United States v. Mena-Robles

United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit

No. 92-1233
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,

v.

ALFONSO MENA-ROBLES,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

No. 92-1299
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL TORRES-RIVERA,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella and Stahl, Circuit Judges and

Burns, * District Judge.

Olga M. Shepard for appellant Mena-Robles.

Julio C. Codias for appellant Torres-Rivera.

Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom

Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney and Edwin O. Vazquez,

Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellant.

September 28, 1993

*Of the District of Oregon, sitting by designation

STAHL, Circuit Judge. After a jury convicted

appellants Miguel Torres Rivera ("Torres Rivera") and Alfonso

Mena Robles ("Mena Robles") of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

846, they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 200

months and 170 months, respectively. On appeal, both

defendants claim that the district court erroneously denied

their motions for acquittal made under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29,

and that their sentences contravened the Sentencing

Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the

convictions and sentences.

I.
I.

Factual Background
Factual Background

We recount the relevant evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Alvarez, 987

F.2d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed,

U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 9, 1993) (No. 92-9080). The arrest

and indictment of appellants and their 11 original co-

defendants was the culmination of a reverse sting operation

conducted by the Puerto Rico Department of Justice ("PRDOJ")

and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration

("DEA"). The law enforcement agents posed as large-scale

cocaine dealers. Their goal was to apprehend genuine drug

traffickers by arranging a "sale" of a sizable quantity of

cocaine. Toward that end, PRDOJ Agent Eric Munoz ("Munoz"),

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posing as a cocaine supplier, held several meetings with

potential purchasers interested in setting up a deal. On

March 22, 1990, Munoz met with Carlos Kortwright Perez

("Carlos Kortwright"), his wife, Damaris Camacho Valcarcel

("Damaris Camacho"), his mother, Frances Perez Corujo

("Frances Perez"), and Samuel Solis Sierra, and began

negotiations for Kortwright's purchase of 50 kilograms of

cocaine at a price of $16,000 per kilogram. Further

negotiations took place on April 1, 1990, at which time an

agreement was reached to consummate the deal in mid-May.

After several phone conversations, Munoz met on April 25,

1990, with Carlos Kortwright, Damaris Camacho, and her

brother, Miguel Camacho Valcarcel ("Miguel Camacho"). Munoz

told Miguel Camacho that the deal could take place in

approximately two weeks.

After further telephone conversations between Munoz

and the potential buyers, Munoz met again with Carlos

Kortwright and Damaris Camacho on May 6, 1990. They

discussed more details of the deal, with Munoz reporting that

the ship carrying the cocaine to Puerto Rico was already at

sea. On May 10, 1990, Damaris Camacho called Munoz and

informed him that the money needed for the drug sale had been

gathered. For closing the deal, two rooms at the Cerromar

Hotel in Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, had been rented. The

plan was for the sale to take place in one room, while police

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would undertake surveillance from the other. After preparing

the rooms, Munoz phoned Carlos Kortwright and told him he was

ready. Two hours later, Carlos Kortwright and Frances Perez

arrived at the hotel. After hours of phone calls between and

among Munoz, Carlos Kortwright, his brother, Jose, and Samuel

Solis Sierra, it became apparent that the money was not, in

fact, ready.

Finally, the deal was called off, with Munoz

telling Carlos Kortwright that the cocaine had been sold to

other, more ready, purchasers. He did, however, report that

a new supply of cocaine might soon be available. After

several telephone contacts, an agreement was arranged to sell

Carlos Kortwright 75 kilograms of cocaine at $14,500 each.

The transaction was set for May 24, 1990. Again, two hotel

rooms were rented, this time at the Condado Plaza Hotel in

Condado, Puerto Rico. After Munoz and his undercover

partner, Lt. Ayala, phoned Carlos Kortwright and Frances

Perez, they all met at the hotel, along with Miguel Camacho,

Samuel Solis Sierra and Rolando Solis Sierra. Miguel Camacho

accompanied Munoz to one of the hotel rooms to sample some of

the cocaine. All the buyers except Frances Perez then left

the hotel, presumably to return later to consummate the deal.

Again, however, the sale fell through, as Carlos Kortwright

reported to Munoz that he was having problems with his "money

man." Carlos Kortwright then told Munoz that he was "going

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to take over everything [and] be in charge," and that Munoz

should call him the next day, Friday, May 25, 1990.

