Cordero-Trejo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1385

JUAN FRANCISCO CORDERO-TREJO,

Petitioner,

v.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,

Young,* District Judge.

Maureen O'Sullivan with whom Harvey Kaplan, Jeremiah Friedman and

Kaplan, O'Sullivan & Friedman were on brief for petitioner.

Iris Gomez with whom Massachusetts Law Reform Institute was on

brief for Guatemaltecos Unidos En Accion of Rhode Island and
Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition, amici curiae.
Donald E. Keener, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Philemina McNeill

Jones, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief for respondent.

November 23, 1994

*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Juan

Francisco Cordero Trejo claims the Board of Immigration

Appeals ("Board") erred in dismissing his appeal from a

denial of asylum and withholding of deportation by the

immigration judge. Cordero's principal contention is that

the Board, in summarily adopting the IJ's conclusions,

ignored substantial portions of the evidence and accepted

inappropriate assumptions about how Guatemalan society

operates in concluding that his claim to have a well-founded

fear of persecution if returned to Guatemala contains fatal

"inconsistencies" and "implausibilities," and that he is

statutorily ineligible for either asylum or withholding. See

8 U.S.C. 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

After full review, we hold that the findings

underlying the Board's conclusion that Cordero is ineligible

for asylum are not supported by substantial evidence. The

Board's adoption of the IJ's findings and conclusions is

unreasonable when evaluated in light of the record as a

whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

The Board's initial basis for denying Cordero's bid for

asylum, i.e., the IJ's extensive negative credibility

findings, are without foundation in the record. The Board's

alternative holding that Cordero is statutorily ineligible

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for asylum based upon, inter alia,1 its conclusion that no

one in Guatemala "is interested in him for any of the five

statutory grounds for asylum," In re Cordero, No. A70438773,

slip op. at 2 (BIA Mar. 22, 1994), can only be derived from

reliance on those unreasoned findings to discredit a

substantial portion of Cordero's evidence. Finally, the

Board did not evaluate the record "in light of general

conditions" in Guatemala and failed to consider evidence

concerning the pattern and practice of persecution of

similarly situated persons in Guatemala, as required by INS

regulations. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(a) and (b)(2)(i). See Osorio

v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we

vacate the Board's eligibility determination and remand for

new proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I.
I.

BACKGROUND2
BACKGROUND

Cordero is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He

was born in 1948, and completed high school and attended

medical school there. He was a 42 year-old married father of

four daughters, a small property owner, and owner and

1. The Board also based this alternative holding on
Cordero's failure to show past harm and the fact that his
family remains in Guatemala unharmed. These are statutorily
insufficient grounds for a denial of asylum, as discussed
infra.

2. Except where expressly indicated, the facts stated herein
were not contradicted.

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operator of a successful construction business that employed

dozens of workers when he fled his country in November of

1990. He enjoyed a good standard of living, had savings, and

sent his daughters to private school. His wife and daughters

remain in Guatemala.

From 1976 to 1990 Cordero also worked as a

volunteer with "Laicos Comprometidos" (the committed laymen),

a religious organization dedicated to promoting the Catholic

faith, to providing medical care, food and clothing to needy

Guatemalans and to helping them "rise above their poverty."

He travelled on these missions approximately three times a

year to remote areas which had been hard hit by conflicts

between guerrillas and the Guatemalan military. Cordero

testified to having been stopped many times on these missions

by armed groups who accused him and his fellow missionaries

of inciting rebellion among the rural people.

In 1985 Cordero began to receive anonymous

threatening phone calls warning him to stop his activities

with Laicos. Then, in 1986, Cordero's younger brother was

attacked by armed men who stabbed him multiple times, stating

that this was a warning for Cordero. Several months later,

Cordero's older brother was attacked by armed men who threw

him off a cliff, stating that it was on account of his

brother's (Cordero's) failure to heed their warnings. Both

brothers survived, and remain in Guatemala. Cordero

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testified that both before and after these attacks he and

members of his family were followed on the street and his

house was being watched. He reported the threatening phone

calls and surveillance, but was unable to obtain any

assistance from the National Police.

