Schuler v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 10, 2007 Decided February 12, 2008

No. 06-7207

HAROLD D. SCHULER, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED OLDER EMPLOYEES,
APPELLANT

v.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP,
APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 05cv02355)

David L. Rose argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs was Dotie Joseph.

Eric M. Nelson argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief were Stephen L. Sheinfeld and Minoti Patel. Julie
A. Klusas Gasper entered an appearance.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
 TATEL, Circuit Judge: A sixty-three-year-old
professional who works in his employer’s Washington, D.C.
branch office filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s New York district office alleging
that his employer, headquartered in Manhattan, is violating
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by
maintaining a discriminatory partnership policy under which
the company refuses to promote older qualified employees.
After the EEOC dismissed the charge and informed the
employee of his right to sue, the employee filed a class-action
complaint in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
alleging violations of the ADEA and the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act and seeking relief for the company’s
failures to promote him in July 2004 and July 2005. The
district court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiff
failed to satisfy the ADEA’s procedural requirements because
he failed to file (1) his EEOC charge with the D.C. Office of
Human Rights and (2) a new EEOC charge following the
company’s allegedly unlawful July 2005 promotion denial.
We reverse. Plaintiff satisfied the ADEA’s state filing
requirement by virtue of a worksharing agreement between
the EEOC and the D.C. Office of Human Rights, as well as
through the Commission’s referral of his charge to the New
York State Division of Human Rights. And because plaintiff
seeks damages flowing from the July 2004 ADEA violation
alleged in his original EEOC charge through the present, his
failure to file a new charge after the July 2005 nonpromotion
decision is of no consequence.

I.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it
“unlawful for an employer to . . . discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Patterned after
Title VII, the ADEA allows “[a]ny person aggrieved [to]
 3
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for
. . . legal or equitable relief.” Id. § 626(c)(1). Before doing
so, however, plaintiffs must jump through two administrative
hoops. First, under section 626(d) plaintiffs must file a
discrimination charge with the EEOC. See id. § 626(d) (“No
civil action may be commenced by an individual under this
section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful
discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.”). Second, section 633(b) requires
that plaintiffs also file a charge with an appropriate state
agency:

[If] an alleged unlawful practice occur[s] in a
State which has a law prohibiting discrimination
in employment because of age and establishing or
authorizing a State authority to grant or seek
relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit
may be brought under section 626 of this title
before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under the
State law, unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated.

Id. § 633(b). Under section 633(b), “resort to administrative
remedies in deferral States by individual claimants is
mandatory, not optional.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 758 (1979). This requirement “is intended to screen
from the federal courts those discrimination complaints that
might be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in state
proceedings.” Id. at 756.

In this case, appellee PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), a
large accounting and professional services firm headquartered
in New York City, maintains a “Partners and Principals
Agreement” providing that each partner’s “association with
 4
the Firm shall cease at the end of the fiscal year in which he
or she attains age 60,” and, as a result, rarely promotes
employees over the age of forty-five to partner. See Compl.
¶¶ 17-19; see also Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
357 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting, in a related
case, that “PwC does not dispute that its Partnership
Agreement requires mandatory retirement for partners or that
fewer employees are admitted in higher age brackets . . . .”).
Partners enjoy higher salaries, more generous retirement
benefits, and greater responsibilities than other professional
employees. Compl. ¶ 12.

Appellant Harold Schuler, a managing director in PwC’s
Washington, D.C. office, alleges that the company refuses to
promote him “and other qualified older professional
employees” to partner on the basis of age in violation of the
ADEA. Id. ¶ 2. Schuler alleges he is the longest serving
managing director in the firm, having been promoted to that
position in 1994, and that his education, training, and
experience qualify him for partnership.

The case before us is Schuler’s second lawsuit against
PwC. In May 2002, Schuler, along with a co-worker, C.
Westbrook Murphy, sued the firm over the same allegedly
discriminatory partnership policy. See Murphy, 357 F. Supp.
2d 230. Before initiating that suit, Schuler filed an
administrative charge with the District of Columbia Office of
Human Rights (DCOHR) alleging that PwC denied him
promotion on the basis of age from 1999 to 2001. Id. at 236.
Schuler “cross-filed” his charge with the EEOC, meaning that
both the DCOHR and the Commission received a copy.
Schuler and Murphy alleged violations of the ADEA, as well
as the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) and the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), both of
which also prohibit age discrimination. See D.C. Code § 2-
 5
1401.01 et seq.; N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. The district
court dismissed most of the ADEA claims for failure to file
timely administrative charges with the EEOC. See Murphy,
357 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40. And of significance to the case
now before us, the district court dismissed the NYHRL claims
because, in its view, New York law requires plaintiffs to
“allege that the actual impact of the discriminatory act was
felt in New York.” Id. at 244. The court allowed the
plaintiffs’ DCHRA claim and ADEA “disparate treatment”
claim to go forward, however, and that case remains pending
in the district court. See id. at 245, 249.

