National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1176

NATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF DEDHAM,
Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

Theodore E. Dinsmoor, with whom Finnegan and Stanzler, P.C.,

Philip Y. Brown, Grant Schwartz & Brown, Tad Jankowski, and Lori

Wiechelt were on brief, for appellant.

Joyce Frank, with whom Kopelman and Paige, P.C. was on

brief, for appellee.

January 4, 1995

SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a medley of
SELYA, Circuit Judge.

constitutional questions driven by the passage of a municipal by-

law that effectively prohibits the exhibition of motion pictures

at the town's only theater between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and

6:00 a.m. After careful consideration of appellant's

asseverational array, we affirm the district court's entry of

summary judgment in the municipality's favor.

I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellant, National Amusements, Inc., owns

and operates Showcase Cinemas (Showcase), a complex containing 12

theaters located on Route 1 in Dedham, Massachusetts. In 1978,

appellant began exhibiting "midnight movies" on Friday and

Saturday nights. These performances started between 11:30 p.m.

and 12:30 a.m., and ended between 1:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m.

On January 12, 1989, at a meeting of the Board of

Selectmen (Dedham's governing body), Selectman Kehoe raised the

issue of secondary effects, expressing particular concern over

purported traffic and security problems associated with

Showcase's operation of its business. At a selectmen's meeting

the following week, after another selectman reported that he had

received complaints about disruptions connected with appellant's

exhibition of midnight movies, the Board placed a proposed by-law

amendment on the warrant for the forthcoming annual Town

Meeting.1 The text of this proposal, denominated "Article 40,"

1The venerable institution of the town meeting is perhaps
more celebrated in New England than elsewhere. The colonial
government of Massachusetts first passed enabling legislation,

2

read in pertinent part:

To see if the Town will vote to amend Chapter
XIII of the Town By-Laws by adding the
following new section:

Section 42B- No holder of an entertainment
license for theatrical exhibition, public
show, public amusement, concert, dance or
exhibition . . . shall conduct business
between the hours of 12 midnight and 6:00
a.m.

The Board also sent a letter to William Towey, appellant's senior

vice-president, memorializing its "concern about the problems

generating from the Showcase Cinemas after the weekend late

shows," and indicating that the Board "would like to discuss this

situation . . . ." On February 2, Towey and approximately 30

interested residents met with the selectmen and discussed matters

related to the exhibition of midnight movies.

In response to the residents' articulated concerns,

Towey conferred with various townsfolk, including the police

chief. Thereafter, appellant agreed to undertake, at its

expense, a variety of measures designed to enhance security,

reduce noise levels, control traffic, and ameliorate the problem

of litter. Despite these concessions, the voters approved

entitled the "Town Act," in 1636. A 1647 version of the Town Act
gave municipalities the "power to make such laws and
Constitutions as may concern the welfare of their Town. Provided
they be not of a criminal but only of a prudential nature . . .
and not repugnant to the publick Laws." 1647 Mass. Town Act, The

Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts 50 (1648 & reprint 1929).

While Dedham's present-day Town Meeting operates under the aegis
of the Home Rule Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, see

Mass. Const. amend. art. 2, 1-9, amended by Mass. Const.

amend. art. 89; see also Bloom v. City of Worcester, 293 N.E.2d

268, 274-75 (Mass. 1973), it, too, possesses lawmaking capacity,
see Mass. Const. amend. art. 2, 6.

3

Article 40 at a Town Meeting held on April 10, 1989 (first

amending it to exempt ballroom dancing and to change the closing

time to 12:30 a.m.).

Under the Massachusetts scheme, municipal by-laws

cannot take effect without the imprimatur of the Attorney General

of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 40,

32. The Attorney General refused to sanction Article 40 on the

ground that the proposed amendment, by distinguishing ballroom

dancing from other forms of dance, was not content-neutral and

was, therefore, unconstitutional.

Undaunted, the Board of Selectmen proposed a neoteric

amendment, Article 4, for inclusion on the next Town Meeting

warrant. Article 4 provided in pertinent part:

To see if the Town will vote to amend Chapter
XIII of the Revised By-Laws of the Town of
Dedham, entitled "Police Regulations" by
adding a new section at the end thereof, as
follows: Section 57.

Unless otherwise restricted, no holder of a
license issued by the Town of Dedham,
pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws,
Chapter 140, Sections 177A, 181 and 183A,
shall permit any activity licensed thereunder
to be conducted between the hours of 1:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m.2

The voters adopted Article 4 at a special Town Meeting

held on November 6, 1989. The Attorney General approved it on

February 8, 1990. On the day that Article 4 took effect,

2The state laws cited in Article 4 authorize municipalities,
in general, to grant and revoke licenses for amusement devices,
concerts, dances, exhibitions, and public shows for which an
admission fee is charged.

4

appellant sued, charging that the by-law violated its rights

under both the federal and state constitutions.3 Following

pretrial discovery, Dedham successfully moved for summary

judgment. See National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 846

F. Supp. 1023 (D. Mass. 1994). This appeal ensued.

II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A federal court may grant summary judgment in a civil

action "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court

fleshed out this rule in a trilogy of cases decided in the 1985-

86 term. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In

general, these cases require that a party seeking summary

judgment make a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of

material fact exists. Once the movant has made this showing, the

nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific

facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue.