In November of 1987 Cordero was stopped by the

army3 while on a mission in a region plagued by guerilla

unrest. He was interrogated at length about his motives for

coming to the region, and when he explained he was with

"Laicos Comprometidos" he was accused of inciting rebellion

among the people. Several priests with whom Cordero was

intimate were killed in the course of their work in the

countryside. In 1989 Cordero suspended the activities of a

group of lay social workers that he and some friends had

founded to help troubled teens because of a telephone threat

they received.4

3. In his affidavit in support of his asylum application,
Cordero states that he was "arrested" by the army. Later, in
response to questioning before the immigration judge, Cordero
stated that he had never been arrested in Guatemala. The IJ
in his opinion and the INS in its brief ignore this incident,
whereas Cordero's brief maintains he was in fact arrested.
Because the record offers no reason to believe the incident
described here did not occur, we feel it is safe to assume
that Cordero probably understood the word "arrest" as he used
it in his affidavit to mean "stop," rather than its more
specialized criminal law meaning. We believe the discrepancy
can therefore be simply explained by inadequacies of
translation.

4. This incident too, although not contradicted anywhere in
the record, is not acknowledged by either the immigration
judge or the INS.

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In June of 1990, after twelve years of service,

Cordero resigned from Laicos because he believed this might

put a stop to the campaign against him and his activities

that was terrorizing his family. However, in October of 1990

he was accosted on a city street by armed men who identified

themselves as belonging to the "death squads." They warned

him to abandon the country and that this would be his final

warning. They robbed him, but did not harm him physically.

Cordero claims that his family was terrorized and

that his own fears of persecution crystallized at this point.

He believes that if he returns to Guatemala he will be killed

by those who continuously threatened him. He was tempted to

leave Guatemala that night, but decided instead to try to

leave legally. He obtained a passport without difficulty,

but was turned down by the United States Consulate for a

visa. He then left Guatemala on November 21, 1990,

travelling by bus and on foot through Mexico. He entered the

United States near Brownsville, Texas on or about February 2,

1991 without inspection and was apprehended by the

Immigration Service shortly thereafter.

In deportation hearings held in March and June of

1991 Cordero conceded deportability and applied for asylum

and withholding of deportation, and in the alternative,

voluntary departure. Immigration and Nationality Act 208,

243(h) and 244(e), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a), 1253(h) and 1254(e)

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(1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The IJ denied Cordero's

applications for asylum and withholding, but granted his

request for voluntary departure. Cordero appealed to the

Board. On March 22, 1994 the Board dismissed the appeal.

The Board relied on adverse credibility findings by the IJ in

reaching its decision that Cordero did not meet the statutory

definition of a "refugee." INA 101 et seq.,

101(a)(42)(A), 208(a), as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.,

1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a). The Board reasoned that

"inconsistencies and implausibilities" in Cordero's

application rendered him unworthy of credibility, and that

even if credible, he had failed to establish statutory

eligibility for asylum because he had not shown that he was

ever harmed in Guatemala, or that his family remaining in

Guatemala had been harmed, or that "anyone in Guatemala is

interested in him for any of the five statutory grounds for

asylum." In re Cordero, slip. op. at 2. The Board noted

that suffering from civil disturbances and fleeing general

conditions of violence do not qualify an applicant for

asylum.

Cordero now appeals.

II.
II.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The INS charges that Cordero did not exhaust his

administrative remedies because until now he has claimed only

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religious persecution, and failed to claim persecution on

imputed political opinion and/or social group grounds, as he

now seeks to do on appeal to this court. This contention is

without merit. See generally the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and

Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979), 66

and 67. Not only did Cordero check the social group box on

his I-589 application for asylum, the immigration judge

framed the discussion in his order and opinion principally in

terms of the social group ground. Moreover, the language of

the Board's decision reveals that it considered Cordero's

application lacking with respect to "any one of the five

statutory grounds."5 In re Cordero, slip. op. at 2.

III.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review findings of fact and credibility by the

Board "under a deferential 'substantial' evidence standard."

Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990); Novoa-

Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1990) ("we must uphold

any finding of fact that is supported by 'substantial

evidence'"). Board determinations of statutory eligibility

5. Petitioner stated his fear to be "on account of his
membership in the social group of religious layworkers
(catechists) and on account of the political opinion which is
imputed to such people, and to the Petitioner in particular."
We regard Cordero's application for asylum as justiciable
under any one or several of the statutory grounds that the
record as a whole supports.

