July 11, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-2347
JUAN CAMACHO-PACHECO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LUIS A. MEDINA-VARGAS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 93-2348
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ-TORRES, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
LUIS A. MEDINA-VARGAS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Roberto Buso-Aloy, with whom Harry Anduze Montano was on brief
for appellants Rodriguez, et al.
Francisco R. Gonzalez, with whom Jesus Hernandez Sanchez and
Hernandez Sanchez Law Firm were on brief for appellant Camacho-
Pacheco.
Edgardo Rodriguez-Quilichini, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Pedro A. Delgado-Hernandez, Solicitor General, and Carlos Lugo-
Fiol, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
2
Per Curiam. During the evening of March 10, 1990,
Per Curiam.
Officer Luis Medina Vargas arrived by unmarked patrol car in the
Caimito Ward of Yauco, Puerto Rico, accompanied by his partner,
Antonio Rodriquez. Medina, who believed that he had come upon an
illegal street-side "dice" game, jumped from the patrol car,
announced himself as a police officer, and fatally shot Manuel
Camacho Rodriquez in the back. Camacho was unarmed.
In August 1991, Camacho's family filed suit in federal
district court against Medina, his partner, and several police
department supervisors, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Medina's partner had failed
to take reasonable measures at the scene to prevent the shooting,
and that Medina's supervisors had demonstrated reckless or
callous indifference to Camacho's constitutional rights by (i)
maintaining deficient police recruiting procedures and failing
adequately to train or supervise Camacho for this "special"
patrol, (ii) ignoring previous administrative complaints lodged
against Camacho, and (iii) permitting department-wide use of
excessive force. The district court ultimately granted summary
judgment for the partner and the supervisors.
A de novo review of the summary judgment record, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Gaskell v. The Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 3 F.3d
495, 497 (1st Cir. 1993), leads us to conclude that summary
judgment was proper.
3
First, the claim against Medina's partner falters
because all record evidence indicates that Medina fired his
weapon a split second after jumping from the patrol car, before
his partner even had time to shift the vehicle into park.
Second, the record is similarly deficient as concerns
appellants' claims against Medina's supervisors:
Supervisor liability [under section 1983] may
not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat
superior. . . . Moreover, a supervisor can-
not be liable for merely negligent acts.
Rather, a supervisor's acts or omissions must
amount to a reckless or callous indifference
to the constitutional rights of others. "An
official displays such reckless or callous
indifference when it would be manifest to any
reasonable official that his conduct was very
likely to violate an individual's rights."
Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91-92 (1st Cir.
1994) (citations omitted). In order to surmount the required
evidentiary threshold, appellants needed to show "'an "affirma-
tive [causal] link" between the street level of misconduct and
the action or inaction of supervisory officials.'" Gutierrez-
Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) (cita-
tion omitted).
None of the evidence adduced by appellants even remote-
ly suggests that Medina's supervisors were or should have been on
notice that Medina posed a danger to the public. There was no
evidence that Medina's prior conduct demonstrated an inclination
or tendency to use excessive force, nor that the police depart-
ment routinely used excessive force. Absent such evidence,
4
appellants could not establish that the defendant supervisors
knowingly instituted or maintained a recruiting system ill-suited
to rooting out dangerous recruits. See Febus-Rodriguez, 4 F.3d
at 92 (noting that summary judgment record must show that super-
visor knew of recruiting and training problems, knowledge which
reflected a "conscious policy" decision to hire or retain incom-
petent officers).
Nor was there evidence to substantiate appellants'
conclusory contentions that the sort of gambling patrol in which
Medina was engaged is a policing task requiring "special" train-
ing or constant supervision by superior officers. Medina gradu-
ated from the police academy in 1986, having taken such courses
as "basic police tactical operations" and "use and handling of
firearms." During the next four years, Medina served primarily
as a traffic officer, earning numerous commendations for exempla-
ry police service (e.g., apprehension of murder suspects) and
professional demeanor. He was honored as Policeman of the Year
in 1989-90. Official police department files contain no adminis-
trative complaints against Medina prior to the Camacho shooting.
Cf. id. at 93-94 (summary judgment awarded where five prior
administrative complaints were "unrelated" to the violent activi-
ty giving rise to plaintiff's suit); but cf. Gutierrez-Rodriguez,
882 F.2d at 564 (finding supervisor liability based on several
prior complaints of brutality). Appellants made conclusory
allegations in their complaint that Medina was "known," on the
5
police force and in the community, for aggressive behavior, and
that his supervisors engaged in a systematic cover-up of citizen
complaints. But they offered no competent evidence in support of
these allegations.
Given the dearth of competent evidence, and the failure
to request an extension of the discovery deadline as permitted
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), Resolution Trust Corp. v. North
Bridge Assocs., Inc., F.3d , (1st Cir. 1994) [1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9358, at *10-13 (1st Cir. May 2, 1994)], the district
court correctly concluded that appellants failed to demonstrate a
trialworthy issue as to whether the defendant supervisors had
reason to know that Medina possessed a dangerous or volatile
disposition. Accordingly, the district court judgment must be
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Affirmed
6