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

To satisfy the criterion of trialworthiness, and

thereby forestall summary judgment, an issue must be "genuine,"

3Dedham agreed not to enforce the by-law against Showcase
pendente lite. This stipulation remains in effect.

5

that is, the evidence relevant to the issue, viewed in the light

most flattering to the party opposing the motion, see Mack v.

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989),

must be sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder

to resolve the issue in favor of either side. See Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. at 250; Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). Trialworthiness

necessitates "more than simply show[ing] that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586. As we have stated, "[t]he evidence illustrating the

factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must

have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of

the truth which a factfinder must resolve . . . ." Mack, 871

F.2d at 181.

Trialworthiness requires not only a "genuine" issue but

also an issue that involves a "material" fact. See Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. In this context, the term "material"

means that a fact has the capacity to sway the outcome of the

litigation under the applicable law. See id.; see also United

States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Etc. (Great Harbor Neck,

New Shoreham, R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). If the

facts on which the nonmovant relies are not material, or if its

evidence "is not significantly probative," Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted), brevis disposition becomes

appropriate.

An order granting summary judgment engenders plenary

6

review. See Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 1993).

In conducting such review, we examine the summary judgment record

in the light most friendly to the summary judgment loser, and we

indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See id.

Withal, we need not credit purely conclusory allegations, indulge

in rank speculation, or draw improbable inferences. See Medina-

Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8(1st Cir. 1990).

III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

The heart of appellant's case is its multifaceted claim

that the municipal by-law violates the First Amendment. We turn

directly to that claim (relegating appellant's related

overbreadth challenge to Part IV(C), infra).

A. Putting First Things First.
A. Putting First Things First.

In the context of First Amendment challenges to

government regulations that burden speech, the Supreme Court has

identified two differing modes of analysis, or levels of

scrutiny, that may come into play. Since entertainment

constitutes a form of speech, fully protected by the First

Amendment, see Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65

(1981), our initial task is to determine the appropriate level of

judicial scrutiny that attaches to an analysis of Article 4. We

begin this endeavor by mapping the choices and putting them into

workable perspective.

Freedom of speech is among the most precious of our

constitutional rights. Thus, courts have long recognized that,

when governmental action places speech in special jeopardy,

7

special protections must apply. For this reason, a court

embarking on an inquiry into the constitutionality of

governmental action will devote "the most exacting scrutiny to

regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential

burdens on speech because of its content." Turner Broadcasting

Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994); accord Simon &

Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.

Ct. 501, 508 (1991); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).

Strict scrutiny is desirable in these circumstances because such

laws "pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to

advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular

ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through

coercion rather than persuasion." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S.

Ct. at 2458. Courts therefore treat content-based regulations as

"presumptively invalid" under the First Amendment. R.A.V. v.

City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).

In contrast, regulations that burden speech, but that

are unrelated to the speaker's viewpoint or to the content of the

proscribed speech, are subject to a less taxing (but nonetheless

meaningful) level of judicial scrutiny. This disparate treatment

is justified because, on the whole, non-content-based regulations

pose "a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or

viewpoints from the public dialogue." Turner Broadcasting, 114

S. Ct. at 2459. Phrased another way, since regulations that are

not content-based portend less jeopardy for freedom of speech,

the special prophylaxis that strict scrutiny ensures is less

8

necessary.

This dichotomy has important practical ramifications

for constitutional analysis as the applicable indices of

constitutionality vary according to the level of scrutiny that

attaches. Strict judicial scrutiny makes it less likely that any

given regulation will clear the constitutional hurdle for, in its

domain, the operative test is whether a regulation "is necessary

to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to

achieve that end." Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,

481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). Under ordinary First Amendment

scrutiny sometimes called "intermediate" scrutiny in

recognition of the fact that all First Amendment scrutiny is more

demanding than the "rational basis" standard that is often used

to gauge the constitutionality of economic regulations, see

Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2458; see also Madsen v.

Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2537 (1994) (Scalia,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) the test is

less exacting in both the "ends" and "means" segments of the

equation. Thus, where intermediate scrutiny pertains,

restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected

expression "are valid provided that they are justified without

reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are

narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,

and that they leave open ample alternative channels for

communication of the information." Clark v. Community for

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

9

B. Identifying the Level of Scrutiny.
B. Identifying the Level of Scrutiny.

In light of these differing analytic modalities, it is

unsurprising that many First Amendment battles over the

constitutionality of government regulations start with a debate

about what level of scrutiny is appropriate. The instant case is

no exception. Here, appellant advances two main theses in

support of its exhortation that Dedham's by-law must be subjected

to strict scrutiny. First, it maintains that Article 4 is

content-based. Second, it maintains that Article 4 impermissibly

singles out, and thus targets, Showcase's exhibition of midnight

movies. Neither thesis merits a passing grade.

1. Relationship to Content. Appellant's flagship
1. Relationship to Content.

claim portrays Article 4 as a content-based regulation. If

sustainable, this characterization would require us to employ the

most exacting scrutiny in evaluating the by-law's

constitutionality. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at

508. Be that as it may, we do not think that the

characterization is apt.

