FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 13 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FIONA STRASHOON, No. 09-55439
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00067-MMA-
POR
v.
NORTHROP GRUMMAN MEMORANDUM *
CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 7, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Fiona Strashoon appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation dismissing her claim for
equitable estoppel under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
-2-
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. For the following reasons, we affirm.
When an ERISA plan beneficiary brings an equitable estoppel claim against
the plan administrator pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), “in the face of contrary
written plan provisions,” Greany v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812,
821 (9th Cir. 1992), she must establish not only (1) “a material misrepresentation,”
(2) “reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation,” and (3)
“extraordinary circumstances,” but also that (4) “the provisions of the plan at issue
[are] ambiguous such that reasonable persons could disagree as to their meaning or
effect,” and (5) the “representations . . . made to [her] involv[ed] an oral
interpretation of the plan,” Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331
(9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
Here, Plaintiff seeks to equitably estop Defendant from enforcing a
provision in its pension plan governing the finality of elections for retirement
benefits. She premises her claim on a misstatement, made by a representative in
Defendant’s employee benefits service center, that her election for early retirement
would have no effect on her continued eligibility to receive benefits under a long-
term disability plan administered by another company. The record shows that
-3-
Plaintiff relied on this misstatement to her detriment; her long-term disability
benefits stopped once she elected to take early retirement.
But even assuming without deciding that the service center representative
was acting as Defendant’s agent, and that the pension plan term governing finality
of elections is ambiguous, Plaintiff’s proof still falls short under Pisciotta’s fifth
prong. Nothing in the record shows that Plaintiff requested, or that Defendant
provided, an oral construction of the finality-of-election term prior to Plaintiff’s
election. In the absence of such proof, we cannot force Defendant to let Plaintiff
reverse her election. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED.