United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 4, 2005 Decided June 3, 2005
No. 03-5370
MILTON JOSEPH TAYLOR,
APPELLANT
v.
UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICE, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
(USDC) for the District of Columbia
(No. 03cv02134)
Paul S. Berman, appointed by the court, argued the cause as
amicus curiae in support of appellant.
Milton J. Taylor, pro se, was on the briefs of appellant.
Megan L. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for appellee United States Probation Office. With her on
the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael
J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.
Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the
cause for appellee M.L. Brown. With her on the brief were
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Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General for the District of
Columbia, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.
Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.
ED WARDS, Circuit Judge: Milton J. Taylor appeals from
the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights action for
damages arising out of his allegedly unlawful confinement at the
District of Columbia Central Detention Facility (“CDF”).
Taylor does not challenge any conviction or sentence. Rather,
he contends that his placement at CDF was unlawful in light of
orders of the federal District Court and the local Superior Court
prescribing that he be confined at a halfway house.
Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court,
on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2000),
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court
concluded that Taylor had failed to satisfy the so-called
“favorable-termination” or “prior-invalidation” requirement of
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which bars
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) seeking “damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid,” unless the plaintiff “can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.”
We reverse. Heck and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
make it clear that Heck ’s application is limited to suits that, if
successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, i.e., suits challenging the fact
or duration of confinement. Because Taylor’s complaint
challenges only the fact that he was confined at one facility
rather than another and, thus, does not challenge the fact or
duration of his confinement, the rule of Heck is inapplicable.
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I. BACKGROUND
In June 2001, following an allegation that Taylor had
violated the terms of his supervised release imposed after a prior
criminal conviction, see United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-
0035 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1997), the District Court revoked the
supervised release and sentenced Taylor “to be imprisoned for
a term of . . . SIX (6) months to be served in Hope Village
Halfway House for intensive residential drug counselling and
treatment.” United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-0035 (D.D.C.
June 19, 2001), reprinted in App. of Court-Appointed Amicus
Curiae (“App.”) at 3. Taylor was directed to surrender himself
to the halfway house when space became available and to report
to his probation officer for drug testing in the interim. Id.
On July 31, 2001, before space had become available at the
halfway house, Taylor was arrested and charged in the District
of Columbia Superior Court with an unrelated drug offense.
Three days later, the Superior Court ordered that Taylor be
released to a halfway house on work release pending trial.
Pursuant to this order, Taylor was transferred from CDF (where
he had been confined since his arrest) to a local halfway house.
On August 14, while Taylor was at the halfway house, the
United States Marshals Service issued a detainer against Taylor
to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. See
United States Marshals Service Detainer of 8/14/2001, reprinted
in App. for Appellee Brown (“Supp. App.”) at 1. “A detainer is
a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution
in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either
to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when
release of the prisoner is imminent. Detainers generally are
based on outstanding criminal charges, outstanding parole- or
probation-violation charges, or additional sentences already
imposed against the prisoner.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S.
716, 719 (1985) (citations omitted).
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The detainer at issue in this case requested the Department
of Corrections to notify the Marshals Service when Taylor was
released from the Department’s custody, so that the Marshals
could take Taylor into custody. See Detainer, Supp. App. at 1.
The detainer referenced the docket number of Taylor’s criminal
case in the District Court and included the following notation:
“6 Mths Halfway House.” See id. On August 15, however, the
day after the detainer was issued, Taylor was removed from the
halfway house and taken to CDF, where he remained until
January 2002. It is unclear whether Taylor was taken from the
halfway house by the U.S. Marshals, local authorities, or others.
Nor is it clear at whose direction and on what authority Taylor
was moved.
In October 2001, Taylor filed two actions in the District
Court challenging his confinement at CDF as inconsistent with
the Superior Court’s order that he be placed in a halfway house
pending his local trial and the District Court’s order that he
serve his federal sentence at a halfway house. Taylor sought
damages as well as his release back to the halfway house. The
District Court construed both actions as petitions for habeas
corpus, and, because Taylor had been released by the time the
petitions were considered, dismissed the petitions as moot on
September 27, 2002. See Taylor v. U.S. Prob. Office, Civil Nos.
01-2132, 01-2133 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2002), reprinted in App. at
5-8. It appears that Taylor did not appeal these dismissals.
In September 2003, Taylor commenced the instant civil
action for money damages against the CDF warden, the U.S.
Probation Office, and his federal probation officer. Taylor’s
complaint alleges that the defendants unlawfully detained him
at CDF in violation of the orders of the District Court and
Superior Court.
Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court
dismissed the case on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring court to dismiss in forma pauperis
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action “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . .
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”). The
court concluded that Taylor’s claim “goes to the fact or duration
of his confinement,” and was therefore barred under Heck
because Taylor had not established prior invalidation.
See Taylor v. United States Prob. Office, Civil No. 03-2134
(D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2003), reprinted in App. at 14-16.
This appeal followed. Professor Paul Schiff Berman was
appointed by the court as amicus curiae to present arguments in
support of Taylor’s position.
II. ANALYSIS
As noted above, the District Court dismissed Taylor’s
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. We review such
dismissals de novo. See Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d
1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Dismissal for failure to state a
claim is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957). We must accept all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and give Taylor the benefit of all inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from those allegations. Kaempe
v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We also remain
mindful that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, like Taylor,
are “h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (per curiam).