The concept of what constitutes a content-based as

opposed to a content-neutral regulation has proven protean in

practice. The Court's cases teach that the "principal inquiry in

determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in

time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the

government has adopted a regulation of speech because of

disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation omitted). Even a

10

regulation that does not choose sides or otherwise convey

disapproval of a particular message can run afoul of this dictate

because the "First Amendment's hostility to content-based

regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of

an entire topic." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); accord Simon & Schuster, 112 S.

Ct. at 509. This does not mean, however, that the sovereign must

steer away from content at all costs, or else risk strict

scrutiny. "A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the

content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an

incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."

Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also City of Renton v. Playtime

Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).

The subject of our inquiry here seems at first blush to

be the very model of a content-neutral regulation. Article 4, by

its terms, does not demand reference to the content of the

affected speech in order to determine if the ordinance applies;

the only requisite reference is to an external characteristic:

whether the activity is licensed under one of several particular

sections of state law. Furthermore, nothing in the record

suggests that Article 4 arose out of an effort to suppress some

particular message communicated through Showcase's selection of

motion pictures. In all events, any such forensic fizgig would

be easily defused, because the midnight movies comprise exactly

the same fare that appellant displays during the hours when the

theater's operation is totally unaffected by Article 4.

11

Faced with so formidable a set of barriers, appellant

hems and haws. In the end, it theorizes that Article 4 is

content-based because, while banning licensed activity in the

early morning hours, the by-law leaves untouched other forms of

expression, say, unlicensed entertainment, street demonstrations,

public speeches, and candlelight vigils. In appellant's view,

this distinction is driven by a value judgment the town's

conscious decision to place less worth on licensed entertainment

than on unlicensed entertainment and thus constitutes

"irrational discrimination between the secondary effects of

prohibited and permitted forms of expression based solely on the

charge of an admission fee." Appellant's Brief at 26.

As authority for this bold proposition, appellant cites

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505

(1993). We do not believe that the case can carry the cargo that

appellant piles upon it. In Discovery Network, a city, motivated

by interests in both safety and aesthetics, imposed a categorical

ban on the distribution, via newsrack, of "commercial handbills,"

but allowed the continued distribution of "newspapers"

(containing primarily noncommercial speech). Id. at 1507-09.

This policy clearly favored noncommercial speech over commercial

speech, and, under it, "whether any particular newsrack falls

within the ban is determined by the content of the publication

resting inside that newsrack." Id. at 1516. On that

understanding, the Court found the ban to be content-based. See

id. at 1516-17. In so holding, the Justices, though

12

acknowledging that the city had a legitimate interest in limiting

the number of newsracks, gave short shrift to Cincinnati's

suggestion that the regulation was content-neutral because it was

born of a desire to combat certain distasteful secondary effects

associated with newsracks. The Court contrasted the case with

Renton, explaining that Cincinnati had failed to identify any

"secondary effects attributable to respondent publishers'

newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati

permits to remain on its sidewalks." Id. at 1517.

Appellant's reliance on Discovery Network is mislaid.

Whether Cincinnati's regulation applied to a particular newsrack

was determined by necessary reference to the subject matter of

the specific publications contained therein a telltale

harbinger of content-based regulation. Dedham's regulation is

not of this ilk; Article 4 applies without reference to either

the content of the entertainment or the communicative impact of

any speech. Unlike in Discovery Network, the applicability

determination is based solely on an external, content-neutral

characteristic the existence of an admission fee.

To rub salt in an open wound, appellant not only

misapprehends the import of Discovery Network, but also overreads

the Court's opinion. The case does not stand for the sweeping

proposition that any differential treatment of speakers renders a

regulation content-based. Instead, the Court's holding pivots on

the conclusion that, though the city's underlying purpose in

enacting the ordinance was proper, the differential treatment of

13

speakers had no relationship to that underlying purpose.4 See

id. at 1517. Thus, Discovery Network establishes a much narrower

proposition: that, even when a municipality passes an ordinance

aimed solely at the secondary effects of protected speech (rather

than at speech per se), the ordinance may nevertheless be deemed

content-based if the municipality differentiates between speakers

for reasons unrelated to the legitimate interests that prompted

the regulation. Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980)

(sustaining challenge to statute permitting labor, but not

nonlabor, picketing, because "nothing in the content-based labor-

nonlabor distinction ha[d] any bearing" on the state's legitimate

interest in privacy).

Here, Dedham's stated interest in enacting Article 4

is, and has been, to reduce the number of sources of potential

noise and disturbance.5 Such an objective is plainly within the

office of municipal government. Accordingly, the relevant

question reduces to whether Dedham has offered a neutral

justification for the differential treatment that Article 4

accords to purveyors of licensed entertainment, on the one hand,

and purveyors of unlicensed entertainment, on the other hand. On

the facts of this case, the question requires us to ascertain

whether there are any secondary effects attributable to licensed

4In this regard, it is interesting that, as applied, the
regulation outlawed only 62 newsracks while permitting over 1,500
others to remain in service. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct.

at 1510.

5We discuss appellant's claim that Dedham's stated interest
is illusory and-or pretextual in Part III(C)(1), infra.

14

(commercial) amusements that distinguish them from the unlicensed

(noncommercial) amusements that Dedham has left unregulated. See

Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517.

