United States v. Hahn

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1858

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ROBERT HAHN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

Circuit Judges.

Paul J. Haley, with whom Scott L. Hood and Law Office of Paul J.

Haley were on brief for appellant.

David A. Vicinanzo, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.

March 9, 1994

CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellant Robert Hahn challenges
CYR, Circuit Judge.

various trial court rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions for using or carrying a firearm in

relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), con-

spiring to possess and distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846, and

conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. 848(a),

(c). Careful review discloses no error.

I

BACKGROUND

We recite the relevant facts in the light most favor-

able to the verdict. See United States v. Welch, F.3d ,

, No. 92-1368 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 1993, slip op. at 19). In

1992, Hahn and ten other defendants were jointly indicted in the

United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire,

as former members of a nationwide marijuana trafficking conspira-

cy spanning more than a decade and headed by one Alberto "Dad"

Lujan. As a principal underboss, Hahn had been responsible for,

inter alia, transporting smuggled Mexican marijuana from Arizona

for distribution in California, Colorado, Michigan, New Hamp-

shire, Massachusetts and New York, among other locales.

In the early 1980s, Hahn and Lujan were local marijuana

dealers seeking to penetrate marijuana markets outside Arizona in

order to capitalize on their connections with suppliers in

Mexico. Eventually, Hahn established a business relationship

2

with Mark Heino, a New Hampshire native living in southern

California. Some of the marijuana Heino bought from Hahn, he

resold in California. The rest Heino distributed during his

frequent trips to New Hampshire. Heino himself became an under-

boss in the Lujan organization, a position he retained until his

arrest on trafficking charges in early 1984.

With Heino out of circulation, the New Hampshire

operation was taken over by Hugh Mulligan, another New Hampshire

native. Like Heino, Mulligan had been recruited into the Lujan

organization by Hahn, who thereafter supervised Mulligan's New

Hampshire operation. Later, when the New Hampshire marijuana

market softened, Mulligan introduced Hahn to Dennis and P.J.

Dougherty, Long Island residents with New Hampshire ties. The

Doughertys afforded the Lujan organization access to the lucra-

tive Metropolitan New York marijuana market, and large marijuana

shipments were soon being trucked in from Arizona. Several years

later, after the Doughertys dropped out of the picture, Hahn

established a high-volume marijuana trade with another New York

dealer. Meantime, Heino was released from prison in mid-1986,

returned to New Hampshire, and reestablished himself in the Lujan

organization. During this period, Hahn concentrated on the

organization's interests in Arizona, Metropolitan New York, and

New Hampshire.

3

Hahn's primary role was to supervise marijuana ship-

ments from Arizona to New York and New England.1 In early 1991,

Lujan set up a bogus produce-trucking operation as a cover for

the marijuana shipments. A professional truck driver, one Roger

Bradley, was recruited for the long-haul runs between Arizona and

the Northeast. Upon arrival at his East Coast destination,

Bradley would contact Hahn to arrange for offloading. Normally,

Bradley would "deadhead" back to Arizona, but on occasion he

transported large quantities of currency back to Lujan at Hahn's

request.2

The cross-country trucking operation was a success. At

its apex, during 1991 alone, thirteen to fifteen tractor-trailer

loads were transported from Arizona to the Northeast under Hahn's

1Hahn's secondary role was to ensure the security of the
organization's marijuana supply in Arizona. Several witnesses
testified that Hahn almost always carried a .45 caliber Colt
Commander handgun. Coconspirator Michael Sheehan testified that
Hahn admitted conducting raids, or "rips," on rival traffickers
and stealing their marijuana, thereby impeding the competition.
Hahn told Sheehan that he had been wounded by gunfire during a
"rip" in Tucson on December 8, 1989. At trial, a police officer
testified to having found Hahn in the aftermath of the December 8
shootout, and the government introduced photographs depicting the
shootout scene, strewn with bullets and bales of marijuana.