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for relief from deportation, whether via asylum or

withholding, are conclusive if "supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered

as a whole." 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4) (1988). Gebremichael v.

INS, 10 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1993).

Under normal principles of administrative law

governing the role of courts of appeals when reviewing agency

decisions for substantial evidence,

[t]he Board's findings must . . . be set
aside when the record before a Court of
Appeals clearly precludes the Board's
decision from being justified by a fair
estimate of the worth of the testimony of
witnesses or its informed judgment on
matters within its special competence or
both.

Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490. This is to ensure that an

agency "keeps within reasonable grounds." Id. See,

Ghebllawi v. INS, 28 F.3d 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1994) (invoking

Universal Camera standard to emphasize that Board of

Immigration Appeals is not "a unique kind of administrative

agency entitled to extreme deference"). We will not

"supplant the agency's findings merely by identifying

alternative findings that could be supported by substantial

evidence." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. at 1060.

However, though we defer to reasonable inferences drawn by

the Board from conflicting evidence, see, Martinez v. INS,

970 F.2d 973, 975 (1st Cir. 1992), Consolo v. Federal

Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966), deference

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is not due where findings and conclusions are based on

inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded

in the record, viewed as a whole, Universal Camera, 340 U.S.

at 491; Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 49

(1954), or are merely personal views of the immigration

judge. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.

1986). In any case, credibility findings resting on analysis

of testimony rather than on demeanor may "deserve less than

usual deference." Consolidation Coal v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 482,

488 (7th Cir. 1982).

IV.
IV.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

Of the issues Cordero raises on appeal with respect

to the denial of his application for asylum, two merit

serious discussion: (1) the Board erred in relying on adverse

credibility and other factual findings which are not

supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (2) the

Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence

because it ignores significant documentary evidence pertinent

both to the credibility of Cordero's claimed fear of

persecution on account of one or several statutory grounds,

and to the persecution of similarly situated persons in

Guatemala. We address each argument in turn.

A. Credibility and Other Factual Findings
A. Credibility and Other Factual Findings

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The Board's denial of asylum adopted the IJ's

findings that Cordero's application and testimony (1) was

rife with inconsistencies and implausibilities, and (2)

failed to show either that he had suffered past harm in

Guatemala, or that his family had been harmed since his

departure, or "that anyone in Guatemala is interested in him

for any of the five statutory grounds for asylum." In re

Cordero, slip. op. at 2.

As to the Board's second holding, it is well-

established that the first two reasons are not prerequisites

to qualify for asylum under the statute. INA

101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), 8 C.F.R.

208.13(b) and (b)(2)(i). INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.

421 (1987). Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA

1987). See also, Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 37

(2nd Cir. 1994) (fact that petitioner had not yet been

physically harmed "is not determinative of whether he has a

well-founded fear of persecution"); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d

1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987) (petitioner's "freedom was

threatened when he was watched continuously and felt

compelled to restrict his activities"). And the third reason

is a conclusion that the Board could only have reached by

relying on the IJ's adverse credibility findings to discredit

the bulk of Cordero's evidence.

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Because the Board adopted these credibility

findings as the initial basis for its denial of asylum, and

relied on them in formulating its alternative holding that

Cordero had in any event not established statutory

eligibility for asylum, the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting these findings remains an issue on appeal. We

evaluate each IJ finding for substantial evidence:

1. Because Cordero's affidavit does not identify the

"unknown armed men" who attacked him and two of his

brothers as members of "death squads," nor mentions

that the attackers identified themselves as such,

the judge found his testimony to that effect

inconsistent, and his characterization of these

attacks therefore not deserving of credibility.

The record establishes that, far from being "a

significant fact that one . . . would be expected to state

in the asylum application or supporting affidavit," as the IJ

asserted, accounts of political attacks and killings in

Guatemala refer to "unknown attackers," "unidentified men,"

"armed assailants" and members of "death squads"

interchangeably. Cordero's descriptions of his and his

family's attackers are thus consistent with how similar

incidents are described in Cordero's supporting evidence.

The record reveals that precisely because these groups are

unofficial and "clandestine" they are by definition

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"unknown." In fact, the record suggests that in most

instances the only way they are knowable, i.e.,

distinguishable from mere bandits and criminals, is by the

threats and indications of motive that typically precede or

accompany their violence. Both Cordero's testimony and his

affidavit refer repeatedly to the attackers' demands that he

discontinue his activities with Laicos, and to warnings of

future violence should he disregard them.