Meanwhile, the law enforcement officials had decided to let

the weekend elapse before resuming negotiations. On May 25,

1990, Munoz told Frances Perez that the deal was on hold.

On May 28, 1990, Munoz again contacted Carlos

Kortwright and Frances Perez to resume negotiations. Later

that day, the three, along with Lt. Ayala and DEA Special

Agent Miranda met at a Pizza Hut in Condado. They agreed to

carry out the cocaine sale on May 31, 1990, at a police-owned

beach house at Vega Baja, Puerto Rico. Prior to the meeting

at the beach house, the plans called for a meeting at La

Terraza restaurant in Dorado, Puerto Rico, where Munoz would

be able to see the buyers' money. It was agreed that Munoz

would then phone the beach house, and they would all drive

there, caravan style. In reality, Munoz's picking up the

telephone was to be the signal for other officers to move in

and make arrests.

On May 31, 1990, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Carlos

Kortwright phoned Munoz, and the two agreed to meet at La

Terraza at 3:30 that afternoon. Shortly after Munoz and

Ayala seated themselves in the empty restaurant, several cars

arrived simultaneously, including a brown Buick owned by

appellant Mena Robles. In total, Munoz testified to seeing

about a dozen people arrive. Of those people, Carlos

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Kortwright, Alberto Morales Colberg and Jose Francisco

Casiano joined Munoz and Ayala at one table. Appellants sat

across from each other at the next table, two to three feet

from the others, facing in the direction of Munoz's table.

The other dozen or so tables in the restaurant were

unoccupied.

After everyone gathered in the restaurant, Munoz

asked Carlos Kortwright about the two men (the appellants)

seated at the adjacent table. Munoz testified that

Kortwright told him that "these people are here to protect

the money and the money is outside." Munoz then offered to

buy drinks for the entire group, including appellants, but

Colberg precluded any acceptance of the offer by insisting on

proceeding with the deal. Soon after, a waiter brought Munoz

and Ayala drinks they had ordered before the others' arrival.

At that point, Ayala repeated Munoz's drink offer. This

time, Casiano, seated between Munoz and Ayala, interceded,

giving his approval to Ayala's offer. Appellant Mena Robles

ordered a beer. At about the same time, co-defendant Rafael

Montanez Ortiz, who had remained outside, entered the

restaurant and shouted something in the direction of the

group. Carlos Kortwright left the table and spoke briefly

with Montanez Ortiz. When he returned, Colberg again tried

to get the deal going. He asked Munoz whether the 75 kilos

of cocaine were available. When Munoz replied affirmatively

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and asked Colberg whether he was ready to buy, Colberg and

Carlos Kortwright went to the parking lot, retrieved a

notebook and calculator from one of the vehicles, and sat

together at an empty table in the restaurant, away from the

others. After a short time, they returned to their original

seats, whereupon Colberg told Munoz that he was ready to buy

15 kilos immediately, and the other 60 kilos later that

evening. Munoz balked, first telling Colberg that he had no

place to keep the unsold 60 kilos that Carlos Kortwright had

originally agreed to buy, and then reminding Colberg that he,

Munoz, had yet to see any of the buyers' money.

Colberg and Carlos Kortwright then escorted Munoz

to a blue Volvo in the parking lot. Three men were near the

car, one of whom, Hector Santana Olmo, was leaning against

the trunk as Munoz arrived. Munoz was unable to identify the

other two men with Santana Olmo. Upon opening the trunk,

Santana Olmo showed Munoz two bags of money. The first

contained packs of five, ten, and twenty dollar bills, which,

Munoz told Santana Olmo, would be insufficient to complete

the deal. The second bag, however, a large plastic trash

bag, contained packs of fifty and one hundred dollar bills.

Santana Olmo told Munoz that there was a total of $500,000 in

the two bags. Satisfied by the buyers' showing, Munoz told

them that he would alert his confederates. On his way to the

telephone, Munoz stopped to talk to Ayala, who was then alone

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in the restaurant.1 He apprised Ayala of what had

transpired outside.

