Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School District

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1828

KEVIN W. MURPHY, ETC., ET AL.

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

TIMBERLANE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Cyr, Circuit Judge.

Gerald M. Zelin, with whom Diane M. Gorrow and Soule, Leslie,

Zelin, Sayward and Loughman were on brief for appellant.

Ellen J. Shemitz, with whom Michael R. Chamberlain and

Chamberlain and Connor were on brief for appellees.

April 28, 1994

CYR, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellees Kevin W.
CYR, Circuit Judge.

Murphy (Kevin) and his parents, Janice and Kevin C. Murphy,

brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.,1 to compel

defendant-appellant Timberlane Regional School District (Timber-

lane) to provide Kevin with compensatory education for the

two-year period during which he received no educational services

due to the failure of the parties to agree upon an appropriate

individual educational plan (IEP). The district court ultimately

granted summary judgment against Timberlane, and Timberlane

appealed. We affirm the district court judgment.

I

BACKGROUND

After incurring an accident-induced disability at an

early age, Kevin was determined a disabled individual entitled to

special educational services under the IDEA.2 Several years

1The IDEA formerly was known as the Education of the
Handicapped Act. See Pub. L. 102-119, 25(b), Oct 7, 1991, 105

Stat. 607 (substituting "Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act" for "Education of the Handicapped Act").

2We relate only the background necessary to an understanding
of this appeal. For greater detail, see Murphy v. Timberlane

Regional Sch. Dist., 973 F.2d 13, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1992) (vacating

summary judgment against the Murphys) ("Murphy I").

As the court explained in Murphy I:

[The IDEA] requires . . . participating states
[to] adopt policies assuring all students with dis-
abilities the right to a "free appropriate public

2

later, the Murphy family moved to Plaistow, New Hampshire, which

is within the Timberlane Regional School District. In September

1981, Timberlane placed Kevin in a special educational program at

Charlotte Avenue School, a public elementary school in Nashua,

New Hampshire. Although Kevin's parents originally agreed to

this placement, they soon expressed concerns to his teacher and

to Timberlane's special education administration that Kevin was

regressing academically. In December 1981, after Kevin suffered

education." 20 U.S.C. 1412(1). New Hampshire has
adopted the required policies and attempts to comply
with the requirements of the Act.

As defined by [the IDEA], the term "free appro-
priate public education" refers to the special educa-
tion and related services that must be provided in
conformity with an individualized education program
(IEP). 20 U.S.C 1401(a)(20). An IEP is a statement
of the educational program which must be written for
each child and designed to meet each child's unique
needs. 20 U.S.C 1401(a) (19). The IEP is developed
by a team including a qualified representative of the
local educational agency, the teacher, the parents or
guardian, and, where appropriate, the student. Id.

. . . An IEP is appropriate under [the IDEA] if it
provides instruction and support services which are
reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits to
the student. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.

176, 203-207 (1982); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d

223, 226-27 (1st Cir. 1983).

[The IDEA] further requires states to establish
and maintain certain procedures "to assure that chil-
dren with disabilities and their parents or guardians
are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to
the provision of free appropriate public education."
20 U.S.C. 1415(a). Parents who believe that a pro-
posed IEP is inappropriate are entitled to an impartial
due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2). Any
party aggrieved by the decision of the administrative
hearing officer may appeal to either state or federal
court. 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2).

Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 14.

3

a seizure at home, his parents decided not to return him to

school. Kevin received no educational services from Timberlane

between January 1982 and January 1984, the two-year period to

which the compensatory education claim at issue in this case

relates. Finally, in January 1984, after a great many meetings

and an abortive truancy proceeding against Kevin's father, the

parties came to an agreement on Kevin's placement at Pinkerton

High School, where he remained through the 1988-89 school year.3

In the fall of 1988, Mr. Murphy and Timberlane offi-

cials had discussions concerning continuation of Kevin's special

education beyond his twenty-first birthday on July 9, 1989. Mr.

Murphy later signed Kevin's 1988-89 IEP with the understanding

that Kevin would be provided special educational services beyond

age twenty-one. On January 5, 1989, however, the Timberlane

school board rejected a request by the Timberlane superintendent

to fund continued special education for Kevin. On July 24, 1989,

shortly after Kevin's twenty-first birthday, George Wright,

Timberlane's representative on Kevin's IEP team, notified the

Murphys that Kevin would be discharged as a special education

student.

Kevin is now twenty-five years of age and no longer

entitled to a free public education under New Hampshire law. See

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 186-C:9 (disabled "child shall be entitled

to continue in an approved program until such time as the child

3Although briefly placed in two different schools for
evaluation, in June 1982 and October-November 1983, Kevin was not
returned to a permanent educational setting until January 1984.