2The cross-country transportation operation required manpow-
er. The principal truck driver was Bradley, but on at least one
occasion coconspirators Michael Sheehan and Jeff Heino, Mark
Heino's brother, were brought to Arizona by Hahn to help with
the driving. Hahn also recruited his stepson, Craig Nezat, and
Nezat's cousin, Robert Mercado, to come to New York to assist
with offloading. And, finally, Hahn often used either Jeff
Heino, Sheehan, or Ken White, as a helper to drive and assist
in offloading the marijuana. Although Mulligan took a back seat
to Mark Heino after the latter was released from prison, on at
least one occasion Hahn used Mulligan as a courier for transport-
ing the organization's currency from New York to Arizona.

4

supervision, approximating 5,000 pounds apiece. The criminal

conspiracy unravelled shortly thereafter, however. During 1992,

Hahn's performance faltered, due apparently to his cocaine habit,

and he was cashiered by Lujan. Heino was unable to reestablish a

supply line between Arizona and New Hampshire. Finally, Hahn was

arrested in Arizona on November 12, 1992.3

II

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Standard of Review

The challenges Hahn asserts to the sufficiency of the

evidence and to the denial of his motions for judgments of

acquittal "raise a single issue." United States v. Batista-

Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1991), quoted in United States

v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Welch,

F.3d at [slip op. at 19]. The verdicts are reviewed

under well-recognized standards:

We assess the sufficiency of the evidence as
a whole, including all reasonable inferences,
in the light most favorable to the verdict,
with a view to whether a rational trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not weigh
witness credibility, but resolve all credi-
bility issues in favor of the verdict. The
evidence may be entirely circumstantial, and
need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence; that is, the factfinder may

3Hahn's ten codefendants entered into plea agreements with
the government.

5

decide among reasonable interpretations of
the evidence.

Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 17 (citations omitted).

2. Continuing Criminal Enterprise

A conviction under 21 U.S.C. 848 for engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") requires proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) committed a felony drug

offense, (2) as part of a continuing series of such violations,

(3) in concert with five or more persons in relation to whom he

acted as a supervisor, organizer, or manager, (4) and from which

multiple operations he realized substantial income or other

resources. See, e.g., United States v. Rouleau, 894 F.2d 13, 14

(1st Cir. 1990). Hahn claims that the government established

neither the third nor the fourth element of the CCE offense.

Under the familiar construction accorded the third CCE

element, the jury need only have found that the predicate crime

was committed in concert with at least five different individuals

in relation to whom the defendant served as an organizer, super-

visor, or in any other management position. See 21 U.S.C.

843(c)(2)(A); see also United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 730-

32 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Toro Aristizabal v.

United States, 112 S. Ct. 605 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom.,

Yarden v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 908 (1992), and cert. denied

sub nom., Toro Aristizabal v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1298

(1992), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); United States

6

v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 395 (1990).4

The record abounds with evidence that Hahn performed a

supervisory role in the Lujan organization which required manage-

ment of more than five other individuals. First, Hahn concedes

that he supervised Craig Nezat and Robert Mercado. Further,

there is uncontroverted evidence that he exercised virtually

exclusive managerial control of marijuana transportation between

Arizona and the Northeast, which means that truck drivers Roger

Bradley, Michael Sheehan and Jeff Heino were under Hahn's control

and supervision from time to time as well. Although these five

subordinates were enough to establish the third CCE element, Ken

White and Hugh Mulligan were managed by Hahn as well. See supra

at pp. 3-4.5

4As the Tenth Circuit explained in Jenkins:

[The CCE statute's] use of the indefinite
article when describing 'a position of organ-
'a
izer' or 'a supervisory position or any other
'a any other
position of management' contemplates that a
given network may have many persons in au-
thority. Thus, the defendant need not be the
dominant organizer or manager of the enter-
prise; he need only occupy some managerial
some
position with respect to five or more per-
sons.

Jenkins, 904 F.2d at 553 (emphasis in original).