On February 23, 2005, Schuler, laying the groundwork
for the case now before us, filed another EEOC charge
alleging that PwC’s promotion policy violates the ADEA. In
particular, the class-action charge, which Schuler’s counsel
mailed overnight from his office in Washington, D.C. to the
EEOC’s New York district office, alleged that “PwC has
followed and continues to follow age discriminatory practices
for promotion to partnership that favor employees younger
than 40 years old and harm me and other older employees.”
EEOC Charge of Discrimination, No. 160-2005-01264
(February 2005). Schuler’s charge also alleged that “PwC has
promoted more than 1,500 of its professional employees to
partnership on and after July 1, 1998 through at least July 1,
2004, and not one (0) of those promoted was over the age of
60 when promoted.” Id. In a five-page declaration attached
to the charge, Schuler asserted that he and other employees
had failed to make partner because of “policies and
procedures adopted and maintained by [PwC]’s Senior
Partner and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Nally and the 14
other members of its Board of Partners and Principals,” and
alleged that the “Board decides each year which employees
shall be promoted to partnership.” Decl. of Harold Schuler 1,
 6
4. Schuler stated that he resides in Virginia and alleged that
PwC maintains its headquarters in New York City.

Schuler addressed his charge to the “New York City
(NY) Commission Human Rights [sic], and New York State
Div. of Human Rights, and EEOC.” He included the
following instruction: “I want this Class Action Charge filed
with both the EEOC and the State and local Agency, if any.”
EEOC Charge of Discrimination. At the end of his
supporting declaration, Schuler typed, mostly in capital
letters, “This complaint should be CROSS FILED WITH
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENCIES OF NEW YORK
CITY, THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND
WASHINGTON, D.C.” Decl. of Harold Schuler 5.

Three weeks later, the EEOC informed Schuler by letter
that it had received his ADEA charge and would file it with
the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR),
assuring him, “You need do nothing further at this time.”
Letter from Patricia M. Araujo, Investigator, EEOC, to
Harold Schuler (Mar. 14, 2005). The letter made no mention
of the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights,
however, and nothing in the record indicates whether either
the EEOC or Schuler ever referred the charge to that local
agency.

On April 28, 2005, the EEOC, acting again through its
New York district office, dismissed Schuler’s charge with the
cryptic explanation, “Case in Court/District of Columbia,”
EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Apr. 28, 2005)—an
apparent reference to the still pending Murphy litigation. See
Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1,
3 n.2 (D.D.C. 2006). The notice informed Schuler that he
could file suit in federal district court within ninety days, a
time limit the parties tolled as they attempted to settle the
 7
case. When negotiations failed, Schuler, seeking relief for
PwC’s failure to promote him to partner in July 2004 and
again in July 2005, filed the present action in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.

Schuler’s complaint includes two claims: one federal,
one state. First, pointing to PwC’s mandatory partner
retirement policy, Schuler alleged that “PwC has engaged in a
pattern and practice of age discrimination in making decisions
regarding assignments and promotions in violation of Section
4 of the ADEA.” Compl. ¶ 50. Second, asking the court to
invoke its supplemental jurisdiction, Schuler brought a claim
under the DCHRA. D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. PwC filed
an answer and, arguing that Schuler had failed properly to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, moved
to dismiss the case on the pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P.
12(c).

The district court granted PwC’s motion and dismissed
the complaint. Explaining that under National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), “each
incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse
employment decision constitutes a separate actionable
unlawful employment practice for which an administrative
charge must be filed,” the court considered PwC’s two
allegedly improper failures to promote Schuler as discrete
incidents and analyzed each independently. Schuler, 457 F.
Supp. 2d at 4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Beginning with PwC’s July 2004 decision not to promote
Schuler to partner, the district court found that Schuler had
failed to file his charge with the DCOHR. According to the
court, because the District of Columbia is a “deferral state”
under the ADEA, i.e., it provides an administrative remedy
for employment discrimination, the statute required Schuler to
file with the state agency there—the site of his alleged
 8
injury—before seeking redress in federal court. Id. The court
found it irrelevant that Schuler’s charge had been cross-filed
with the New York State Division of Human Rights. See id.
at 5. Turning next to the July 2005 nonpromotion decision,
the court found that Schuler had failed to file an EEOC
charge arising out of the July 2005 promotion denial within
the ADEA’s 300-day statute of limitations period. Id.
Schuler had filed his only charge in February 2005—four
months before PwC’s second allegedly discriminatory failure
to promote him. Having thus disposed of Schuler’s federal
claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Schuler’s state-law DCHRA claim. Id.

