March 30, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1927
No. 91-1928
RICHARD A. STREET,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PAUL RAKIEY, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
Richard A. Street on brief pro se.
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
Catherine A. Arnold, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for
appellees.
Per Curiam. Plaintiff Richard Street, an inmate at MCI-
Cedar Junction in Massachusetts, was charged in 1990 with two
disciplinary offenses. After conducting separate hearings,
prison officials in each instance found plaintiff guilty and
imposed a sanction of isolation time. Plaintiff thereafter
filed these pro se actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging
that the two disciplinary hearings suffered from assorted due
process violations. He requested relief in the form of
damages and the removal of the offenses from his record.
Named as defendants were the prison superintendent and other
correctional officials. In both cases, over plaintiff's
opposition, the district court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff now
appeals. I.
Plaintiff advances the following factual allegations.1
Appeal No. 92-1927 involves an incident on June 18, 1990 in
which plaintiff is alleged to have destroyed a light fixture.
William Cabino, the reporting staff person, prepared a
disciplinary report stating as follows: (1) at 6:55 a.m.,
Cabino was directed to remove plaintiff from a security cell
1. The factual allegations are drawn from plaintiff's
verified complaints and the exhibits attached thereto (which
consist of the records of the disciplinary hearings). Such
exhibits are considered part of the complaint, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(c), and may properly be reviewed when evaluating a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Hamilton
v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1992); O'Brien v.
DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 545 n.1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
"due to his disruptive behavior"; (2) upon entering the cell,
he noticed that a lighting fixture had been broken; and (3) a
subsequent search uncovered a five-inch piece of metal
located under a mattress and a "large piece of glass" located
under the toilet, both of which "apparently came from the
lighting fixture." Plaintiff was charged with four code
offenses under 103 C.M.R. 430.24 (1987), including
possession of a weapon and willful destruction of state
property.
At the disciplinary hearing, which was held on June 28,
1990, plaintiff pled not guilty by reason of insanity. In
his complaint, he alleges that he submitted a written request
for two witnesses--Cabino and Dr. Navaras, a prison
psychiatrist--but that a correctional official (Lt. Ayala)
tore up the witness form in plaintiff's presence. The record
of the hearing contains a partial reference to this matter,
explaining the denial of plaintiff's request for witness(es)
as follows:
Request for witness Dr. Navaras denied in
accordance with CMR 430.11(4).[2] Failed to
submit witness form. Inmate Street claimed Lt.
Ayala tore it up. Lt. Ayala states he never tore
it up.
2. Under 103 C.M.R. 430.11(1), an inmate is to be served
with a "request for witness form" within twenty-four hours of
the designation of the offense as a major matter. Section
430.11(4) in turn provides that an inmate's "failure to
submit a request for ... witness form may, in the discretion
of the disciplinary board chairperson, constitute a waiver of
the inmate's rights to call witnesses."
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The record also contains a notation that plaintiff did not
request Cabino's presence. Admitted into evidence were
Cabino's disciplinary report and the pieces of metal and
glass recovered from the cell. Based on such evidence, the
disciplinary board found plaintiff guilty of both possessing
a weapon and destroying property. He was given a sanction of
fifteen days in isolation on each charge, for a total of
thirty days. Plaintiff appealed the matter to the
superintendent, claiming that his so-called "disruptive
behavior" had in fact been a suicide attempt, that he
suffered from "severe mental illness," and that he should be
transferred to a hospital. Plaintiff alleges that his appeal
was denied without explanation.
Appeal No. 92-1928 involves an unrelated incident which
allegedly occurred one day later. A disciplinary report
prepared by staff person John Lopes stated: "On 6/19/90 ...,
this officer did see Inmate R.A. Street run from the Mental
Health office to the Hospital ward grill and spit on Inmate
John Debella ...." Plaintiff was subsequently charged with
disruptive conduct and "assaulting ... another person with
any offense against his person." 103 C.M.R. 430.24(18).
At a disciplinary hearing held on July 5, 1990, plaintiff
again pled not guilty by reason of insanity, adding
(according to the hearing record) that he had been at the
health unit to see a psychiatrist due to an episode of mental
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illness, and that he did not recall the incident. In his
complaint, plaintiff alleges that he requested two witnesses-
-Lopes and Dr. Navaras. The hearing record indicates that
Lopes' presence was initially requested but was later waived
by plaintiff (an assertion plaintiff denies in his
complaint). The disciplinary board denied the request to
call Dr. Navaras on the ground that "witness was not present
at the incident." Based on Lopes' written report, the
disciplinary board found plaintiff guilty and imposed a
sanction of fifteen days isolation. On appeal to the
superintendent, plaintiff argued that he had had a "psychotic
episode ... I was hallucinating and thought [Debella] was a
devil about to attack me, so I spat on him to break his evil
spell." This appeal, according to the complaint, was also
denied without explanation.