4

has acquired a high school diploma or has attained the age of 21,

whichever occurs first"); see also id. 186-C:2 (similar). In

August 1989, less than one month after Kevin had been discharged,

the Murphys requested an administrative hearing. The Murphys

maintained that Kevin was entitled to compensatory educational

services beyond age twenty-one as a consequence of Timberlane's

failure to provide special education during the two-year period

from January 1982 through January 1984. The Murphys specifically

alleged that Timberlane had violated the IDEA by failing either

to propose an IEP acceptable to all IEP team members or to

initiate administrative proceedings to resolve the IEP impasse in

accordance with N.H. Code Admin. R. Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b ("section

1125").4

The administrative hearing officer determined that the

Murphys' claim for compensatory educational services was barred

by laches. The United States District Court for the District of

New Hampshire granted summary judgment in favor of Timberlane,

affirming the administrative decision. We vacated the district

4Section 1125 states:

If the parent(s) inform the district of their disagree-
ment, or if they fail to make a decision within the
specified time frame, it shall be interpreted as dis-
agreement with the decision or action proposed by the
local school district's Special Education Evalua-
tion/Placement Team. If the Local Education Agency

feels its action or decision should, in the best inter-

ests of the student, be implemented, the Local Educa-

tion Agency shall initiate its right of due process as

specified in the Complaint and Impartial Due Process
Hearing Procedures Section of the Standards to obtain
the authority to implement its decision. (emphasis
added).

5

court decision and remanded for further findings relating to the

laches defense. Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 18. On remand, after

receiving evidence and argument on both the laches defense and

the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

rejected Timberlane's laches defense, denied its motion for

summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense, and

granted summary judgment for the Murphys. Murphy v. Timberlane

Regional Sch. Dist., 819 F. Supp. 1127 (D.N.H. 1993) ("Murphy

II"). Timberlane appeals the district court order.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Laches

When Timberlane's laches defense was before us in 1992,

we explained that "[t]he equitable doctrine of laches is an

affirmative defense that serves as a bar to a claim for equitable

relief 'where a party's delay in bringing suit was (1) unreason-

able, and (2) resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.'"

Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 16 (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza,

Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 911 (1st Cir. 1989)). We went on to hold

that "the Murphys' delay in filing their claim was not so un-

reasonable as to make the laches defense available without a

clear showing of prejudice." Id. (emphasis added). On remand,

the district court found that the delay had not prejudiced

Timberlane's ability to present its case as a result of the

unavailability or failed memories of key witnesses. Murphy II,

819 F. Supp. at 1133. Our review reveals no abuse of discretion

6

by the district court. See K-Mart Corp., 875 F.2d at 911.5

Timberlane represented to the district court that "most

of the primary actors" from the relevant period were unavailable,

and that the "memories of critical witnesses had failed."

However, two of these "primary" witnesses (Kevin's teachers:

Martha Kadel and Claudia Libis) testified at the district court

hearing. A third key witness, Nikolas Sarbanis, resides within

the reach of the district court's subpoena power, yet Timberlane

did not produce him. Timberlane rested its "prejudice" showing

relating to the other "primary" witness, former Timberlane

Superintendent Robert Crompton, solely on its unsupported asser-

tion that he was unavailable. The district court received

testimony, however, that Crompton resides in Florida, and Timber-

lane made no proffer that he was either unable or unwilling to

testify. See Hoover v. Department of Navy, 957 F.2d 861, 864

(Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that "prejudice" showing must be sup-

ported by "substantial evidence" and holding, on similar facts,

that this burden "is not met simply by showing that a potential

witness has retired" outside the subpoena power of the court.)

Moreover, Timberlane did not assert, let alone show, that Cromp-

ton's testimony would not be available by deposition. See, e.g.,

Fairfield 274-278 Clarendon Trust v. Dwek, 970 F.2d 990, 994-95

5Because the district court conducted a preliminary hearing
at which the parties were allowed to present evidence, see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(d), "abuse of discretion" is the appropriate
standard of review, see Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 900 F.2d 1, 2-

3 (1st Cir. 1990), notwithstanding that the laches defense
originally was raised on motion for summary judgment.

7

(1st Cir. 1992) (explaining requirements for the introduction of

deposition testimony when witnesses are unavailable, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)).

The district court further found that Timberlane had

failed to take reasonable steps to refresh its witnesses:

At the [district court] hearing, [six
Timberlane witnesses] testified on . . .
direct examination as to aspects of their
involvement with Kevin's special education
program which they could not remember. On
. . . cross-examination [by the Murphys'
counsel], however, each acknowledged that
[Timberlane] had not shown them relevant
documents contained in the record of the
instant case, such as transcripts of signifi-
cant meetings concerning Kevin.