Schuler now appeals. We review a district court’s
decision to grant a motion for dismissal on the pleadings de
novo. See Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d
1483, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “We will affirm the district
court if the moving party demonstrates that no material fact is
in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “the factual allegations of the complaint must be
taken as true, and any ambiguities or doubts concerning the
sufficiency of the claim must be resolved in favor of the
pleader.” Doe v. DOJ, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

II.
Before determining whether Schuler has satisfied the
ADEA’s administrative prerequisites, we must resolve a
dispute between the parties over the precise nature of
Schuler’s claims. Schuler argues that contrary to the way the
district court characterized his complaint, he has alleged a
“pattern and practice” of age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA, which is rooted in PwC’s mandatory retirement and
partnership promotion policies. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (explaining that in a
 9
Title VII “pattern or practice” case, “discrimination [is] the
company’s standard operating procedure—the regular rather
than the unusual practice”). According to Schuler, these
policies led PwC’s board to deny him and other older
employees admission to the firm’s partnership in July 2004
and July 2005. PwC, echoing the district court’s opinion,
refers to the 2004 and 2005 nonpromotion decisions as
separate claims to be analyzed and disposed of independently.

We need not dwell long on this dispute, for the complaint
answers the question in Schuler’s favor. Schuler did raise
two claims, but not the ones the district court thought. As
noted above, Schuler’s first claim, raised under the subject
heading “Claim One,” alleges the following ADEA violation:

PwC has discriminated against Schuler and against
other professional employees of PwC over the age of
45 by denying them promotions to partnership on the
basis of their age. . . . PwC’s discriminatory
promotional practices are guided by an underlying
discriminatory policy that requires all partners to
leave their employment with PwC when they attain
age 60.

Compl. ¶ 48. Put simply, Schuler’s first claim is this: “PwC
has engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination in
making decisions regarding assignments and promotions in
violation of section 4 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).” Id.
¶ 50. The dates July 1, 2004 and July 1, 2005 appear nowhere
in claim one. Schuler’s second claim, styled “Claim Two,”
alleges similar violations of the DCHRA. Like Schuler’s
federal claim, this state law claim makes no reference to
individual nonpromotion decisions, but rather incorporates
the rest of the complaint by reference. Only in the
complaint’s jurisdiction and fact sections does Schuler
 10
mention the “two discrete incidents of discrimination” around
which the district court framed its opinion. Schuler, 457 F.
Supp. 2d at 4. The jurisdiction section explains that the
“action seeks . . . relief for PwC’s refusal to promote Schuler
and other qualified older professional employees on July 1,
2004 and July 1, 2005,” Compl. ¶ 2, and the fact section
relates a string of statistics demonstrating how PwC’s
allegedly discriminatory promotion policies have injured
older employees over the years, including him. Id. ¶¶ 22-23,
39. Indeed, Schuler claims that PwC’s policy has consistently
and unlawfully operated to his disadvantage since the year
2000. Id. ¶ 39. In short, Schuler alleges that PwC’s
discriminatory retirement policy, which begets a
discriminatory promotion policy, violates the ADEA to his
detriment and to the detriment of the class of older workers he
seeks to represent. That Schuler now seeks relief for the
policy’s continued application in 2004 and 2005 is neither
here nor there. We therefore read Schuler’s complaint as he
wrote it—alleging one ADEA claim based on PwC’s “pattern
and practice” of discriminatory promotion decisions and one
state law claim under the DCHRA challenging the same
policy.

Having thus identified Schuler’s claims, we turn to the
first question before us: has Schuler satisfied the ADEA’s
administrative preconditions for filing suit in federal court?
By filing his February 2005 charge with the EEOC’s New
York district office, Schuler plainly satisfied section 626(d)’s
requirement that he file a complaint with the EEOC. The
district court, however, dismissed the case, concluding that
Schuler had failed to satisfy section 633(b)’s requirement that
he also file his charge with a state agency authorized to “grant
or seek relief from [the alleged] discriminatory practice.” 29
U.S.C. § 633(b). Challenging this decision, Schuler argues
that he fulfilled this administrative prerequisite in two ways:
 11
(1) through the operation of a “worksharing agreement”
between the EEOC and the DCOHR under which his charge
was “deemed filed” with the District of Columbia agency;
and (2) by virtue of the EEOC’s cross-filing his charge with
the NYSDHR in New York. We address each argument in
turn.

The D.C. Worksharing Agreement

EEOC regulations, specifically 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10,
allow the Commission to “enter into agreements with State or
local fair employment practices agencies to cooperate in
enforcement, technical assistance, research, or public
informational activities, and [to] engage the services of such
agencies in processing charges assuring the safeguard of the
federal rights of aggrieved persons.” Id. § 1626.10(a). The
regulations further provide that these agreements may
“authorize such agencies to receive charges and complaints
pursuant to § 1626.5 and in accordance with the specifications
contained in §§ 1626.7 and 1626.8.” Id. § 1626.10(b). The
first of these provisions allows aggrieved employees to
submit EEOC charges “to any office of the Commission or to
any designated representative of the Commission,” id. §
1626.5, the second establishes timeliness requirements, id. §
1626.7, and the third prescribes the necessary substantive
contents of charges, id. § 1626.8. Critically for this case, the
regulation’s final subsection provides:

When a worksharing agreement with a State
agency is in effect, the State agency will act on
certain charges and the Commission will promptly
process charges which the State agency does not
pursue. Charges received by one agency under
the agreement shall be deemed received by the
other agency for purposes of § 1626.7.
 12

Id. § 1626.10(c) (emphasis added). Pursuant to these
regulations, the EEOC has entered into worksharing
agreements with both the NYSDHR and the DCOHR. Thus,
Schuler argues, when he filed his charge with the EEOC’s
New York district office, it should have been “deemed
received” by the DCOHR, id., thereby satisfying ADEA
section 633(b) and clearing the way for his federal suit.

