United States v. Laliberte

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1786

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

CARL LALIBERTE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Cyr, Circuit Judge.

Martha S. Temple, with whom Foote & Temple was on brief for

appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jay

P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

May 31, 1994

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. On February 18,

1992, Carl Laliberte was charged in a five-count indictment

with conspiring with seven others to possess in excess of

five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (1988)

(Count One), possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) (1988) and

18 U.S.C. 2 (1988) (Counts Two through Four), and using

real property to commit violations of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),

846 (1988) so that the property was subject to forfeiture

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853 (1988) (Count Five). On April

27, 1992, Laliberte pleaded guilty to Counts One and Five

pursuant to an Agreement To Plead Guilty And Cooperate (the

"Cooperation Agreement") entered into with the United States

Attorney for the District of Maine (the "Government")

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. On October 6, 1992,

Laliberte, prior to sentencing, filed a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea. The United States District Court for the

District of Maine, on May 21, 1993, entered a memorandum of

decision and order denying Laliberte's motion. Laliberte

appeals from this decision. We affirm.

I.

The April 27, 1992, Cooperation Agreement between

Laliberte and the Government, in addition to requiring

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Laliberte to plead guilty to Counts One and Five, provided,

inter alia, that Laliberte would

meet with attorneys and agents of the
Government, as needed, to tell fully,
honestly, truthfully and completely all
that the defendant kn[ew] or ha[d] heard
about violations of federal and state
laws, including but not limited to the
defendant's involvement and the
involvement of others in violations of
law . . . . The defendant agree[d] to
provide the Government or aid the
Government in acquiring all documents,
photographs, bills, records, receipts and
all like materials to which the defendant
ha[d] access, which w[ould] corroborate
this information. Defendant further
agree[d] to testify fully, honestly,
truthfully and completely at any and all
grand juries, trials or other official
proceedings in which his testimony [was]
requested.

Laliberte also consented to "assist the United States in

effecting the forfeiture or other transfer of any property

. . . subject to forfeiture to the United States under any

law of the United States." In exchange for Laliberte's

compliance with its terms and conditions, the Cooperation

Agreement stated that the Government (1) "may petition the

Court for the imposition of any lawful sentence," see Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B), and (2) "will move to dismiss Counts

Two, Three and Four of the indictment after sentence is

imposed,"1 see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(A). The

Cooperation Agreement left to the sole judgment of the United

1. Counts Two through Four were, in fact, dismissed on the
Government's motion.

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States Attorney for the District of Maine whether Laliberte

had complied with its terms and conditions although the

Government promised that, at Laliberte's request, it would

"make known the cooperation provided by defendant to any

individual or entity to whom defendant wishe[d] such

information disseminated." A decision that Laliberte had not

cooperated was to have "a material and articulable basis."

Finally, the Cooperation Agreement expressly stated that

"[n]othing in this agreement shall be interpreted to require

the United States to move the Court pursuant to United States

Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guideline Section 5K1.1 for

a downward departure."

Laliberte maintains, and the record tends to

confirm, that after the execution of the Cooperation

Agreement he assisted the Bureau of Intergovernmental Drug

Enforcement (the "BIDE") and the Drug Enforcement Agency (the

"DEA") on at least one occasion. His cooperation was in

regard to the controlled purchase of six pounds of marijuana

a transaction that led to the arrest, on May 4, 1992, of

an individual named Hank Dresser the seizure of fifteen

pounds of marijuana, and the criminal forfeiture of a

residence.