Murphy II, 819 F. Supp. at 1133.

After reviewing the entire hearing transcript with

care, we are persuaded that the rejection of Timberlane's claim

of prejudice was well within the district court's sound discre-

tion. See K-Mart Corp., 875 F.2d at 912; see also Kersey v.

Dennison Mfg. Co., 3 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 1993) (abuse of

discretion occurs "'when a relevant factor deserving of signifi-

cant weight is overlooked, or when an improper factor is accorded

significant weight, or when the court considers the appropriate

mix of factors, but commits a palpable error of judgment in

calibrating the decisional scales.'") (quoting United States v.

Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted).

B. The Timberlane Motion for Summary Judgment

Following the evidentiary hearing on its laches

defense, Timberlane moved for summary judgment on the ground that

8

the present action is time-barred. Reasoning from the absence of

an express limitation provision in both the IDEA and the im-

plementing New Hampshire statute, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 186-

C,6 the district court ruled that laches alone could provide a

temporal limitation on the Murphys' compensatory education claim.

Murphy II, 819 F. Supp. at 1132. We conclude that the compensa-

tory education claim was not time-barred under the New Hampshire

limitation provision appropriate for "borrowing" in the present

case. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.

1990) ("court of appeals [may] affirm a judgment on any indepen-

dently sufficient ground").

(i) The "Borrowing" Methodology

The Supreme Court has described the federal "borrowing"

praxis in broad terms: "[w]hen Congress has not established a

time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled

practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law

if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so."

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) ( 1983 action).

See also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895) (absent

federal limitation, congressional intent is best served if the

federal right is "enforced in the manner common to like actions"

under state law); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194,

198 (1st Cir. 1987) (borrowing N.H. RSA 508:4 six-year limita-

6New Hampshire has since adopted a limitations scheme
specifically applicable to special education claims. See N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. 186-C:16-b (effective June 30, 1992).

9

tion on "personal actions" for application to 1981 action). In

selecting the appropriate state limitation, Campbell and its

progeny require the borrowing court to balance both the interests

of the parties and the legislative goals of the particular

federal statute. See Amann v. Town of Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 931-33

(1st Cir. 1993) (borrowing administrative review limitation

period after balancing three IDEA policy goals: the parental

interest in participation, the school's interest in speedy

resolution of disputes, and the child's interest in receiving

educational entitlement). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has

observed that:

[T]he nature of actions that can be brought
under the [IDEA] as well as the Act's goal of
proper education of the handicapped child
make the selection of state limitations
periods on a case-by-case basis an
imperative. The individual case must be
characterized by considering the facts, the
circumstances, the posture of the case and
the legal theories presented.

Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir.

1986) (citation omitted); see Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750

F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.N.H. 1990) (similar) (Stahl, J.); see also

Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 449 (3d Cir.

1981) ("Ultimately, we must be guided by the aim of the [IDEA] in

devising the limitation period in issue here. If state limita-

tions law conflicts with federal procedural safeguards embodied

in [the IDEA], the federal concerns are paramount."), cert.

denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).

(ii) The Compensatory Education Claim

10

First, we must attempt to "characterize the essence of

the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute

provides the most appropriate limiting principle." Wilson, 471

U.S. at 268. The present IDEA claim seeks to vindicate Kevin's

"right to a free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. 1412-

(1); see also 20 U.S.C. 1412(2)(b), based on the contention

that Kevin was deprived of educational services for two years

while Timberlane, contrary to its mandated duty under section

1125, failed to resort to the New Hampshire administrative

process to resolve the impasse between Timberlane and the Murphys

as to what constituted an "appropriate education." See generally

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988) (finding IDEA "confers

upon disabled children an enforceable substantive right to public

education"). The Murphys request equitable relief in the form of

an injunction compelling Timberlane to provide Kevin with two

years of compensatory special education.

The peculiar procedural warp presented in this case

seems to us sufficiently important to qualify as a defining

feature of the limitation to be borrowed from New Hampshire law.

The administrative hearing officer initially ruled that the

Murphys' hearing application was timely under the New Hampshire

statute of limitations governing "personal actions" in general,

see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 508:4, and therefore that the compen-

satory education claim should be addressed on the merits. Later,

on reconsideration, the hearing officer ruled that the compensa-

tory education claim was barred by laches. The Murphys filed a

11

timely appeal to the district court from the administrative

ruling on laches pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2), and the

district court upheld the administrative ruling. On appeal, we

vacated the district court decision and remanded to the district

court for further proceedings. Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 18.

The district court convened an evidentiary hearing on

laches, and presumably in light of the circumstances of the case

Kevin was approaching his mid-twenties by this point, the

litigation had been pending for more than three years, and an

extensive district court evidentiary record had already been

generated the district court decided to adjudicate the Mur-

phys' compensatory education claim on the merits rather than

remand to the administrative hearing officer. See 20 U.S.C.

