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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 13, 2003 Decided August 19, 2003
No. 02-3078
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
JAMAL STEVEN HANSON,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 99cr00208–01)
Douglas Wham, appointed by the court, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.
Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,
Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Tros-
man, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON, and GARLAND, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Defendant Jamal Hanson pled
guilty to distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base.
Before sentencing, Hanson moved to withdraw his plea on the
ground that his counsel had miscalculated the appropriate
sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines. The district court denied the motion and sentenced
Hanson to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hanson
contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw the plea. We conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion, and we therefore affirm its judgment.
I
On May 20, 1999, Hanson spoke by telephone to a prospec-
tive purchaser concerning the sale of two ounces of cocaine
base (‘‘crack’’). Unbeknownst to Hanson, the purchaser was
an undercover officer of the Metropolitan Police Department,
Detective David Dessin, and the conversation was electroni-
cally recorded. After the conversation, the two met in the
700 block of G Street, N.W. in Washington, D.C. Hanson sat
in the front passenger seat of Dessin’s car and handed the
detective a brown paper bag filled with more than fifty grams
of crack; Dessin gave Hanson $1,600 in exchange. The
conversations and transaction were recorded on audio- and
videotape, and two days later Hanson was arrested. A grand
jury subsequently returned a two-count indictment, charging
Hanson with distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base
on May 20, 1999, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A)(iii), and with distributing additional cocaine base to
Dessin the previous month, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii).
This was not Hanson’s first arrest. Indeed, he had been
arrested on several previous occasions. Two of those arrests,
in 1993 and 1994, resulted in convictions in Maryland state
court for possession with intent to distribute narcotics. The
3
1993 conviction involved over fifty grams of cocaine and three
pounds of marijuana.
Attorney Charles Daum was assigned to represent Hanson,
and after consulting with Daum, Hanson signed a written plea
agreement with the government. Hanson agreed to plead
guilty to the May 20th distribution of fifty grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A)(iii), and to cooperate with law enforcement authori-
ties ‘‘in any matter as to which the Government deem[ed] his
cooperation relevant.’’ Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1, 3(a) (Sept. 21,
1999). In return, the government promised, inter alia, to
dismiss the other count of the indictment and to file a motion
for a downward sentencing departure under United States
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 5K1.1 if it determined
that Hanson provided substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person. The agreement noted
the offense’s mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ im-
prisonment and statutory maximum sentence of life, and
stated that Hanson’s sentence would be ‘‘imposed in accor-
dance with the United States Sentencing Commission’s
Guidelines Manual.’’ Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1, 12. The plea
agreement also recited Hanson’s ‘‘underst[anding] that the
sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discre-
tion of the Court,’’ id. ¶ 12, and that Hanson would ‘‘not be
allowed to withdraw the guilty plea TTT solely because of the
harshness of the sentence imposed,’’ id. ¶ 4.
On September 21, 1999, the district court held the plea
hearing required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Hanson admitted to engaging in the May 20th
drug deal and that his other relevant conduct made him
accountable for a total of 146.5 grams of cocaine base. Daum
summarized the plea agreement, and stated that ‘‘the govern-
ment had also agreed that [it] would not file any enhancement
notification’’ — a reference to the notice that the government
must file under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) for a defendant to
receive the mandatory life sentence prescribed for an individ-
ual who distributes fifty grams or more of cocaine base after
two previous felony drug convictions, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
4
The court advised Hanson of the statutory minimum (ten
years) and maximum (life) sentences applicable to the offense
to which he was about to plead. 9/21/99 Tr. at 5–6. In
addition, the court discussed the import of the Sentencing
Guidelines. In particular, the judge asked the defendant
whether he understood that the court ‘‘won’t actually deter-
mine your sentence in your case until after TTT [the] presen-
tence report,’’ and that the court had authority ‘‘to impose a
sentence that’s more severe or less severe than the sentence
called for by the guidelines.’’ Id. at 6. Hanson said he
understood. The judge also expressly warned the defendant
against relying on ‘‘any prediction or promise as to what
sentence you’ll receive in this case,’’ because ‘‘the Court
doesn’t know itself right now until after a presentence report
is prepared.’’ Id. at 10. Again, Hanson said he understood.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court accepted Han-
son’s plea and released him on the condition that he maintain
weekly contact with the government. Id. at 12–13. As
contemplated in the plea agreement, sentencing was to be
delayed until Hanson completed his promised cooperation.
