IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-20939
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RANDALL LEROY MYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-95-CR-98-ALL
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September 17, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Randall Leroy Myers appeals the district court’s order
revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a 24-month
prison sentence. Myers, who was convicted of three counts of
interstate transmission of threatening communications in 1995,
was charged with violating the conditions of his supervised
release in 1998 by making additional threatening communications
and by failing to attend mental-health counseling sessions as
directed by his probation officer.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-20939
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Myers contends that the district court erred in failing to
hold a hearing on his mental competency to proceed with the
revocation proceeding and in determining that he was mentally
competent. The court did not err in failing to hold a competency
hearing before proceeding with the revocation hearing because
Myers failed at that time to establish “reasonable cause to
believe” that he was “suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he [was]
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The district court’s determination at
the conclusion of the revocation hearing that Myers was competent
was not “clearly arbitrary and unwarranted.” See United States
v. Doke, 171 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.
filed (July 22, 1999, No. 99-5486).
Myers argues that the district court erred in revoking his
supervised release because there was not sufficient evidence to
support such revocation. The evidence overwhelmingly established
that Myers had violated the supervised-release condition
requiring him to attend regular mental-health counseling
sessions. The district court may have improperly relied on
hearsay evidence in concluding that Myers had made additional
threatening communications. However, because Myers did not
object to the admission of such evidence, the “plain error”
standard applies, and Myers has not shown that the district
court’s conclusion about this evidence violated his substantial
rights. See United States v. Alaniz-Alaniz, 38 F.3d 788, 791-92
No. 98-20939
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(5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321, 326
(5th Cir. 1999). Myers has also not shown plain error as to his
claims that the district court violated his Confrontation Clause
rights by relying on hearsay, written statements and by failing
to issue written findings regarding the evidence supporting the
revocation of his supervised release. See United States v.
McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 1995).
Myers raises several challenges to his sentence, all of
which are set forth for the first time on appeal. He has not
shown that the district court abused its discretion in ordering
the revocation of his supervised release. The district court did
not commit plain error in failing to consider suggested guideline
imprisonment ranges in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), p.s., because the
court was not bound by such ranges. See United States v.
Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1993). Similarly, the
court did not commit plain error by failing to explicitly
consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before
imposing sentence, because such consideration was implicit in the
reasons stated by the court. See United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d
831, 836 (5th Cir. 1996). Finally, the 24-month prison term was
not “plainly unreasonable,” because the sentence was based on
Myers’ multiple violations of the conditions of supervised
release and on Myers’ need for “medical care or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” See United
States v. Pena, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1527 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
AFFIRMED.