PwC counters that these worksharing agreements bind
only individual EEOC field offices to individual state
agencies, meaning that the New York agreement allows the
NYSDHR and the Commission’s New York office to refer
charges to one another while the D.C. agreement does the
same for the DCOHR and the EEOC’s District of Columbia
field office. But because the EEOC’s New York office—
where Schuler filed his charge—has no contractual
relationship with the DCOHR, PwC argues that the charge
cannot be “deemed received” by that agency, id., which,
according to PwC, is the only state agency “authoriz[ed] . . .
to grant or seek relief from [the alleged] discriminatory
practice.” 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). And because nothing in the
record indicates the DCOHR ever actually received a copy of
Schuler’s charge, either from the Commission or from
Schuler himself, PwC insists that the district court correctly
dismissed the action for failure to satisfy ADEA section
633(b).

Resolving this dispute requires an analysis of the
worksharing agreement, which the EEOC, acting in
accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10, has signed with the
DCOHR. Because that “worksharing agreement . . . is in
effect, . . . [c]harges received by one agency under the
agreement shall be deemed received by the other agency.” Id.
§ 1626.10(c) (emphasis added). The D.C. worksharing
 13
agreement’s first operative provision expressly implements
this regulation, stating, “[i]n order to facilitate the assertion of
employment rights, the EEOC and the [DCOHR] each
designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving
and drafting charges.” D.C. Worksharing Agreement ¶ II.A.
Read together, the regulation and agreement thus make clear
that for all intents and purposes, the DCOHR receives charges
filed with the EEOC.

Even if this arrangement alone fails to refute PwC’s
argument, it bears mentioning that the DCOHR has waived its
right to process age discrimination claims initially filed with
the EEOC. The worksharing agreement provides that “[t]he
EEOC and the [DCOHR] will process all Title VII, ADA, and
ADEA charges that they originally receive.” Id. ¶ III.A.
Deferral state filing requirements are designed to “give state
agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination
complaints,” Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972),
and states may voluntarily waive that right if they wish, see
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 117
(1988) (holding that states may “waive the [Title VII] 60-day
deferral period but retain jurisdiction over discrimination
charges by entering into worksharing agreements with the
EEOC”). Here, the District of Columbia has preemptively
declined its opportunity, effectively telling the EEOC that it
wants nothing to do with ADEA claims the Commission
receives first. Had the D.C. agency physically received
Schuler’s charge, it would have taken no action on it.

Accordingly, absent any indication to the contrary, we
hold that the D.C. worksharing agreement alone sufficed to
“commence[]” proceedings under state law as ADEA section
633(b) requires. In Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610 (5th
Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit reached an identical conclusion
while interpreting a similar worksharing agreement in the
 14
Title VII context. There, the court held that “upon the
EEOC’s receipt of the complaint, the [state agency], for all
legal and practical purposes, received the complaint,”
meaning that “once the [state agency] received [the]
complaint, even if only nominally, proceedings were
instituted within the meaning of [the statute].” Id. at 612-13.
The Seventh Circuit similarly allowed an ADEA claim to
proceed in light of a worksharing agreement. See Kaimowitz
v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“Because the workshar[ing] agreement provides
for direct filing with the EEOC and both initiation and
termination of the state’s interests pursuant to a prearranged
waiver, [the plaintiff] was not required to physically file his
complaint with the [state agency].”). Nothing in the record
before us provides any reason to reach a more restrictive
result here. We therefore conclude that Schuler, having
waited more than “sixty days after proceedings ha[d] been
commenced under . . . State law” to file his complaint in
federal court, has satisfied ADEA section 633(b)’s procedural
requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).

