UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 99-20064
Summary Calendar
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THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
THERMON JAMES FLANIGAN; ET AL.,
Defendants,
THERMON JAMES FLANIGAN
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-97-CV-3812)
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December 15, 1999
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Thermon James Flanigan, pro se, appeals the summary judgment
award of Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance (SGLI) benefits, arising
out of his wife’s death, to her parents, instead of to her stepson
(his biological son).
I.
Antoinette Flanigan, Flanigan’s wife, died in February 1996.
At the time of her death, she was insured by SGLI for $200,000,
naming her father and Flanigan as beneficiaries for half of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
proceeds respectively. There was no contingent beneficiary
designated.
Flanigan was convicted in October 1996 of first degree murder
in the death of his wife, making him statutorily ineligible to
receive the insurance proceeds. Only the proceeds designated for
Flanigan, and whether his son is entitled to them, are at issue in
this appeal.
In November 1997, Prudential brought this interpleader action
to determine the beneficiary for the proceeds that were to have
been received by Flanigan. In June 1998, Prudential advised the
district court that the insured might have been survived by a
child, Christopher Flanigan, a minor, and requested the appointment
of an attorney ad litem. The court did so; and that November, the
attorney reported to the court that Christopher Flanigan was not
the biological or adopted child of Antoinette Flanigan; and was,
therefore, not entitled to the proceeds. Counsel moved for
dismissal. By summary judgment that December, the court dismissed
Christopher Flanigan from the action and awarded the proceeds to
the parents of the insured.
II.
A.
After summary judgment was entered, Flanigan entered an
undated notice of appeal; it was received on 8 January 1999, more
than 30 days after the 4 December 1998 judgment; and is, therefore,
untimely. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
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By letter dated 14 December 1998 (received by the district
court on 21 December), however, Flanigan stated: “I am in the
process of appealing the order”, stated the case number and
referred to the order granting summary judgment. We construe pro
se pleadings liberally; this is sufficient to meet the liberal
pleading requirements for a notice of appeal as specified in FED.
R. APP. P. 3. See generally, Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 236
(5th Cir. 1988).
B.
Thermon Flanigan contends that Christopher Flanigan, the
claimed stepson of the insured, should recover the insurance
proceeds at issue. Of course, the threshold question is whether
Flanigan has standing to appeal. As noted, Christopher Flanigan
was represented by an attorney ad litem, who determined that
Christopher Flanigan was not entitled to the proceeds and did not
appeal the adverse summary judgment. In this regard, Flanigan is
not appealing in a representative capacity.
To have standing to appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the
district court’s order. “[A]n indirect financial stake in another
party’s claim is insufficient to create standing on appeal”. Rohm
& Hass Tex. v. Ortiz Bros. Insulation, 32 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir.
1994)(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, as urged by
Prudential, as well as in the amicus brief of the parents of the
insured, Flanigan does not have standing to appeal, because he
lacks the requisite stake in the proceedings.
III.
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The pending motions are DENIED; the appeal,
DISMISSED.
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