We answered the same question in a slightly different

setting in Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d

1115 (1st Cir. 1981). There, several adult bookstores challenged

the constitutionality of a municipal licensing ordinance (enacted

pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. ch. 140, 181, a statute referenced in

Dedham's amended by-law) on the ground, inter alia, that the

ordinance treated commercial and noncommercial amusements

differently. In response, we rejected

appellant's argument that the statute and the
ordinance are facially underinclusive by
reason of their failure to subject non-
commercial amusements to the same licensing
requirements. We think a legislature could
reasonably conclude that non-commercial
amusements present sufficiently less
likelihood of the harms sought to be
prevented to justify their differential
treatment.

Fantasy Book Shop, 652 F.2d at 1121 n.6 (offering examples).

In the case at bar, we think it self-evident that a

legislative body might reasonably conclude that the frequency and

regularity of activity inherent in an ongoing commercial venture

heighten the probability of late-night disruptions and boost the

number of likely participants. The profit motive itself, which

encourages marketing and promotion aimed at increased

consumption, is the surest indicator that, where commercial

amusements operate, crowds will probably gather. Hence, the

distinction drawn by Dedham between licensed and unlicensed

15

entertainment bears a rational relationship to the specific

interests cited by it in enacting Article 4. It follows

inexorably that, notwithstanding the differential treatment that

the by-law gives to unlicensed as opposed to licensed

entertainment, it cannot successfully be condemned as content-

based.

2. Targeting. Warbling from a different perch,
2. Targeting.

appellant asseverates that Article 4 should be strictly

scrutinized because it singles out, and in that sense targets,

Showcase's midnight movies. This asseveration rests on the

notion that strict scrutiny is always justified when a

municipality enacts an ordinance that, in practical effect,

regulates the First Amendment rights of a select group. We

consider the notion misguided.

In mounting its "targeting" offensive, appellant relies

primarily on Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r

of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). In Minneapolis Star, the Court

struck down a state use tax on newsprint and ink, ruling that the

tax violated the First Amendment both because it "singled out the

press for special treatment" by taxing newspapers in a manner

"without parallel in the State's tax scheme," id. at 582, and

because it impermissibly "target[ed] a small group of newspapers"

within the press as a whole, id. at 591.6 In reaching this

result, the Court consigned the Minnesota statute to strict

6Because the Minnesota tax exempted the first $100,000 worth
of newsprint and ink used annually by each publisher, its burden
fell almost exclusively on large newspapers.

16

scrutiny, reasoning:

When the State singles out the press, . . .
the political constraints that prevent a
legislature from passing crippling taxes of
general applicability are weakened, and the
threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute.
That threat can operate as effectively as a
censor to check critical comment by the press
. . . .

Id. at 585. The Court added that "differential treatment, unless

justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests

that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression

of expression, and such a goal is presumptively

unconstitutional." Id.

Before attempting to transplant the teachings of

Minneapolis Star, it is important to recall that, in a later

case, the Court revisited the matter of differential taxation.

See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). There, the Court

ruled that Arkansas could extend its generally applicable sales

tax to cable television and satellite services, while exempting

print media, without offending the First Amendment. The Court

refined the analysis it had crafted in Minneapolis Star,

explaining that targeting engenders strict scrutiny only when

regulations (1) single out the press, (2) take aim at a small

group of speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the

content of protected speech. Id. at 447. Because the Arkansas

tax measure avoided these pitfalls for example, there was "no

indication" that Arkansas "targeted cable television in a

purposeful attempt to interfere with . . . First Amendment

activities," id. at 448 the Court concluded that the statute

17

did not warrant strict scrutiny.

It is incumbent upon us to inspect this case through

the precedential prism of Minneapolis Star and Leathers. Reduced

to bare essence, appellant's argument for strict scrutiny based

on targeting necessarily rises or falls on the second of the

three criteria identified by the Leathers Court. We believe it

falls, for Article 4 does not target Showcase either as a speaker

or as a business.

By its terms, Article 4's proscription on activity

between 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. applies to a myriad of other

First Amendment speakers, such as persons who from time to time

may hold licenses for concerts, dances, or plays. And, moreover,

First Amendment speakers are not the only businesses prohibited

from late-night operation in Dedham; there is substantial

evidence in the record to support the town's contention that the

disputed by-law is simply the latest in a progression of by-laws

designed to ensure that commercial activities do not impinge

unduly on private, residential life.7 In this respect, Article

4 is more akin to the tax in Leathers an impost that the Court

upheld because it was an extension of a generally applicable tax,

499 U.S. at 447 than to the tax in Minneapolis Star an impost

7For example, section 42 of the town's revised by-laws, as
amended in 1976, prohibits individuals from selling food at
retail between 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. Section 42A, added
to the by-laws in 1976 and thereafter revised slightly in 1979,
proscribes the sale of virtually all retail commodities except
fuel products between 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. Dedham also
has adopted a by-law forbidding the illumination of signs for
retail establishments during the same six-hour interval.

18

that the Court struck down because it was "without parallel in

the State's tax scheme," 460 U.S. at 582.

To cinch matters, appellant's targeting argument also

flies in the teeth of the secondary effects doctrine. Under

appellant's formulation, any regulation that has an effect on

fewer than all First Amendment speakers or messages could be

deemed to be a form of targeting and thus subjected to strict

scrutiny. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that a

municipality lawfully may enact a regulation that "serves

purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it

has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not

others." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.