PwC nonetheless insists that Schuler’s EEOC filing
was insufficient, but its arguments are unpersuasive. In
support of its contention that EEOC worksharing agreements
bind individual EEOC field offices rather than the
Commission in general, PwC points out that both the D.C.
and New York agreements were signed by the EEOC’s
regional directors on behalf of each local office. But so what?
That the Commission conducts its affairs through local offices
and officers goes without saying. Indeed, the EEOC’s annual
report, which lays out the agency’s organizational structure,
explains that “through the [Headquarters-based] Office of
Field Program’s State and Local Programs, the EEOC
maintains worksharing agreements . . . with 96 state and local
Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) for the purpose
 15
of coordinating the investigation of charges dual-filed under
State and local law and Federal law, as appropriate.” EEOC,
FISCAL YEAR 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT appx. A (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
abouteeoc/plan/par/2007/appendixes.html#a. Accordingly,
the agreements refer to the “EEOC” as the relevant party
throughout their substantive provisions, not to its constituent
field offices. In that sense, the worksharing agreements echo
their authorizing regulation, which states that “the
Commission may enter into agreements with state or local fair
employment practices agencies.” 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10(a)
(emphasis added). Furthermore, it would make little sense to
allow aggrieved employees to satisfy ADEA section 626(d)
by submitting their EEOC charges in “any office of the
Commission or to any designated representative of the
Commission” across the country, id. § 1626.5, while
simultaneously saddling them with the burden of divining
which other EEOC offices must also receive their charges to
satisfy section 633(b). These worksharing agreements are
meant to ease charges through the remedial system, not to
erect hurdles claimants must decipher and overcome. As the
Sixth Circuit put it while discussing Title VII’s analogous
deferral state provision, “[a]lthough . . . state worksharing
agreements are designed to allow states a ‘first bite’ at
resolving [discrimination] cases, mechanisms created to give
states such [an] opportunity must not stand in the way of the
necessarily simple claims-making procedure.” Nichols v.
Muskingum College, 318 F.3d 674, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2003).

Next, PwC argues that section 1626.10(c) comes into
play only after the EEOC actually sends a charge to the
relevant state agency—something PwC says never happened
here. For support, it points to Petrelle v. Weirton Steel Corp.,
953 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1991), in which the Fourth Circuit,
interpreting a West Virginia EEOC worksharing agreement,
 16
found similar “deemed received” language insufficient to
satisfy section 633(b) because the charge had never actually
been referred to the state agency. Id. at 152-53. In Petrelle,
however, the Fourth Circuit heard the case on appeal from a
decision granting a motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, id. at 149, not from a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, as we do. Therefore, the Petrelle court could go
beyond the pleadings and consider the trial record, which
included testimony by the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission’s assistant director explaining that “despite the
agreement’s language of agency, the [state agency] requires
physical receipt by it of the EEOC’s referral in order to deem
charges filed with . . . it.” Id. at 152. Here, by contrast, we
have no evidence outside the pleadings, and nothing in those
documents implies that the DCOHR maintains a similar
requirement. Nor do we see any reason to read one into the
agreement; indeed, given that “any ambiguities or doubts
concerning the sufficiency of the claim must be resolved in
favor of the pleader,” Doe, 753 F.2d at 1102, we must assume
its absence. Moreover, the agreement at issue in Petrelle
“contain[ed] no automatic waiver language which [could] be
interpreted as an unconditional waiver by the state of its
deferral rights under § 633(b).” 953 F.2d at 153. As
discussed above, the D.C. worksharing agreement contains
precisely such language.

Even if the DCOHR had to receive an actual copy of the
complaint to commence proceedings, it bears repeating that
Schuler explicitly told the EEOC that his “complaint should
be CROSS FILED WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENCIES OF NEW YORK CITY, THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, AND WASHINGTON, D.C.” Decl. of Harold Schuler
5 (emphasis added). PwC reads this statement as an abstract
acknowledgment that the charge ought to be filed in
Washington, D.C. rather than as a specific request that the
 17
EEOC refer the charge to the DCOHR, but this is absurd. As
Schuler’s counsel explained at oral argument, he filed his
charge in New York to ensure that PwC managers
“understood what was being argued in the case” and “thought
that was all right [be]cause the reg[ulation]s say you can file
your charge with [the] EEOC anywhere.” Oral Arg. Tr. 13.
Counsel nonetheless sought to protect his client by asking the
EEOC to cross-file his charge with all relevant state agencies,
including the DCOHR—a request that made sense given
Commission regulations empowering it to “refer all charges
to any appropriate State agency . . . in order to assure that the
prerequisites for private law suits, as set out in section
[633(b)], are met.” 29 C.F.R. § 1626.9. “It is well settled
law that if the EEOC fails to refer a charge to the state
charging agency, the EEOC’s misfeasance is not held against
the plaintiff.” Nichols, 318 F.3d at 678; see also Mitchell v.
Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Ky., 466 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir.
1972) (“It is clear that [plaintiff] should not lose her cause of
action because of the failure of EEOC to refer her complaint
to a State agency.”). Thus, even if the DCOHR required
physical receipt of Schuler’s charge—and we have no reason
to believe that it does—in order to initiate proceedings over a
complaint the agency has already disclaimed any intention of
acting upon, Schuler cannot be held responsible for the
EEOC’s failure to forward the charge as he explicitly
requested. This assumes, of course, that the EEOC’s decision
not to forward Schuler’s charge to the DCOHR amounted to a
bureaucratic failure in the first place. For reasons we explain
below, however, we find perfectly reasonable the EEOC’s
decision to refer Schuler’s charge only to the New York State
Division of Human Rights.

