July 13, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1062
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSE MARTINEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Charles P. McGinty on brief for appellant.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and James D.
Herbert, Assistant United States Attorney, on Motion for Summary
Disposition for appellee.
Per Curiam. The government has moved for summary
affirmance of the district court's order revoking defendant's
supervised release.
Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1). He was initially sentenced to 57 months in
custody followed by three years of supervised release. H e
conceded at the revocation hearing that he had violated the
conditions of his supervised release. The district court
resentenced him to 15 months imprisonment, followed by 21
months of supervised release.
On appeal defendant raises a single issue, "whether
the supervised release revocation ["SRR"] provisions of 18
U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), permit a district court, upon revocation
of a term of supervised release, to impose a sentence
combining incarceration with a further term of supervised
release."
This court recently considered the identical issue
in United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993). We
held in O'Neil,
[T]he SRR provision . . . permits a district court,
upon revocation of a term of supervised release, to
impose a prison sentence combining incarceration
with a further term of supervised release, so long
as (1) the incarcerative portion of the sentence
does not exceed the time limit specified in the SRR
provision itself, and (2) the combined length of
the new prison sentence cum supervision term does
not exceed the duration of the original term of
supervised release.
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O'Neil, 11 F.3d at 302.
Defendant concedes that the sentence imposed upon
him comports with O'Neil. He argues, however, that O'Neil
was wrongly decided.
We decline defendant's invitation to revisit
O'Neil, especially as all of defendant's arguments, and most
of the authorities he cites, were aired and considered by the
panel that heard O'Neil. In this circuit, newly-constituted
panels are generally bound by prior panel decisions on point.
Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294, 1298 (1st Cir. 1993).
Defendant's reliance on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259
(1994), is misplaced. Granderson and O'Neil addressed
different substantive and interpretive issues involving
discrete statutory sections with different texts, designs,
and histories. The differences which defendant perceives in
the two opinions, including their differing uses of the "rule
of lenity," are a function of the lack of common issues, not
of differences in analytic method or statutory construction.
As the dispositive issue on appeal has been
recently and authoritatively decided by a panel of this
court, and no other substantial question is presented, the
decision below is summarily affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.
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