5It is therefore unnecessary to address Hahn's argument that
he did not control the New Hampshire branch of the Lujan organi-
zation. "[S]o long as the record supports a finding that any

five people were under [the defendant's] control, our task is
complete and the status of the other individuals is immaterial."
David, 940 F.2d at 731 (emphasis in original).

7

Hahn's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on

the fourth CCE element is unavailing as well. The "substantial

income" requirement may be met either by direct evidence of the

revenues realized and resources accumulated by the defendant, or

by such circumstantial evidence as the defendant's position in

the criminal organization and the volume of drugs handled by the

organization. United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 75 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); United States v. Sisca, 503

F.2d 1337, 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).

The "substantial income" test establishes no fixed minimum, but

is intended "to exclude trivial amounts derived from occasional

drug sales," Roman, 870 F.2d at 75; see also United States v.

Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The practical

meaning of 'substantial income or resources' will normally be a

question for the trier of fact").

There is overwhelming circumstantial evidence that Hahn

derived "substantial income" from the management services ren-

dered to the Lujan organization. The government need only prove

revenue, not profit. See, e.g., Roman, 870 F.2d at 75. The

sheer scope of the conspiracy, which generated millions of

dollars from many tons of marijuana over several years, provided

ample basis for a reasonable inference that Hahn realized far

more than trivial amounts of income from the organization. See

id. For example, the trial testimony indicated that Bradley

alone transported approximately 50,000 pounds of marijuana from

Arizona to the Northeast and over $1 million in cash from New

8

York to Arizona at Hahn's direction on one occasion alone.

Coconspirator Ken White testified that he purchased tens of

thousands of dollars worth of automobiles and handguns at Hahn's

request. And coconspirator Jeff Heino testified that Hahn typi-

cally spent $1,500 to $2,000 per day while Heino was working with

him in the field on organization business. The fourth CCE

element was established beyond a reasonable doubt.6

3. Conspiracy to Possess and Distribute Marijuana

Next, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction for conspiring to distribute

marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. 846, which requires proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that "(1) a conspiracy existed, (2) . . . the

defendant knew of it, and (3) . . . he voluntarily participated

in it." David, 904 F.2d at 735. "A criminal conspiracy is a

tacit or explicit agreement to perform an unlawful act or omit

one the law requires." United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911

F.2d 833, 840 (1st Cir. 1990), citing Iannelli v. United States,

420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). The illicit agreement may be estab-

lished by direct and circumstantial evidence. Batista-Polanco,

927 F.2d at 19.

Hahn's claim that the government failed to establish an

agreement among him and his confederates is frivolous. The

6Although Hahn's father testified that throughout the period
in question his son lived in a trailer behind the family home and
was "constantly asking for money," we may not presume the jury
incapable of circumspection. See Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at

17.

9

evidence undergirding the CCE conviction alone, see supra at pp.

6-8, was sufficient to support a jury finding that Hahn conspired

with at least seven other persons to distribute marijuana.

Beyond that, however, Hahn concedes that he was a "middleman"

between "Dad" Lujan and Mark Heino. Finally, the evidence was

not nearly so limited, but demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt

that Hahn was a key conspirator in a large-scale marijuana

conspiracy involving many other people.

4. Firearms Conviction

Hahn contends that the government did not establish

that he "used or carried" a firearm during and in relation to a

drug trafficking crime as required by 21 U.S.C. 924(c). This

claim too is without merit. Hahn concedes that "many witnesses

testified at trial regarding the fact that the defendant oc-

casionally carried a weapon."7 Since we will not second-guess

credibility determinations by the jury, id. at 17, that testimony

was sufficient evidence in itself since these weapon-carrying

incidents involved activities in direct furtherance of the

conspiracy. See supra notes 1 & 7.

7We mention but a few examples. First, coconspirator Craig
Nezat testified that Hahn carried a gun during their marijuana-
related business trips to New York. Second, coconspirator Ken
White testified that he bought more than one dozen guns for Hahn,
and that Hahn almost always carried a gun. Finally, when Hahn
was found at the December 8, 1989 shoot-out scene, he lay only
inches from a .45 Colt Commander, his signature handgun. See

supra at note 1.