PwC raises a final question about the D.C. worksharing
agreement. Immediately following paragraph II.A’s language
designating the EEOC as the DCOHR’s agent for purposes of
 18
receiving charges (and vice versa), the agreement says:
“EEOC’s receipt of charges on the [DCOHR]’s behalf will
automatically initiate the proceedings of both the EEOC and
the [DCOHR] for the purposes of . . . Title VII.” D.C.
Worksharing Agreement ¶ II.A (emphasis added). According
to PwC, this language unambiguously demonstrates that the
agreement commences proceedings only for Title VII claims,
not ADEA claims. Disagreeing, Schuler points to the
agreement’s waiver provision, which draws no such
distinction and expressly mentions the ADEA. Id. ¶ III.A.

The record contains no evidence at all of the contracting
parties’ intent because PwC chose to move for judgment on
the pleadings rather than summary judgment. Absent any
evidence to the contrary, it seems to us that the agreement
may have singled out Title VII claims because that statute
requires grievants to file with state agencies before filing with
the EEOC while the ADEA allows for “concurrent rather than
sequential state and federal administrative jurisdiction.”
Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 757. Accordingly, the EEOC and
the DCOHR may have wished to make it clear that the D.C.
agency intended to waive its statutory right to proceed first.
That the worksharing agreement addresses this statutory
peculiarity neither limits nor otherwise affects the rest of the
agreement’s clear application to ADEA claims.

We reject PwC’s construction of the worksharing
agreement for another reason: it would effectively rewrite the
ADEA’s administrative prerequisites, making them traps for
the unwary, poised to spring into action and deny those who
may have suffered employment discrimination their right to
seek redress in federal court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
announced “a guiding principle for construing the provisions
of Title VII,” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 397 (1982), which applies with equal force to the
 19
ADEA: a technical reading of the statute’s filing requirements
is “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which
laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.”
Love, 404 U.S. at 527 (holding that a Title VII claimant need
not re-file a charge after termination of state proceedings); see
also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755 (interpreting the ADEA’s
state filing requirement in light of Title VII’s because the two
provisions are “virtually in haec verba”). To be sure, Schuler
had a lawyer, but we interpret the statute not just for his
benefit, but for all aggrieved employees. We must therefore
avoid construing the statute in a way that imposes extra-
textual burdens “serv[ing] no purpose other than the creation
of an additional procedural technicality.” Love, 404 U.S. at
526.

The EEOC filing requirement “is intended to promote the
speedy, informal, non-judicial resolution of discrimination
claims, . . . to preserve evidence and records relating to the
alleged discriminatory action,” McClinton v. Ala. By-Prods.
Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1984), and “to give
prompt notice to the employer,” Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398. Like
its Title VII analog, the ADEA’s deferral state filing
requirement “is intended to give state agencies a limited
opportunity to resolve problems of employment
discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to
federal relief by victims of the discrimination.” Oscar Mayer,
441 U.S. at 755. Because Schuler’s actual filing with the
EEOC and his nominal filing with the DCOHR served each of
these purposes, the ADEA requires nothing more.

In sum, Schuler properly and timely filed an EEOC
charge and asked the Commission to cross-file it with the
DCOHR, which has entered into a contractual arrangement
with the EEOC designed to “facilitate the assertion of
employment rights.” D.C. Worksharing Agreement ¶ II.A.
 20
Nothing in either the agreement’s text or the record before us
reveals that the EEOC or the DCOHR intended to exclude a
claim like Schuler’s from coverage. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Schuler satisfied ADEA
section 633(b)’s deferral state filing requirement.

The New York State Division of Human Rights

Schuler argues that even if we were to find the D.C.
worksharing agreement ambiguous or otherwise inadequate,
his suit may proceed on an alternate ground. Specifically,
Schuler argues that he satisfied ADEA section 633(b)’s
deferral state filing requirement when the EEOC cross-filed
his charge with the NYSDHR, assuring him that he “need do
nothing further at this time.” Letter from Araujo to Schuler.
PwC disagrees, pointing out that in Murphy—Schuler’s
previous and still pending case—the district court held that
New York’s Human Rights Law requires plaintiffs to “allege
that the actual impact of the discriminatory act was felt in
New York.” Murphy, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 244. Because
Schuler’s alleged injury occurred in Washington, D.C., PwC
argues, the NYSDHR lacks authority to “grant or seek relief
from [the alleged] discriminatory practice,” rendering it an
inappropriate deferral state. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). We
disagree. Relying on a plain reading of both the state law and
Schuler’s EEOC charge, we hold that New York’s Human
Rights Law covers this case, thereby granting the NYSDHR
jurisdiction over Schuler’s charge.

Like his complaint in the district court, see supra at 9-10,
Schuler’s February 2005 EEOC charge clearly alleges a
pattern and practice of discrimination resulting from PwC’s
mandatory retirement and promotion policies. On the
charge’s cover page, Schuler wrote, “The Employer, PwC,
has followed and continues to follow age discriminatory
 21
practices for promotion to partnership that favor employees
younger than 40 years old and harm me and other older
employees.” EEOC Charge of Discrimination. In the
declaration attached to the charge, Schuler stated that he lives
in Virginia, that PwC is headquartered in New York City, and
that he and other employees have failed to make partner
because of “policies and procedures adopted and maintained
by [PwC]’s Senior Partner and Chief Executive Officer
Dennis Nally and the 14 other members of its Board of
Partners and Principals.” Decl. of Schuler 1. Schuler further
asserted that PwC has promoted over 200 older employees to
“Managing Director” while younger employees have become
partners. Id. at 3.