Even appellant's most vaunted precedent does not

support its targeting argument. In Minneapolis Star, the Court

did not condemn all regulations that single out First Amendment

speakers for differential treatment; rather, the Court

acknowledged that certain forms of differential treatment may be

"justified by some special characteristic" of the regulated

speaker. 460 U.S. at 585. Secondary effects can comprise a

special characteristic of a particular speaker or group of

speakers. Accordingly, the language we have quoted from

Minneapolis Star comfortably accommodates an exception to the

prohibition on differential treatment for regulations aimed at

secondary effects, so long as the disparity is reasonably related

19

to a legitimate governmental interest.8

In sum, appellant's targeting argument, like its

argument about content quality, fails to furnish a cognizable

basis for invoking strict scrutiny. We, therefore, apply an

intermediate level of scrutiny in considering the

constitutionality of

Article 4.

C. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny.
C. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny.

Strict scrutiny aside, restrictions on the time, place,

and manner of protected expression and Article 4 plainly

qualifies as such a restriction should be upheld so long as

they are content neutral, closely tailored to serve a significant

governmental interest, and allow for reasonable alternative

channels of communication. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50; Clark,

468 U.S. at 293. Appellant says that Article 4 fails to satisfy

any of these three criteria. We do not agree.

1. Governmental Interest. Dedham maintains that the
1. Governmental Interest.

voters enacted Article 4 to "preserve peace and tranquility for

Town citizens during the late evening hours." Such an interest,

in the abstract, suffices to justify a content-neutral

8Appellant's continued insistence that Article 4 unlawfully
targets Showcase because it was conceived in response to
complaints about disruptions incident to the midnight movies
reflects a distorted view both of the secondary effects doctrine
and of how a representative democracy functions. An ordinance is
not called into constitutional question because its enactment is
prompted by non-speech-related concerns (e.g., crime, traffic,

noise) stemming from the activity of a specific entity. So here:
it works no constitutional insult that the community's concerns
about the midnight movies acted as a catalyst that spurred the
passage of a generally applicable regulation.

20

restriction on protected speech (so long as other requirements

are met). No less an authority than the Supreme Court has

observed that government's "interest in protecting the well-

being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the

highest order in a free and civilized society." Carey, 447 U.S.

at 471.

Appellant concedes the theoretical validity of the

town's interest in preserving peace and tranquility, but insists

that the record evinces a genuine question as to whether Dedham's

articulated concerns, such as noise, crime, and litter, are

founded in fact. Going a step further, appellant also contends

that Dedham's asserted interest is pretextual, and that a race-

based animus, instead of a desire to promote serenity, motivated

the adoption of the by-law. The record fails to bear out either

of these claims.

a.
a.

As an initial matter, appellant asserts that Dedham's

professed governmental interest is not substantial because

exhibiting midnight movies did not adversely affect the

peacefulness of the community, and, therefore, the secondary

effects at which Article 4 is aimed are illusory. We agree with

appellant's premise: a governmental interest woven exclusively

out of the gossamer threads of speculation and surmise cannot be

termed substantial. However, we disavow appellant's conclusion:

the record before us consists of sturdier stuff and tells a story

that strongly supports Dedham's stated purpose. We canvass

21

certain key pieces of evidence.

Before Article 4 was more than a gleam in its sponsors'

eyes, numerous citizens had complained about vandalism,

trespassing, noise, and late-night traffic through residential

neighborhoods (with accompanying disruption from headlight

glare). On January 19, 1989, Selectman Hoell emphasized at a

selectmen's meeting "his concern and the concern of the neighbors

in the area of the Cinema regarding incidents at the Cinema

during and after the late showings on weekends." At the same

meeting, Selectman Kehoe noted that she had "received calls from

residents" complaining about "many incidents" at the site, and

the police chief, Dennis Teehan, reported to the selectmen that

"[t]here have been numerous incidents happening in the area . . .

after the midnight shows let out." At the February 2 selectmen's

meeting, several residents, including John Birda, Bob Zieman, and

John Howard, complained that appellant's late-night operations

resulted in disruptions, such as noise in the vicinity of a

nearby bus stop. Additionally, appellant acknowledged in the

district court that, between February 2 and April 6, its

representatives "met with . . . Dedham residents on five separate

occasions," and that, during these meetings, it "proposed and

developed plans to alleviate any articulated concerns pertaining

to traffic, noise and security at or around the Showcase Cinemas

complex." Appellant's Complaint, 10. Appellant then put these

plans (including, for example, a beefed-up police presence, added

patrols, and a litter-removal program) into effect at its expense

22

thus lending a patina of plausibility to the complaints.

Robert Cedrone, chairman of the Poor Farm Committee, a

neighborhood alliance, capsulized the situation, describing it in

the following terms at the April 24 Town Meeting:

[There are] more people coming out of the
late show cutting through the neighborhood,
cutting through back yards. The elderly
people still can't get used to that, even
with the extra police protection . . . . The
people in this neighborhood got to go to
sleep . . . . They're sleeping on eggs out
there.

Appellant attempts to brush aside these remonstrances.