Viewing Cordero's affidavit and testimony "in light

of the record as a whole," it is difficult to perceive how a

reasonable factfinder could find an inconsistency between the

labels "death squad" and "unknown armed men" sufficient to

impugn the applicant's credibility. Similarly, Cordero's

testimony concerning "strongly armed men with vehicles

without number plates" is consistent with both labels.

2. "One must question why [Cordero] would report these

threats to national police of the Guatemalan

government."

The record shows that in Guatemala it is, among

other things, a lack of response by authorities with the

power to halt these sorts of attacks that suggests that a

particular incident was no ordinary crime or random violence.

Viewed in this context, it makes perfect sense that victims

would report violent incidents to the authorities. In fact,

given that the record contains several examples of victims or

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relatives reporting such incidents to police, it does not

support the assumption that Guatemalans would not attempt to

exercise their legal rights in order to prevent, redress or

simply record incidents of persecution.

3. Given that Cordero testified that the death squads

always carry rifles and use them with impunity,

"one must wonder why [neither he nor his] two

brothers who were allegedly attacked by death squad

members were not shot or apparently attacked with

firearms and were not killed."

The record documents numerous politically motivated

attacks upon social activists and religious lay workers,

many, if not most, of which are characterized by acts of

violence accompanied by warnings and threats of future

violence that do not result in the death of the victim(s).

The record suggests that the use of violence as a vehicle for

intimidation is widespread in Guatemala. Understood in this

context, a reasonable interpretation of Cordero's testimony

that the death squads use their weapons with impunity would

encompass their use for purposes of intimidation, and not

merely for killing.

It is difficult to see how a reasonable factfinder

could view Cordero's off-hand comment regarding his

attackers' fondness for weaponry in the context of this

record, and conclude that his credibility has been

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compromised. Moreover, to infer that an asylum applicant is

unlikely to be persecuted because he and his relatives were

not killed during attempts to terrorize them "lead[s] to the

absurd result of denying asylum to those who have actually

experienced persecution and were fortunate enough to survive

. . . ". Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir.

1985).

4. The IJ found it "not particularly credible" that

Cordero "would not tell his alleged attackers in

October of 1990 that he was no longer a member of

or active in the Laicos religious movement if in

fact he was threatened . . . for his religious

activities."

There is perhaps a superficial basis for the IJ's

question. How much credit, however, would his attackers give

to a protestation that, after so many years, he had resigned

or retired? It is to be noted that this confrontation

occurred in an urban area, without the attackers waiting to

find him in the countryside. Could he reasonably expect to

end these threats by talk?

5. The IJ found it "not particularly credible that

[Cordero's] attackers, if they were truly

interested in his religious activities, would rob

him as opposed to physically harming him as they

had allegedly threatened to do. . . .".

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The record, documenting a wide variety of

exploitation, including thefts of documents, robberies, and

ransacking of artwork, religious and other valuable property

by those seeking to terrorize or intimidate the populace, is

to the contrary, and contains no evidence to support this

assumption.

6. "One must wonder why the Guatemalan government

would place its seal on a document . . . extolling

[Cordero's] virtues in a movement allegedly

targeted by government death squads or would

provide information purporting to corroborate the

death squad atrocities."

Referring to the letter from the Laicos leadership

commemorating Cordero's service and resignation, and to

certain hospital documents, it appears that the IJ assumed

the government puts its stamp of approval on documents

executed upon paper bearing government "seals" after their

completion in concluding that they therefore deserve "little

weight." This assumption is not only unsupported by any

discernible evidence, but is contradicted by Cordero's

testimony that these documents were never submitted to any

arm of the Guatemalan government. In fact, examination of

the documents belies the IJ's conclusion: paper preprinted

with such seals appears to be obtainable from the government

merely by payment of fifty "centavos de quetzal" for the

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purpose of executing "official" documents of any sort, thus

the government never sees, let alone approves their contents,

as Cordero himself testified.

7. The IJ found that Cordero's supporting documents

"are not under oath, are conclusory in nature,

provide no foundation for the stated conclusions

and . . . are suspect at best."