Munoz proceeded to the telephone. When he picked

up the receiver, however, the expected law enforcement help

did not materialize. He phoned headquarters and was informed

that many of the officers were caught in traffic. Munoz

stalled on the phone, because he had told the buyers that the

drugs would arrive five minutes after he placed the call.

While speaking with headquarters, Munoz told an officer there

to inform the arriving officers that the money was in a blue

Volvo. While still on the phone, Munoz was approached by

Colberg and Carlos Kortwright. He told them he was having

last-minute difficulty with his supplier. When Munoz finally

got off the phone, the three men started walking back toward

the restaurant, stopping in the parking lot, behind the brown

Buick, which was then occupied by three people with the

right-front door open. The Buick was still parked next to

Munoz's car. Munoz then entered the restaurant, where Samuel

Solis Sierra was speaking with Ayala. As Munoz approached

them, other law enforcement agents arrived. Munoz and Ayala

arrested Solis Sierra. Munoz then went outside with the

other officers. Santana Olmo, the two unidentified men with

him, and the blue Volvo in which Munoz had seen the money had

1. According to Munoz, appellants had remained at the
adjacent table throughout the negotiations. The record is
silent as to when they left it.

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already departed. The men inside the brown Buick turned out

to be appellants and Rafael Montanez Ortiz. Mena Robles, to

whom the car was registered, was in the driver's seat; Torres

Rivera was in the back; Montanez Ortiz was in the front

passenger seat, adjacent to the open door. A Magnum revolver

was found on the ground about five feet from the open car

door. Bullets compatible with the gun were found on Montanez

Ortiz's person. All three men were arrested. In total, nine

people were arrested at the restaurant; the remaining co-

defendants were apprehended later.

On June 27, 1990, 13 people were named in a six-

count indictment. Count I charged all 13 with participating

in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.

Appellants were charged only in Count I. Except for

appellants, all defendants pled guilty prior to trial.

Several pled to one count of the indictment, while others

pled to new informations in exchange for having the

indictment dismissed. II.
II.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

A. The Rule 29 Motions2
A. The Rule 29 Motions

2. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 29, "The court on motion of a
defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal . . . if the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a conviction . . . ."

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Appellants claim that the district court erred in

denying their respective Rule 29 motions for acquittal.3

Our task is to review the record to determine whether the

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, taken as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendants were guilty as charged. Alvarez,

987 F.2d at 83. A conviction may be premised in whole or

part on circumstantial evidence. Id. In addition, "juries

are not required to examine the evidence in isolation, for

`individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to

prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an

evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its

constituent parts.'" United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707,

711 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1005 (1993)

(quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80

(1987)). Finally, it is not our function to weigh evidence

or make credibility determinations. Id. Instead, it is the

jury's responsibility to make credibility judgments. Thus,

the jury is empowered to accept or reject, in whole or in

part, any testimony. Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 83.

Here, appellants were charged with and convicted of

conspiracy. "The `essence' of a conspiracy is an agreement

3. Although both appellants appeal the denial of their Rule
29 motions, they assert different grounds. We therefore
address them individually.

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to commit a crime." United States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299,

1300 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420

U.S. 770, 777 (1975) (emphasis in original)). To convict a

defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to agree and to

commit the substantive offense that was the object of the

agreement. United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 613, 616 (1st

Cir. 1992). The agreement may be express or tacit, and may

be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing

United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989)). "However, the

government need not establish that the defendants knew or

agreed upon every detail of the conspiracy. All that is

required is to show the essential nature of the plan and

their connections with it." United States v. O'Campo, 973

F.2d 1015, 1019 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

1. Mena Robles
1. Mena Robles

Appellant Mena Robles argues that the evidence

fails to show the existence of an agreement between himself

and the other conspirators. We disagree. It is true, as

Mena Robles argues, that there is no evidence tending to

indicate that he played a role in arranging the transaction.