II.
In his pair of complaints, plaintiff advanced nearly
identical challenges to these two disciplinary proceedings.
He argued that the following due process violations occurred
in each instance: (1) inadequate notice of the charges was
provided; (2) he was denied the right to call and cross-
examine witnesses; (3) the conviction was not based on
substantial evidence; (4) the board failed to reach a finding
after the close of the evidence; and (5) no reasons were
provided for the denial of his appeal. He charged that
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imposing multiple sanctions for a single act of misconduct
violated double jeopardy. He argued that the board
contravened "common law" by (1) basing its findings on
unsupported written testimony and (2) failing to explain its
credibility findings. And he contended that each incident
was attributable to the negligent supervision of defendants--
conduct which in No. 92-1927, at least, amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment. The district court found that none of
these allegations presented a federal claim cognizable under
42 U.S.C. 1983.
Appellate review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
plenary. See, e.g., Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d
41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). We must accept all well-pled factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences
therefrom in plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics, Etc. Unit, 61 U.S.L.W. 4205, 4206-
07 (U.S. March 3, 1993); Roth v. United States, 952 F.2d 611,
613 (1st Cir. 1991); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,
889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). In addition, a pro se
complaint is held to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed if
"it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.'" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per
curiam) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
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(1957)); accord, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976).
Our task is to determine not whether the disciplinary
hearings comported in every detail with the state
regulations, but whether they were consistent with the
"minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495
(1985).3 "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). As outlined by the
Court in Wolff, the applicable constitutional safeguards
include the following: providing "written notice of the
charges" to the inmate at least 24 hours before the hearing,
id. at 564; allowing the inmate "to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting
him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals," id. at 566; and, should a
finding of guilt be reached, providing "a written statement
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
for the disciplinary action," id. at 564 (quotation omitted);
accord, e.g., Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional
3. It is clear that the loss of liberty entailed in
isolation time suffices to trigger constitutional safeguards.
See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19 (1974);
Smith v. Mass. Dep't of Correction, 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 (1st
Cir. 1991).
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Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Smith v.
Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, 936 F.2d 1390, 1398 (1st
Cir. 1991).
III.
Few of plaintiff's claims require extended comment. His
contention that he received inadequate notice of the charges
is entirely conclusory. The hearing records indicate (and
plaintiff does not dispute) that he was afforded at least 24
hours advance notice. In particular, he does not dispute
that he received copies of the disciplinary reports in
advance, in which the charges were adequately described.
Plaintiff likewise presents no cognizable claim in contending
that defendants violated double jeopardy by imposing multiple
punishments for a single act of misconduct. As we said in
rejecting an analogous double jeopardy contention in Langton
v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1981), this argument
"fail[s] to appreciate the essential differences between a
disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial." Id. at 234;
accord, e.g., United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259
(10th Cir. 1989); see generally Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528 (1975) ("jeopardy describes the risk that is
traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution").
Plaintiff's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is clearly meritless. It is plain that the board's findings
were supported by "some evidence in the record"--the standard
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of evidentiary sufficiency mandated by the Due Process
Clause. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. Nor has he stated a claim
with respect to (1) the board's consideration of the evidence
or (2) its description of the evidence on which it relied.
The Wolff Court held that "confrontation and cross-
examination" are not "generally required" in this context.
418 U.S. at 568. Consequently, the board's reliance on the
written disciplinary reports was proper, particularly since
each report contained an eyewitness account. In explaining
its findings, the board indicated that it relied on "the
eyewitness testimony as recorded in the officer's report" in
each case and, in No. 92-1927, on the physical evidence as
well. Such summary explanations have been deemed sufficient
in other cases (depending on the facts presented). See,
e.g., Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3456 (Feb. 22, 1993). They were
clearly adequate under the circumstances here. The evidence
at the hearings was straightforward. And rather than
attempting to controvert the central factual allegations
underlying the charges, plaintiff sought to defend himself by
citing the collateral issue of his mental status.4 For the
4. Plaintiff's challenge to the superintendent's alleged
failure to explain his reasons for denying the appeals
similarly falters. No such obligation is imposed by the
state regulations. See 103 C.M.R. 430.18. And we find no
such obligation as a constitutional matter, given that the
board adequately explained its findings.
