June 3, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1038
GERALDINE FOX, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
SOUTHEAST TRANSPORT INC.,
A/K/A BILL MATT ENTERPRISES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
Steven J. Marullo on brief for appellant.
Gary H. Goldberg on brief for appellees.
Per Curiam. Appellant Southeast Transport Corporation
appeals a judgment by the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts in the amount of $15,000 for
appellee Geraldine Fox and in the amount of $20,000 for
appellee Melinda St. John, and the award to appellees of
reasonable attorneys' fees. We summarily affirm.
I
Fox and St. John were hired by appellant as truck
drivers in June 1988. They were both terminated on August 11
of the same year. In 1989, appellees brought suit alleging
that appellant had discriminated against each "based upon her
sex in the terms and conditions of her employment by creating
a hostile, offensive and abusive work environment and
terminating her employment" in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e
and Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. In July 1991, the court entered
a default judgment against defendant, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(a). The court then conducted an evidentiary
hearing to determine the amount to be awarded to each
appellee in damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress on
their Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B claim. They also requested
reasonable attorneys' fees. Each of the appellees testified
at the hearing, as did two witnesses for the defendant. The
court detailed its findings and conclusions in a memorandum
and order dated December 9, 1993.
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On appeal, appellant asserts two assignments of error.
First, appellant claims that certain testimony received by
the court at the evidentiary hearing should have been barred
as hearsay, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
appellant contends apply to hearings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b). Second, appellant contends that there was
insufficient evidence presented to sustain the award of
damages to each appellee.
II
Once the default judgment had entered, it was
established, as alleged in the complaint, that the appellant
had discriminated against the appellees both by creating a
hostile work environment and by terminating their employment
because they were women. See Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S.
218, 225 (1929). Therefore, the only issue to be decided at
the Rule 55(b)(2) hearing was the amount of damages to which
appellees were entitled as a result of appellant's illegal
conduct. See Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, 990 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1993). In its memorandum and order, the court,
as required, stated its findings of fact and conclusions.
See Brown v. Kenron Aluminum & Glass Corp., 477 F.2d 526,
530-31 (8th Cir. 1973); Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671
F.2d 636, 638 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court found that
appellees were credible witnesses. It also concluded, based
in part on its assessment of credibility, that the appellees
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had suffered "significant emotional distress" because of
specific illegal conduct by the appellant and, therefore,
were entitled to damages under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. See
Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182, 478 N.E.2d 1292,
1299 (an award of emotional distress damages under ch. 151B
can be sustained by finding of discrimination alone even in
the absence of physical injury or psychiatric consultation),
review denied, 395 Mass. 1103, 482 N.E.2d 328 (1985).
Having read the whole of the record, we find no
reversible error in any of the factual findings or
conclusions of the district court. See Cumpiano v. Banco
Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990) (an
appellate court "ought not to upset findings of fact or
conclusions drawn therefrom unless, on the whole of the
record, [the appellate judges] form a strong, unyielding
belief that a mistake has been made"). Furthermore, in light
of the court's findings and given that damages for emotional
distress are "not easily computed and, therefore, . . .
extremely fact-sensitive," we find no abuse of discretion in
the court's assessment of damages in this case. Jones, 990
F.2d at 5 (upholding an award for emotional damages based
mainly on defendant's statement of damages and sworn
testimony).
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Finally, we find no evidence, and appellant has called
our attention to none, which would indicate that the court,
in its factual findings and conclusions, explicitly or
implicitly relied on any of the statements alleged to be
hearsay. Therefore, even if we were to assume arguendo both
that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to a hearing to
determine damages and that the testimony challenged by
appellant was inadmissible hearsay, any error in the
admission which may have occurred was harmless. See Vincent
v. Louis Marx & Co., 874 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1989)
(admission of evidence harmless when appellate court can say
"with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error") (citations omitted).
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
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