Mena Robles also correctly asserts that his actions in the

restaurant on May 31, 1990, are consistent with the behavior

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of an innocent bystander; that is, there is nothing

inherently inculpatory about sitting at a particular table,

near other people, and accepting a beer when offered. Those

facts are not dispositive, however. Even if Mena Robles did

not actively participate until the final negotiation, he is

not necessarily absolved from being implicated in the

conspiracy because the government is not required to prove

that he took part in all aspects of the conspiracy. See

Cruz, 981 F.2d at 617. As for Mena Robles's "innocent

bystander" argument, we note that "jurors can be assumed to

know that criminals rarely welcome innocent persons as

witnesses to serious crimes and rarely seek to perpetrate

felonies before larger-than-necessary audiences." Ortiz, 966

F.2d at 712. In addition, "`there are circumstances where

presence itself implies participation--as where a 250-pound

bruiser stands silently by during an extortion attempt, or a

companion stands by during a robbery, ready to sound a

warning or give other aid if required.'" Ortiz, 966 F.2d at

712 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 829

(1st Cir. 1973)).

Thus, the jury could have inferred, for example,

that Montanez Ortiz's decision to shout to Carlos Kortwright,

within earshot of the negotiators, was done with the

knowledge that appellants were not "innocent bystanders," but

instead were participants in the scheme. Based on our

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reading of the record, a reasonable jury could also conclude

that appellants: arrived at the restaurant simultaneously

with the other putative conspirators; parked their car near

to those of the others; sat at an adjacent table, only a few

feet from the main negotiators, despite the fact that the

rest of the restaurant was empty; faced toward the

negotiators for the entire time they were in the restaurant;

first declined, and then accepted, the officers' drink

offers, apparently in response to instructions from

codefendants Colberg and Casiano; were identified by

codefendant Carlos Kortwright as being with the group to

"protect the money;"4 and were arrested in a car with

codefendant Montanez Ortiz.

While these factual conclusions are not the only

ones the jury could have reached, we find them eminently

reasonable. See e.g., United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880,

883 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1615 (1993)

("prosecution need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence, so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion

of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."). Accordingly, we find

4. Mena Robles urges us, for a variety of reasons, to reject
Munoz's testimony regarding Carlos Kortwright's
identification. All of the suggested bases for rejection,
however, depend on an evaluation of Carlos Kortwright's
credibility, which, as we have already noted, is the province
of the jury.

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the evidence sufficient to support Mena Robles's conspiracy

conviction.

2. Torres Rivera
2. Torres Rivera

As his first enumerated issue, appellant Torres

Rivera asks "Whether there was sufficient evidence to find

this Appellant guilty of the charged conspiracy and whether

the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel."

The ensuing section of the brief, however, is devoted almost

entirely to a claim of prejudicial variance between the

indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy, and the

evidence, which, according to Torres Rivera, revealed

"several" conspiracies. We will address these claims

individually.

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Torres Rivera essentially argues, as did Mena

Robles, that he was an innocent bystander to the

negotiations, rather than a participant. For the reasons set

forth in our disposition of Mena Robles's similar claim, see

supra sec. II.A.1, we find Torres Rivera's argument

meritless.

b. Prejudicial Variance
b. Prejudicial Variance

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Torres Rivera's variance argument is no more

availing.5 Essentially, Torres Rivera contends that the

"first" conspiracy ended on May 29, 1990, when the cocaine

deal apparently collapsed because of problems with Carlos

Kortwright's "money man," Miguel Camacho. Appellant argues

that the "second" conspiracy was formed thereafter, when

Carlos Kortwright teamed with Morales Colberg, Casiano,

Santana Olmo and Montanez Ortiz. Appellant claims that the

evidence introduced relative to the "first" conspiracy caused

him substantial prejudice, as he could conceivably have been

part of the "second" conspiracy only.

Whether there is a single conspiracy, multiple

conspiracies, or no conspiracy at all is ordinarily a factual

matter for the jury to determine. United States v. David,

940 F.2d 722, 732 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.

2301 (1992). Where, as here, there is no challenge to the

jury instructions, we review the jury's conclusion as to

whether one or more conspiracies existed only for evidentiary

sufficiency. Id. To conclude that there was a single

conspiracy, the jury need not be presented with evidence

showing that each coconspirator knew every detail of the

5. At oral argument, the government suggested that Torres
Rivera failed to preserve this argument because he did not
raise it below. Upon review of the record, it appears that
appellant put forth the variance argument in an unsuccessful
pretrial motion for severance. We will therefore assume, for
purposes of this appeal, that the pretrial motion preserved
the issue.

