United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 14, 2005 Decided May 27, 2005
No. 04-5082
LAWRENCE STEPHEN MAXWELL, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
JOHN W. SNOW, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 00cv01953)
(No. 01cv00246)
Lawrence S. Maxwell, appearing pro se, argued the cause on
his own behalf and was on the joint briefs for appellants. With
him on the joint briefs were Vasilios S. Lambros representing 55
legal entities and 507 other pro se individuals.
Laurie Snyder, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were
Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Jonathan S. Cohen,
Attorney.
Before: SENTELLE , HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit
Judges.
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Lawrence S. Maxwell
and approximately 562 other individuals and entities filed this
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking, inter alia, tax return information and
declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss most of the claims, ruling that
Appellants’ requests had not complied with Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requirements and that the declaratory
and injunctive relief prayed was frivolous. Appellants
contended that 26 U.S.C. § 6103 provides a basis to request
“return information” not subject to FOIA; that their claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief were improperly dismissed
because there remained unresolved issues of fact; and
furthermore, that their claims were not frivolous. For the
reasons more fully set forth below, we conclude that the District
Court was correct and affirm its dismissal of Appellants’ claims.
I. Background
In June of 2000, Appellant Lawrence S. Maxwell sent a ten-
page letter to the National Office of the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) Disclosure Unit seeking tax-related information
for the tax years 1987-2000. He sought disclosure of at least
nineteen types of information pertaining to himself including (1)
“return information” as described in the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), (2) records showing how his “taxable
income” was determined, (3) records showing that he was given
notice of a duty to file a tax, (4) records identifying him as an
individual subject to taxation, (5) records indicating his
citizenship and residency, purportedly because as a citizen and
resident of the U.S. he would not be liable for income tax, (6)
records showing that he “resided or worked within one of the
specified areas of federal jurisdiction of the United States
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government,” purportedly because only such records would
establish federal jurisdiction to tax him, and (7) records
indicating the specific code sections showing him liable for a
particular tax or requiring him to fill out certain forms. Maxwell
cited the provisions of § 6103, relying on this Court’s decision
in Lake v. Rubin, 162 F.3d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1998), a case in which
he was a party, for the proposition that “individuals seeking
‘return information’ . . . must do so pursuant to § 6103 . . . rather
than the Privacy Act.” Id. at 116. The other Appellants sent
letters to the IRS that were identical to Maxwell’s in all relevant
respects. The IRS did not grant or deny the requests, but
informed Appellants by letters that their “Freedom of
Information/Privacy Act” requests did not comply with the
“published procedures for making a request under the Privacy
Act,” advising them how to cure the error.
FOIA outlines procedures for agencies to make information
available to the public under certain conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
Subsection (b)(3) provides that information need not be given
out when it is specifically exempted from disclosure by another
statute (“Exemption 3”). Id § 552(b)(3). Section 6103 of the
Internal Revenue Code specifically exempts tax returns from
disclosure except in specified circumstances. For example, an
individual may request inspection of his tax return or “return
information,” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(1), (7), including
a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his
income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions,
credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax
withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments,
whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be
examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or
any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by,
furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a
return or with respect to the determination of the existence,
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or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of
any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest,
fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense. . . .
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). Section 6103 thus “does not
supersede FOIA but rather gives rise to an exemption under
Exemption 3” and FOIA procedures must still be followed in
applying § 6103. Church of Scientology of California v. IRS,
792 F.2d 146, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Appellants disputed the IRS requirement that they must
follow FOIA or Privacy Act procedures, and filed suit against
the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking access to the requested
information under § 6103, as well as fees, costs, and money
damages. Appellants also requested declarations by the court
that, among other things, Appellants are not citizens, that Texas
is not a part of the United States, and that the United States itself
is unconstitutional because it is not a republican form of
government. The United States moved to dismiss the cases,
arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 6103 and that
Appellants had failed to make a proper FOIA request to exhaust
their administrative remedies. Appellants responded that, under
Lake, § 6103 provides jurisdiction independent of FOIA.