After his release, however, Hanson ceased cooperating and
broke off all contact with the government. He later ex-
plained that he had ceased cooperating because of concern for
his safety and that of his family — a concern that the district
court described as ‘‘legitimate.’’ 8/2/02 Tr. at 7.
The United States Probation Office prepared Hanson’s
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) on December 12,
2000. The PSR calculated Hanson’s base offense level as 32,
and gave him a three-level reduction for acceptance of re-
sponsibility. But it also categorized Hanson as a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which increased both his
offense level and his criminal history category, and resulted
in a guidelines sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ impris-
onment.
That range was well beyond what Hanson had been told to
expect by his attorney, Daum, who had calculated Hanson’s
guidelines sentencing range as 121–151 months. The error
was apparently due to Daum’s misunderstanding of the effect
5
of the two Maryland convictions. On the scheduled sentenc-
ing date, January 24, 2001, Hanson discharged Daum. The
court continued the sentencing and appointed a new attorney
to represent the defendant. On July 31, 2001, Hanson filed
the first of three motions to withdraw his guilty plea. This
motion, under then-effective Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, asked permission to withdraw the plea
based on Daum’s ineffective assistance in giving erroneous
advice regarding the guidelines sentencing range.
At the hearing on this first motion, Hanson testified that
Daum had told him that ‘‘my guidelines were 121 to 151
months, and if I cooperated, possibly it could be cut by two-
thirds.’’ 11/9/01 Tr. at 16. Hanson insisted that Daum had
never mentioned the possibility of a sentence higher than 151
months. Hanson also testified that Daum had not discussed
any possible defenses with him. On cross-examination, Han-
son admitted that he had taken part in the May 1999 drug
deal. He also admitted that he had known at the time he
pled that he would have faced a substantial risk if he had
gone to trial; but he denied knowing that a conviction would
have meant a mandatory life sentence. Finally, he acknowl-
edged knowing that a guilty plea would result in his release
pending sentencing, and that a downward departure for coop-
eration could result in a sentence below the guidelines range.
Id. at 32–33.
On December 10, 2001, the district court denied Hanson’s
motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the test set forth in
United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the
court noted that the government had ‘‘conceded that it
[would] suffer no prejudice’’ if Hanson were to be newly tried,
a factor that ‘‘slightly favor[ed] Hanson’s motion.’’ United
States v. Hanson, No. 99–0208, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Dec. 10,
2001). But the court also determined that Hanson had
‘‘asserted no viable claim of innocence,’’ id. at 15, and that
although Daum had rendered ineffective assistance, his defi-
cient performance had not prejudiced Hanson. The court
further noted that it had advised Hanson of the impossibility
of predicting the applicable sentencing range prior to prepa-
ration of the PSR, that the evidence against Hanson was
6
‘‘overwhelming’’ and that he had ‘‘provided no specificity at all
with respect to his purported potential defenses to the
charges,’’ and that by pleading guilty Hanson had obtained
not only the dismissal of the other count but also the opportu-
nity to earn a downward departure from the guidelines and
statutory mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 14–15. Thus,
the court concluded, the defendant had ‘‘made a rational
choice to plead guilty,’’ id. at 14, and there was ‘‘nothing
unfair or unjust in holding Hanson to his plea agreement,’’ id.
at 16.
On December 27, 2001, Hanson filed another request to
withdraw his plea, this time in the form of a pro se motion.