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conspiracy, or even that each conspirator knew every other

coconspirator. United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209,

223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1030, vacated on

other grounds sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United States, 498

U.S. 954 (1990). Indeed, a single conspiracy may exist where

there has been no direct contact among some of the

participants. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 127 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987). Moreover, "[t]he

fact that every defendant did not participate in every

transaction necessary to fulfill the aim of their agreement

does not transform a continuing plan into multiple

conspiracies." United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17 (1st

Cir. 1984). Instead, a jury may find a single conspiracy if

the evidence sufficiently demonstrates "that all of the

alleged coconspirators directed their efforts towards the

accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan." Id.

In this case, the "common goal" was the purchase of

a large amount of cocaine. Two unsuccessful attempts were

made to the consummate the sale, before the final attempt at

the restaurant on May 31, 1990. In each attempt, Carlos

Kortwright, Jose Kortwright, Samuel Solis Sierra and Rolando

Solis Sierra appeared to be the main actors. The supporting

cast, however, changed somewhat prior to the final attempt,

as Colberg, Casiano, Santana-Olmo, Montanez Ortiz and

appellants replaced Damaris Camacho, Miguel Camacho and

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Frances Perez. In our view, the evidence supports a

conclusion that these events constituted a single conspiracy

to purchase cocaine. As we stated above, it is of no moment

that all the conspirators did not participate in all attempts

to further the plan spearheaded by the main players. See,

e.g., United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 488 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990 (1990) (finding sufficient

evidence to support single conspiracy where appellants were

involved in only one of three attempts by a major dealer to

purchase cocaine). Therefore, appellant Torres Rivera's

variance argument must fail.6

c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Torres Rivera's claim of constitutionally defective

counsel rises and falls with his variance claim. He argues

that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to

object to evidence that Torres Rivera alleges was relevant

only to the "first" conspiracy, and that he was prejudiced by

the introduction of such evidence.

It is well settled that we measure the quality of

trial counsel's performance under the two-part standard set

by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant

to Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel performed

6. Because the jury could reasonably have found a single
conspiracy, we do not address whether Torres Rivera was
prejudiced by the alleged "variance."

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unreasonably and that prejudice resulted therefrom. Id.; see

also United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1990).

As noted above, the single/multiple conspiracy

argument is without merit. Moreover, according to the

record, the district court rejected the same argument made by

several other defendants, who, according to Torres Rivera

were part of the "second conspiracy." In light of these

prior rulings, counsel's failure to rehash the same failed

argument cannot be considered ineffective assistance of

counsel. See United States v. Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673 (1st

Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we reject Torres Rivera's claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel.

B. Sentencing Issues
B. Sentencing Issues

Appellants aim a barrage of arguments at their

respective sentences. We address them seriatim.

Torres Rivera first argues that the district court

erroneously calculated his base offense level ("BOL").

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) and 2D1.47, the BOL for a

conspiracy conviction such as this depends on the quantity of

contraband attributable to the defendant. The district court

concluded that appellants were to be held accountable for 15

7. Although section 2D1.4 has since been repealed, it was
part of the 1991 Guidelines Manual, applicable to this case
by virtue of the fact that sentencing took place in February
1992. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda, 981 F.2d 569, 571

n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (appropriate guidelines are those in
effect at time of sentencing). Accordingly, all guideline
citations herein refer to the 1991 manual.

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kilograms of cocaine,8 and set the BOL at 34. U.S.S.G.

2D1.1(c). Torres Rivera claims that the district court's use

of the 15 kilogram amount was erroneous; that he should be

held responsible for less than 500 grams; and that his BOL

therefore should be 24. We disagree.

U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2) provides that the BOL shall

be determined on the basis of "all acts or omissions

committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which

the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred

during the commission of the offense of conviction." The

relevant application note provides:

In the case of criminal activity
undertaken in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy,
the conduct for which the defendant
"would be otherwise accountable" also
includes conduct of others in furtherance
of the execution of the jointly-
undertaken criminal activity that was
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, comment. (n.1). The final piece of the

puzzle provides that if a "defendant is convicted of an

offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled

substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted

8. This amount, to which the government stipulated, agrees
both with the quantity that Colberg told Munoz that he would
be able to immediately purchase, and with the money that was
shown to Munoz in the Volvo in the restaurant parking lot.
According to the record, the negotiated price for the cocaine
was $16,000 per kilogram; the $500,000 that Santana Olmo
claimed was in the Volvo would, therefore, have been more
than sufficient to make the purchase.

