Quintal v. SHHS

December 28, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1607

DENNIS J. QUINTAL,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington U.S. District Judge]

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and

Stahl, Circuit Judge.

Dennis J. Quintal, Sr., on brief pro se.

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Charlene A. Stawicki,

Assistant United States Attorney, and Thomas D. Ramsey, Assistant

Regional Counsel, Region I Department of Health and Human Services.

Per Curiam. Claimant is a convicted felon. He has

been both sentenced to a 12 to 15 year prison term and

civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person to the

Massachusetts Treatment Center at M.C.I. Bridgewater for a

period of one day to life. An ALJ found claimant to be

disabled, but suspended benefits under 42 U.S.C. 402(x)(1)

because of claimant's confinement. The Appeals Council

upheld the ALJ's determination. Claimant then filed a

complaint for judicial review in the district court, which

the court dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) as frivolous.

While we question whether the complaint was correctly

characterized as frivolous, claimant has since had an

opportunity to present any additional arguments he may have

in his appellate brief. We have considered all of claimant's

arguments. They are all legally meritless, and we conclude

that benefits were properly suspended. In these

circumstances, no purpose would be served by a remand, and we

affirm the district court's judgment, but for different

reasons. Bristol Energy Corporation v. New Hampshire Public

Utilities Commission, 13 F.3d 471, 478 (1st Cir. 1994) (court

of appeals may affirm on any theory supported by the record).

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I

We start with the words of the relevant statute, 42

U.S.C. 402(x)(1)1:

(x) Limitation on payments to prisoners

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subchapter, no monthly benefits
shall be paid under this section or under
section 423 of this title to any
individual for any month during which
such individual is confined in a jail,
prison, or other penal institution or
correctional facility, pursuant to his
conviction of an offense which
constituted a felony under applicable
law, unless such individual is actively
and satisfactorily participating in a
rehabilitation program which has been
specifically approved for such individual
by a court of law and, as determined by
the Secretary, is expected to result in
such individual being able to engage in
substantial gainful activity upon release
and within a reasonable time.

Claimant's arguments, as we understand them, are

that (1) he is a patient in a medical facility--and not a

prisoner in a "jail, prison, or other penal institution or

correctional facility" within the meaning of 402(x)(1)--

because the treatment center is under the jurisdiction of the

department of mental health, not the department of

corrections; (2) he qualifies for benefits under the

"participating in a rehabilitation program" provision; and

(3) hehas been deniedequal protection. We addresseach inturn.

1. Section 402(x) was recently amended. Pub. L. No. 387,
4, 108 Stat. 4071, (1994). Our references are to the
version in effect prior to the 1994 amendment.

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II

A. Confinement in a jail, prison, or other penal
institution or correctional facility.

Claimant was convicted in 1986 of rape of a child

and/or indecent assault and battery on a child. He was

sentenced to 12 to 15 years' imprisonment. Claimant was also

found to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), as defined in

Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 1 (1985), and civilly committed to

the treatment center for a period of one day to life, Mass.

G. L. ch. 123A, 5 (1985)2, where he will remain until he

is no longer sexually dangerous, Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 9

(1989). The "primary objective" of a civil commitment to the

treatment center is "the care, treatment and rehabilitation

of the sexually dangerous person." Commissioner of

Correction v. McCabe, 410 Mass. 847, 852-53, 576 N.E. 2d 654,

657 (1991). While in the treatment center, claimant serves

his criminal sentence. Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 5, (1985).

Discharge from the treatment center prior to the expiration

of the 12 to 15 year criminal sentence will not terminate

that sentence, id., and will result in claimant's transfer to

a regular prison.

The treatment center is under the jurisdiction of

the department of mental health, Mass. G.L. ch. 123A, 2

2. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of ch. 123A have been repealed
prospectively, Mass. Acts of 1990, ch. 150, 304, 104, but
the repeal does not affect claimant in any way material to
the present opinion.

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(1985), although the commissioner of correction appoints the

custodial personnel for the treatment center. Id. Custodial

personnel are "subject to the control of the commissioner of

mental health with respect to the care, treatment and

rehabilitation of persons in their custody," but are "under

the administrative, operational and disciplinary control of

the commissioner of correction." Id.

Claimant seems to contend, essentially, that he is

a patient at a treatment center and not a prisoner in a jail

and that consequently 402(x)(1) does not allow the

suspension of his disability benefits so long as he remains

at the treatment center. We uphold the Secretary's contrary

conclusion.