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same reason, no issue of credibility was presented as to
whether plaintiff actually committed the acts with which he
was charged.
The issue of plaintiff's requests to call Dr. Navaras as
a witness deserves closer scrutiny.5 As mentioned, the
Court in Wolff held that an inmate "should be allowed to call
witnesses ... in his defense when permitting him to do so
will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals." 418 U.S. at 566. In Ponte, the Court
clarified that prison officials have the burden of justifying
the denial of a witness request by tendering an explanation,
either during the administrative hearing or in connection
with subsequent litigation. 471 U.S. at 497-99; accord,
e.g., Smith, 936 F.2d at 1399-1400. This rule is intended to
guard against arbitrary action by requiring prison officials
"to explain, in a limited manner, the reason why witnesses
were not allowed to testify." Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497.
Reasonable explanations include not only interests of prison
safety and discipline, but also legitimate administrative
concerns. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 ("Prison
5. By contrast, no colorable claim is presented regarding
plaintiff's alleged requests to call the authors of the
disciplinary reports as witnesses. Even if we assume
(contrary to the notations in the hearing records) that such
requests were made, prison officials are not required "to
provide reasons in writing to inmates denied the privilege to
... confront witnesses against them in disciplinary
proceedings." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322
(1976); accord Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-69.
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officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the
hearing within reasonable limits ...."); Ramer v. Kerby, 936
F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991) ("legitimate penological
concerns includ[e], but [are] not limited to, safety or
correctional goals, expense, staffing requirements ..., and
the danger of harassment"). And in general, courts "should
not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the
judgment of prison administrators" in this regard. Wolff,
418 U.S. at 566.
We agree with the lower court that plaintiff has failed
to state a viable claim under these standards. In the
assault case, the board denied the request to have Dr.
Navaras testify on the ground that he "was not present at the
incident." We cannot say that this rationale was
unreasonable. Cf. Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 751 (2d
Cir. 1991) (board's refusal to allow psychiatrist to testify
was proper since he "was not an observer of disputed factual
issues concerning the underlying incident"; receipt of his
notes in lieu of his testimony "was harmless error, if error
at all"). To be sure, Dr. Navaras (apparently plaintiff's
treating psychiatrist) likely would have been able to provide
background information as to plaintiff's mental health,
perhaps even as to his susceptibility to "psychotic
episodes." Yet under the rather unusual circumstances
presented (with an inmate personally proclaiming that he had
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been "insane" two weeks earlier), any such testimony would
have been of marginal relevance, and would obviously have
expanded the scope of the hearing in a manner the board might
reasonably have wished to avoid.
In the property-destruction case, the board did not
permit Dr. Navaras to testify because, according to the
record, plaintiff had failed to submit the required witness-
request form. Such a rationale constitutes an adequate
justification. See, e.g., Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341,
346-47 (7th Cir. 1992); Smith, 936 F.2d at 1400 ("denial of a
request to call a witness on the ground that the request is
untimely is well within the disciplinary board's
discretion"). As mentioned, plaintiff disputes this
conclusion, alleging that he did submit the form but that Lt.
Ayala tore it up. The administrative record indicates that
the board, after hearing these differing explanations from
plaintiff and Ayala, chose to believe the latter. Arguably,
this credibility determination, although involving a
collateral issue, is one subject to scrutiny only under
Hill's "some evidence" standard--a test which "does not
require examination of the entire record, independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of
the evidence." 472 U.S. at 455. We need not resolve that
issue, however, since plaintiff's allegation, even if true,
would involve at most harmless error. See, e.g., Elkin v.
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Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir.) (applying harmless error
analysis to disciplinary proceedings), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 473 (1992); Powell, 953 F.2d at 750-52 (same). For the
reasons discussed above, Dr. Navaras' testimony in the
property-destruction case would again have been of negligible
relevance. Indeed, the fact that plaintiff hid the two
"weapons" in the cell--conduct quite at odds with any
suggestion of "insanity"--suggests that psychiatric testimony
would have been even less relevant here.
For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiff's
complaints were properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).6
Affirmed.
6. As we read the complaints, plaintiff's "negligent-
supervision" allegations comprise part of his challenge to
the disciplinary proceedings, rather than being intended as
independent claims for relief. To the extent they were so
intended, we find no suggestion that defendants acted in such
a "wanton" fashion as to have violated the Eighth Amendment.
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991).
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