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distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable

guideline amount." U.S.S.G. 2D1.4, comment. (n.1); see

also United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir.

1989) (affirming estimation of drug quantity based on amount

of money found in defendant's possession).

The thrust of Torres Rivera's BOL argument is that

he had no ability to produce any money to purchase cocaine.

This argument is rooted in the following statement, contained

in Application Note 1 to section 2D1.4:

However, where the court finds that the
defendant did not intend to produce and
was not reasonably capable of producing
the negotiated amount, the court shall
exclude from the guideline calculation
the amount that it finds the defendant
did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing.

In referring to this statement, however, Torres Rivera has

ignored the very next sentence in the same Note: "If the

defendant is convicted of conspiracy, see Application Note 1

to 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)." And, as we noted above, that

section calls for consideration of the foreseeable acts of

coconspirators in determining the BOL. Thus, as the district

court correctly concluded, Torres Rivera's personal financial

ability is inapposite to the matter at hand.

The remainder of Torres Rivera's BOL-related

argument is directed at the fact that much of the negotiating

in this case took place prior to his active involvement.

Therefore, he argues, those negotiations could not have been

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"reasonably foreseeable" to him, and he should not be held

responsible for any drugs involved with earlier stages of the

case. This argument, however, overlooks the events that took

place on May 31, 1990, when he, as a guard, took part in the

final negotiations. Thus, he is in fact being held

responsible for drugs negotiated while he was an active

participant in the conspiracy.

Finally, a recent decision of this court further

undermines Torres Rivera's theory. In United States v. De La

Cruz, No. 92-1279, (1st Cir. June 24, 1993), we rejected a

foreseeability argument made by a defendant whose only role

in a drug conspiracy had been as a driver. At sentencing,

and on appeal, the defendant claimed that he had no knowledge

of the amount of cocaine he was transporting. We first noted

that the defendant must have known that he was part of a

large-scale deal due to the number of people and vehicles

present at the warehouse where the drugs were stored. Id.,

slip op. at 17-18. We then stated:

A defendant who conspires to transport
for distribution a large quantity of
drugs, but happens not to know the
precise amount, pretty much takes his
chances that the amount actually involved
will be quite large. On De La Cruz'
theory, no amount at all could properly
be assigned to him if, as may well be the
case, he never had a specific quantity in
mind. The danger actually posed by the
conspiracy was the distribution of 240
kilograms, De La Cruz knew that a large
quantity was involved, and--absent

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special circumstances--we think that is
enough.

Id. at 18. In our view, Torres Rivera's role is analogous to

that of De La Cruz. Given his presence at the final

negotiations and his role as a guard for the "money man," his

general knowledge of the size of the cocaine deal is readily

inferable. And, like De La Cruz, Torres Rivera "took his

chances" as to the specific quantity.

In light of the foregoing, we can find no clear

error in either the district court's determination of the

quantity of cocaine attributable to appellant Torres Rivera,

or its resulting use of a BOL of 34. See, e.g., United

States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1461 (1st Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1346 (1993) (applying clear error

standard to appellate review of drug quantity attributed to

conspiracy defendant).

Torres Rivera next argues that his sentence was

disproportionately severe when compared with the sentences of

similarly situated codefendants. To support this claim, he

dwells on the fact that his 200 month prison sentence was

greater than those received by all other coconspirators,

including those referred to in the indictment as organizers,

leaders, managers and negotiators. We reject this sentencing

disparity claim. First, our review of the record indicates

that Torres Rivera was treated similarly to those

codefendants who pled guilty to the same conspiracy count of

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which he was convicted.9 All began with a BOL based on a 15

kilogram conspiracy. While some sentences varied, much of

that has to do with the fact that Torres Rivera was in a

Criminal History Category III, and that he and Mena Robles

were the only recipients of a firearm enhancement. Moreover,

despite Torres Rivera's claim to the contrary, the record

reveals no downward sentencing departures having been granted

to any codefendant. And, as a final matter, we have firmly

held that "a perceived need to equalize sentencing outcomes

for similarly situated codefendants, without more, will not

permit a departure from a properly calculated guideline

sentencing range." United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446,

1448 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 441 (1991).