1415(e)(2) (courts sitting in review of administrative rulings

may supplement the hearing record with additional evidence); Pihl

v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 191 (1st Cir. 1993)

(remand to administrative hearing officer may not be required

where the record contains sufficient factual development and the

"peculiar expertise" of a hearing officer is not required).

Neither party opposed the district court's decision to address

the merits. Thus, the instant appeal challenges the district

court order allowing the compensatory education claim on the

merits.

This tortuous procedural trail is material to the

present inquiry in at least two significant respects. First, in

contradistinction to the "typical" IDEA action, this case does

12

not concern the appropriate limitation to be applied to an appeal

from a state administrative ruling to a federal district court

under 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2), but to the initiation of a request

for an "impartial due process" administrative hearing under 20

U.S.C. 1415(b)(2) in the first instance. Compare, e.g., Amann,

991 F.2d at 933-34 (importing 30-day limitation from Massachu-

setts Administrative Procedure Act in 1415(e)(2) case); Bow,

750 F. Supp. at 550-51 (similar, applying 30-day New Hampshire

administrative review limitation).7 Second, we believe that

several factors which militate in favor of borrowing an abbrevi-

ated limitation period for application in the context of an

appeal from an administrative ruling under section 1415(e)(2) are

inapposite in the present context. For instance, where a party

seeks administrative review in order to resolve an ongoing IEP

impasse, the need for a speedy resolution securing the eligible

child's IDEA entitlement at the earliest possible time must be

considered a dominant IDEA policy objective. Amann, 991 F.2d at

932. The present action, on the other hand, concerns a claim for

compensatory education based exclusively on a course of conduct

already concluded, and thus does not implicate an equivalent need

for urgent administrative intervention. Furthermore, whereas the

limitation borrowed in this case will govern whether the Murphys'

7The thirty-day limitation borrowed in Bow appears to have

been supplanted by a newly enacted limitation scheme, applicable
exclusively in the special education context. The new provision
prescribes a 120-day limitation on any "appeal from a final
administrative decision in a special education due process
hearing to a court of competent jurisdiction." N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. 186-C:16-b IV.

13

compensatory education claim can ever be considered by any

tribunal in the first instance, in a section 1415(e)(2) proceed-

ing the district court normally functions something like an

appellate court reviewing a state agency decision on the merits.

Bow, 750 F. Supp. at 549. Consequently, the statute of limita-

tions defense interposed by Timberlane would not merely preclude

a judicial "second look" at an adverse administrative ruling, but

foreclose any ruling, administrative or judicial, on Timberlane's

legal responsibility for the otherwise irretrievable two-year

IDEA educational entitlement denied Kevin.

Thus, the broad equitable considerations and finality

concerns generated by the present action where absent a

compensatory education award there can be no "next year" for the

disabled individual no longer eligible for free public education

are not ordinarily involved in an appeal to the district court

under section 1415(e)(2). Compare Amann, 991 F.2d at 933 (hold-

ing short limitation period appropriate, in part because parents

can always contest next year's proceedings if need be). We think

these considerations bear out the view endorsed by the Bow court

that "[n]othing prevents different provisions of a federal

statute from being characterized differently for statute of

limitation purposes." Bow, 750 F. Supp. at 549, citing Wilson,

471 U.S. at 268. Under the required "borrowing" methodology,

therefore, we weigh the federal interests manifest in the IDEA,

the state and school district interests implicit in section 1125,

and the interests of the learning disabled pupil and his family,

14

all in light of the particular procedural posture and equitable

considerations disclosed in the present record.

(iii) The Appropriate New Hampshire Limitation

Timberlane advocates borrowing the four-year limitation

applicable to "Actions to Recover For Bodily Injury" against

local governmental units, including school districts. See N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. 507-B:7 ("RSA 507-B:7") (amended to three-year

period, effective in actions arising after May 17, 1989). An

alternate candidate is the New Hampshire statute of limitations

which formerly prescribed a six-year limitation on "personal

actions" accruing prior to July 1, 1986. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

508:4 ("RSA 508:4") (amended to three-year period, effective in

actions arising after July 1, 1986). As the present cause of

action accrued before RSA 508:4 and RSA 507-B:7 were amended, see

infra p. 21, the pre-amendment versions govern. See Gonsalves v.

Flynn, 981 F.2d 45, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that federal

"borrowing" court will respect state law provision prescribing

exclusively prospective application of amendatory limitation),

citing Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 234 n.3 (1st Cir.

1977).