PwC argues that Schuler never explicitly alleged that
PwC’s board and CEO meet in New York, or that the
allegedly discriminatory policy was adopted there, but we
think that a reasonable inference given Schuler’s assertion
that the company is headquartered in New York City. See
Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 595
F.2d 711, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that EEOC complaints
“are to be construed liberally”). Thus, the precise question
we face is this: does the NYHRL apply to a New York-based
company’s decision to adopt, maintain, and implement an
allegedly discriminatory promotion policy that injures an out-
of-state resident?

We begin, as we must, with the statute’s text. See
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)
(“[I]n any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins
with ‘the language of the statute.’ And where the statutory
language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
(quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.
469, 475 (1992))). NYHRL section 296 lays out the law’s
substantive provisions, making it “an unlawful discriminatory
 22
practice” for employers, licensing agencies, employment
agencies, or labor organizations to discriminate against “any
individual” on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national
origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability,
predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status.” N.Y.
Exec. Law § 296. As PwC’s counsel conceded at oral
argument, this provision contains no requirement that the
unlawful discriminatory impact occur in New York. See Oral
Arg. Tr. 26 (agreeing with the Court that “there’s no
exception in the statute for discriminatory acts committed
inside the state that affect non-residents”). Rather, the law
forbids all employers in the state from engaging in
discriminatory acts. Thus, absent some exception or
limitation, section 296, on its face, applies to PwC’s adoption,
maintenance, and implementation of an allegedly
discriminatory promotion policy.

Significantly, the NYHRL does include a section
extending the law “to certain acts committed outside the state
of New York,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a, but, as PwC’s
counsel again conceded at oral argument, neither of that
provision’s two subsections has any bearing on this case. The
first, subsection 298-a(1), applies the law with equal force “to
an act committed outside [New York] against a resident of
[New York]” or against a New York corporation. Id. § 298-
a(1). That isn’t this case. The other, subsection 298-a(2)
applies the law to New York residents who violate the law
outside the state. Id. § 298-a(2). That isn’t this case either.
Here, Schuler alleges that a New York company has
committed a discriminatory act in New York, namely
adopting, maintaining, and implementing a retirement and
promotion policy that disadvantages a class of employees on
the basis of age. Thus, nothing in the statute’s plain text
removes Schuler’s charge from the NYHRL’s reach or the
NYSDHR’s jurisdiction.
 23

PwC nonetheless urges us to set the plain terms of the
statute aside and follow a string of New York federal district
court cases construing the NYHRL to include an in-state
impact requirement. See, e.g., Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble
Theater, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1535 (KMW), 2007 WL 707068, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2007) (recognizing a split of authority
regarding whether the NYHRL, like the New York City
Human Rights Law, includes an in-state “impact
requirement” and holding that it does); Lucas v. Pathfinder’s
Personnel, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2252 (BSJ), 2002 WL 986641,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2002) (“[T]he fact that the decision
to terminate Plaintiff was made in New York State is not
sufficient to establish a violation of the NYSHRL.”); Duffy v.
Drake Beam Morin, No. 96 Civ. 5606 (MBM), 1998 WL
252063, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1998) (“[T]he State
Human Rights Law affords no remedy to a non-New York
resident who suffers discrimination outside New York
State.”). For his part, Schuler responds with his own list of
Southern District of New York cases holding “there is no
New York authority to suggest that the impact of a
discriminatory act must be felt within New York for the
NYHRL to apply.” Hart v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein
Sec., LLC, No. 06 Civ. 0134 (DAB), 2006 WL 2356157, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006); see also, e.g., Tebbenhoff v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 2932 (TPG), 2005 WL 3182952,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2005) (“The fact that a decision to
discriminatorily terminate a non-resident was made in New
York can alone suffice to state a claim under NY[]HRL.”);
Torrico v. IBM Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 390, 399 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (disagreeing with Lucas, 2002 WL 986641,
and rejecting an in-state impact requirement).

Although none of these federal district court decisions
binds us, we think it worth noting that the decisions PwC cites
 24
are unpersuasive. Take for example Duffy v. Drake Beam
Morin, the case cited by most of the other decisions on PwC’s
side of the ledger. There, the court held that “the State
Human Rights Law affords no remedy to a non-New York
resident who suffers discrimination outside New York State.”
1998 WL 252063, at *12 (emphasis added). In reaching this
conclusion, the court cites two cases, neither of which
supports its holding.