Laliberte's collaboration was, however, short-

lived. On May 5, 1992, James Hollywood, United States

Pretrial/Probation Officer, complained to the district court

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by memorandum that his office had not been told that

Laliberte was assisting government agents. Hollywood

asserted that it was improper for Laliberte to cooperate

without the permission of the court and others, including the

probation officer. In response, the district court issued an

order on May 6, 1992, directing the cessation of Laliberte's

active law enforcement cooperation.2

About three months later, on August 10, 1992, the

Government filed a motion requesting the district court to

permit Laliberte to resume his active cooperation with law

enforcement agencies. This motion was allowed on August 15,

1992. On September 30, 1992, however, it appears that the

district court vacated its August 15, 1992, order, and

2. The order stated:

It having been brought to the attention of the
Court that the Defendant herein, Carl Laliberte,
has been engaged in active law enforcement

cooperative activities at the instigation of BIDE
and DEA officials . . . without first seeking the
consent of Defendant's supervising officer and the

approval of the Court, and that such activity

interferes with, disrupts, and defeats the Court's
efforts, through its duly appointed officers, to
properly supervise said Defendant while he is
subject to the authority of the Court.

It is hereby, in consequence thereof, ORDERED

that all active participation of Defendant Carl
Laliberte in cooperative or other law enforcement
activity CEASE, forthwith, pending further order of

this Court.

(emphasis in original).

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reinstated its May 6, 1992, order which had proscribed

Laliberte's active cooperation.

Nearly a week later, on October 6, 1992, Laliberte

moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32(d).3 The motion asserted, inter alia, that, following

the district court's May 6, 1992, order, Laliberte's counsel

had asked the Government on May 8, June 17, and June 25 to

take whatever action was necessary to have that order lifted.

Laliberte's motion further maintained that the Government had

"refused to take any action to have the order lifted, and

[had] informed defense counsel of its position that the

[district court] lack[ed] the authority to interfere with the

active cooperation of a defendant with government agents, and

that it would not seek the [district court's] permission to

allow such active cooperation because to do so would

acknowledge that authority." In light of the Government's

alleged "failure to provide the information requested by the

Probation Officer to consider consenting to the defendant's

cooperation, and its failure to seek the approval of the

[district court] to allow such cooperation," the withdrawal

3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) states in relevant part:

If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere is made before sentence is
imposed, imposition of sentence is suspended, or
disposition is had under 18 U.S.C. 4205(c), the
court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a
showing by the defendant of any fair and just
reason. . . .

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motion argued that Laliberte had been denied "the opportunity

to earn the filing of a motion for downward departure which

the Government had promised him." In this same vein, the

final paragraph of the motion concluded:

Since the Government would not have
allowed the defendant to actively
cooperate unless he agreed to plead
guilty, and since the Government's
representation to the defendant that he
would be given the opportunity to earn a
downward departure through such active
cooperation was the most significant
factor in the defendant's determination
to plead guilty, the Government's failure
to seek the consent of the Probation
Officer and the approval of the [district
court] in a timely manner to allow such
active cooperation frustrated the very
basis of the defendant's decision to
enter into the plea agreement and to
plead guilty.

On May 21, 1993, the district court denied Laliberte's

motion, concluding that he had "failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating a `fair and just' reason to withdraw his plea

of guilty entered in this case."

In spite of the district court's having prohibited

Laliberte from actively assisting in cooperative law

enforcement activities, the Government, on June 15, 1993,

moved both to dismiss Counts Two, Three and Four, and for a

downward departure in his sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) (1988). The Government

declared that Laliberte had substantially assisted "in the

investigation and apprehension of others." The district

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court granted the Government's motion, dismissing the three

counts and reducing Laliberte's prison term to sixty months

from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of seventy-

eight to ninety-seven months.4 Laliberte was also sentenced

to serve four years of supervised release and to forfeit his

interest in real property in Auburn, Maine. Judgment was

entered on July 12, 1993.

On appeal, Laliberte now contends that the district

court abused its discretion when on May 21, 1993, it denied

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In considering his

argument, we consider the May 21, 1993, order in light of the

subsequent sentencing actions, including the Government's

request, accepted by the court, to dismiss the three counts

and reduce the sentence.

II.

A.