10

B. Motions for Mistrial

Hahn charges error in the denial of his motions for

mistrial based on the government's failure to establish that his

involvement in the "rip" shootout in Tucson was in furtherance of

the conspiracy. A mistrial need not be allowed absent a clear

showing of prejudice. United States v. Sclamo, 578 F.2d 888, 891

(1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Pappas, 611 F.2d 399, 406 (1st

Cir. 1979). We review the mistrial ruling for "abuse of discre-

tion." United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 157 (1st Cir.

1991).

After the government's opening statement, the defense

moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's reference to the

Tucson "rip." See supra note 1. The government represented at

sidebar that it would link the Tucson "rip" with the larger

conspiracy through the testimony of coconspirator Michael Shee-

han. The court accordingly denied the motion for mistrial,

without prejudice to its renewal. Sheehan later testified that

Hahn had admitted that he conducted the Tucson "rip" to "knock

out the competition." Further, Sheehan testified that Hahn

conducted at least one other such raid while Sheehan was in

Arizona.

At the close of the government's case, the court ruled

the Tucson "rip" evidence admissible as an overt act in further-

ance of the conspiracy. Hahn presents no argumentation even

remotely suggestive of an abuse of discretion, merely reiterating

the unsupported conclusion that the Tucson "rip" was part of a

11

separate conspiracy. The government correctly responds that the

jury reasonably could have found otherwise; that is, by intimi-

dating the competition, and stealing their marijuana, Hahn

furthered the interests of the Lujan organization.

12

C. Evidentiary Rulings

Hahn filed a pretrial motion in limine to preclude, as

irrelevant or unduly prejudicial: (1) testimony of an Arizona

state trooper who had made a routine stop of a vehicle being

driven by Hahn; and (2) testimony of another officer who searched

a different vehicle (subsequently linked with Hahn), and the

physical evidence recovered in the ensuing inventory search.

1. Arizona Traffic Stop

Arizona State Trooper Carlos Contreras testified that

he encountered Hahn in February of 1992 when he stopped a black

Ford pickup truck with New Hampshire license plates because it

lacked mud flaps. The driver, Hahn, was in lawful possession of

a .45 caliber Colt Commander. The government argued that the

traffic-stop evidence was highly probative of the scope of the

alleged conspiracy and Hahn's role in it, and that it corroborat-

ed important testimony provided by other prosecution witnesses.8

Hahn argues that the traffic-stop and handgun evidence

should not have survived the gauntlet for "other acts" evidence

established under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b).

First, the past incident must have some rele-
vance other than to show the defendant's
propensity to commit the crime. United States

8First, it established that Hahn was driving a New Hampshire
vehicle in Arizona. Second, the black Ford pickup registration
was in Hahn's name, and indicated a dwelling owned by coconspira-
tor Mark Heino as Hahn's New Hampshire address. Third, Ken White
had testified to buying a black Ford pickup at Hahn's request.
Fourth, the Colt Commander .45 bore the same serial number
appearing on the bill of sale for a handgun Ken White had pur-
chased at Hahn's request.

13

v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 137 (1st Cir.

1990). Second, even if specially relevant,
the danger of prejudice cannot substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
Id. at 138; Fed. R. Evid. 403.

United States v. Agudelo, 988 F.2d 285, 287 (1st Cir. 1993); See

United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1993)

(similar).

