[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1152
HECTOR SANTOS RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CARLOS LOPEZ FELICIANO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
Howard Charles, with whom Ortiz, Toro & Ortiz Brunet was on brief
for appellants.
Edgardo Rodriguez Quilichini, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Pedro A. Delgado-Hernandez, Solicitor General, and Carlos Lugo
Fiol, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
September 1, 1994
Per Curiam. Appellant Hector Santos Ramirez, joined by
Per Curiam.
his family, initiated this civil rights action, see 42 U.S.C.
1983, alleging that certain narcotics agents affiliated with
the Puerto Rico Police had conspired to violate his constitu-
tional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution by using false statements to obtain
warrants to search his residence and place of business, without
probable cause. The defendant-officers eventually moved for
summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity and Santos
interposed written opposition.
On the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the
district court ordered all parties to comply with District of
Puerto Rico Local Rule 311.12, which requires a party requesting
or opposing summary judgment to file a detailed factual statement
supported by specific references to the record.1 The statement
1Notwithstanding Puerto Rico Local Rule 311.12, Santos'
initial opposition to the motion for summary judgment failed to
specify any disputed facts warranting trial. Local Rule 311.12
provides:
Upon any motion for summary judgment, there shall
be served and filed annexed to the motion a separate,
short, concise statement of material facts as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to
be tried and the basis of such contention as to each
material fact, properly supported by specific reference
to the record.
All material facts set forth in the statement
required to be served by the moving party will be
deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement
required to be served by the opposing party.
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment
shall include a separate, short, concise statement of
material facts as to which it is contended that there
exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported
by specific reference to the record.
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of facts filed by Santos consisted entirely of loosely worded
allegations imported from the complaint, rephrased in the form of
questions of fact, and accompanied by a single record reference
to Santos' own affidavit affirming the allegations in the com-
plaint: "to the best of our knowledge the facts set forth in
[the complaint] are true and should be considered as set forth
herein." The magistrate judge ruled that Santos had failed to
comply with Rule 311.12, and thereupon deemed all uncontroverted
facts set forth in defendants' statement admitted. See D.P.R.
Loc. Rule 311.12; supra note 1. The magistrate judge recommended
that the district court grant the motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. The recommendation was adopted by
the district court over Santos' timely objection, and Santos
appealed.
Santos concedes that Local Rule 311.12 was duly promul-
gated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. See generally Stepanischen
v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 929 (1st Cir.
1983) (encouraging adoption of local rules prescribing summary
judgment procedures, and citing the forerunner to D.P.R. Loc.
Rule 311.12 as an exemplar for curbing imprecise summary judgment
practices which force district courts to "ferret through the
record" to assess the viability of competing claims). Of course,
it is well established that the "[d]istrict courts enjoy broad
latitude in administering local rules[, and] are entitled to
demand adherence to specific mandates contained in the rules."
D.P.R. Loc. Rule 311.12.
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Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., slip
op. at 8 (1st Cir. June 7, 1994). Recently, we reaffirmed our
longstanding view that "local rules are an important vehicle by
which courts operate[, and they] carry the force of law." Id. at
7.
Even though the initial report and recommendation to
the district judge recounted in detail the requirements imposed
by Rule 311.12, as well as the governing summary judgment proce-
dure, Santos' Rule 311.12 statement of facts in opposition to
summary judgment contained but a single "record reference" to a
facially deficient affidavit by Santos, see Sheinkopf v. Stone,
927 F.2d 1259, 1270 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is apodictic that an
'affidavit . . . made upon information and belief . . . does not
comply with Rule 56(e).'") (quoting Automatic Radio Mfg., Inc. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 831 (1949)), which rested
entirely on the conclusory allegations in the complaint, Moreau
v. Local 247, International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 851 F.2d
516, 518 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The [party opposing summary judgment]
may not merely rest on the pleadings and arguments, but must set
forth specific facts showing a genuine issue about a material
fact."). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but . . . must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."). Since the opposition submitted by Santos did not
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contain a "concise statement of material facts . . . properly
supported by specific reference to the record," as required by
Local Rule 311.12, the specific facts set forth in defendants'
duly supported statement of uncontroverted facts were, quite
properly, deemed admitted. See, e.g., Rivas v. Federacion de
Asociaciones Pecuaria de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814, 816 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1991). Finally, an independent review of the district court
record, Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874 (1st
Cir. 1993), satisfies us that defendants were entitled to judg-
ment, as a matter of law, based on the unopposed factual showings
made in their statement of uncontroverted facts.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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