The District Court, reading Lake in the context of Church
of Scientology, found that while § 6103 may supercede the
Privacy Act, it does not supercede the procedural provisions in
FOIA. It ruled that, while Appellants had failed to send their
requests to the proper local bureau under FOIA, 31 C.F.R. §
1.5(b)(3), that error only tolled the Government’s time to
respond while the request was transferred to the correct bureau.
It also found that the Appellants may have failed to “reasonably
describe the records” sought, 31 C.F.R. § 1.5(b)(4), but that the
IRS could not simply dismiss the entire request because some of
the nineteen requests were incomplete or consisted of “pseudo-
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requests” attempting to challenge tax laws rather than seek
information. It then reviewed the requests and found all to be
overly broad or burdensome with the exception of the portion
seeking “return information” as described in 26 U.S.C. § 6103.
The District Court thus directed the IRS to process the portion
of Appellants’ requests for “return information” according to
FOIA, granting the motion to dismiss as to the other requests.
The other claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were
dismissed as frivolous. Appellants filed this present appeal.
II. Analysis
Where, as here, we are reviewing a ruling on a motion to
dismiss, we will “accept as true all facts alleged by the
nonmoving party and . . . draw all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Center for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Because the District
Court did not make any evidentiary findings of its own, we
apply this standard de novo. Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d
201, 204-05 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
A. Standing of Challenged Appellants
Before addressing the substantive merits of Appellants’
claims, we must determine the proper parties to this case. The
IRS has moved to dismiss two groups of individuals as
Appellants. The first group consists of nineteen Appellants1
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The nineteen challenged Appellants are: Ed Francis Bradley,
Ed Francis Bradley II, Ronald Lance Bradley, Roy Claudius Bradley,
J.C. Chisum, Adam E. Chudzikiewicz, Edward Chudzikiewicz, Jack
E. Fyke, Brenda G. Lacy, Neil T. Lacy, Debra L. LaRue, Steven R.
Lutz, Terrence M. McLoughlin, J.J. Miller-Wagenknecht, David M.
Shipley, Cherie D. Teeple, Stephen B. Teeple, Petrona A. Williams,
and Vernon F. Williams.
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who allegedly were not parties to the District Court case because
they did not sign the original complaint or either amended
complaint. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), all pleadings by a pro
se plaintiff must be signed by the party and, if not, must be
stricken unless corrected promptly after being notified of the
omission. The IRS moved to dismiss claiming that in this case
notification at an earlier time was essentially impossible because
of the large number of plaintiffs and the disorganized
presentation of names and signatures in the complaint.
Appellants did not make a timely response and failed to address
the issue in their merits brief although instructed to do so. We
therefore will consider this issue conceded for lack of response
by Appellants, and dismiss the nineteen challenged Appellants
for lack of standing because they were not parties to the
appealed proceeding.
The second set of Appellants that the government has
moved to dismiss are two individuals, Runar Dean Johnson and
Lavina Rae Johnson, who have outstanding sanctions against
them in the Ninth Circuit for filing a frivolous appeal on the
grounds that the IRS does not legally exist. The sanctions were
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in June of 2003, but the Johnsons
have failed to pay them despite repeated requests. Other circuits
have dismissed actions and refused to entertain future litigation
if sanctions or costs incurred in an earlier proceeding, or in prior
actions involving the same parties and the same or similar
subject matter, remain unpaid. See, e.g., Hymes v. United States,
993 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cir. 1993); Christensen v. Ward, 916
F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); Zerman v. Jacobs, 814 F.2d 107,
109 (2d Cir. 1987); Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868, 871-
72 (5th Cir. 1986). This rule provides for sanctions against
frivolous appeals under FED. R. APP. P. 38 to be made effective
and helps protect the courts from abuse. It is uncontested that
the Johnsons have incurred and failed to pay these sanctions,
and the subject matter of their sanctioned appeal is similar to the
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claims in this case. We therefore dismiss Runar Dean Johnson
and Lavinia Rae Johnson’s appeal because of their failure to pay
sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal in a similar matter.
