[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1984
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MARLENE FAYE ROACH,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Marlene Faye Roach on brief pro se.
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, Elizabeth Woodcock,
Assistant United States Attorney, and Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant
United States Attorney, On Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion for
Summary Disposition for appellee.
November 29, 1994
Per Curiam. Appellant Marlene Faye Roach was convicted
after a jury trial of two counts of submitting false claims
for the reimbursement of travel expenses to the United States
Postal Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. 287. She appeals
pro se from her conviction and sentence and raises four
arguments. First, appellant says that the district court
erred in denying her motion to suppress certain incriminatory
statements that she made to two postal inspectors during the
course of an audit of the Athens, Maine post office.1
Second, appellant argues that the district court erred in
admitting into evidence photocopies of the travel vouchers
that appellant used to support her claims for reimbursement.
Third, appellant contends that the district court erred by
allowing the testimony of one of the appellant's witnesses
(i.e., the Rangley postmaster) to be "influenced." Finally,
appellant says that she has been denied her constitutional
rights to counsel, due process, and access to the courts,
primarily because she was not allowed to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis (IFP).
At the outset we observe that appellate review has been
somewhat hampered because appellant failed to secure copies
of the trial transcripts. "[I]t is the appellant's
responsibility to ensure that the record is complete, i.e.,
1. Prior to her conviction, appellant was employed as the
postmaster of that office.
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that it contains all papers necessary for the determination
of the issues presented by the appeal." Muniz Ramirez v.
Puerto Rico Fire Services, 757 F.2d 1357, 1358 (1st Cir.
1985). Nevertheless, we have thoroughly reviewed the
parties' briefs and the record on appeal and have considered
each of the appellant's claims to the extent possible on the
record before us. See Valedon Martinez v. Hospital
Presbiteriano, 806 F.2d 1128, 1135 (1st Cir. 1986). We find
no merit in any of the appellant's contentions.
The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress
indicates that after appellant received the Miranda warnings
and signed a waiver of her rights, appellant admitted to two
postal inspectors that she had submitted approximately $1000-
$1500 in false travel claims to the Postal Service. She
further explained that she had submitted the false claims due
to various personal problems that had plagued her during the
past year. On appeal, appellant argues that her waiver was
not valid because she did not realize that she was a suspect
when she signed the form waiving her rights. Rather,
appellant believed that the postal inspectors wanted to
discuss shortages that they had found in the accounts of
other postal employees. The point has no merit. "[A]
suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of
questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to
determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and
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intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege."
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). Moreover, the
district court found that appellant was not in custody when
she made her remarks, and appellant does not challenge this
finding on appeal.2 As appellant was not in custody, the
inspectors had no duty to give her the Miranda warnings, and
it further was not necessary for appellant to waive her
Miranda rights. Appellant's attack on the validity of her
waiver therefore fails.3
Appellant's contention that the district court erred in
admitting into evidence the photocopies of the travel
vouchers does not state a coherent basis for this assignment
of error, save for noting that appellant used the photocopies
to prepare her income taxes. "[I]ssues adverted to in a
2. We note that appellant does not argue on appeal the
grounds that her counsel urged below in support of her motion
to suppress, i.e., that appellant was in custody when she
made her incriminatory remarks and that her statements were
not voluntary because appellant was under the influence of
prescription drugs when she made them. While appellant has
effectively waived these arguments, we have thoroughly
reviewed the transcript of the hearing on the motion to
suppress and are satisfied that the district court's rulings
are fully supported by the record.
3. Appellant also contends that she is innocent and that her
statements to the postal inspectors did not constitute a
"confession." She says that the postal inspectors
inaccurately recounted her remarks. Credibility judgments
are for the jury to make. Roach's protestation of innocence
provides no basis for setting the verdict aside. Moreover,
as this argument was not made below, it is not properly
before us on appeal. See United States v. Mendoza-Acevedo,
950 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991).
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perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived." United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082
(1990). Thus, we will not review this claim. Appellant's
claim that the district court erred by allowing the Rangley
postmaster's testimony to be influenced is wholly without
merit. While review of this claim is particularly difficult
without the trial transcript, we have accepted appellant's
description of the evidence adduced from this witness on
direct and cross-examination. We discern nothing improper in
the prosecutor's cross-examination or in the trial judge's
failure to stop the cross-examination. Appellant's
conclusory allegation that the Postal Inspection Service
improperly influenced this witness is specious.
Finally, we note that the district court denied
appellant's motion to proceed IFP after determining that she
had sufficient assets to hire an attorney and prosecute this
appeal herself. We previously issued an order upholding this
ruling and nothing in appellant's brief suggests that our
ruling was incorrect. Roach's remaining arguments on appeal
are equally meritless. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
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