UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-41409
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SONNY WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LINDA G. DOWDON, Correctional Officer, Coffield Unit,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:97-CV-244)
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November 24, 1999
Before JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges and PRADO*, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:*
Sonny Wilson (“Wilson”), Texas prisoner #684871, argues
that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim as frivolous and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Wilson argues that the district
court erred in dismissing his excessive force claim based on
controverted prison medical records and without considering the
Officer Linda G. DOWDON’s (“Officer Dowdon”) culpable intent in
*
District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting
by designation.
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
employing the use of force. Our review of the record and
applicable case law leads us to affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand to the district court.
Briefly, the facts giving rise to Wilson’s claim occurred
while he was placed in “super” segregation at the correctional
facility, a form of solitary confinement. Under this type of
confinement, food is served to inmates on trays which are handed to
them through metal slots in metal doors. When Officer Dowdon
delivered Wilson’s food, he immediately complained about the food
and asked to see a supervisor. In response, he alleges that
Officer Dowdon slammed the metal slot closed on his hand and used
the full weight of her body to crush his hand between the door and
the slot.
Procedurally, this case began when Wilson filed suit
against Officer Dowdon alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment
and claiming that Officer Dowdon took these actions in retaliation
for previous complaints Wilson had made against her. A United
States Magistrate Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing in accord
with Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985) and, over
Wilson’s objections, recommended the suit be dismissed as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The district court adopted this recommendation and Wilson
timely appealed.
We have reviewed the record, including the transcript of
the Spears hearing and Wilson’s brief, and have determined that the
district court prematurely dismissed the excessive force claim
2
without sufficiently developing the record with respect to all the
factors relevant to the resolution of the claim. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836,
839 (5th Cir. 1998). Specifically, under Hudson, a district court
should follow three steps: (1) determine whether excessive force
was used; (2) if so, resolve whether the resulting injury was de
minimis; (3) assuming the court has reached the first two parts of
the test, assess whether the use of force falls into a category of
behavior which is repugnant to the conscience of humankind. See
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. In making these determinations, we
remind the district court that “the amount of force that is
constitutionally permissible . . . must be judged by the context in
which that force is deployed.” Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434
(5th Cir. 1996).
In this case, the district court began and ended its
analysis upon a finding that the use of force was de minimis. We
remand for a determination as to steps one and three listed above.
We express no opinion on whether the facts of this case satisfy
these steps. Accordingly, we vacate and remand.
The district court also dismissed Wilson’s retaliation
claim on the basis that he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Wilson has not addressed this issue on appeal;
therefore, he is deemed to have abandoned his retaliation claim.
See Brinkman v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,
748 (5th Cir. 1987). We affirm the district court on this issue.
3
AFFIRMED as to the claim of retaliation; VACATED and
REMANDED for further consideration of the excessive force claim.
4