest" in all proceeds payable to Horsebridge under
the charter party). We need not resolve this dispute. Paki-
stan never asserted the "security interest" theory before the
district court or cited any precedent that mentioned it, and
"[i]t is well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted
at the District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on
appeal." United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421,
425 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting District of Columbia v. Air
Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). That
rule is particularly apt when reviewing a district court's
determination that the discovery sought by a party is not
relevant to the merits of the action. It can hardly be an
abuse of discretion for a court to find requested discovery
irrelevant when the only grounds upon which it might be
relevant are not asserted until long after the court rules.
Pakistan insists that its security interest theory is not
really a new argument, but instead was implicit in the argu-
ments it made before the district court. It notes, for exam-
ple, that it described the assignment of the charter party
proceeds as "a security interest" in its opposition to Ned
Chartering's motion for summary judgment. Opp'n to Pl.'s
Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 (J.A. at 117). Although Pakistan did
include that description, it did so only in the "background"
section of the pleading. Pakistan attached no legal signifi-
cance to the description, and made no argument relating to it,
in the sections devoted to explaining why the court should
deny summary judgment or at least postpone it pending
further discovery. There was no reason for the district court,
reading that description, to attach a significance to it that
Pakistan apparently did not itself discern.
While conceding that the "authorities cited to the district
court to support Pakistan's position did not directly address
the limitations that the law imposes on assignments that are
security interests," Appellants' Reply Br. at 4, Pakistan also
contends that its security interest theory is really only anoth-
er way of expressing the legal theory upon which it did rely in
the district court: that an assignee "acquires no rights supe-
rior to those held by his assignor." Madison Nat'l Bank, 355
F. Supp. at 169. If discovery showed that Horsebridge had
already paid off its debt to Ned Chartering, Pakistan argues,
then granting judgment against the Republic would mean
that Ned "was entitled to be paid twice on the same debt."
And that would mean that Ned had acquired rights "that
were superior to those of its assignor." Appellants' Reply Br.
at 4.
As with the security interest theory, however, this theory
suffers from the fact that it was not raised below. Pakistan's
opposition to summary judgment contains no mention of a
claim that granting judgment for Ned Chartering would be
equivalent to holding that Ned was entitled "to be paid twice
on the same debt," and that such a holding would grant Ned
rights superior to those of Horsebridge. And even if Paki-
stan had made the argument, Madison's maxim would be of
no assistance to it. Madison and the other cases cited by
Pakistan hold only that the assignee acquires no rights
against the obligor superior to those held by the assignor.
Even if Ned had previously been paid by Horsebridge, execu-
tion of the judgment in this case would not mean that it had
been "paid twice on the same debt" by Pakistan.
Finally, Pakistan cites cases that it contends support the
proposition that a court must apply the relevant law regard-
less of whether the parties cite it. It is true that "[w]hen an
issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the
parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify
and apply the proposed construction of governing law."
United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents, 508
U.S. 439, 446 (1993) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991)) (emphasis added). But while a
court may draw upon its own knowledge of applicable prece-
dents in ruling on a motion, it is not required to unearth
theories and precedents not cited by a party in order to
determine whether that party's discovery requests are rele-
vant. Bringing those precedents and theories to the atten-
tion of the district judge is the job of the party's attorneys.
Because Pakistan gave the district court no reason to
believe that the discovery it sought was legally relevant to its
defense, and because the only possibly relevant reason it now
offers was not presented to that court, the denial of time for
further discovery did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
III
The task of district courts is hard enough as it is. We will
not make it doubly so by second-guessing their reasonable
scheduling decisions, or requiring them to discern the rele-
vance of parties' requests based on arguments never made
supported by precedents never cited. The judgment of the
district court, granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, is
Affirmed.