The district court first conducted an in camera con-

ference with counsel to delimit Trooper Contreras's testimony,

heard the testimony, then found that the testimony forged a

relevant link among various regional elements in the Lujan

organization. Then, with defense counsel's imprimatur, a firm

jury instruction was given to the effect, inter alia, that it was

lawful for Hahn to possess the handgun.9

The court correctly ruled that the challenged "other

acts" evidence was not precluded under Rule 404(b)'s absolute

bar, which "excludes evidence . . . relevant only because it

shows bad character," United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135,

137 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original); see Williams, 985

9Immediately after Trooper Contreras's direct examination,
the district court instructed the jury as follows:

Ladies and Gentleman of the jury, you have
heard testimony from this witness about Mr.
Hahn's possession of a firearm in Arizona.
The witness has already testified that it was
entirely lawful for Mr. Hahn to possess that
firearm and the witness's statement is cor-
rect and you are to understand from me as my
instruction on the law that it was entirely
lawful for Mr. Hahn to possess that firearm
and you're not to draw any inference against
Mr. Hahn because he was in possession of that
firearm as testified to by this witness.

14

F.2d at 637; all evidence derived from the traffic stop, includ-

ing the handgun, clearly bore direct relevance to legitimate

issues, see note 7 supra. Furthermore, possession of a licensed

firearm is neither a bad act nor indicative of bad character.

Under the required Rule 403 balancing, see id., the

"other acts" evidence itself posed scant risk of engendering any

improper inference of predisposition to possess or use a firearm

unlawfully, as distinguished from lawful access to a particular

firearm, a piece of evidence highly relevant to Hahn's involve-

ment and role in the alleged conspiracy and CCE. Whatever

"prejudice" resulted by reason of the fact that Hahn was being

tried, inter alia, on a weapons charge, was not only mitigated by

the limiting instruction, see Huddleston v. United States, 485

U.S. 681, 691-92, citing United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229,

235 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988), but did

not derive unfairly from the challenged evidence itself. We

discern no unfair prejudice and no abuse of discretion.

2. The Lincoln Mark VII

Hahn attempted to preclude evidence seized from a

Lincoln Mark VII abandoned near an airport in Islip, New York.

An inventory search yielded, inter alia, a .45 caliber Derringer

handgun, several Colt .45 caliber ammunition clips, and various

travel documents in Hahn's name. Coconspirator Ken White had

testified to purchasing an identical Lincoln Mark VII at Hahn's

behest, and several witnesses testified that the Lincoln was used

by Hahn in his New York City area activities in behalf of the

15

Lujan organization. The Derringer bore a serial number matching

that on the bill of sale White received when he purchased it, as

he did other handguns, at Hahn's request. Finally, among the

travel documents found in the Lincoln was the receipt for a

round-trip airline ticket issued in Hahn's name for travel

between Tucson and Islip.

Hahn argues that this evidence should have been exclud-

ed under Rule 403 because its prejudicial effect outweighed its

probative value. The difficulty with Hahn's claim is that he

"has not shown that the probative value of the 'other act'

evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice."

United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993)

(emphasis in original); see United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada,

877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) ("all evidence is meant to be

prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided").

Although evidence of handgun possession may indeed invite an

inference that the defendant used the gun, the entirely legiti-

mate predicate inference for so concluding is that prior posses-

sion makes it "more probable" that the defendant used a handgun

than would be the case if there were no such evidence. See Fed.

R. Evid. 401. Thus, no unfair inference of character-based

predisposition was necessary to constitute the seized handgun and

ammunition probative evidence on several important factual

issues, including Hahn's activities in the New York area. As no

cautionary instruction was requested, we discern no abuse of

discretion.

16

17

D. Impeachment Evidence

After trial, Hahn's attorney became aware of a plea

agreement and a police report relating to government witness

Roger Bradley which had not been provided to the defense.

Claiming that these documents would have been useful for impeach-

ment purposes, Hahn moved for a new trial. The district court

denied the motion.

"[T]he district court's determination on the materiali-

ty of newly discovered evidence in prosecutorial nondisclosure

cases is ordinarily accorded deference." United States v.

Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 618 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted),

cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977 (1991). A new trial is in order only

if Hahn can demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result

would have been different had the defense provided the undis-

closed evidence before trial. See Barrett v. United States, 965

F.2d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1992); Sanchez, 917 F.2d at 617.