In this motion, Hanson asserted that he ‘‘fully intended to
make a viable claim of innocence,’’ on the basis of discovery
violations by the prosecution and defects in the chain of
custody of the government’s evidence. Mot. to Amend Origi-
nal Compl. at 3, 6. He blamed his second lawyer, whom he
had dismissed in the interim, for failing to raise these defens-
es in the preceding motion. On March 7, 2002, the district
court denied this second request to withdraw, noting that,
‘‘with respect to a viable claim of innocence,’’ the defendant
had ‘‘merely referred to ‘possible’ issues TTT but ha[d] again
failed to substantiate the claim with sufficient specificity and
evidentiary support.’’ United States v. Hanson, No. 99–0208,
slip op. at 2 (Mar. 7, 2002).
Hanson then hired a third attorney, who filed a third
request to withdraw. This request asserted, for the first
time, that Hanson had an entrapment defense that he would
have raised had the case proceeded to trial. On May 30,
2002, the district court held another evidentiary hearing.
Hanson testified that he had gotten involved in the transac-
tions at issue through his interactions with a man named
Seay, the government’s confidential informant and the boy-
friend of Hanson’s neighbor, Dominique. According to the
defendant, Seay pressed him to sell the crack to Detective
Dessin, preying on Hanson’s sympathies for Dominique, who
Seay said was pregnant and in financial difficulties. Domi-
nique, Hanson said, was ‘‘like family’’ to him, and he engaged
7
in the drug deals to help Seay provide for her. 5/30/02 Tr. at
19.
The district court issued an opinion denying this third
request on June 19, 2002. The court found it suspicious that
Hanson had failed to bring up or substantiate the entrapment
allegations earlier; the late-raised argument, the court said,
‘‘appear[ed] contrived.’’ United States v. Hanson, No. 99–
0208, slip op. at 13 (June 19, 2002). The court thought it
likely ‘‘that Hanson carefully reviewed this Court[’s] prior
decision and retooled his approach by particularly zeroing in
on the Court’s prior statement that ‘Defense counsel reiterat-
ed this general claim of a potential defense TTT but provided
no further specificity or support for it.’ ’’ Id. at 14. Further-
more, the court held, Hanson’s entrapment defense was not
viable because ‘‘the Court finds that while Hanson may have
taken some prodding before agreeing to engage in the narcot-
ics transactions in this case, Seay’s persistence was ultimately
successful because it appealed to Hanson’s self-interest as
well as his altruism. The Court thus is unconvinced that
Seay’s appeal to Hanson’s sympathies toward Dominique
overcame Hanson’s will to otherwise obey the lawTTTT’’ Id.
at 17.
Having denied Hanson’s third attempt to withdraw his plea,
the court sentenced the defendant to 262 months in prison,
the bottom of the guidelines range. This appeal followed.
II
Hanson poses a single issue for our review: ‘‘[w]hether the
district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hanson’s
pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.’’ Appellant’s
Br. at 1. The court’s decision on Hanson’s withdrawal motion
was governed by former Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provided: ‘‘If a motion to with-
draw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before
sentence is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be
withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason.’’
8
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) (2001) (emphasis added).1 In reviewing
the denial of a motion to withdraw, we consider three factors:
‘‘ ‘(1) whether the defendant has asserted a viable claim of
innocence; (2) whether the delay between the guilty plea and
the motion to withdraw has substantially prejudiced the gov-
ernment’s ability to prosecute the case; and (3) whether the
guilty plea was somehow tainted.’ ’’ United States v. McCoy,
215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 139 F.3d
at 929). As both parties agree, we review a district court’s
refusal to permit the withdrawal of a plea before a sentence
has been imposed only for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The government does not contend that its ability to prose-
cute would have been substantially prejudiced if withdrawal
had been permitted, a factor that in any event has never been
dispositive in our cases. See id. at 1208 (noting that ‘‘preju-
dice to the Government has never been a determinative factor
in our decision to affirm the district court’s decision to deny a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea’’). Hanson argues, however,
that he had a viable claim of innocence based on his entrap-
ment defense, and that his guilty plea was tainted because it
resulted from Daum’s incorrect advice regarding the guide-
lines sentencing range he would face if he pled. We there-
fore turn to an examination of those two factors.
