IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-60334
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ROGER REEVES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
In this age discrimination case, Defendant-Appellant Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. (“Sanderson”) appeals the district court’s
order denying Sanderson’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a
matter of law (“JML”), and granting Plaintiff-Appellee Roger
Reeves’s motion for front pay. After reviewing the record, we
conclude that Reeves did not prove a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) by a preponderance of the
evidence. Hence, we reverse the district court’s order and render
judgment in favor of Sanderson.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Fifty-seven year old Reeves was employed for 40 years by
Sanderson —— a company involved in the manufacture of toilet seats
and covers. At the time of his discharge, Reeves worked in a
department of the company known as the Hinge Room. The Hinge Room
ran a regular line which was supervised by Reeves, and a special
line which was supervised by 35 year old Joe Oswalt. Forty-five
year old Russell Caldwell was the manager of the department and he
supervised both Reeves and Oswalt.
At all times relevant to this case, a union represented
Sanderson’s production and maintenance employees. The union
contract included general work rules, part of which dealt
specifically with attendance. Pursuant to these rules, an employee
who was absent from work in excess of five percent of his scheduled
hours in a month, or who was late twice in a month, was subject to
disciplinary action.
As part of his essential duties as a supervisor, Reeves was
required to keep daily, weekly, and monthly records of the
attendance and tardiness of employees under his control. These
records were reviewed by Reeves for accuracy before he passed them
on to Caldwell, who then sent them on to data processing.
In the fall of 1993, Sanderson’s Department of Quality Control
—— under the direction of Powe Chesnut —— conducted a review of the
2
operating procedures in the Hinge Room. According to Sanderson,
the study revealed productivity problems on Reeves’s regular line,
stemming from a lax assembly line operation. As a result, Reeves
was placed on a 90-day probation for unsatisfactory work
performance.
Nearly three years later, in the summer of 1995, Caldwell
informed Chesnut —— who by this time had become Director of
Manufacturing —— that the Hinge Room was again having difficulty
meeting its production requirements due to pervasive absenteeism
and tardiness. Because the Hinge Room records did not reflect
employee attendance problems, however, Chesnut requested that
Lucille Reeves, then-Manager of Quality Control, conduct an audit
of the department’s time sheets. This investigation revealed
numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations on the part of
Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Dana Jester, Vice President of Human
Resources, conducted an independent review of the records, and
confirmed Quality Control’s findings. Armed with these results,
Chesnut, Jester, and Vice President of Operations Tom Whitaker,
recommended to Company President Sandra Sanderson1 that Caldwell
and Reeves be dismissed.2 Ms. Sanderson —— who was 52 years old at
1
The record is uncontradicted that Ms. Sanderson had married
Chesnut in December 1988.
2
Chesnut testified at trial that, had Oswalt not voluntarily
terminated his employment several months earlier, Oswalt would have
been subject to dismissal along with his co-workers, Reeves and
Caldwell.
3
the time —— heeded this advice, firing both Caldwell and Reeves in
October 1995. Thereafter, Sanderson filled Reeves’s position, on
three successive occasions, with men in their thirties.
In June 1996, Reeves filed suit, claiming that Sanderson
terminated him because of his age, in violation of the ADEA.
Reeves based his claim on two age-related statements allegedly made
by Chesnut several months before Reeves’s dismissal, namely (1)
that Reeves was so old that he “must have come over on the
Mayflower,” and (2) that he was “too damn old to do the job.”
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Reeves, awarding him $35,000 and finding that Sanderson
discriminated willfully on the basis of age in its adverse
employment action. After the verdict, Sanderson renewed its
previous motion for JML, and moved, in the alternative, for a new
trial. At the same time, Reeves filed a motion seeking front pay.
The district court denied Sanderson’s motions, and entered judgment
in favor of Reeves in the amount $70,000 —— adding $35,000 in
liquidated damages to the jury’s compensatory damages in that
amount based on the jury’s determination of willfulness.3 In
addition, the court awarded Reeves $28,490.80 in front pay,
representing two years of lost income. Sanderson timely filed a
notice of appeal.
3
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)(1990)(providing that “liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of
this Act.”).
4
II
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“A motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . in an action
tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.”4 We review the denial of
such motions de novo, applying the same standard as the district
court.5 A JML is appropriate if the “facts and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that a reasonable
jury could not have concluded” as the jury did.6 Applying this
standard to the instant case, the district court’s judgment should
be reversed only if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find” that Sanderson discharged
Reeves because of his age.7
B. The ADEA
The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge
any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”8 To
establish a violation of the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove, by a
4
Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997).
5
Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1998).
6
Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 148 (5th
Cir. 1995).
7
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 50(a)(1).
8
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1990).
5
preponderance of the evidence, intentional discrimination on the
part of his employer.9 As direct evidence of discrimination is
rare, plaintiffs may rely on indirect evidence and reasonable
inferences to establish an ADEA claim under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis.10
Under this analysis, a plaintiff must first present a prima
facie case, thereby establishing a rebuttable presumption of age
discrimination.11 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer
must then rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.12
If the employer presents such evidence, then the presumption of
discrimination fades, and the plaintiff must prove that the
employer’s articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.13
To establish pretext, a plaintiff must prove not only that the
9
Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir.
1997).
10
Id.
11
Id. There are four elements to a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge under the ADEA, including proof that the
plaintiff was (1) discharged; (2) qualified for the position; (3)
within the protected class at the time of the discharge; and (4)
either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii)
replaced by someone in the protected class but younger than the
plaintiff, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age.
Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993).
12
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1996).
13
Price, 119 F.3d at 337.