The district court's decision denying Laliberte's

motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reviewed solely for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Parrilla-Tirado,

F.3d , , 1994 WL 143251, at *1 (1st Cir. Apr. 28, 1994)

("[W]e review the district court's decision to grant or deny

a request to withdraw a guilty plea solely for abuse of

4. The district court calculated the Sentencing Guidelines
range based on its conclusion that Laliberte's Adjusted Total
Offense Level was twenty-seven (27) and that he fell into a
Criminal History Category of II.

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discretion." (citing United States v. Doyle, 981 F.2d 591,

594 (1st Cir. 1992), and United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d

1535, 1538 (1st Cir. 1989))).

In Parrilla-Tirado, we observed that a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea brought before sentencing, such as the

one here, is reviewed under a more liberal standard than a

motion filed after sentencing. Id. at *2 (citing Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note ("Under the

amendment, a defendant who proceeds too late to come under

the more generous `fair and just reason' standard must seek

relief under 2255, meaning the applicable standard is that

stated in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962): `a

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice' or `an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.'")). Nevertheless, "a

defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw his

plea even at that comparatively early stage." Id. (citing

United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 998 (1st Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1015, 109 S. Ct. 808, 102 L. Ed. 2d

798 (1989), and United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 454

(1st Cir. 1983)). Rather, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea

brought before sentencing will be granted only "upon a

showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." Fed.

R. Crim. P. 32(d); Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251, at *2.

The burden of persuasion as to the existence of such a reason

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falls upon the defendant. Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251,

at *2 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100

(2d Cir. 1992), and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) advisory

committee's note).

To decide whether the reason for withdrawal

proffered by the defendant is "fair and just," courts

consider a number of factors, including:

(1) the plausibility [and the force] of
the reasons prompting the requested
change of plea; (2) the timing of the
defendant's motion; (3) the existence or
nonexistence of an assertion of
innocence; and (4) [most importantly,]
whether, when viewed in light of emergent
circumstances, the defendant's plea
appropriately may be characterized as
involuntary, in derogation of the
requirements imposed by Fed. R. Crim. P.
11, or otherwise legally suspect.

Id. (citing United States v. Doyle, 981 F.2d 591, 594 (1st

Cir. 1992), and United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535,

1537 (1st Cir. 1989)) (footnote omitted). Additionally,

"[i]f the combined weight of these factors tilts in the

defendant's favor, then the court must also assess the

quantum of prejudice, if any, that will inure to the

[G]overnment" before it permits the defendant to withdraw his

plea. Doyle, 981 F.2d at 594; e.g., Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL

143251, at *2; Pellerito, 878 F.2d at 1537.

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B.

We apply the above-listed factors seriatim.

1. Plausibility and Force of the Proffered

Reasons. A defendant may not renounce his guilty plea

without advancing a plausible reason for doing so. See,

e.g., Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251, at *2; Doyle, 981 F.2d

at 594; United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 72-73 (1st Cir.

1992). Laliberte argues that he should have been allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea because, by virtue of the district

court's sua sponte order prohibiting him from actively

assisting the BIDE and the DEA, he was denied the opportunity

to perform his end of the Cooperation Agreement, or, as he

says, he was compelled "to breach the agreement he signed."

Had the district court's prohibition operated so as

to deny Laliberte the benefit of his bargain, that might

indeed have been a plausible reason to allow him to renounce

his plea. But Laliberte mischaracterizes what actually

happened. Laliberte pled guilty on the basis of a so-called

Cooperation Agreement, which burdened him with meeting with

government agents, "as needed," to tell all he knew about

violations of law and providing testimony and other

assistance, as requested. If he did this, the Cooperation

Agreement provided that the Government (1) "may petition the

Court for the imposition of any lawful sentence," and (2)

would "move to dismiss Counts Two, Three and Four of the

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indictment after sentence [was] imposed." The U.S. Attorney

was to be the sole judge of Laliberte's compliance, and

promised to make known Laliberte's cooperation to anyone

Laliberte requested. The Cooperation Agreement flatly stated

that nothing therein required the Government "to move the

Court pursuant to United States Sentencing Commission

Sentencing Guideline Section 5K1.1 for a downward departure."

