United States v. Brown, Monte

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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2004 Decided July 20, 2004

No. 03-3069

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLANT

v.

MONTE F. BROWN, JR.,
APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(02cr00283–01)

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C.
Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth
Trosman, and Ana F. Matheson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause
and filed the brief for appellee.

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge; RANDOLPH and ROBERTS,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The main question presented in
the government’s appeal from an order suppressing evidence
is whether, under the Fourth Amendment, items found in the
passenger compartment of a car gave rise to probable cause
to search the trunk. A subsidiary issue is whether it is
necessary for the government to present evidence of the
training and experience of the officer who conducted the
search.
‘‘Running radar’’ at 1:30 a.m. in the Fort Dupont area of
Washington, D.C., United States Park Police Officer Robert
LaChance clocked a Chevrolet sedan exceeding the speed
limit and pulled it over. He asked the driver – Monte F.
Brown, Jr. – for his driver’s license. Brown produced a card
containing his name and photograph; across the top of the
card were the words ‘‘Washington, D.C. IDENTIFICATION
CARD.’’ LaChance radioed the Park Police communications
center and confirmed that Brown did not have a District of
Columbia driver’s license. He then placed Brown under
arrest, handcuffed him and put him in the back of the police
car.
LaChance returned to Brown’s vehicle and began searching
it. In the passenger compartment he found a receipt in
Brown’s name for repair of the car; a valid registration for
the car; a Virginia driver’s license; a District of Columbia
driver’s license; an American Express credit card; and a
blank personal check. Brown’s photograph appeared on both
of the licenses, each of which was under the driver’s seat.
The Washington, D.C. license bore the name of ‘‘John
Wright’’ with an address different than the one on Brown’s
identification card. The Virginia license was in the name of
‘‘Donald Lichvancid’’ at an address in Arlington, Virginia.
The American Express card was also in that name. The
blank check was in the name of ‘‘Donald L. Vancid,’’ and
contained the same address as the Virginia license. Both the
credit card and the check were on the passenger seat.
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After searching the passenger compartment, Officer La-
Chance turned his attention to the trunk. There he found
what appeared to be newly purchased items and receipts for
the items, among which were a pager, a comforter and
several pairs of shoes. The items were in shopping bags with
the names of different stores on the bags. The officer also
discovered a loaded pistol.
The government charged Brown with one count of posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon. Brown moved to
suppress the pistol, arguing that it was the fruit of an
unlawful search. The district court determined that Officer
LaChance had probable cause to stop Brown for speeding, to
arrest him for driving without a license, and to search the
passenger compartment incident to the arrest. United States
v. Brown, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-6 (D.D.C. 2003). The search of
the trunk was another matter. Id. at 6-10. Officer La-
Chance testified that he believed he was authorized to search
the trunk incident to Brown’s arrest for driving without a
license. The district court held that under New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981), only a search of a
vehicle’s passenger compartment may be conducted incident
to a lawful arrest of an occupant. A search of a car’s trunk
required probable cause of its own. But Officer LaChance
was not thinking in those terms. At the suppression hearing
he said nothing about what the items found in the passenger
compartment signified to him; and he did not testify about
his experience and training. The district court held that the
searching officer ‘‘must provide TTT some testimony about
what justified his actions, what inferences he drew from the
circumstances he faced, and, in a case like this, specifically
why he had a basis to believe there was evidence of crime in
the trunk.’’ Brown, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 9. Since LaChance
gave no such testimony, the court issued an order suppress-
ing the pistol.
The district court was correct in holding that the search of
the trunk depended on ‘‘whether the police had probable
cause to believe that contraband might be found’’ there.
United States v. Rocky Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir.
2003); see also United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C.
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Cir. 1997). It follows that Officer LaChance misunderstood
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It does not
follow that his error rendered the search of the trunk uncon-
stitutional. In holding otherwise, the district court relied on
two statements in United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995 F.2d
1069, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Prandy-Binett I) (internal cita-
tions omitted): (1) ‘‘ ‘probable cause’ is evaluated not only
from the perspective of a ‘prudent man,’ but also from the
particular viewpoint of the officer involved in the search or
seizure’’; and (2) ‘‘whether the officer’s inference from the
facts was ‘reasonable’ TTT depends on information showing
the officer’s accumulated knowledge of criminal activity, infor-
mation that must be in the record if it is to be considered.’’
Both statements accurately reflect the law. Neither was
meant to suggest that a court must hold a search unconstitu-
tional unless the officer testifies about how his particular
