Estrada v. Vose

January 20, 1994
                    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                         

No. 93-1508 

                    LUIS M. ESTRADA, JR.,

                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                              v.

                     GEORGE A. VOSE, JR.,

                     Defendant, Appellee.

                                         

         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

        [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                                    

                                         

                            Before

                    Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
                       Circuit Judges.
                                     

                                         

Luis M. Estrada, Jr. on brief pro se.
                    
Michael B.  Grant, Senior Legal  Counsel, Rhode  Island Department
                 
of Corrections, on brief for appellee.

                                         

                                         

          Per Curiam.  Appellant Luis M. Estrada, Jr. filed a
                    

civil rights action  in the Rhode Island district  court.  He

is serving  a sentence pursuant to a  Rhode Island conviction

and  currently is incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in

Terre Haute, Indiana.   He raises two issues on  appeal:  (1)

whether his constitutional  right of access to the courts has

been infringed due to his  incarceration in Indiana; and  (2)

whether he has a constitutional right of access to his prison

files to correct allegedly erroneous information placed there

as a result  of the investigation leading up  to the transfer

decision.  Although the district  court did not address these

issues, the generality of the first claim and the speculative

nature of the second make a remand unnecessary.

          We  review a  grant of  summary  judgment de  novo.
                                                            

Goldman v.  First Nat'l Bank  of Boston, 985 F.2d  1113, 1116
                                       

(1st Cir.  1993).   In so doing,  we view  the record  in the

light   most  favorable  to   the  nonmovant,  indulging  all

reasonable inferences in  his or her favor.   Garside v. Osco
                                                             

Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990).  In  relation to
          

issues on which appellant bears the burden of proof, however,

he  is obligated to "reliably demonstrate that specific facts

sufficient to  create an authentic  dispute exist."   See id.
                                                             

That is, he "must produce evidence which would  be admissible

at trial to  make out the requisite issue  of material fact."

See Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355,357 (1st Cir. 1991).
                          

          A.  Access to Courts
                              

          It is "established beyond doubt that prisoners have

a constitutional right  of access to the courts."   Bounds v.
                                                          

Smith,  430 U.S.  817, 821  (1977).   To meet  this standard,
     

prison  authorities must  "assist inmates in  the preparation

and  filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with  adequate  law  libraries or  adequate  assistance  from

persons trained in the law."   Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
                                  

Appellant has alleged the  following facts in support  of his

assertion that prison officials have not met the requirements

of Bounds.
         

          First, he states that the prison library in Indiana

does not  contain any  sources of Rhode  Island law  and that

there is no one at the prison familiar with Rhode Island law.

This situation has  impeded appellant in the prosecution of a

state  post-conviction   review  proceeding  to   reduce  his

sentence; he asserts that  the matter currently is on  appeal

and  that he  has had to  file a "pre-brief  statement in the

blind."   Appellant has  not submitted copies  of any  of the

pleadings he has filed in the state courts nor does  he refer

to the titles or docket  numbers of these alleged state court

actions.

          The  ACI  official, Joseph  DiNitto,  who  has been

appointed to assist  appellant with his  legal needs wrote  a

letter  to appellant.   In it,  he states  that there  are no

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cases  concerning  appellant  pending  in  the  Rhode  Island

Supreme Court and  only one case in the  state Superior Court

(in which no action had been taken  for several months).   In

the letter, DiNitto also offers  to assist appellant with his

legal  needs.   However,  DiNitto  goes  on,  appellant  must

provide more  detailed information  concerning the status  of

his state  cases  and must  be more  specific concerning  the

research  material  appellant  requires.    Finally,  DiNitto

inquired  whether appellant had  contacted the Office  of the

Public Defender for assistance.

          Based on the above, we  do not think that appellant

has  submitted   sufficient  evidence   to  demonstrate   the

existence of an issue of material fact.  Significantly, there

is no indication  that appellant ever responded  to DiNitto's

letter.  The  fact that appellant was "highly skeptical" that

DiNitto could held him is,  at best, an "arrant  speculation"

and cannot  suffice to defeat  summary judgment.   See Kelly,
                                                            

924 F.2d at 357.  The letter requested reasonable information

and, in the absence of  any evidence that upon receiving such

data  from  appellant,  DiNitto   would  not  have   provided

assistance, the letter  represents adequate assistance  under

Bounds.  
      

          B.  Access to Prison Files
                                    

          Cases  have uniformly held  that a prisoner  has no

constitutional  right of access  to his or  her prison files.

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See, e.g.,  Slocum  v.  Georgia  State  Bd.  of  Pardons  and
                                                             

Paroles, 678  F.2d 940,  942 (11th  Cir.), cert.  denied, 459
                                                        

U.S.  1043 (1982);  Paine v.  Baker, 595  F.2d 197,  200 (4th
                                   

Cir.)  (prisoner has  no constitutional  right  of access  to

prison files),  cert. denied, 444  U.S. 925  (1979); Cook  v.
                                                         

Whiteside,  505  F.2d 32,  34  (5th Cir.  1974)  ("failure of
         

[parole] Board to  allow [prisoner] to see his  file does not

assume the proportions of  a deprivation of his rights  under

the   Constitution  or  the  laws  of  the  United  States").

Appellant  argues  that in  his  case,  this  rule should  be

relaxed  and  that  prison officials  should  be  required to

expunge the allegedly erroneous information.

          In support  of his  claim, appellant first  asserts

that  if  an  inmate  has  been  found  guilty  based  on  an

"institutional report,"  good-time credits are deducted  on a

day-for-day basis for  each day spent in lockup.   His second

argument is that he is  scheduled to appear before the parole

board  in February 1994  and that the  inaccurate information

can be relied on by the board.  Both of these occurrences, he

concludes,   implicate  his   constitutional   rights  to   a

significant degree.  We think that these allegations are  too

uncertain  to create a  question of material  fact concerning

whether appellant is entitled to equitable relief.  See Lopez
                                                             

v.  Garcia,  917 F.2d  63,  67  (1st  Cir. 1990)  (to  obtain
          

injunctive  relief, plaintiff  must  show  that  there  is  a

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likelihood that defendants will engage in unlawful conduct in

the future).

          For the  foregoing  reasons, the  judgment  of  the

district court is affirmed.
                          

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