May 23, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1002
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT RIVER ROAD, ELIOT,
YORK COUNTY, MAINE,
Defendant, Appellee,
DANA B. SNODGRASS, JR.
Claimant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Thomas Van Houten on brief for appellant.
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Michael M.
DuBose, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. Dana B. Snodgrass, Jr. appeals from the
district court's order dismissing his claim to the defendant
property for lack of standing and from the judgment of
forfeiture for the United States. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 26, 1993, plaintiff United States filed a
complaint of forfeiture in rem against defendant property, a
Maine residence, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 881(7).
Approximately two months later, Dana B. Snodgrass, Jr. filed
a claim to the property stating that he is its "legal titled
owner." In his answer to the complaint, claimant asserted an
"innocent owner" defense to the forfeiture.
On November 9, 1993, with the consent of both counsel,
the district court held a preliminary evidentiary hearing on
the issue of claimant's standing to challenge the forfeiture.
On November 10, 1993, the district court issued a memorandum
of decision and order concluding that claimant is without
standing to assert his claim of ownership. United States v.
Certain Real Property Located at River Rd., 839 F. Supp. 1
(D. Me. 1993). The district court ordered that Snodgrass,
Jr.'s claim be dismissed and that judgment enter for the
plaintiff. A final decree of forfeiture entered on November
15, 1993.
The district court's factual findings are set forth
fully in its memorandum and are not challenged. In brief,
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the district court found that claimant's father, Dana B.
Snodgrass, Sr., had conveyed defendant property to claimant
after learning that he, Snodgrass, Sr., was being
investigated for drug trafficking.1 Although not reflected
in the deed of conveyance, Snodgrass, Sr. retained all rights
to the occupancy and use of the property and the obligation
to tend to and fund its upkeep and maintenance. At the time
of the transfer, Snodgrass, Sr. had had no relationship of
substance for seventeen years with claimant, who resided in
Seattle, Washington. The court found that the transaction of
conveyance was intended solely by Snodgrass, Sr. to shield
the property from forfeiture and was not intended to convey
any right of dominion or control over, or even any beneficial
interest in, the defendant property.
DISCUSSION
In a civil forfeiture action, once the government has
met its burden of showing probable cause to believe that a
substantial connection exists between the property to be
forfeited and the illegal exchange of a controlled substance,
the burden shifts to the claimant to show that the property
is not subject to forfeiture. United States v. 116 Emerson
St., 942 F.2d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 1991). As an element of this
burden, a claimant must prove an interest in the property
1. The parties stipulated that probable cause exists to find
that the defendant property was used to facilitate a
violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1).
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sufficient to establish standing to contest the forfeiture.
United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 216 (6th
Cir. 1989). "[C]ourts have uniformly rejected standing
claims put forward by nominal or straw owners." United
States v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 & 144-07143,
971 F.2d 974, 985 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting David B. Smith,
Defense and Prosecution of Forfeiture Cases, 9.04, at 9-
58.6 (1985 & Supp. 1991)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580
(1993). Thus, possession of mere legal title by one who does
not exercise dominion and control over the property may be
insufficient to establish standing to challenge a forfeiture.
Id.; see also United States v. Vacant Land Located at 10th
St. & Challenger Way, 15 F.3d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. 5000 Palmetto Drive, 928 F.2d 373, 375 (11th
Cir. 1991); 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d at 217; United States
v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, 604 F.2d 27, 28-29
(8th Cir. 1979); United States v. New Silver Palace
Restaurant, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 440, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
In the instant case, the evidence amply supported the
district court's conclusion that the transaction of
conveyance was a facially transparent sham. After the
conveyance, Snodgrass, Sr. continued to live on the property.
With the exception of one visit to Maine, during which he
stayed in a hotel, claimant remained in Seattle, Washington.
Snodgrass, Sr. paid the mortgage and taxes on the property.
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Claimant did not know the amount of the mortgage or the
identity of the mortgage holder. Snodgrass, Sr. also made
improvements to the property without consulting claimant. In
sum, there was no evidence whatsoever that claimant exercised
any dominion or control over the property. Indeed, the
evidence pointed inexorably to the conclusion that claimant
was nothing more than a nominal or straw owner. Accordingly,
the district court properly concluded that claimant lacked
standing to contest the forfeiture.
Claimant argues that a rule requiring him to show more
than legal title to establish standing to challenge a
forfeiture is inconsistent with Article III standing
jurisprudence. We disagree. The rationale for the rule is
that things are often not what they appear to be, especially
in the world of drug trafficking. See United States v. 900
Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer, 624 F.
Supp. 290, 294-95 (S.D. Fla. 1985). People engaged in
illegal activites often try to disguise their interest in
property by placing title in someone else's name. 900 Rio
Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d at 630. Article III standing requires
that a claimant suffer an injury in fact. Adams v. Watson,
10 F.3d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1993). A straw owner has no real
interest in the seized property and, accordingly, suffers no
genuine injury.
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Claimant also suggests that the district court erred in
not allowing him to prove ownership to a jury as an element
of his claim. We deem this argument waived. Having
consented to an evidentiary hearing to determine his standing
to assert a claim of ownership, claimant cannot now complain
of the manner of proceeding below. See United States v.
Palmer, 956 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1992) (an issue not presented
to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal).
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
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