training and experience led him to draw inferences amounting
to probable cause.
Our opinion in Rocky Brown makes this clear enough, but
the decision came down after the district court ruled in this
case. Rocky Brown also dealt with the search of a car’s
trunk. As here, the question was whether there was proba-
ble cause to believe the trunk held contraband. We sustained
the search because it was reasonably likely, in light of what
the passenger compartment contained (a pistol) and other
evidence (including multiple gunshots heard recently in the
neighborhood), that another weapon would be in the trunk (as
it was). 334 F.3d at 1171. In finding probable cause for the
search of the trunk, we did not mention reasonable inferences
from the evidence in light of the officer’s particular expertise.
Like Officer LaChance, the officer in Rocky Brown had not
thought along those lines. He opened the trunk to secure
whatever it contained, believing – wrongly – that he did not
need probable cause to do so. 334 F.3d at 1172 n.8.
Rocky Brown, and the cases it cites and discusses, set forth
three propositions of law that are controlling here. The first
is that an officer’s testimony about his experience, although
relevant as Prandy-Binett I held, is not ‘‘a necessary element
of a probable cause determination,’’ Rocky Brown, 334 F.3d
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at 1171. The second is that a search may be upheld even if
the officer never considered whether he had probable cause
to conduct the search. Id. at 1172 n.8. The third is that in
this situation the standard ‘‘for probable cause is objective’’
(id.): would the evidence lead a ‘‘prudent, reasonable, cau-
tious police officer’’ to believe that there was a reasonable
likelihood the trunk contained contraband. United States v.
Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(c), at 38 (3d ed. 1996).
That standard, we believe, was met in this case. In
‘‘assessing probable cause,’’ we ‘‘necessarily deal with condi-
tional probabilities’’: ‘‘if one event occurs, how likely is it that
another event will occur?’’ United States v. Prandy-Binett, 5
F.3d 558, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying rehearing) (Prandy-
Binett II); Prandy-Binett I, 995 F.2d at 1070. Here, any
objective observer would have concluded that the driver’s
licenses, the American Express card, and the personal check
found in the passenger compartment of Brown’s car were
fraudulent. Of these, the two most important were the
Virginia license in the name ‘‘Donald Lichvancid’’ with
Brown’s photograph and the American Express card under
the same name. It is unimportant whether this evidence
tended to show that Brown had engaged in identity theft, or
that he had procured the credit card under a fictitious name,
or that the card was forged. See Prandy-Binett I, 995 F.2d
at 1073-74. Whatever the case, several reasonable inferences
leading to probable cause may be drawn. It may be useful to
spell these out in sequence rather than rest on the non-
descriptive ‘‘totality of the circumstances test,’’ which of
course is not really a test at all. See Prandy-Binett II, 5
F.3d at 559.
The initial step is to ask why Brown possessed the Ameri-
can Express card. The answer requires no special training
or experience in law enforcement. It is likely, highly likely,
Brown had the credit card for the same reason everyone else
has credit cards – to purchase goods and services. As for the
Virginia driver’s license, there are two important consider-
ations. The first is Brown’s failure to display it when Officer
LaChance asked him for his driver’s license. This makes it
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probable that Brown intended to use the fraudulent license
for a purpose other than avoiding a charge of driving without
one. The only plausible explanation is that he had the
Virginia license so that he could engage in face-to-face trans-
actions with his American Express card. It is common
knowledge that merchants sometimes demand credit card
purchasers to produce a driver’s license as identification.
Since Brown probably had the credit card and the license in
order to make fraudulent purchases, it is reasonable to as-
sume that he had successfully accomplished his objective,
which brings us to the trunk of the car. Everyone knows
that drivers who lawfully purchase items at stores often place
their purchases in the trunks of their cars. Nothing in
common experience suggests that criminals act any different-
ly. The trunks of automobiles store items; they also conceal
them. The time of the stop – 1:30 a.m. – may somewhat
lessen the likelihood that Brown purchased anything within
the previous few hours. But nothing tended to offset the
distinct possibility that the trunk contained earlier purchases.
It is fair to assume that one would not run the risk of driving
around with such obviously incriminating documents unless
they were going to be put to use. Burglar’s tools on a car’s
passenger seat give rise to a likelihood not only that the
driver used the tools but also that he placed the fruits of his
crime in the trunk. So here.
Other reasonable inferences suggested that evidence of
criminal activity might be in the trunk. The Virginia driver’s
license did not exactly match the name on the check (‘‘Donald
L. Vancid’’). The check would doubtless be of no use without
an identification document containing the same name. Since
such a document was not in the passenger compartment, one
logical place to look for it was the trunk of the car. In
addition, the number on the check – 2484 – suggested the
existence of other checks in the series. Again, a logical place
to look for them was in the trunk.
For these reasons, ‘‘the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act,’’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
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160, 175 (1949), lead to the conclusion that the search of the
trunk was supported by probable cause.
Reversed.