B. Use of FOIA Procedures for § 6103 Requests
Appellants first challenge the District Court’s determination
that their requests for “return information” under 26 U.S.C. §
6103 should be processed according to FOIA procedures. They
argue that the Lake holding made § 6103 the exclusive statutory
route to seek this information. They characterize the
government’s desire to follow FOIA procedures as a “deceptive
shell game” in which the IRS throws up successive procedural
barriers on shifting and “revisionist” legal theories to avoid
answering Appellants’ requests. Appellants also claim, without
citing any support, that FOIA requirements cannot be applicable
to their requests for personal information, but only to requests
for public information. All of these arguments fail, for the
reasons already articulated by the District Court.
The Appellants misread Lake by taking it out of the context
of Circuit precedent and therefore their only legal argument is
without merit. In 1986 this Court decided Church of
Scientology, holding that FOIA is intended as an “across-the-
board” statute covering all requests for information unless
specifically exempted in a later statute. 792 F.2d at 149.
Because § 6103 contains no such exemption and has no
procedures or rules of its own implying an exception to FOIA,
the court held that FOIA procedures apply to § 6103 requests.
Id. at 149-50. The Lake court decided in 1998 that 26 U.S.C. §
6103 was the proper vehicle for requesting information rather
than the Privacy Act because 26 U.S.C. § 7852(e) withdrew the
power of the federal courts to force the IRS to comply with the
Privacy Act. See Lake, 162 F.3d at 114. It did not, as
Appellants assume, make § 6103 the exclusive statute governing
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requests for information from the IRS, but only said that § 6103
must be used instead of the Privacy Act.
As the District Court notes, we must read Lake and Church
of Scientology together and not assume with Appellants that
Lake overruled Church of Scientology. In fact, it could not have
done so because this Court is bound to follow circuit precedent
until it is overruled either by an en banc court or the Supreme
Court. Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369, 1373 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Nor is it difficult to read these cases in harmony.
Lake does not speak to whether FOIA requirements should apply
to the processing of Appellants’ § 6103 requests, so Church of
Scientology clearly controls this case in requiring FOIA
procedures. The District Court was thus correct in holding that
FOIA still applies to § 6103 claims.
C. Dismissal of Frivolous Claims
Appellants finally contend that the District Court erred in
dismissing Appellants’ requests for injunctive and declaratory
relief as frivolous. They maintain that theirs were not simply
“tax protest claims” to be dismissed out of hand, and that eighty
issues of material fact existed at the time of the motion to
dismiss that should have been resolved before dismissal. They
give examples of these alleged issues of fact in their brief,
including “Whether the federal United States government is a
‘corporation’,” and, “Whether a corporation is a republican
form of government” (emphasis in original). These arguments
are without merit.
First, the examples of “material facts in dispute” put forth
by the Appellants are not issues of fact at all, but issues of law,
and do not appear in the amended complaint in this case or
elsewhere in the record before this Court. Similarly, the
requests for relief denied by the District Court are all patently
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frivolous, including requests for declarations that laws passed by
Congress do not apply to Maxwell as a “sovereign citizen of the
Union State of Texas,” that the United States is not a republican
form of government and therefore must be abolished as
unconstitutional, that the Secretary of the Treasury’s jurisdiction
is limited to the District of Columbia, that Maxwell is not a
citizen of the United States, and so on.
Most of these claims are only relevant to this case based on
Appellants’ legal theory that the federal government’s
jurisdiction is limited to the District of Columbia and other
federally owned lands by art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution.
This is a blatant misreading of this clause which does not limit
the other constitutional grants of authority to the federal
legislature but only limits the places where the federal
government has exclusive legislative power. The other grants of
authority in Article I still hold, including the power to “lay and
collect Taxes . . . throughout the United States.” U.S. C ONST .
art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Sixteenth Amendment further authorizes a
direct nonapportioned income tax upon United States citizens
throughout the country. Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S.
1, 12-19 (1916). Both of these powers to tax have long been
upheld by the Supreme Court; arguments resting on the
assumption that the federal government has no such power are
frivolous. Appellants’ few remaining claims are based on
similar outright misreadings of various federal statutes and
constitutional provisions and are likewise frivolous. We thus do
not address these and other issues not material to the outcome of
this case.
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III. Conclusion
For the reasons given above we dismiss twenty-one
Appellants from this appeal, affirm the District Court’s holding
that FOIA procedures should apply to requests for return
information under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of all other claims for relief as frivolous. We
dismiss all other outstanding motions as moot.