We think it clear that RSA 507-B:7 does not meet the

threshold "like action" test, see Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616,

because it applies only in actions "to recover for bodily injury,

personal injury, or property damage caused by" fault attributable

to a governmental unit. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 507-B:2. The New

Hampshire Supreme Court has observed: "Taken as a whole, the law

15

[RSA 507:B] seems designed to limit municipal liability arising

from tort suits and related personal property claims . . . ."

Cannata v. Deerfield, 566 A.2d 162, 167 (N.H. 1989). The Mur-

phys' compensatory education claim, on the other hand, is pre-

mised on allegations that Timberlane denied Kevin's federal

statutory rights by withholding all special education services

for a two-year period in violation of the IDEA and section 1125,

the New Hampshire implementing regulation.8

Moreover, certain extraordinary characteristics of the

present compensatory education claim point up the appropriateness

of the New Hampshire catch-all limitation applicable to "personal

actions" generally. Prior to its amendment in 1986, RSA 508:4

stated: "Except as otherwise provided by law, all personal

actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only

within 6 years of the time the cause of action accrued." Al-

though we have found no precise definition of the term "personal

actions," the New Hampshire Supreme Court often has described RSA

508:4 as a "general statute of limitations," see, e.g., Petition

of Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911, 914 (N.H. 1992); Clark v. Exeter

Co-operative Bank, 344 A.2d 5, 5 (N.H. 1975). Further, the

opening proviso "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law"

8Even if the present claim were somehow considered tort-
based, the required "borrowing" methodology does not encourage
recourse to state limitations tailored to curtail public liabili-
ty. See, e.g., Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279 (noting, in context of

1983 action, that "the very ineffectiveness of state remedies"
may have motivated Congress to impose a federal enforcement
scheme against state actors); cf. Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 198

(borrowing N.H. RSA 508:4 for 1981 claim).

16

strongly suggests that RSA 508:4 is meant to serve as a "back-

stop" limitation on civil actions not governed by some more

particular limitation. Compare, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

507-C:4 (providing two-year limitation on actions for "medical

injury"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 508:4-B (providing eight-year

limitation on actions for "damages from construction").

As an IDEA-based claim for compensatory education is

similar to a civil rights action, the "borrowing" praxis also may

be informed by relevant principles developed in the context of

civil actions under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Supreme

Court has identified a general preference for borrowing state

limitations governing personal injury actions, Wilson, 471 U.S.

at 279 ( 1983 action), in part because "[i]t is most unlikely

that the period of limitations applicable to [personal injury

actions] ever was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would

discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with

federal law in any respect." Id. (emphasis added). Under this

criterion, as between RSA 507-B:7 and RSA 508:4 the statute of

limitations governing personal actions generally RSA 508:4

presents the more analogous New Hampshire statute under the "like

action" test established in Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616, hence the

more appropriate for application to the IDEA claim for compensa-

tory education in the present case.9 Cf. Lillios v. Justices of

9See James v. Nashua Sch. Dist., 720 F. Supp. 1053, 1058

(D.N.H. 1989). The James court borrowed RSA 508:4 for applica-

tion to a claim for attorney fees in an IDEA action. As the
Murphys seek to enforce a substantive federal right rather than a
derivative fee-shifting provision, however, the RSA 508:4 limita-

17

New Hampshire Dist. Court, 735 F. Supp. 43, 48 & n.9 (D.N.H.

1990) (RSA 508:4 provides limitation applicable to 1983 actions

brought in New Hampshire).10

We next consider whether borrowing RSA 508:4 comports

with the purposes underlying the IDEA and the New Hampshire

implementing regulation. See Wilson, 471 U.S. 266-67; Bow, 750

F. Supp. at 551. The central purpose of the IDEA is to secure

special educational entitlements to eligible recipients. See 20

U.S.C. 1400(b)(9) ("it is in the national interest that the

Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide

programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in

order to assure equal protection of the law"). Likewise, in the

present context the borrowing praxis must take into account the

central importance of the IDEA's procedural overlay. As the

Supreme Court has observed, procedure is at the very core of the

IDEA:

It seems to us no exaggeration to say that
Congress placed every bit as much emphasis on
compliance with procedures giving parents and
guardians a large measure of participation
. . . as it did upon the measurement of the
resulting IEP against a substantive standard.

Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-206 (1982); accord

W.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992)

tion is even more suitable for borrowing in the instant action on
general policy grounds.

10We need not address any impact that amended RSA 508:4
(three-year period), or newly enacted RSA 186-C:16-b, may have
either on the present analysis or on earlier case law relating to
"borrowing" in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and
1983.

18

(noting centrality of implementing procedure to IDEA statutory

scheme); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1990)

(same).

The core role of procedure in the IDEA setting is well

illustrated by Timberlane's failure to initiate the required

administrative proceedings, see N.H. Code Admin. R. Ed. 1125.01-

(b) (3)-b; supra note 4, to end the IEP impasse in this case.