An examination of the letters, hospital reports and

other documents submitted in support of Cordero's claim

reveals that they were executed on official paper, signed by

the affiant, sealed with, e.g., "Laicos Comprometidos,"

"Hospital General San Juan de Dios" or "Hospital Roosevelt"

insignia, and included the language "giving faith to what was

previously said" or "CERTIFIES." There is no evidence that

this is insufficient to be considered a sworn statement in

Guatemala. Both medical statements are signed by hospital

officials and the heads of the examining departments; both

detail the injuries, and their causes, sustained by Cordero's

brothers, as contained in their medical records. The Laicos

Comprometidos document is signed by both the President and

Secretary of the organization and describes Cordero's work in

detail. No reasonable interpretation of these documents

supports the immigration judge's conclusions as to their

authenticity or worth. Cf., Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90,

96 (6th Cir. 1986) (observation that petitioner's sworn

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statements "are not documented" to conclude he is not telling

the truth "is a non-sequitur").

8. The IJ found the fact that Cordero's wife signed

her full name on letters to him, and that the

letters "are addressed to respondent's formal name"

suspect because "one would normally expect the

spouse to use the more familiar form."

The record reveals that Cordero's wife opened her

letters to her husband with either "Dear Paco," "My Beloved

Husband," or "My dear one," while addressing the envelopes to

"Senor Juan Francisco Cordero Trejo." It is impossible to

see how this is contrary to what "one would normally expect"

anywhere. Nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest

that signing a letter to a spouse residing in a foreign

country by using one's full name is contrary to the common

practice of someone of Mrs. Cordero's cultural background.

9. If Cordero "were truly targeted by the government,"

it is "not particularly plausible" that he obtained

a passport.

This court has acknowledged that ability to obtain

a passport does not necessarily indicate absence of

persecution. Ipina v. INS, 868 F.2d 511, 515 n.9 (1st Cir.

1989). The "mere possession of a valid national passport is

no bar to refugee status." United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for

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Determining Refugee Status, 48, at 14 (Geneva 1979); See,

Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987)

(incorrect for IJ to assume government that allows a person

to leave will not persecute him upon return). Furthermore,

Cordero is not claiming to have been targeted and threatened

by the civilian government, but by a shadowy, extra-legal

entity associated with the Guatemalan military.

10. The IJ assumed that because Cordero never held

office in Laicos, and led only two or three

missions per year, his involvement in this

religious movement was "relatively limited," and

that since officers of Laicos "suffered no apparent

harm . . . for the past several years," Cordero had

"embellished" his alleged fear: "Certainly the

leading officers . . . are more visible and

susceptible to potential persecution than are the

rank and file members such as respondent."

The record is replete with references to incidents

of politically, socially or religiously motivated persecution

of precisely the sort of non-prominent lay or volunteer

workers, like Cordero, who carried out the missions for

social change to which they or their organizations are

committed. The IJ's conclusion about who would have a

legitimate fear under these circumstances in Guatemala thus

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cannot be derived from a reasonable appraisal of the evidence

presented in the record.

* * *

Each "inconsistency" or "implausibility" that the

IJ identified either appears to be based upon "expectations"

without support in the record, or inexplicably refutes

uncontroverted testimony, or is flatly contradicted by

relevant background and country conditions evidence. It is

apparent that the IJ did not consider Cordero's testimony and

evidence "in light of general conditions" in Guatemala, as

required by law. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(a). The IJ never

referred to the significant country conditions evidence in

the record.

This court, in reversing the Board in Perez-Alvarez

v. INS, adopted the analysis of a dissenting Board member:

As a general rule, in considering claims
of persecution I think it highly
advisable to avoid assumptions regarding
the way other societies operate. Time
and again this Board has considered
appeals in which assumptions of this
nature have been proven to be totally
wrong . . . .

857 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1988) (nothing in record sustains

IJ's assumptions, "except perhaps his general perception of

life or political conditions in El Salvador which may or may

not be grounded in fact").

Here, the IJ's conclusions are not drawn from any

perspectives offered by the unique vantage point of the

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factfinder, such as witness demeanor, conflicting or confused

testimony, etc., from which credibility is typically

assessed. In fact, it is difficult to ascertain from what

sort of evidence the IJ drew his credibility conclusions.

The opinion states no more than "one must question why . . .