Accordingly, we reject Torres Rivera's sentencing disparity

argument.10

Next, both appellants challenge the district

court's two-point offense-level enhancement, pursuant to

9. Several other coconspirators pled guilty to lesser
charges contained in superseding informations in exchange for
dismissal of their indictments. Those coconspirators
therefore received, comparatively, the shortest sentences.
We reject, however, Torres Rivera's reliance on the sentences
meted out to this group as support for his disproportionality
claim. See, e.g., United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 90

(1st Cir. 1992) (where codefendants are charged and convicted
of different offenses, they are not "similarly situated").

10. We have reviewed Torres Rivera's other sentencing
complaints and find them to be without merit.

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U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1),11 for possession of a firearm

during the offense. This circuit calls for the firearm

enhancement "whenever a codefendant's possession of a firearm

in furtherance of [] joint criminal activity was reasonably

foreseeable to the defendant." United States v. Bianco, 922

F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).12 In

reviewing a district court's use of the firearm enhancement,

we accord due deference to the application of the enhancement

to the facts of the case. United States v. Sostre, 967 F.2d

728, 731 (1st Cir. 1992). Factual conclusions related to

sentencing need only be supported by a preponderance of the

evidence and will be set aside only for clear error. Id.

Appellants essentially argue that the evidence is

not sufficient to support the two-level adjustment. We do

not agree. As noted above, coconspirator Montanez Ortiz was

found in possession of five bullets compatible with the gun

retrieved from just outside the car in which he and

appellants were seated at the time of their arrests. From

this, the court could properly infer that Montanez Ortiz had

11. In relevant part, section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides for a two
level BOL increase "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was possessed during commission of the offense . . .
."

12. We note with particular emphasis the First Circuit
standard because appellants rely on a host of cases from
other circuits.

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the gun on his person prior to ejecting it from the car.13

Appellants assert that neither their presence in Mena

Robles's car with Montanez Ortiz, nor any other record

evidence, is sufficient to infer the requisite

foreseeability. However, as we stated in Bianco:

[W]e often observe that firearms are
common tools of the drug trade. Absent
evidence of exceptional circumstances, we
think it fairly inferable that a
codefendant's possession of a dangerous
weapon is foreseeable to a defendant with
reason to believe that their
collaborative criminal venture includes
an exchange of controlled substances for
a large amount of cash.

Id. at 912 (citations omitted). See also Sostre, 967 F.2d at

731-32 (enhancement affirmed where only codefendant

physically possessed gun, but defendant was part of

"protection" team employed by drug seller); United States v.

Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d 664, 673 (1st Cir. 1992) (weapon

enhancement affirmed where only codefendant was in actual

possession of firearm, but both defendant and codefendant

served as "muscle" for drug-debt collections).

Here, given the jury's supportable conclusion that

appellants were involved in the drug transaction at issue,

and the lack of any evidence to contradict the reasonable

foreseeability of Montanez Ortiz's possession of a gun at the

13. Indeed, Montanez Ortiz pled guilty, in exchange for
dismissal of the indictment, to an information charging him
with carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug
related felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c).

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scene of a large-scale cocaine deal, we can find no clear

error in the district court's application of the two-level

weapon enhancement.14

Next, Mena Robles contends that the gun enhancement

was the product of vindictive sentencing on the part of the

district judge. This assertion is based solely on the fact

that only these appellants exercised their right to trial,

and they alone received the sentencing enhancement, although

those codefendants who pled guilty to the conspiracy charge

were situated similarly with respect to the firearm at issue.

We do not agree.

In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),

the Supreme Court faced a situation where a defendant who

successfully appealed his conviction was again found guilty

on retrial and given a harsher sentence by the same trial

judge. The Court, concerned with the possibility of a

vindictive response to the exercise of a constitutional right

to appeal, held that such an increased sentence must be

explained in the record. Id. at 726. Later, the Court held

14. Appellants also argue that the district court failed to
make the specific findings mandated by 18 U.S.C. 3553(c).
See United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1st Cir.