While parents and school officials dithered and debated, a

disabled child with special educational needs lost day after

irreplaceable day of educational opportunity mandated by law. We

cannot overlook the reality that a central federal policy

underlying the IDEA, and an important feature of the IDEA-

implementing scheme adopted in New Hampshire, have both been

blunted. Thus, absent a more particular limitation applicable to

this extraordinary compensatory education claim, we think it

appropriate to borrow the New Hampshire catch-all limitation

applicable to personal actions generally.11

In addition, the more abbreviated the limitation on

compensatory education claims the greater the disincentive to

11The availability of compensatory education as a remedy
under the IDEA the one form of IDEA relief that holds any
potential for redressing this deprivation has only recently
been recognized in this Circuit, see Pihl, 9 F.3d at 187-89; and

only a year earlier in the District of New Hampshire, Manchester

Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 867-88 (D.N.H.

1992). The first reported court of appeals case to recognize a
compensatory education claim is Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749,

753 (8th Cir. 1986). Thus, the recency and novelty of the
compensatory education remedy likewise suggest that the catch-all
limitation prescribed in RSA 508:4 is most suitable for
borrowing.

19

parents to shed an adversarial posture and get on with the

business of cooperating with school officials to further the

special-education needs of the child. See David D. v. Dartmouth

Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 424 (1st Cir. 1985) (IDEA embodies

preference for educational decisions arrived at through "good-

faith cooperation and negotiation among the parties"); see also

Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 16 ("Obviously, the Murphys were not

sitting on their rights, but were attempting to resolve their

differences with the school district without resorting to litiga-

tion."). The resultant undermining of section 1125 would be

particularly erosive of IDEA policy in New Hampshire. Once the

IEP negotiations had remained at an impasse for a reasonable

period of time, i.e., not long into the two-year period during

which he received no special education, the onus was on Timber-

lane to obtain administrative approval to implement the IEP it

considered appropriate for Kevin. See supra note 4.

Finally, as noted above, most IDEA cases involve the

borrowing of state statutes of limitations for application to

judicial appeals from administrative decisions. See Amann, 991

F.2d at 931 (collecting administrative review cases borrowing

limitations ranging from thirty days to three years); Bow, 750 F.

Supp. at 548 (similar). Careful research discloses but one case,

Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 982 (1992), involving a compensatory

education claim even roughly analogous to the Murphy claim. The

blind twenty-seven-year-old plaintiff in Hall brought an IDEA

20

action challenging the appropriateness of the special educational

services provided to her by the defendant school district between

five and ten years earlier. Id. at 404-06. The Hall court

assumed, arguendo, that a five-year limitation applied, but found

the action time-barred in any event because it could not have

accrued less than six years before the complaint was filed. Id.

at 408-09. Although Hall is distinguishable from the present

action on a number of grounds, the most cogent distinction is

that the present dispute involves a total denial of all special

education services for an extended period of time, not merely a

challenge to the appropriateness of special education services

provided years earlier. Revisiting the appropriateness of

special education services actually provided in school years long

since passed may indeed be an exercise of "extremely limited

utility," as has been suggested, see Bow, 750 F. Supp. at 550,

but given the totality of the present deprivation the effort to

evaluate the merits of the compensatory education claim in this

case is both useful and far less problematic.

(iv) Accrual

We turn now to the question of accrual, which is

governed by federal law. Hall, 941 F.2d at 408; G.D. v. West-

moreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (D.N.H. 1992)

(same); cf. Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353

(1st Cir. 1992) (same, 1983 case). "The general rule under

federal law is said to be that [IDEA] claims 'accrue when the

parents know or have reason to know of the injury or event that

21

is the basis for their claim.'" Hall, 941 F.2d at 408 (quoting

Judith W. Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children, 17

J. of L. & Educ. 625, 654

(1988)). As with the methodology for borrowing a limitation from

state law, no mechanical formula controls the accrual determina-

tion: "Where a statute does not indicate when a cause of action

accrues, the court must 'keep[] in mind the purpose of the [Act]

and the practical ends to be served by a period of limitations.'"

G.D., 783 F. Supp. at 1535 (alterations in original, quoting

Albert v. Maine Cent. R.R., 905 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1990)).