In fact, the Government ultimately moved to

dismiss, and the district court dismissed, Counts Two, Three

and Four of the indictment, thus giving to Laliberte the full

benefit of its promise under (2). The Government also

complied with (1) by petitioning for "a lawful sentence,"

and, in so doing, disregarded its right, elsewhere stated,

not to seek a downward departure. To Laliberte's benefit,

the Government moved for, and the district court granted, a

significant downward departure in Laliberte's sentence on the

grounds of his substantial assistance.

The Government's recommendations, incorporated in

the district court's final judgment, accordingly gave

Laliberte the full benefit of his bargain for dismissal of

the three charges, and also gave Laliberte an additional,

unpromised benefit (the downward departure) that the

Cooperation Agreement had expressly stated the Government was

not required to provide. The stated premise of these

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benefits was that Laliberte had substantially assisted, thus

performing his share of the bargain as to cooperating.

Whatever can be said had Laliberte been denied these benefits

because of asserted non-cooperation, we can see no basis for

his claim of having been denied the right to perform his

share of the agreement where the Government acknowledged that

he had met his obligations and accorded him everything

promised in the event of his performance with a sizable

bonus (the downward departure) to boot.

Laliberte suggests that had he been allowed to

cooperate for the entire time, he would, in some way not

explained, been so extraordinarily helpful that the

Government might have requested an even greater downward

departure. But as the Government pointed out at argument,

what opportunities are extended to an informer to help catch

others are necessarily always subject to the Government's

control and veto. The Cooperation Agreement, moreover, was

devoid of any promise by the Government to allow Laliberte

the right to engage in unlimited cooperation; cooperation was

rather a duty imposed on Laliberte as needed and requested

a duty which, if satisfied in the opinion of the U.S.

Attorney, would result in the guaranteed dismissal of three

counts and possibly, though only by implication, some

unspecified recommendations for sentencing leniency.

Whatever promise of sentence reduction was implied, however,

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was offset by the Government's express disclaimer of any

right to a downward departure. Under the Cooperation

Agreement as so written, Laliberte would doubtless have been

entitled to complain had his chance to cooperate been so

vitiated as to remove all possibility of earning the promised

dismissal of the three counts, and possibly although far

less clearly to earn some sentencing leniency. But where,

as here, his cooperation sufficed both to secure dismissal of

the three counts and a discretionary downward departure, we

see no plausibility in the claim that he was deprived of a

fair and sufficient chance to fulfill his part of the

contract.

2. Timing. "The timing of a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is significant. Delayed requests, even if made

before sentencing, are generally regarded with disfavor."

Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251, at *4 (citing Pellerito, 878

F.2d at 1541); e.g., Doyle, 981 U.S. at 595. Generally, the

longer a defendant waits before bringing his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, the more forceful his reasons in

support of withdrawal must be. E.g., Parrilla-Tirado, 1994

WL 143251, at *4; Doyle, 981 F.2d at 595. This principle

obtains because, "[w]hile an immediate change of heart may

well lend considerable force to a plea withdrawal request, a

long interval between the plea and the request often weakens

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any claim that the plea was entered in confusion or under

false pretenses." Doyle, 981 F.2d at 595 (citing cases).

Here, Laliberte entered his guilty plea on April

27, 1992. The district court's order prohibiting his active

involvement with law enforcement agencies was filed just a

little more than a week later on May 6, 1992. Although the

district court vacated that order on August 15, 1992,

Laliberte contends that, by that time, he had lost all

opportunity to cooperate because sentencing was then

scheduled for September 21, 1992.5 Accordingly, Laliberte

moved the district court to withdraw his guilty plea on

October 6, 1992 more than five months after he had entered

it and five months to the day after the district court's May

6, 1992, order. Laliberte attributes much of this five-month

delay to time "spent trying to resolve the problem" created

by the district court's order. One can argue, however, that

Laliberte's efforts to promote the efficacy of the

Cooperation Agreement over several months after its execution

make it less likely that he entered his guilty plea in

"confusion or under false pretenses." Id. But because the

timing issue is essentially immaterial to our outcome here,

we see no need to resolve it. Even assuming the motion was

timely, it fails on its merits.