1990). This assertion is based primarily on the fact that
the sentencing judge did not, as he said he would, issue
written findings "summarizing his reasons for . . . a two
level increase . . . ." While it is apparently true that no
such written summary has been issued, our review of the
sentencing transcript shows clearly that the district court
made factual findings sufficient both to support the
enhancement and to adequately frame the appeal.

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that a "presumption of vindictiveness" is triggered whenever

the same judge imposes a stiffer sentence after retrial.

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982). This

presumption may be overcome only when objective information

in the record justifies the increased sentence. Id. at 372-

384; Johnson v. Vose, 927 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1991).

We have applied the Pearce presumption to

situations where, as here, defendant has rejected a plea

bargain in favor of a trial. See, e.g., United States v.

Crocker, 788 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1986); Longval v. Meachum,

693 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098

(1983). As we have pointed out, however, "not every instance

of an enhanced sentence following a defendant's exercise of a

legal right triggers the presumption." Vose, 927 F.2d at 11.

"The principle established by Pearce and its progeny is not

that enlarged sentences are forbidden, but only that such

sentences may not be fueled by vindictiveness." Id.

Therefore, we have qualified the presumption, holding that

"[t]he presumption [] arises only in circumstances in which

there is a reasonable likelihood that the increase in

sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part

of the sentencing authority." Id. In the absence of such

reasonable likelihood, the defendant bears the burden of

proving actual vindictiveness. Id., citing Alabama v. Smith,

490 U.S. 794 (1989).

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As we stated above, Mena Robles has pointed to

nothing in the record to support a claim of vindictiveness,

other than the fact of the gun enhancement itself. This will

not suffice. In Both Longval and Crocker, the trial judges

made mid-trial comments which "explicitly linked harsher

sentences to the defendants' refusal to cut short their right

to a jury trial." Vose, 927 F.2d at 12. These remarks, we

determined, were sufficient to establish a reasonable

likelihood of vindictiveness. Id.15 Here, the record is

devoid of similar evidence that would trigger the Pearce

presumption or demonstrate actual vindictiveness.

Accordingly, Mena Robles's vindictiveness argument fails.16

Appellant Torres Rivera also argues that the

implementation of the gun enhancement without a finding a

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a violation of due

process. This contention has been soundly rejected, and thus

we need not address it further. See United States v. Pineda,

981 F.2d 569, 574 (1st Cir. 1992).

15. In addition, we noted in Crocker and Longval that the

trial judges' comments could be construed as retaliation for
pursuing trials in cases the judges considered "unworthy of
[their] time and effort." Crocker, 788 F.2d at 809. Here,

where the sentencing judge did not preside at trial, no such
sentiment is likely.

16. Indeed we must question, but need not here decide,
whether such a presumption can ever result where, as here,
the sentencing judge was not the trial judge.

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As a final matter, we address Torres Rivera's claim

that he should have been granted a four-point reduction in

his BOL for playing only a "minimal" role in the conspiracy.

The district court awarded him a two-level adjustment as a

"minor" participant. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. We review the

district court's mitigating role determination for clear

error. United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir.

1991). According to the relevant application notes, a

"minimal" participant is a defendant who is "plainly among

the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a

group." While that description may superficially fit Torres

Rivera, further light is shed on the parameters of the

adjustment by means of these illustrative examples: "someone

who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling

operation than to offload part of a single marihuana

shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a

courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small

amount of drugs." U.S.S.G. 3B1.2, comment. (n.2).

Moreover the same note indicates that the "minimal

participant" adjustment will be used "infrequently." We

believe the district court correctly concluded that this

should not be one of those infrequencies. In his role as a

guard for the money, Torres Rivera occupied a position

integral to the completion of the deal. Indeed, Munoz

testified that Carlos Kortwright said that such protection

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was necessary because "the money man" had "lost money" in

prior transactions. In the end, we accept the following

reasoning on the part of the district court:

The Court finds, however, that since the
amount of drugs involved was quite large
and since defendant acted as a bodyguard,
a role which entailed providing
protection to the principal actors during
their negotiations and may result in
acts of violence, that it cannot in good
conscience assign any such actor the
label of minimal participant.

Based on the foregoing, we reject Torres Rivera's claim of

minimal participant status.

We have reviewed appellants' other arguments, and

find them without merit. Appellants' convictions and

sentences are therefore affirmed.
affirmed.

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