III
Hanson contends that, had he gone to trial, he would have
had a viable defense of entrapment. The district court
disagreed, concluding that Hanson did not have a viable
defense and making clear that it thought Hanson had fabri-
cated the claim in response to the court’s statements. Al-
though we think it a close question whether Hanson’s defense
can be characterized as not ‘‘viable,’’ there is no question but
that it would have been extremely weak. We therefore
1 Effective December 1, 2002, the provision governing plea with-
drawals was amended and moved to Rule 11(d). See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11(d) (2003).
9
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
deciding that the proffered entrapment defense added little
weight on the side of permitting withdrawal.
The defense of entrapment ‘‘has two related elements:
government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predispo-
sition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal
conduct.’’ Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988);
see also United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir.
2000); United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir.
1998). When a defendant claims entrapment, he first bears
the burden of showing ‘‘that he was induced by the Govern-
ment to commit a crime he otherwise would not have commit-
ted.’’ United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 985 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). If the defendant is successful, ‘‘the burden then
shifts to the government to prove the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime.’’ Glover, 153 F.3d at 754; see
also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992).
Hanson argues that the inducement requirement was satis-
fied because the government’s informant, Seay, repeatedly
pressed him to sell drugs to Dessin. Hanson also asserts
that Seay ‘‘play[ed] on [Hanson’s] considerable sympathies for
Seay’s pregnant girlfriend, Dominique,’’ the neighbor whom
Hanson regarded as ‘‘ ‘like family.’ ’’ Appellant’s Br. at 18.
Hanson testified that he had sold the drugs ‘‘[s]trictly to help
out Seay and Dominique’s situation.’’ 5/30/02 Tr. at 51.
This claim of inducement is quite weak. ‘‘[R]epeated gov-
ernment solicitations do not establish inducement unless the
requests are coupled with persuasive overtures, or unless
there is evidence of reluctance on the defendant’s part dem-
onstrating that the repetition of the requests may have moved
an otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal act.’’
Glover, 153 F.3d at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And ‘‘[a]lthough we have TTT indicated that ‘pleas based on
TTT friendship’ can satisfy the inducement prong TTT, we have
never found such a plea sufficiently strong to do so.’’ Evans,
216 F.3d at 90 (citations omitted). Moreover, Hanson’s asser-
10
tion that his motive was friendship is belied by his admission
that he had a profit motive as well,2 an admission that is
hardly mitigated by his protestation that friendship was the
greater of the two motivating factors. And as the district
court noted, the fact that it took Hanson thirty-two months
and three lawyers before he asserted that Seay had en-
trapped him was a significant strike against the credibility of
his claim of inducement.
But we need not tarry over the inducement prong, because
the government had extremely strong evidence of Hanson’s
predisposition to commit the drug deal. During the preced-
ing six years, Hanson had been arrested on narcotics charges
multiple times and was twice convicted of possession with
intent to distribute.3 Indeed, he was still on probation for
one of those convictions when he was arrested for the offense
that is the subject of this appeal. PSR ¶¶ 29–32, 36. That
conviction involved more than fifty grams of crack and more
than three pounds of marijuana, with a total street value
exceeding $40,000. PSR ¶ 29. Moreover, Hanson’s testimo-
ny at the second evidentiary hearing ‘‘described his ability to
obtain significant quantities of drugs quickly,’’ his ‘‘indepen-
dent knowledge (i.e., apart from Seay and Detective Dessin)
of where to obtain the narcotics at issue,’’ and his ‘‘thorough
understanding of the current market prices for various quan-
tities of narcotics.’’ Hanson, slip op. at 18 (June 19, 2002).