Under 402(x)(1), benefits must be denied not only

while a convicted felon is incarcerated in a jail or prison,

but also while he is "confined" in any "other penal

institution or correctional facility" pursuant to his felony

conviction. In the circumstances of this case, we think it

is fair to say that claimant is "confined" in a "correctional

facility" during the period he serves his criminal sentence

at the treatment center. Claimant is certainly "confined,"

for he is not free to depart. And his confinement is in an

institution, which, under state law, is considered to be a

"correctional" facility. See Mass. G. L. ch. 123A, 2

(1985) (treatment center must be located "at a correctional

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institution approved by the commissioner of correction");

Commonwealth v. Geary, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 579 N.E.2d 172

(1991) (concluding that a defendant who had been both

criminally convicted and civilly committed to the treatment

center was a "prisoner in any . . . correctional institution

of the commonwealth" for purposes of a statute proscribing

attacks by "prisoners" in any "correctional facility" upon

guards and rejecting defendant's claim that he was no more

than a patient in a mental health facility).

Treating claimant as a prisoner and the treatment

center as a correctional facility is consistent with the

legislative history, which reflected the view that convicted

felons incarcerated at public expense did not need benefits:

The committee believes that the basic purposes
of the social security program are not served by
the unrestricted payment of benefits to individuals
who are in prison . . .. The disability program
exists to provide a continuing source of monthly
income to those whose earnings are cut off because
they have suffered a severe disability. The need
for this continuing source of income is clearly
absent in the case of an individual who is being
maintained at public expense in prison. The basis
for his lack of other income in such circumstances
must be considered to be marginally related to his
impairment at best.

Sen. Rep. No. 96-987, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980),

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4787, 4794-95. Claimant, who,

but for his civil commitment to the treatment center would be

in a regular prison, similarly is not dependent upon

disability benefits for subsistence.

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In sum, the Secretary's determination that claimant

was subject to 402(x)(1) so long as he was serving his

criminal sentence in the treatment center accords with the

language of the statute and its legislative history and

therefore must be upheld. Davel v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559

(7th Cir. 1990) (upholding suspension of disability benefits

to convicted felon serving two concurrent commitments--one

civil and one criminal--in a mental health institute operated

by the state's department of health and social services).

B. Eligibility under rehabilitation provision.

Under 402(x)(1), an incarcerated felon may

nevertheless receive disability benefits if he

is actively and satisfactorily
participating in a rehabilitation program
which has been specifically approved for
such individual by a court of law and, as
determined by the Secretary, is expected
to result in such individual being able
to engage in substantial gainful activity
upon release and within a reasonable
time.

Claimant contends he is engaging in various

rehabilitation programs at the treatment center, which the

state court approved for him when it decided to civilly

commit him to the treatment center rather than have him serve

his sentence in a regular prison. See Thibodeau v.

Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 452, 454, 319 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1974),

Mass. G.L. ch. 123A, 5 (1985) (sentencing judge has

discretion whether to commit an SDP to the treatment center).

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The ALJ disagreed, noting that a treatment plan is not drawn

up until sometime after commitment and therefore its details

are not before the court or approved by the court at

commitment. Consequently, claimant's program had not been

"specifically approved for [claimant] by a court of law," the

ALJ reasoned.

We need not decide whether claimant is

participating in a rehabilitation program "specifically

approved" for him by a "court of law" because the ALJ denied

benefits for an independent, unassailable reason. The ALJ

concluded that the program was not likely to result in

claimant being able to engage in substantial gainful

employment "within a reasonable time," as required by

402(x)(1):

At present, the claimant is no more than
in the early stages of his rehabilitation
program. His commitment to [the
treatment center], if he fails to meet
the standards for dropping his SDP
status, could conceivably extend for the
remainder of his natural life -- possibly
for another 40 years or more. Given the
slow progress described by the
[Restrictive Integration Review Board] in
its periodic findings, it is highly
unlikely that he will be released prior
to the expiration of his sentence more
than 7 years hence. Under any
circumstance, it is unreasonable to
conclude that "release and a regained

ability for substantial gainful activity
will be achieved within a reasonable
time.

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Claimant has not challenged the ALJ's summary of

the evidence. Based on that summary as well as a review of

the materials provided to us, we conclude that the ALJ's

factual determination that claimant is in the early stages of

rehabilitation and not likely to be able to engage in

substantial gainful employment within a reasonable time is

amply supported. Indeed, claimant has not articulated any

argument to the contrary. Claimant was not entitled to

payment of benefits under the participation in a

rehabilitation program provision.

C. Equal Protection

Claimant asserts that some people who have been

both criminally convicted and civilly committed to the

treatment center receive benefits while others do not. To

deny claimant benefits, while others in the exact same

situation receive them, violates the equal protection clause,

he claims.

Neither in the district court nor in his appellate

brief has claimant provided any clarifying details. He has

not identified any inhabitant of the treatment center who

receives social security benefits while concurrently serving

his criminal sentence. It may be that some have received

benefits after their criminal sentence has expired, but if

that is the substance of claimant's complaint, there is no

equal protection violation. Once a criminal sentence is

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served, the person is no longer "confined pursuant to his

conviction," 402(x)(1) no longer applies, and the person is

not similarly situated to claimant.

We have considered all of claimant's arguments.

None warrant relief.

Affirmed.

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