UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1792
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
GEORGE CHAPDELAINE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
George Chapdelaine on brief pro se.
Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, and Michael P.
Iannotti, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
May 2, 1994
Per Curiam. George Chapdelaine is appealing the
district court's order applying $22,300.46, which was seized
from his room during a search in 1991, toward Chapdelaine's
outstanding criminal fine. We affirm.
In 1985, Chapdelaine was convicted of a drug
offense, and the district court imposed imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine on him. In 1993, the government moved to apply
the proceeds of the cash it had seized to the fine and the
interest that had accumulated thereon. As of May 1993,
Chapdelaine owed a balance of $9,571.75 on the fine, and the
government claimed interest of $13,338.59, for a total of
$22,910.34. At a hearing, the government claimed that the
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, formerly codified at
18 U.S.C. 3565(c)(1), required interest to be assessed on
Chapdelaine's outstanding criminal fine, and submitted a copy
of the statute to the court.
Chapdelaine denied that any statute authorized
interest on criminal fines prior to 1987. He told the court
that some of the money seized by the government had come
either from his pension or from work he had performed after
being released from prison; he also acknowledged that some of
the money represented gambling proceeds. He argued that it
would be unfair for the government to apply funds he had
earned toward his fine. Finally, he said that the fine
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should never have been imposed in 1985 since he was indigent
at that time.
In response to Chapdelaine's arguments, the court
stated that the question of Chapdelaine's ability to pay the
fine when imposed had been "resolved long since." It sought
to ascertain how Chapdelaine could have acquired such a large
sum of money by 1991 when he had told the court in 1990 that
he was indigent. It expressed its doubt that the money found
in Chapdelaine's room represented his savings since 1990,1
and noted that Chapdelaine had had many opportunities to
contest the fine and to seek its remission in court. The
court said that in fairness Chapdelaine should pay the fine,
particularly in view of the fact that Chapdelaine's
challenges to his fine had been underwritten by taxpayers
whose taxes fund the court system. Accordingly, the court
ordered the seized money applied to satisfy both
Chapdelaine's fine and the interest thereon.
Chapdelaine makes several arguments on appeal, none
of which have merit. First, he says that the court did not
rule on the question whether interest could be assessed on a
criminal fine imposed in 1985, and that the court had no
authority to assess interest on the original fine. Although
1. According to an undated personal financial statement in
the record, which apparently reflected Chapdelaine's
financial status as of late 1989, Chapdelaine was receiving
$758/month in social security and veterans pension benefits
and had monthly expenses totalling approximately $710.
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the court did not specifically hold that statutory authority
existed for assessing interest, by granting the government's
motion it clearly indicated that it had accepted the
government's argument that interest was authorized under the
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 ("Act"). Moreover, as
Chapdelaine acknowledges, in United States v. Atlantic
Disposal Service, Inc., 887 F.2d 1208, 1209-11 (3d Cir.
1989), the Third Circuit analyzed the criminal fine statutes
in existence for the 1984-87 time period and concluded that
the interest provision of the Act applied to crimes committed
between December 31, 1984 and November 1, 1987. See also
United States v. Finley, 783 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (applying that provision to a fine imposed for a crime
committed before November 1, 1987).
Although Chapdelaine appears to question the
court's analysis of Congressional intent, his argument
apparently relates to a different statute, section 238 of the
Sentencing Reform Act, which had also provided for interest
on fines, but which had been repealed by the Act. See
Atlantic Disposal Service, supra, 887 F.2d at 1210 & n.6. We
accept the Third Circuit's analysis in this case and agree
that the interest provision of the Act, which applied to
offenses committed after December 31, 1984, see P.L. No. 98-
596, 10, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3138, and was not
repealed until November 1, 1987, see 18 U.S.C. 3561-3580
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(Supp. V 1988) (note on repeal of Chapter 227), applied to
thecriminalfine imposedon Chapdelaineforhis 1985drug offense.
Second, Chapdelaine argues that the district court
erred by failing to consider his claim that the fine was
illegal when imposed because he was indigent. The court did
consider that claim, but rejected it, because that question
had already been decided against Chapdelaine in previous
proceedings. Chapdelaine does not dispute that prior court
proceedings had determined that he could pay the fine as of
the time it was imposed. The record does not indicate
whether Chapdelaine challenged his fine in appealing his
conviction to this court or whether his subsequent motion to
reduce the fine alleged inability to pay at the time he was
sentenced. In any event, in reviewing Chapdelaine's motion
to remit his fine in 1990 the court squarely considered and
rejected Chapdelaine's claim that he had been indigent in
1985 when the fine was imposed on him; Chapdelaine did not
appeal that determination.2 Finally, Chapdelaine suggests
2. The docket sheet from Chapdelaine's underlying conviction
indicates that his conviction (and presumably sentencing) had
been affirmed in 1986, and that soon thereafter he filed a
motion for a reduction of his sentence. The docket sheet
indicates that the court's order denied his request to reduce
his fine and to remit a special assessment which had also
been imposed on him, but does not make clear what grounds
Chapdelaine had alleged in support thereof. In 1990, after
Chapdelaine was released from prison, a hearing was held on a
motion he brought to remit his fine, and Chapdelaine
testified that he could not pay the fine at that time. The
magistrate agreed, but concluded that Chapdelaine's "claim of
indigency at the time of his arrest is inconsistent with the
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that the court granted the government's motion in order to
punish him for seeking redress of his grievances in court.
The transcript of the hearing indicates quite clearly that
the court had no punitive intent, but that its purpose in
describing Chapdelaine's recourse to the courts was to
demonstrate that there was no unfairness in requiring him to
pay his fine.
Although Chapdelaine raises additional arguments,
we decline to consider them, either because they were not
raised in his initial brief, or because they were not
presented to the district court. See Playboy Enterprises v.
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico, 906 F.2d 25, 40
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990) (an appellant
waives issues not adequately raised in its initial brief);
United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It
has long been the practice in this circuit that an issue not
facts of his case, . . . wherein [he] was found at the time
of his arrest with $6,000 in his suitcase" (citing United
States v. Chapdelaine, 616 F. Supp. 522 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd,
795 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1986) (table)). The magistrate also
recommended dismissal of Chapdelaine's motion to remit to the
extent it was based on the claim that the sentencing judge
had not considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3622 in
imposing the fine, because the motion was untimely; he also
found that no other statutory basis for remitting the fine
existed. After Chapdelaine failed to object, the court
issued an order accepting the magistrate's report and
recommendation. Subsequently, however, a hearing was held on
the report, and Chapdelaine again testified, apparently only
as to his ability to then pay the fine. The court thereafter
denied his motion to remit his fine since there was no
statutory basis for doing so. Chapdelaine did not appeal.
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presented in the district court will not be addressed for the
first time on appeal.").
Affirmed.
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