The district court ruled that no such showing had been

made by Hahn because: (1) defense counsel had been provided with

a plea agreement between Bradley and the United States Attorney

for the District of New Hampshire, and had been made aware of the

existence of the Arizona plea agreement even though the document

itself was not provided; (2) Hahn's counsel made good use of

these plea agreements at trial and, indeed, Bradley admitted on

cross-examination that he was hoping for a lighter sentence in

exchange for his testimony; and (3) the Arizona police report was

cumulative, as it contained information previously provided to

18

the defense in other documents, and had been effectively used in

cross-examination. Careful review leaves no doubt that these

findings were well founded, in law and fact. "'Impeachment evi-

dence, even that which tends to further undermine the credibility

of the key government witness whose credibility has already been

shaken due to extensive cross-examination, does not create a

reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist when that evidence

is cumulative or collateral.'" Id. at 618-19 (quoting United

States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979)).

E. Sentencing

The district court imposed two concurrent life terms

for the CCE and conspiracy count convictions, as well as a

mandatory, consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense

under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); a $25,000 fine; costs of confinement;

and five years' supervised release.10 In accordance with 18

10These sentences were imposed pursuant to the November 1,
1992, version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.1

(1992). The 924(c) conviction triggered a mandatory consecu-
tive five-year sentence. See id. 2K2.4. The CCE and conspira-

cy counts were grouped pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2D1.5, comment.
(n.4). See id. 3D1.3.

On the conspiracy conviction, the court conservatively
calculated the drug quantity at 10,000 to 30,000 kilograms of
marijuana, see id. 2D1.1(c)(4), for a base offense level

("BOL") of 36, augmented by a two-level enhancement for possess-
ing a firearm, see id. 2K2.4, comment. (n.2), and a four-level

enhancement for Hahn's leadership role, see id. 3B1.1(a), for

an adjusted base offense level ("ABOL") of 42.
On the CCE count, the ABOL was 42 as well, see id. 2D1.5,

and Hahn's category I criminal history status resulted in a
guideline sentencing range of 360 months to life. See id. 5A

(sentencing table).

19

U.S.C. 3553(c)(1), the district court entered the following

statement of reasons for sentencing Hahn at the upper limit of

the guideline sentencing range ("GSR"):

1. Hahn was a career criminal who had
"devoted his entire life to the business
of trafficking in illegal drugs."

2. Hahn used weapons, violence, and intimi-
dation as a day-to-day part of his busi-
ness operation.

3. Estimated conservatively, the quantity
of marijuana attributable to Hahn was
well in excess of the 10,000 kilograms
necessary to qualify for the offense
level found applicable in the pre-sen-
tence report.

4. Hahn managed and corrupted considerably
more than five people over the course of
the conspiracy.

The only challenge to these findings is directed at the amount of

marijuana for which Hahn was held responsible.

The "drug quantity" determination must be based on a

preponderance of the evidence, U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, and we review

only for clear error. United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279,

1287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2393 (1993). The

presentence report recommended that 64,200 pounds of marijuana

(approximately 29,000 kilograms) be attributed to Hahn, based in

part on the trial testimony of several witnesses who recounted

particular transactions during the decade-long period from 1980

to early 1991, augmented by an estimate of the amount transported

by Roger Bradley in thirteen tractor-trailer loads during 1991

alone. The court conservatively estimated the total amount at

49,700 pounds for sentencing purposes.

20

Hahn's challenge is based exclusively on a credibility

attack against Bradley's trial testimony. But see United States

v. Sepulveda, F.3d , (1st Cir. 1993) [Slip op. at 72

(December 20, 1993)] (where testimony provides competent basis

for estimating drug quantity, we need go no further, id. at

[slip op. at 77]). Not only are the district court findings

fully supported, but Hahn does not allege that he was responsible

for less than the 10,000 kilograms of marijuana required to

trigger BOL 36. See note 10 supra. Thus, any alleged discrepan-

cy in weight would be immaterial for guideline sentencing purpos-

es.

Affirmed.

21