" or "one must wonder why . . . ." As the record contains no

evidence that supports these findings, we find that they

unreasonably eviscerate Cordero's attempt to establish both

the objective and the subjective elements of his asylum

claim--that he has been, and fears being again, targeted for

persecution in Guatemala.

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B. Background and "Country Conditions" Evidence
B. Background and "Country Conditions" Evidence

1. Credibility and Context
1. Credibility and Context

A "well-founded fear of persecution" contains both

a subjective and an objective element. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480

U.S. at 430-31, 440. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 5

(1st Cir. 1990). The former is established via the

applicant's credible testimony that his fear is genuine;

while the latter is largely dependent upon the context and

believability he can establish for his claims through

presentation of reliable, specific, objective supporting

evidence. Id. (collecting cases). In addition, the Code of

Federal Regulations provides that

[t]he testimony of the applicant, if

credible in light of general conditions

in the applicant's country of nationality

or last habitual residence, may be
sufficient to sustain [his] burden of
proof without corroboration.

8 C.F.R. 208.13(a) (emphasis added).

The Board recognizes the importance of documentary

evidence both in providing a plausible context for an asylum

applicant's claim, and in making credibility assessments:

Without background information against
which to judge the alien's testimony, it
may well be difficult to evaluate the
credibility of the testimony. . . . The
applicant's statements cannot . . . be
considered in the abstract, and must be
viewed in the context of the relevant
background situation. A knowledge of
conditions in the applicant's country of
origin . . . is an important element in
assessing the applicant's credibility.

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Matter of Dass, Int. Dec. 3122, 1989 WL 331876, at *10

(citation omitted). "[T]he general rule regarding the

consideration of asylum applications by immigration judges

and the Board . . . is that they must be evaluated based on

matters of record (i.e., based on the evidence introduced by

the parties to the case under consideration). Id. at LEXIS

*9.

Cordero submitted ample documentary evidence

confirming persecution of religious, community, and social

activists, religious lay workers and members of the clergy.6

This evidence suggests that all such activists tend to be

viewed by the shadowy, quasi-military "death squads" Cordero

claims were hounding him and others as responsible for

inciting rebellion among poor peasants in the countryside,

simply for helping to improve their quality of life. It is

thus extremely important for contextualizing, in the absence

of direct corroboration, the events which Cordero claims

constitute persecution or the threat of persecution on

account of activities similar to those of other victims in

Guatemala.

Both the judge and the Board failed to address much

of Cordero's evidence. With all deference, it is far too

6. The Board nowhere suggests that this evidence is
unreliable, and we note that it comes from sources, such as
the State Department and internationally recognized non-
governmental organizations, generally regarded by courts of
law as reliable.

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extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general

statement. This failure unreasonably eviscerates the

applicant's attempt to establish the objective element of his

asylum claim.

2. Pattern and Practice
2. Pattern and Practice

The "Immigration Judge shall not require the

applicant to provide evidence that he would be singled out

individually for persecution" if he establishes his inclusion

in and identification with "similarly situated" groups of

persons against which there is a "pattern or practice" of

persecution in his country on account of any of the five

statutory grounds for asylum. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(2)(i).

Cordero supports his fear of persecution on account of one or

several statutory grounds with considerable documentation

concerning the treatment of persons in Guatemala engaged in

similar activities and motivated by similar religious and

social concerns as himself. There are some 150 pages of news

items, reports from the State Department, and from

international human rights and non-governmental

organizations.

Again, the Board makes no mention of this evidence,

and no effort to engage in the inquiry necessitated by

regulation. Id. The record contains upwards of sixty

specific incidents of threats, kidnapping, disappearances,

murder and other infliction of harm upon the clergy, lay

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church workers and others connected to church-related

activities. It also contains information regarding similar

violenceagainsthundredsof
othersinvolvedincomparableactivities.

V.
V.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Although, for the reasons stated, we believe the

present decision denying eligibility cannot stand, we are not

sufficiently moved to depart from the usual practice and rule

as matter of law. We remand for further consideration by the

Board. At the same time, in all fairness, we apprise the

Board that we have grave doubts whether a reasonable fact-

finder making the full study this record calls for could deny

refugee status to Cordero. The question whether asylum

should be granted to Cordero, assuming him to be a

statutorily eligible refugee, is a matter for administrative

determination.

Remanded.

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