Based on information developed through an in-depth investigation

conducted in the course of litigation (and, therefore, well after

the fact), it argues that the residents' complaints proved to be

phantoms, and that, therefore, Dedham failed to carry its burden

of establishing that Article 4 actually serves a substantial

governmental interest. In advancing this proposition, appellant

in effect argues that a municipality cannot credit complaints and

other evidence related to past problems with a particular

activity or enterprise unless and until it conducts an

independent investigation and corroborates each incident. We do

not believe that local legislatures are so constrained.

A legislative body can act without first acquiring

irrefutable proof. In other words, lawmakers need not bury each

piece of described trash before acting to combat litter, or

confirm each honking horn before acting to abate noise levels.

Instead, a legislative body, acting in furtherance of the public

interest, is entitled to rely on whatever evidence it "reasonably

23

believe[s] to be relevant to the problem" at hand. Renton, 475

U.S. 51-52.9 Here, it seems pellucid that, in addressing

problems of crime, litter, and noise posed by late-night

commercial entertainment activities, Dedham had ample reason to

assume that the collocation of factors on display at the Town

Meeting recurrent, wide-ranging complaints lodged by residents,

constabulary concern with a pattern of incidents reasonably

believed to have occurred in connection with the exhibition of

midnight movies, and a commonsense realization that the placidity

of a residential community will be jeopardized by an activity

that regularly draws hundreds of late-night patrons, most in

automobiles, who must then depart in the early morning hours

9Appellant reads Renton with an astigmatism bred of self-

interest. To be sure, as appellant suggests, the Ninth Circuit
initially found the city's stated justifications for the
ordinance to be speculative because the city enacted it without
the benefit of any studies relating to the city's "particular
problems or needs." Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (citation omitted).

But the Supreme Court determined that the Ninth Circuit had
"imposed on the city an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof,"
id., reasoning that "[t]he First Amendment does not require a

city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies
or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses," id. at 51-52. To the extent it is relevant

here, Renton stands for the proposition that a municipality may

rely upon the experience of other communities in assessing, and
then addressing, particular problems. It neither holds nor
suggests that a city is debarred from using its own experiences

for the same purpose. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (holding that a

city's substantial interest in limiting sound volume was
satisfactorily "evidenced by the complaints about excessive
volume generated by respondent's past concerts").

24

were relevant to, and probative of, its assessment of the

problem.10 Consequently, we reject appellant's contention that

Dedham's asserted governmental interest is a phantom.

b.
b.

In addition to attacking the credibility of the town's

anecdotal evidence, appellant asserts that Article 4's "ulterior

purpose is to keep African Americans out of Dedham . . . ."

Appellant's Brief at 39. This is a serious charge and we treat

it as such. Having scoured the record, we agree with the

district court that the allegation stands unproven.

In support of the accusation, appellant relies

principally upon a survey purporting to demonstrate that the

audience composition for Showcase's midnight movies is

approximately 80% African-American as contrasted with an audience

composition of approximately 30% African-American for other

screenings. Appellant buttressed the survey results with the

affidavit of the theater manager, Anthony Pungitore, to the

effect that midnight movie audiences have been "predominantly"

African-American, at least since 1986. The district court

articulated an abiding concern about the relevance and validity

10In respect to governmental interest, the material fact is
whether Dedham had adequate reason to act upon its stated
concerns, not, as appellant would have it, whether Dedham's
concerns were well-founded. As to the former, the evidence is
overwhelming. Hence, the lower court appropriately granted
summary judgment on this issue.

25

of the survey evidence,11 but eventually accepted it arguendo

for summary judgment purposes as probative of "the racial mix of

Showcase audiences." National Amusements, 846 F. Supp. at 1028.

Nevertheless, the district court found the record "devoid of

evidence that race played a role in the decision to adopt the By-

law." Id. We reach the same conclusion.

Even accepting appellant's assertion as to the racial

composition of the midnight movie audiences, appellant has not

linked that fact to the municipal decisionmaking process. That

is to say, appellant cites no evidence that any person involved

in the passage of Article 4 was aware at that time of the racial

composition of Showcase's audiences. This omission is fatal to a

claim of intentional racial discrimination. See Washington v.

Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (elucidating "the basic equal

protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed

to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a

racially discriminatory purpose"); Village of Arlington Heights

v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)

(similar; rejecting claim that municipality's zoning decision was

racially discriminatory); cf. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.

256, 279 (1979) (explaining that the requirement of

discriminatory purpose "implies that the decisionmaker . . .

11The survey results were tabulated by a market research
firm that appellant engaged for several weeks in the summer of
1993 (three years after the Town Meeting enacted Article 4). The
surveyors noted theatergoers' races, and asked a representative
sampling of midnight movie patrons, of all races, why each
individual chose to attend the late show.

26

selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in

part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects

upon on an identifiable group").