On cross-examination, Hanson further recounted that he
2 See 5/30/02 Tr. at 41 (‘‘[N]o person in his right mind would take
a chance and endanger his life and not make nothing out [of] the
deal. So, yeah, if I can help him out and make something on the
side, I have to. I wouldn’t just go get the drugs and then give it to
him for freeTTTT’’).
3 See United States v. Haire, 103 F.3d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that ‘‘[p]rior distribution of illegal drugs TTT constitutes
predisposition’’); United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (holding that evidence of prior conviction for transferring
marijuana was evidence of predisposition to rebut defense of en-
trapment).
11
knew in advance the price at which he would be able to
purchase the crack that he intended to sell to Seay and
Dessin, as well as the going price for resale on the street.4
In sum, Hanson’s belated claim of entrapment was ex-
tremely weak, and we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in declining to give it much weight as a
factor favoring the withdrawal of Hanson’s guilty plea.
IV
The remaining factor to consider is whether Hanson’s
guilty plea was tainted. Hanson maintains that it was, by
Daum’s erroneous advice regarding the guidelines sentencing
range that would govern Hanson’s case if he accepted the
plea. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Su-
preme Court held that a claim that the ineffective assistance
of counsel rendered a plea not voluntary and intelligent must
be evaluated under the general test for ineffective assistance
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Such a claim requires two showings. ‘‘First, the defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was deficientTTTT
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense.’’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The government does not dispute that Daum’s failure to
take into account the career offender provisions of U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1 — and hence to recognize that Hanson’s post-plea
sentencing range would be 262 to 327 months rather than 121
to 151 — was constitutionally deficient. See United States v.
Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (‘‘This circuit has
held that a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a
plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance
if the lawyer makes a plainly incorrect estimate of the likely
sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he
should have been aware.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We therefore proceed to the question of whether counsel’s
4 In addition, in a pre-plea interview with the prosecution, Hanson
discussed his familiarity with several drug suppliers, provided infor-
mation that ranged from their cell phone numbers to particulars of
their drug operations, and stated that he had purchased narcotics
from them. See Hanson, slip op. at 18 (June 19, 2002).
12
deficient performance prejudiced Hanson. Where the defen-
dant attacks a plea bargain, the prejudice inquiry ‘‘focuses on
whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance af-
fected the outcome of the plea process.’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
‘‘[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defen-
dant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.’’ Id. We do not believe
that Hanson has made that required showing.
First, the district court’s admonition at the plea hearing
that Hanson should not rely on sentencing predictions weak-
ens the defendant’s claim that those predictions were at the
root of his decision to plead guilty. The court warned
Hanson that it wouldn’t ‘‘actually determine your guidelines
sentence in your case until after TTT [the] presentence re-
port,’’ 9/21/99 Tr. at 6, that the court had authority ‘‘to impose
a sentence that’s more severe or less severe than the sen-
tence called for by the guidelines,’’ id., and that Hanson
shouldn’t rely on ‘‘any prediction or promise as to what
sentence you’ll receive in this case’’ because ‘‘the Court
doesn’t know itself right now until after a presentence report
is prepared,’’ id. at 10. Hanson assured the court that he
understood. In United States v. Horne, this circuit relied on
a virtually identical set of warnings as a factor in concluding
that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying
a motion to withdraw a plea, notwithstanding the fact that —
as was true here — defense counsel had substantially under-
estimated his client’s guidelines range by misunderstanding
the import of a prior Maryland felony conviction. 987 F.2d
833, 834–38 (D.C. Cir. 1993).5
Second, even if counsel had told Hanson that the applicable
guidelines range was 262 to 327 months if he pled, Hanson
5 See also United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 847 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (vacating a guilty plea, but noting that the case contrast-
ed with Horne because ‘‘[i]n Horne, the district judge expressly told
the defendant, before accepting his plea, that ‘he should not rely
upon any [sentencing] estimate made by his counsel or anyone
else’ ’’ (quoting Horne, 987 F.2d at 836)).