Pinpointing accrual in the present case would pose a

complex question, inasmuch as the Murphys' action challenges an

entire course of conduct by Timberlane. Compare, e.g., Amann,

991 F.2d at 933-34 (involving an appeal from an administrative

decision and noting under Massachusetts law that limitation runs

from "receipt of notice of final decision"); G.D., 783 F. Supp.

at 1535-36 (similar, N.H. law). We need not fix the precise date

of accrual, however, since the Murphys' claim unquestionably

accrued within the six-year period preceding their request for

administrative review on August 20, 1989. Thus, the request for

administrative review was timely whether accrual occurred in

October of 1983 upon Kevin's initial trial placement at the

Pinkerton school (as Timberlane urged below), or at the time he

was permanently placed in January of 1984 (as the Murphys

claimed), or at some intermediate time. Moreover, from whatever

point in time within the two-year period the Murphys might be

22

found to have known (or had reason to know) either of "the injury

or the event that is the basis for their [compensatory education]

claim," Hall, 941 F.2d at 408, Timberlane remained in continuous

violation of its section 1125 obligation to pursue an administra-

tive resolution to the IEP stalemate. Consequently, we conclude

that Timberlane's ongoing failure to comply with section 1125

throughout the relevant portion of the two-year period constitut-

ed a unitary violation under the IDEA and the New Hampshire

implementing regulation.

C. The Murphy Motion for Summary Judgment

As a threshold matter, two arguments advanced by

Timberlane on the merits have been foreclosed by our recent

decision in Pihl v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184 (1st

Cir. 1993), recognizing a compensatory education claim under the

IDEA, id. at 187-89, notwithstanding that the student was beyond

the eligible age for a free education under state law, id. at

189-90. Thus, two further issues remain unaddressed.

1. Section 1125

The district court held Timberlane liable for failing

to fulfill its section 1125 responsibility either to present an

acceptable IEP or seek administrative enforcement. The district

court simply applied our own straightforward construction of

section 1125:

In New Hampshire, if the parents disagree
with a proposed IEP and the local educational
agency feels it would be in the best interest
of the child to implement the IEP, the local

23

agency is required to initiate administrative

procedures to obtain permission from a hear-
ing officer to implement the IEP. N.H. Code
Admin. R. Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b. No such pro-

cedures were ever initiated by Timberlane.

Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 17 (footnote omitted & emphasis added).

Under section 1125, the school district must take the initiative

to ensure that intransigence and foot-dragging in the IEP pro-

cess, whether bureaucratic or parental, do not indefinitely

compromise the child's right to a free and appropriate public

education. See, e.g., W.G., 960 F.2d at 1486 (parental conduct

does not waive responsibility of school district); Town of

Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 795 (1st Cir.

1984) (same), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).

Timberlane's primary argument on appeal is that an IDEA

claim, a federal cause of action, cannot be premised on a viola-

tion of a state administrative regulation.12 Its argument

overlooks the IDEA framework and our case law. The IDEA invests

expansive discretion in the states to structure implementing

procedures and enforcement mechanisms, thereby constructively

incorporating duly promulgated state regulations:

12Timberlane also argues that section 1125 is invalid
because it imposes on the school district obligations beyond
those authorized either by the IDEA or the New Hampshire imple-
menting statute. Neither argument is persuasive. First, the
IDEA and its companion regulations merely establish foundational
requirements states may impose more stringent procedural and
substantive requirements. See Burlington, 736 F.2d at 789.

Second, section 1125 is well within the broad authority conferred
upon the New Hampshire Board of Education to promulgate regula-
tions under the IDEA. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 186-C:16

(authorizing, inter alia, regulations governing appeals of IEP

team decisions and regulations relating to "other matters"
pertinent to implementation of the IDEA).

24

[S]tate standards, be they substantive or
procedural, that exceed the federal basic
floor of meaningful, beneficial educational
opportunity . . . . will operate to determine
what an appropriate education requires for a
particular child in a given state.

Id. at 789 (footnotes omitted); accord David D., 775 F.2d at 417

(1st Cir. 1985) (it is "beyond cavil that the federal [IDEA]

standard explicitly incorporates" certain state standards); Doe

v. Board of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 457 (6th

Cir. 1993) (same, citing cases). It is plainly true, of course,

as Timberlane argues, that not every procedural irregularity

gives rise to liability under the IDEA. Nevertheless, "procedur-

al inadequacies [that have] compromised the pupil's right to an

appropriate education . . . or caused a deprivation of education-

al benefits" are the stuff of successful IDEA actions. Roland M.

v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990) (cita-

tions omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991). And that is

exactly what happened here.

We emphasized in Murphy I that whereas "parents are

entitled to request a hearing if they disagree with an IEP, state

regulations impose upon Timberlane not only the right, but the

obligation to do the same." 973 F.2d at 17 (emphasis in

original).13 Thus, by its longstanding procedural lapse in

13Timberlane's misconceptions about the IDEA are betrayed,
as much as anything, by the contention that its institution of
truancy proceedings should be considered the rough equivalent of
the administrative adjudication required under section 1125.
Even assuming that Timberlane had done something more than merely
file the truancy petition, a coercive adversarial proceeding
against a parent is no substitute for a substantive review of the
special educational needs of the handicapped child.

