August 24, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1486
JOHN J. DEFAZIO, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC. EDWARD KAHLER,
EDWARD M. CHEROF, AND W. WHITT HAWKINS
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S.District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
George E. Kersey on brief for appellant.
Wilfred J. Benoit Jr. and Goodwin, Procter & Hoar on brief for
appellee.
Per Curiam. We have reviewed carefully the record, the
district court opinion, and the parties' briefs in this case.
We summarily affirm the district court judgment essentially
for the reasons stated in its memorandum of decision dated
March 29, 1994. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1. We add only the
following.
Even if we assume that appellant properly raised before
the district court a claim that he had been wrongfully
terminated in violation of a state public policy against
dismissal of an employee who has only been charged with a
crime, we find no merit in the claim. The general rule in
Massachusetts is that "[e]mployment at will is terminable by
either the employee or the employer without notice, for
almost any reason or for no reason at all." Jackson v.
Action for Boston Community Development, Inc., 403 Mass. 8,
9, 525 N.E.2d 411, 412 (1988). Although a "public policy"
exception to the employment at will doctrine exists, the
exception is "interpreted . . . narrowly," King v. Driscoll,
1994 Mass. LEXIS 474, at 11 (Mass. Aug. 11, 1994), and
requires a showing that the dismissal violated a "clearly
established public policy," id. at 10.
Appellant asserts that his dismissal violated the state
policy which presumes an accused to be innocent until proven
guilty. This presumption, however, serves to focus a jury on
what a prosecutor must establish so as to obtain a conviction
in a criminal case. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 169,
188, 326 N.E.2d 320, 332 (1975) (emphasis added). It has no
applicability in the employment context and, consequently,
does not warrant invocation of the public policy exception.
See Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa
1994) (presumption of innocence "limited to criminal
procedures" and is not "a public policy applicable in the
employment context"); Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc.,
328 Pa. Super. 300, 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1984) (presumption
of innocence applies to trial and is not "superimposed into
an accused's remaining life experiences"); see also King,
supra, at 15 (statutory right "must relate to or arise from
the employee's status as an employee" to warrant invocation
of public policy exception). Furthermore, although
Massachusetts does not appear to have directly addressed the
question of whether a dismissal of an employee on the basis
of a mere accusation is a violation of public policy, other
states which have addressed similar claims have held that
such a dismissal is not a violation of public policy. See
Beery v. Maryland Medical Laboratory, Inc., 89 Md. App. 81,
597 A.2d 516, 523 (1991) (firing based on fellow employee's
unsubstantiated allegations does not "contravene any clear
mandate of public policy"), cert. denied, 325 Md. 329, 600
A.2d 850 (1992); Cisco 476 A.2d at 1344 (rejecting public
policy claim based upon dismissal following criminal
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accusation); Borschel, 512 N.W.2d (discharge after accusation
of sexual abuse not violation of public policy). We are
aware of nothing which suggests that Massachusetts would
decide otherwise.
Appellee's request for sanctions is denied. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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