Appellant labors valiantly to fill this void, citing

statements from various selectmen and town meeting members that

are, to appellant's way of thinking, code words demonstrating

"institutional racism." Appellant's Brief at 41. Typical of

these comments are Selectman Kehoe's reference to "these young

kids, who don't even live in Dedham," and Selectman Hoell's

references to "nice little out-of-towners" and "the undesirable

element that's attracted by [Showcase's] activity." But these

statements, if viewed in the most cynical light, are at worst

ambiguous. Standing alone, they are insufficient to raise an

inference of racial animus. The record chronicles the lengthy

series of events incident to the town's consideration of Article

4, and does not contain the slightest indication that the race of

theatergoers was an issue. To the contrary, all the evidence

supports Dedham's assertion that Article 4 was aimed principally

at curbing late-night disruptions. Against this backdrop, the

snippets that appellant has extracted from the record with near-

surgical precision simply do not support an inference of racism

on the part of the legislative body.

While the summary judgment mantra requires us to draw

every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party,

inferences, to qualify, must flow rationally from the underlying

facts; that is, a suggested inference must ascend to what common

27

sense and human experience indicates is an acceptable level of

probability. Cf. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d

13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). This means, of course, that a court

pondering a Rule 56 motion need not embrace inferences that are

wildly improbable or that rely on "tenuous insinuation." Mesnick

v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 826 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992).

This principle is dispositive of appellant's claim of

racial discrimination. While ambiguous remarks may, under some

circumstances, help to illuminate the summary judgment record,

such remarks rarely will suffice to conceive an issue of material

fact when none otherwise exists.12 As we stated in Mesnick, a

court is not under an obligation "to draw unreasonably

speculative inferences in mulling whether the plaintiff fulfilled

his burden of adducing `specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.

12On this point, case law in the age discrimination context
is instructive. In that milieu, courts frequently have ruled
that ambiguous remarks, without more, are not enough to raise an
inference of an employer's discriminatory intent. See, e.g.,

Thomure v. Phillips Furniture Co., 30 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir.

1994) (employer's suggestion to employee that he "might want to
consider retirement" rather than accept a pay cut found not
probative of age discrimination); Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd.,

3 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir. 1993) (supervisor's statement that
company sheltered "no sacred cows" insufficient to raise
inference of age discrimination); Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 826

(supervisor's comment that he was "sad to lose the youth of the
work force" did not, by itself, raise an inference of bias
against older employees); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d

1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for
employer despite supervisor's comment that he chose plaintiff's
replacement because the latter was "a bright, intelligent,
knowledgeable young man").

28

at 256). It follows that, "[e]ven in cases where elusive

concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment

may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported

speculation." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8; see also Manego v.

Cape Cod Five Cents Sav. Bank, 692 F.2d 174, 177 (1st Cir. 1982)

(recognizing that, at the summary judgment stage, "smoke alone is

not enough to force the defendants to a trial to prove that their

actions were not [racially] discriminatory"; a plaintiff must at

least identify "some glowing embers"). So here: asking a court

to infer, based on nothing more than the uncommunicated existence

of a predominantly African-American theater audience and a

handful of arguably ambiguous statements, that a deliberative

body of several hundred members acted out of a race-based animus

in passing a facially neutral law is simply too much of a

stretch.

Because courts occupy a special place in our democracy,

they must be especially careful not to succumb to the merchants

of conjecture. Consequently, they must deal in facts as opposed

to suspicions, and in plausible inferences as opposed to

speculative suppositions. Fidelity to this ideal constrains us

to rebuff appellant's postulatory claim that racial animosity

paved the way for Article 4's passage. The record reflects no

trialworthy dispute on this issue.

2. Narrow Tailoring. Appellant complains that Article
2. Narrow Tailoring.

4 is not narrowly tailored because it affects all licensed

29

entertainment, irrespective of any individualized impact on

crime, noise, traffic, or trash. The irony of this position is

not lost upon us: appellant seemingly demands in this breath

that Article 4 be limited to Showcase Cinemas because the

relevant secondary effects have been linked predominantly to that

entity, yet in an earlier breath denounced such a focus as

impermissible targeting, see supra Part III(B)(2). We reject

this anfractuous effort to trap Dedham between the Scylla of

narrow tailoring and the Charybdis of targeting.

In Ward, the Court explained that the narrow tailoring

requirement does not mandate a least restrictive means analysis;

"[r]ather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so

long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government

interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the

regulation." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (internal quotation omitted).

Article 4 meets that test: it promotes the substantial

government interest of preserving tranquility an interest that,

as Dedham's past experience demonstrates, would not be achieved

as effectively absent the regulation. Nor is the regulation

rendered infirm by its general applicability to all licensed

entertainment. It is within a legislature's legitimate purview

to conclude that such secondary effects as late-night noise and

traffic are likely to adhere to all commercial entertainment.

Indeed, the very existence of a licensing scheme, with its built-

in emphasis on commercial amusements, supports Dedham's decision

to enact a generally applicable regulation. See, e.g., Fantasy

30

Book Shop, 652 F.2d at 1121 n.6 (explaining that a legislature

may regulate licensed entertainment based on a reasonable

likelihood that patrons would create "excessive noise" or engage

in "disruptive or illegal conduct").

3. Alternate Avenues of Communication. Appellant's
3. Alternate Avenues of Communication.

contention that Article 4 is invalid because it does not allow

for "ample alternative channels for communication of the

information," Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, need not detain us. The

record conclusively demonstrates that adequate alternatives exist

allowing appellant to communicate, and audiences to receive, the

message contained in the midnight movies. The ban on licensed

entertainment affects only five hours out of each 24-hour day,

leaving appellant 19 hours (or roughly 80% of each day) in which

to communicate its cinematic message. Indeed, the very same

films that can no longer be exhibited between 1:00 a.m. and 6:00

a.m. will still be shown an average of six times a day on Fridays

and Saturdays, and will be exhibited for roughly 13 hours a day

on the other five days of the week.