6
employer’s stated reason for its employment decision was false, but
also that age discrimination “had a determinative influence on” the
employer’s decision-making process.14 Age-related comments may
serve as sufficient evidence of discrimination if the remarks are
(1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an individual
with authority over the challenged employment decision; and (3)
related to that employment decision.15 Mere “stray remarks” ——
i.e., comments which are “vague and remote in time” —— however, are
insufficient to establish discrimination.16
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Sanderson does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting Reeves’s prima facie case of age
discrimination.17 Rather, Sanderson argues that it articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for firing Reeves:
Reeves’s shoddy record keeping. Because Reeves failed to offer
evidence sufficient to prove both that this reason is untrue and
that age is what really triggered Reeves’s discharge, argues
14
Id.
15
Brown, 82 F.3d at 655.
16
Id.; Price, 119 F.3d at 337.
17
Indeed, when, as here, a case has already been tried on the
merits, whether the plaintiff properly made out a prima facie case
is no longer relevant. United States Postal Service Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). Instead, the
important inquiry is whether the plaintiff has “produced sufficient
evidence for a jury to find that discrimination has occurred.”
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1992).
7
Sanderson, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
agree.
At trial, Chesnut testified that he became aware of
timekeeping problems in the Hinge Room after Caldwell —— the
department manager —— complained of inadequate production resulting
from absenteeism. This complaint prompted an investigation which
uncovered numerous errors in the department’s attendance records.
Because of specific misrepresentations and errors made by Reeves,
argues Sanderson, employees under Reeves’s control were being paid
for time they did not work, and were not being disciplined for
their habitual absenteeism and tardiness. Reeves testified that he
was familiar with the company’s attendance policy, as well as his
timekeeping responsibilities as a supervisor under that policy. In
light of this admission, argues Sanderson, Reeves’s failure to keep
accurate records in accordance with the policy amounts to
unsatisfactory work performance, which is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis for dismissal.
Reeves attempts to cast suspicion on Sanderson’s proffered
explanation by first asserting that Sanderson’s explanation changed
between the time of Reeves’s discharge and trial. When he was
fired, claims Reeves, he was told that he had caused a specific
employee to be paid for time she had not actually worked. In
contrast, Reeves argues, Sanderson defended its employment decision
at trial by claiming that Reeves’s timekeeping mistakes had
resulted in the overpayment of numerous employees. Although proof
8
that an employer lied to its employee about its reasons for
discharge does, under some circumstances, raise a “red flag” of
pretext,18 the inconsistency noted by Reeves in this case can hardly
be considered mendacious. Sanderson has, at all times, supported
its decision to fire Reeves with the charge that Reeves’s work
performance was unsatisfactory. That Sanderson may have explained
this charge at the time of dismissal with only one instance of
inaccurate record keeping, but buttressed its defense by adducing
evidence of other similar infractions at trial smacks more of
competent trial preparation than telling a lie.
Reeves goes on, however, to challenge the veracity of
Sanderson’s allegation that he engaged in inaccurate record keeping
at all. At trial, Reeves testified that he was always very careful
to ensure that his employees arrived at their work stations on
time. In addition, he claimed that any employee who was permitted
to clock in early or stay late —— and thereby receive additional
pay —— had extra work assignments to perform. According to Reeves,
if any record keeping errors were made, they were the result of
Caldwell’s inattentiveness and not his own. Moreover, Reeves
points out, at trial Chesnut was unable to testify as to the cost
to the company, if any, of Reeves’s alleged record falsifications.
Based on this evidence, claims Reeves, a reasonable jury could have
found that Sanderson’s explanation for its employment decision was
18
Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1996).
9
pretextual.
On this point, Reeves very well may be correct. Even so,
whether Sanderson was forthright in its explanation for firing
Reeves is not dispositive of a finding of liability under the ADEA.
We must, as an essential final step, determine whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated Sanderson’s
employment decision.
In an attempt to satisfy this burden at trial, Reeves
testified that Chesnut —— while serving as Director of
Manufacturing —— made the above-quoted age-related comments just
months before Reeves was terminated. As Chesnut was one of three
people who recommended his termination to Ms. Sanderson, argues
Reeves, Chesnut’s comments should be taken as sound evidence of the
company’s underlying discriminatory motives.
Reeves also expressed the belief that he was treated less
favorably than Sanderson’s younger employees. This belief, Reeves
now claims, is confirmed by Oswalt’s testimony that Chesnut treated
Reeves like a child. As further evidence of Sanderson’s disparate
treatment, Reeves points to his 1993 probation, and notes that the
30-something Oswalt was not put on probation despite a similarly
lagging production level on the Hinge Room’s special line.
Likewise, argues Reeves, when Quality Control initiated its
investigation of his timekeeping records in 1995, none of the
supervisors from other departments were singled out for such
scrutiny.
10
Considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to
Reeves, we nevertheless conclude that there was insufficient
evidence for a jury to find that Sanderson discharged Reeves
because of his age. Despite the potentially damning nature of
Chesnut’s age-related comments, it is clear that these comments
were not made in the direct context of Reeves’s termination. In
addition, Chesnut was just one of three individuals who recommended
to Ms. Sanderson that Reeves be terminated, and there is no
evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers were
motivated by age. In fact, the record shows that at least two of
the decision makers were themselves over the age of 50 —— Ms.
Sanderson at 52, and Jester at 56. Furthermore, the fact remains
that, as a result of the 1995 investigation, each of the three
Hinge Room supervisors was accused of inaccurate record keeping,
including not only Reeves and Caldwell, but 35 year old Oswalt as
well. Finally, there is evidence that, at the time Reeves was
dismissed, 20 of the company’s management positions were filled by
people over the age of 50, including several employees in their
late 60's.
Based on our plenary review, we find that Reeves did not
introduce sufficient evidence of age discrimination to support the
jury’s finding of liability under the ADEA. For this reason, we
reverse and render judgment in favor of Sanderson.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
11