The gravamen of Taylor’s complaint is that his confinement
at the CDF location rather than at a halfway house was unlawful,
because it contravened the orders of the District Court and the
Superior Court. The District Court concluded that this claim
“goes to the fact or duration of his confinement” and, thus, that
Taylor was required under Heck to establish that his “conviction
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or sentence ha[d] already been invalidated,” see Heck, 512 U.S.
at 487. Because Taylor made no such showing, the District
Court dismissed the case. We hold that the District Court erred
in dismissing this action, because, as we explain below, Taylor’s
claim is not subject to Heck’s prior-invalidation requirement.
****
In Heck, a state prisoner brought an action for damages
pursuant to § 1983, challenging the conduct of state officials
who, the prisoner alleged, had unconstitutionally caused his
conviction by improperly investigating his crime and destroying
evidence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478-79. Pointing to “the hoary
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” the
Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Williams v. Hill, 74
F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that
the Heck rule also applies to claims under the cause of action
created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
The Heck Court made it clear that this requirement of prior
invalidation in § 1983 actions applies only if “a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. If, on the other
hand, “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not
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demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment
against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.”
Id.
This limitation on Heck’s applicability has been preserved
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Just last year, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that “Heck’s requirement to resort to
state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not . . .
implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no
consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.”
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam); see
also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005) (“Heck
specifies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages
where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a
(not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”). And we
have observed that this limitation creates a “clear line between
challenges to the fact or length of custody,” which amount to a
collateral attack on the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, “and
challenges to the conditions of confinement,” which have no
implication regarding the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s conviction
or sentence. Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168 (D.C. Cir.
1997); see also Dotson, 125 S. Ct. at 1248 (stating that Heck
bars a state prisoner’s § 1983 action, absent prior invalidation,
only if “success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or its duration”).
****
Applying these principles, it is abundantly clear that Heck’s
favorable-termination requirement is not implicated by Taylor’s
complaint. If Taylor succeeds in his action, this will
demonstrate nothing more than the unlawfulness of his
placement at the CDF location instead of a halfway house.
Success in this case will in no way imply that any confinement
of Taylor was invalid or that the duration of his confinement
should have been shorter. Thus, Heck’s concerns regarding
collateral attacks on criminal judgments are not in play here.
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Indeed, far from attacking the federal and local court orders
sentencing and remanding him to a halfway house, Taylor
argues that his placement in CDF was unlawfully inconsistent
with those orders. He is not challenging the validity of the
orders themselves.
It does not matter that the claims underlying Taylor’s
action, although not implying the invalidity of the court orders,
might imply the invalidity of whatever administrative
determination prompted his removal from the halfway house to
CDF, for it is clear that “the incarceration that matters under
Heck is the incarceration ordered by the original judgment of
conviction.” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751 n.1; see also Brown,
131 F.3d at 168 (“One of the Court’s principal concerns in Heck
was to limit collateral attacks on final judgments; but a
proceeding that is incapable of giving rise to collateral estoppel,
like that at issue in this case, hardly needs to be insulated from
collateral attack.” (citation omitted)). Thus, Taylor’s action is
properly characterized as a challenge to a condition (namely, the
location) of his confinement, and not its fact or duration.
Appellees argue at length that a challenge to Taylor’s
confinement would have been properly cognizable in habeas.
This is obviously beside the point. It may well be that habeas is
available where a prisoner alleges that he “is unlawfully
confined in the wrong institution,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 486 (1973) (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894),
and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)), or “is being
unlawfully detained by the Executive,” id. (citing Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972)), but this is not the question under
Heck. Rather, Heck specifically limited its application to
damages actions that, if successful, “would necessarily imply the
invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); cf. also Brown, 131 F.3d at 168-
69 (“Habeas corpus might conceivably be available to bring
challenges to such prison conditions . . . but requiring the use of
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habeas corpus in such cases would extend Preiser far beyond the
‘core’ of the writ that Preiser set out to protect.”).
Finally, there is no merit to appellees’ argument that
Taylor’s use of phrases like “illegal confinement” and
“unconstitutional sentence” in his pleadings suggests that he is
challenging the fact of his confinement. Taylor’s pro se
complaint is more faithfully read as challenging only the fact
that he was confined at CDF instead of a halfway house. The
complaint challenges neither the legality of any conviction or
sentence, the fact of his incarceration, nor the length of his
incarceration. Rather, the complaint challenges a condition of
confinement – i.e., placement at the CDF location rather than at
a halfway house – so his action is not subject to Heck. See
Brown, 131 F.3d at 168 (noting the clear “distinction between
challenges to the fact or length of custody and challenges to
conditions of confinement”).
In sum, on the record at hand, we hold that Taylor’s
complaint lies outside of Heck’s ambit. There appears to be no
dispute that the judgment of the District Court, the order of the
Superior Court, and the U.S. Marshals Service Detainer all
specified that Taylor was to be in custody at a halfway house,
but that he was removed from a halfway house and confined at
CDF. Taylor alleges that he suffered cognizable injury as a
result of this action. Appellees may have valid defenses to these
claims. For example, the federal appellees claim that the
Probation Office played no role in the issuance or execution of
the detainer. But any such defenses are properly addressed upon
consideration of the merits of Taylor’s action. We express no
view on the merits. We hold only that, in light of Heck’s
inapplicability, there is nothing on the face of Taylor’s
complaint that justified the District Court’s summary dismissal
of the case at this stage of the proceedings.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
So ordered.