April 13, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-2139
DONALD J. MCCLAIN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GORDON CLARK, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Donald J. McClain on brief pro se.
Marc J. Miller and Bernstein, Golder & Miller, P.A. on brief for
appellee Gordon Clark.
Per Curiam. Appellant Donald McClain filed an
action in the district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against
Gordon Clark, a correctional officer, and John McGonigle, the
Middlesex County Sheriff. McClain alleged the use of
excessive force by Clark in the process of moving McClain
from the jail in which he was housed to a van in preparation
for transportation to court. The district court granted
Clark's motion for summary judgment. In so doing, it relied
on Clark's affidavit to find that the force used by Clark was
reasonable and necessary to fulfill his duties under Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
On appeal, McClain first complains that he never
received the report of a magistrate judge which had earlier
recommended the denial of McClain's motion for summary
judgment. McClain also states that he was not notified that
the case had been transferred from Judge Wolf to Judge
Hornby. In light of the fact that McClain apparently
received notice of Judge Wolf's adoption of the magistrate
judge's recommendation, it is hard to see how he was
prejudiced. Even if he was deprived of the opportunity to
file objections to the report, he essentially received an
equivalent opportunity when he responded to Clark's motion
for summary judgment. That is, he wrote a memorandum and
submitted his medical records and the affidavits of two
witnesses to some of the events in question.
Second, McClain argues that he met the requirements
for summary judgment because he suffered an injury to his
right hand when Clark smashed his hand by stepping on it and
when Clark, in double-handcuffing him, placed the cuffs on so
tightly that circulation was cut off to his hands. Also,
prison officials allegedly applied excessive force in the way
they carried him to the van. McClain asserts that the
actions of the prison officials, especially Clark, were not
warranted because he (McClain) never presented a threat to
any officers.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a
moving party must "show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once
the movant has met this standard, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to establish the existence of "at least one
issue that is both `genuine' and `material.'" Kelly v.
United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Here, as Judge Hornby
noted, McClain did not file his own affidavit. However, he
did submit the affidavits of the two inmates; he also
submitted medical records.
To show an Eighth Amendment violation when force is
used, an inmate must demonstrate "the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. That is,
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that the force was not "`applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline [but was used] maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'" Id. at
320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). In considering
this question, courts must take into account "the extent of
the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the
facts known to them. . . . " Id. at 321.
Upon reviewing the affidavits of the two prisoners
and comparing them to Clark's affidavit, the following
undisputed scenario emerges. There was an argument in which
McClain refused to let the prison officials prepare him for
transportation to court and in which he denied the requests
that he be voluntarily handcuffed as required by prison
policy. Although one of the inmates asserts in his affidavit
that McClain "appeared" not to be putting up any resistance,
Clark nonetheless forced McClain onto a table with a night
stick. However, this inmate also states that he (the inmate)
was taken out to the van immediately after this occurred.
Thus, he did not see, nor did the other inmate claim to see,
what happened next when Clark put the leg irons on McClain
and began patting down McClain. Because McClain claims that
Clark inflicted the force (smashing his hand and tightening
the handcuffs) during this period of time, we think that
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Clark's version of what happened in the course of the ensuing
process remains uncontradicted. That is, that McClain, due
to his resistance and combativeness, presented a threat to
Clark which required the use of force by Clark.
Once this is established, the question then becomes
whether the force employed was used "maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" or, as
Clark asserts in his affidavit, in a "good faith" effort to
keep McClain in custody and under control. "The focus of
this standard is on the detention facility official's
subjective intent to punish." Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d
1440, 1449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2998 (1993).
Further, the Whitley Court recognized that deference should
be accorded prison officials in the choice and use of
practices they believe are necessary to maintain security.
See 475 U.S. at 321-22.
Given the situation facing Clark -- that McClain
had to be transported to court but was refusing to proceed
voluntarily -- Clark reasonably could have perceived that
some force would be needed to accomplish this goal.
Moreover, once McClain became combative, and therefore
potentially dangerous, one way to subdue and keep McClain
from hurting others was by the use of leg irons and
handcuffs. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
Clark's assertion that, based on the facts then before him,
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he acted in good faith during this process must be taken as
true. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
Because the use of force in this case was not
constitutionally excessive, the alleged injuries McClain
suffered become irrelevant. We therefore need not address
McClain's claim that Clark committed perjury by stating in
his affidavit that McClain had not received any "significant
injury."
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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