13
would nonetheless have had reason to expect a sentence
below that. As Hanson’s plea agreement makes clear, he
anticipated providing substantial assistance to the govern-
ment in other narcotics investigations, which would have
qualified him for a departure below both the guidelines range
and the statutory minimum sentence. Plea Agreement
¶ 10(e); see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Although
Hanson ultimately broke his agreement to provide such assis-
tance out of concern for his and his family’s safety, we must
evaluate what his likely decision would have been at the time
of the plea — albeit with the hypothetical benefit of compe-
tent advice. And it is reasonable to expect that a competent
attorney would have advised Hanson that he stood a good
chance of obtaining a sentence well below the (correctly
calculated) guidelines range if he followed through on his
pledge of cooperation.
Third, had Hanson proceeded to trial and been convicted,
his prior convictions would have dictated a mandatory life
sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Although Hanson
asserts that his counsel did not tell him and that he did not
know he faced a life sentence at the time he agreed to plead
guilty, there is evidence to the contrary.6 In any event, in
order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, Hanson must
show that it is reasonably likely he would have insisted on
going to trial ‘‘but for counsel’s errors,’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59,
which means all of counsel’s errors, not just some of them.
6 This includes Daum’s statement at the plea hearing that the
government had agreed not to file an enhancement notice (which
would have made the mandatory life provision applicable). It also
includes the testimony of a police officer that, after Hanson’s arrest,
the officer told Hanson that he was facing ‘‘letters’’ not ‘‘num-
bers’’ — meaning a life sentence rather than a term of years — and
that on hearing that information Hanson had lowered his head and
‘‘slouched.’’ 11/9/01 Tr. at 60–61. On cross-examination, Hanson
acknowledged that he knew what the phrase ‘‘letters not numbers’’
meant, but denied that anyone had told him that was what he faced.
Id. at 40–41.
14
The Hill/Strickland inquiry focuses on what the defendant
would have done had he been advised by a competent attor-
ney, not one who was merely partially incompetent. And
there is no question but that a competent attorney would
have advised Hanson of the mandatory minimum sentence he
faced. See Booze, 293 F.3d at 518–19.7
Finally, any competent attorney would also have advised
Hanson that he stood little chance of obtaining an acquittal at
trial. The evidence of his participation in the two drug
transactions with which he was charged was overwhelming,
while his only defense — entrapment — was exceedingly
weak. To be sure, Hanson does not need to show that he
would have prevailed at trial, only that there was a reason-
able probability that he ‘‘would have gone to trial.’’ McCoy,
215 F.3d at 108 (emphasis added). But any rational decision
regarding the latter would have required a realistic assess-
ment of the former. And we think it extremely doubtful that,
had he been advised that the sentencing range for conviction
after a guilty plea was 262 to 327 months, with a reasonable
reduction anticipated for cooperation, Hanson (who was only
25 years old) would have chosen to go to trial despite the
overwhelming likelihood that as a consequence he would
spend the rest of his life in jail.
We conclude that Hanson has failed to show that ‘‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Accordingly, the district court
7 As the defendant correctly notes, we reversed a district court’s
refusal to withdraw a guilty plea in McCoy, where the defendant
also faced the risk of a mandatory life sentence if he lost at trial.
But the defendant in McCoy did not have Hanson’s advantage on
the other side of the ledger: the opportunity for a reduced sentence
if he pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In addition,
in McCoy the district court not only did not warn the defendant
against relying on sentencing predictions, it failed to advise him of
the maximum statutory penalty. See McCoy, 215 F.3d at 105, 106,
108.
15
did not err in holding that Hanson’s guilty plea was not
tainted by the ineffective assistance of his counsel.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hanson’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. The judgment of that court is
therefore
Affirmed.