5. Sentencing was eventually continued until the first week
of July 1993.

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3. Claim of Innocence. Courts look more

favorably on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the

motion is accompanied by an assertion of innocence. E.g.,

Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251, at *4; Doyle, 981 F.2d at

596. Conversely, "the absence of a claim of innocence weighs

in favor of allowing a guilty plea to stand." Doyle, 981

F.2d at 596; e.g, Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251, at *4. In

this case, Laliberte concedes that he admitted his guilt at

the Rule 11 proceeding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Neither

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea nor his appellate

brief contains an assertion of innocence.6 "Thus, this

factor cuts sharply against allowing [Laliberte's] motion to

withdraw his guilty plea." Parrilla-Tirado, 1994 WL 143251,

at *4.

4. Voluntariness. "In assaying the merits of a

motion to withdraw, an inquiring court must determine

whether, in light of the defendant's proffered reason and any

newly disclosed facts, the plea may still be deemed voluntary

and intelligent." Doyle, 981 F.2d at 596 (citing United

States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1991), and

6. The district court noted that Laliberte argued in
Defendant's Reply To Government's Opposition To Defendant's
Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea that he had represented his
legal innocence to his counsel. The district court was not
impressed by this argument, observing that at no time during
the proceedings did Laliberte assert his legal innocence to
the court.

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United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1245-47 (1st Cir.

1991)).

Laliberte maintains that he would not have

voluntarily entered a guilty plea had he known that within a

month of doing so the district court would proscribe his

active cooperation with law enforcement agencies, and thereby

vitiate his ability to earn a downward departure in his

sentence.7 We think, however, that the denial of

Laliberte's motion to withdraw his plea must now be reviewed

in light of the Government's actual recommendations and the

final judgment that was entered. This court asks simply

whether, given what finally happened, including the

Government's favorable recommendations, the court's dismissal

of the counts, and the reduced sentence, Laliberte's plea

still appears to have been voluntary and intelligent. For

reasons already largely discussed above, see supra part

II.B.1, the answer is clearly "Yes."

It is true the district court's May 6, 1992, order

prevented Laliberte from continuing to assist government

agencies during much of the period prior to sentencing.

Still, he rendered some assistance and, more to the point,

that assistance sufficed for him to receive all the benefits

and more promised to him in the Cooperation Agreement

7. Laliberte does not argue that his initial decision to
plead guilty was made involuntarily, unintelligently, or in
violation of the requirements of Rule 11.

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in return for his assistance. In exchange for Laliberte's

promise to plead guilty to Counts One and Five and to

cooperate with government agencies, the Government, in the

Cooperation Agreement, had agreed to "move to dismiss Counts

Two, Three and Four of the indictment after sentence [was]

imposed." The Government further said that it "may petition

the Court for the imposition of any lawful sentence,"

although the Cooperation Agreement expressly stated that

"[n]othing in this agreement shall be interpreted to require

the United States to move the Court pursuant to United States

Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guideline Section 5K1.1 for

a downward departure." Thus, Laliberte voluntarily pleaded

guilty on April 27, 1992, with no assurances whatever, but

only a bare hope, that he would receive a downward departure

in his sentence. Ultimately, the district court, pursuant to

the Government's motions, not only dismissed Counts Two,

Three and Four, but also, by downward departure, reduced

Laliberte's prison term to sixty months from the guideline

range of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months. Accordingly,

when viewed in light of all of these "emergent circumstances"

not just the district court's May 6, 1992, order

revealing that Laliberte received no less and, indeed, more

than he had been promised if he pleaded guilty, we cannot say

that Laliberte's guilty plea was rendered involuntary or

unintelligent by subsequent events.

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Affirmed.

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