The first case, Iwankow v. Mobil Corp., 541 N.Y.S.2d
428 (App. Div. 1989), is the only New York state court
decision addressing the NYHRL’s extraterritorial scope.
There, the Appellate Division held, “absent an allegation that
a discriminatory act was committed in New York or that a
New York State resident was discriminated against, New
York’s courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the
alleged wrong.” Id. at 429. Thus, contrary to the Duffy
court’s interpretation, Iwankow says nothing about where
plaintiffs may “suffer[] discrimination,” Duffy, 1998 WL
252063, at *12; it merely requires them to allege an in-state
discriminatory act. In Iwankow, “[t]he only jurisdictional
nexus asserted in the complaint, apart from the fact that
defendants [we]re domestic corporations, [was] that
plaintiff’s termination was part of a world-wide reduction in
force which was decided upon at corporate headquarters in
New York.” 541 N.Y.S.2d at 429. The court dismissed that
claim because the plaintiff had failed to “allege that the
decision to implement this reduction in an age-discriminatory
manner originated at corporate headquarters.” Id. Schuler, of
course, alleges just that regarding PwC’s promotion policy.
Like Iwankow, the second case Duffy cites, Beckett v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 893 F. Supp. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), holds that “[t]he NYHRL does not provide a
non-resident with a private cause of action for discriminatory
conduct committed outside of New York by a New York
 25
corporation.” Id. at 238. And also like Iwankow, Beckett
provides no support for Duffy’s broad holding that “a non-
New York resident who suffers discrimination outside New
York State” may find no recourse in the NYHRL. Duffy,
1998 WL 252063, at *12 (emphasis added); see also Rice v.
Wartsila NSD Power Dev., Inc., 183 Fed. App’x. 147, 148
(2d Cir. 2006) (unpublished summary order) (finding the
NYHRL inapplicable when plaintiff failed to allege a
discriminatory act occurring in New York), aff’g Rice v.
Scudder Kemper Invs., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7078 (RLC), 2003
WL 21961010 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2003). More to the point,
given that Schuler has alleged discriminatory conduct
committed in New York, neither Iwankow nor Beckett has any
bearing on this case.

In sum, the New York Human Rights Law, by its terms,
applies to this case, and “no New York authority . . .
suggest[s] that the impact of a discriminatory act must be felt
within New York for the NYHRL to apply.” Hart, 2006 WL
2356157, at *8. Absent a contrary interpretation by the New
York Court of Appeals or the Second Circuit, we conclude
that in addition to satisfying ADEA section 633(b)’s deferral
state filing requirement via the D.C. worksharing agreement,
Schuler adequately sought a state administrative remedy in
New York by having his charge cross-filed with the
NYSDHR.

III.
A final question remains: did Schuler have to file a new
EEOC charge after PwC’s failure to promote him in July
2005, or was his February 2005 charge sufficient? Schuler’s
complaint alleges that PwC’s board declined to elevate him to
partner on two occasions—July 2004 and July 2005—and he
seeks damages flowing from each decision. Schuler’s
February 2005 EEOC charge, however, made no mention of
 26
the July 2005 nonpromotion for an obvious reason: Schuler
filed it four months before that decision occurred. Finding
the two alleged failures to promote to be “discrete incidents of
discrimination,” Schuler, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 4, the district
court dismissed the July 2005 “claim” as untimely because
Schuler failed to file a new charge based on the July 2005
decision. Id. at 5; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (requiring a
plaintiff to file an EEOC charge “within 300 days after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred” if section 633(b) applies).
According to PwC, this failure provides a separate ground for
affirming the district court’s dismissal of Schuler’s July 2005
“claim.” Schuler disagrees, contending that his pattern and
practice claim “necessarily contemplates continued annual
violations of the ADEA,” Appellant’s Opening Br. 22,
making it pointless to require him to file a new EEOC charge
with each predictable application of the same discriminatory
policy.

Interesting as this question may be, we need not decide it
because, given the posture of this case, it is of no practical
significance. As described above, Schuler brought a single
federal claim—a class-action pattern or practice ADEA claim
arising out of PwC’s mandatory retirement and promotion
policy—not two discrete nonpromotion charges. See supra at
9-10. Schuler seeks damages flowing from the first
application of PwC’s allegedly discriminatory policy through
to the present. See Compl. 16 (seeking an “[a]ward of
damages in an amount to be determined by the jury, for each
year commencing on July 1, 1999, and each year thereafter”).
As Schuler’s counsel explained at oral argument, should
Schuler ultimately prevail on his federal claim, he will be
entitled to compensation dating back to the original injury.
See Oral Arg. Tr. 14-15; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)
(allowing ADEA plaintiffs to bring “action[s] for recovery of
amounts owing as a result of a violation of” the statute).
 27
Accordingly, because Schuler filed a timely and procedurally
adequate EEOC charge before initiating his federal suit, see
supra Part II, and because his complaint seeks damages
flowing from the alleged violation onward, we see no reason
to consider whether an additional EEOC charge was required
to support the effectively irrelevant July 2005 nonpromotion
decision.

IV.
Because it is quite possible that Schuler can prove a “set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief,” Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001), we
reverse the dismissal of his ADEA claim for failure to satisfy
the statute’s administrative prerequisites and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
leave it to the district court to decide whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Schuler’s DCHRA claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

So ordered.