25

failing to initiate administrative review as required under

section 1125, Timberlane abdicated its responsibility to termi-

nate the IEP impasse preventing Kevin's access to a free and

appropriate education. We think a procedural default which

permits a disabled child's entitlement to a free and appropriate

education to go unmet for two years constitutes sufficient ground

for liability under the IDEA. See, e.g., W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484

(when severe procedural flaws infect IEP process an action lies

under IDEA); Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994 (same); Mrs. C., 916

F.2d at 72-73 (same); cf. Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976

F.2d 48, 53-54 (1st Cir. 1992) (technical IDEA violations may be

insufficient to warrant setting aside IEP).

2. Summary Judgment

Lastly, Timberlane claims that genuine issues of

material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether: (1)

Kevin's parents were intransigent and at least partly responsible

for interrupting Kevin's education, and (2) the educational

services Timberlane provided from 1985 to 1989 were "more than

appropriate," and thus compensated for the educational loss

occasioned during 1982-84. The party resisting summary judgment

"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . .

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

There is no trialworthy issue unless there is sufficient compe-

tent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the opposing

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

26

(1986).

A painstaking review of the entire record has not dis-

closed, nor does Timberlane identify, any evidence sufficient to

generate a genuine factual issue as to either contention, even

assuming their materiality.14 Instead, consistent with its

prior strategy, Timberlane elected to try to fend off summary

judgment through recourse to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), which permits

a party to establish, by affidavit, that evidence which would

demonstrate a trialworthy issue is for some valid reason unavail-

able. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also James W. Moore et al.,

Moore's Federal Practice 56.22-56.24 (1993). Timberlane

relied entirely on its contention, unsubstantiated by the re-

quired affidavit,15 that it needed "an opportunity to conduct

14The first hurdle confronting Timberlane, of course, is
that parental intransigence would not absolve the school district
of its responsibility under section 1125. Indeed, section 1125
targets intransigence. See Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 17; supra p.

23. Thus, Timberlane can demonstrate no issue of material fact

in this regard. But neither has it demonstrated a genuine issue

of fact. Although the record contains several "sarcastic"
letters from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Sarbanis, Timberlane presented no
evidence suggesting anything more than that Mr. Murphy was a
tenacious and zealous advocate for his son's interests. Summary
judgment should not be disturbed on so fragile a claim, especial-
ly as two school district representatives praised Mr. Murphy as a
cooperative and concerned, indeed model, parent. Even though Mr.
Sarbanis, the one school district official with whom Mr. Murphy
clearly had a stormy relationship, still lives in New Hampshire,
Timberlane presented no affidavit from Sarbanis. And although
Timberlane's pleadings are replete with allegations that Mr.
Murphy was intransigent, "[b]rash conjecture, coupled with the
hope that something concrete will materialize, is insufficient to
block summary judgment." Dow v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 1

F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993).

15Given that the district court had already rejected essen-
tially these same contentions, advanced in support of Timber-
lane's laches defense, see supra pp. 6-8, the failure to comply

27

discovery to reconstruct [the] chronology [of Kevin's education]

and to fill in critical gaps about events which occurred before,

during and after the years in question[,]" and to "depose the

out-of-state witnesses."

The district court rejected Timberlane's Rule 56(f)

initiative, on the ground that the evidence adduced at the

hearing on the laches defense demonstrated that Timberlane had

made no serious effort to present its putative evidence. The

court accordingly ruled that Timberlane could not take refuge

from summary judgment under Rule 56(f) since the memories of its

witnesses were available for affidavit purposes in opposition to

the Murphys' motion for summary judgment. The Rule 56(f) deter-

mination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. First Nat'l Bank

v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 294 (1968). We find none.

In March of 1993, more than one month after the eviden-

tiary hearing on the laches defense, the district court entered a

scheduling order requiring the parties to submit "law and/or

evidence" on the merits of the compensatory education claim

thereby plainly signaling its intention to proceed beyond the

procedural defenses interposed by Timberlane. Shortly thereafter

the Murphys filed their motion for summary judgment. Thus,

although it had clear notice that the district court would

proceed to the merits, Timberlane made the strategic decision to

with the Rule 56(f) affidavit requirement was no mere technical
lapse. See Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)

(Rule 56(f) affidavit requirement generally to be enforced
liberally, but district court need not spare litigants the effect
of their own neglect).

28

persist with its litigation position, viz., that it could not

provide evidence because its witnesses (or their memories) were

unavailable. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

declining to credit or revisit the flawed premise underlying

Timberlane's Rule 56(f) motion.

III

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the district court

order disallowing defendant-appellant's defenses and affirm the

judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

Affirmed.

29