NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-2579
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT W. SWEET,
Appellant.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 07-cr-00268)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 16, 2010
Before: SLOVITER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
and POLLAK * , District Judge.
(Filed: April 16, 2010)
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*
Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Robert Sweet appeals his judgment of sentence following a guilty plea. We will
affirm.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts. Until March
2006, Sweet served as Director of the Department of Public Works for the Borough of
Taylor, Pennsylvania. Sweet’s position allowed him to control which businesses and
individuals were awarded public works contracts. In October 2005, a contractor informed
the FBI that Sweet regularly accepted kickbacks from Borough contractors. Between
October 2005 and February 2006, this cooperating contractor paid Sweet several thousand
dollars in kickbacks during several meetings recorded by the FBI. When confronted by
FBI agents in March 2006, Sweet admitted accepting illegal kickbacks for the previous
five years. He also acknowledged receiving kickbacks from contractors who billed the
Borough for work they never performed.
Sweet pleaded guilty to a single count of interfering with commerce by extortion
under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. At sentencing, Sweet
stipulated he had received between $10,000 and $30,000 in illegal kickbacks during the
course of his scheme. Sweet did not object to the calculation of his advisory Guidelines
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range of 37 to 46 months imprisonment. Recognizing Sweet’s acceptance of
responsibility and substantial assistance, the Government moved for a five-level
downward departure. The District Court granted this motion, yielding a final Guidelines
range of 21 to 27 months imprisonment. The District Court then granted Sweet’s request
for a downward variance and sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment.
II.
Sweet argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District
Court failed to consider the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The record
demonstrates otherwise. The District Court began by considering Sweet’s personal
history and characteristics, noting that his advanced age, medical problems, and
significant family and community support all supported a lenient sentence. See
§ 3553(a)(1). The District Court also explained that the nature and circumstances of the
offense involved an abuse of public trust. See id. Such a serious offense, reasoned the
District Court, required a sentence that would promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, and deter similar conduct by other public officials. See § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B).
The District Court further considered the various sentencing alternatives when granting
both the Government’s motion for a downward departure and Sweet’s request for a
variance. See § 3553(a)(3). Because the record reflects rational and meaningful
consideration of the pertinent § 3553(a) factors, Sweet’s sentence was not procedurally
unreasonable. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Sweet next contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it
was greater than necessary given the circumstances of this case and other sentencing
alternatives, such as home confinement and probation. We have made clear, however,
that “if the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. After granting Sweet a five-
level downward departure and a downward variance, the District Court fully explained
how his 18-month sentence reflected the considerations embodied in § 3553(a). Given
the facts of this case, we cannot say that such a sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Id. (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007)) (“Ultimately, ‘[t]he
touchstone of ‘reasonableness' is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’”).
Having found no procedural or substantive error, we will affirm Sweet’s judgment
of sentence.
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