Appellant readily acknowledges the frequency of its

exhibitions, but nonetheless argues that the ban on midnight

movies forecloses the opportunity to communicate its message to a

distinct segment of the movie-going public. To bolster this

argument, it again retreats to its survey. The survey results

indicate that, out of a random sampling of midnight moviegoers,

14% said that they attended late shows because they "had to work

late, and could only come to a late show," and 11% "felt that the

31

midnight show was the only entertainment option open to him/her."

From these somewhat inscrutable results, appellant's market

research firm concluded that:

The late [midnight] show is the only
opportunity that the Theater has to exhibit
films in order to communicate with a distinct
portion of its patrons. Showing films
earlier in the day is not a viable means of
communication with this segment, because, as
indicated by the survey results, these
patrons are extremely unlikely and/or unable
to attend earlier shows.

There are a slew of problems with appellant's analysis.

First, the survey is not particularly informative because it

focuses on the patrons' options on one particular night.13

Thus, patrons who identified the midnight movies as their "only

entertainment option" or who said they "could only come to a late

show" may well have been confining their answers to one specific

evening. Questions of more general applicability were

conspicuously lacking. Hence, the wording of the survey defeats

appellant's attempted reliance on it.

Second, it is reasonable to assume that midnight movies

are commercially successful because some people prefer to attend

them. Yet, thwarting such an idiosyncratic preference cannot be

equated with a denial of adequate avenues of communication.

Although Article 4 diminishes the total quantity of appellant's

speech in some measure, and simultaneously curtails its

13For example, Question No. 2 asked: "Why did you come to
the `Midnight Show' tonight?" (emphasis supplied). Similarly,

Question No. 3 asked: "If you couldn't get into the movies
tonight, what other entertainment options would you have?"

(emphasis supplied).

32

opportunity to communicate with some patrons, those are necessary

side effects of almost any restriction on speech. As long as

restrictions are content-neutral, some diminution in the overall

quantity of speech will be tolerated. See, e.g., City Council of

Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803, 812

(1984) (finding ample alternative avenues of communication

despite assumption that the ordinance "diminishe[d] the total

quantity" of appellees' speech).

In short, the lens of inquiry must focus not on whether

a degree of curtailment exists, but on whether the remaining

communicative avenues are adequate. As the Court phrased it:

"That the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree

the potential audience for respondent's speech is of no

consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining

avenues of communication are inadequate." Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.

Given 19 hours a day within which to exhibit movies, with no

special limitations on content, appellant's evidence does not

call into legitimate question the adequacy of the alternate

routes for communication.

D. Recapitulation.
D. Recapitulation.

To recapitulate, Dedham has demonstrated, in conformity

with the protocol of Rule 56, that Article 4 escapes strict

scrutiny. Dedham has also demonstrated that Article 4 survives

the lesser degree of scrutiny that obtains here. The municipal

by-law is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest,

it is narrowly tailored in the service of that interest, and it

33

leaves open ample avenues of communication. Therefore, the

district court did not err in granting brevis disposition on

appellant's ingenious collection of First Amendment initiatives.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS
IV. MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS

Appellant makes several additional claims, one under

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, one

intimating, albeit somewhat obliquely, that Article 4 places an

unconstitutional condition on appellant's entertainment license,

one involving overbreadth, and the last under Article 16 of the

Declaration of Rights contained in the Massachusetts

Constitution. These claims lack force.14

A. The Due Process Claim.
A. The Due Process Claim.

Appellant maintains that Dedham did not afford it

procedural due process in adopting Article 4. Its rhetoric rings

hollow.

As an initial matter, we doubt that the concept of

procedural due process is applicable in respect to the

legislative enactment of a generally applicable statute or

ordinance. After all, procedural due process is a doctrine most

closely associated with assuring fairness in regard to the

14Appellant also hints at a claim under the Takings Clause,
presumably on the theory that Dedham took its "valuable interests
in exhibiting midnight movies" without just compensation.
Appellant's Brief at 45. We do not probe the point for
appellant, by devoting a mere two sentences to the possibility in
its briefs, waived any such claim. See, e.g., Ryan v. Royal Ins.

Co., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is settled in this

circuit that issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed
to have been abandoned.").

34

enforcement of laws or the administration of programs. In

general, then, the doctrine bears no relation to the initial

enactment of a law. See Laurence H. Tribe, American

Constitutional Law 664 (2d ed. 1988). Indeed, the prospect of a

legislative body being required to afford a panoply of

protections for all persons who might arguably be affected by a

forthcoming statute or ordinance would seem to be a prescription

for parliamentary paralysis.

In reaching this conclusion, we follow guideposts

erected by the Supreme Court. We find particularly instructive

the Court's opinion in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), a case that arose after the

Colorado Board of Equalization promulgated a county-wide increase

in property valuations for tax purposes. The petitioner there

adopted much the same position that appellant advocates here.

Thus, the Court had to decide "whether all individuals have a

constitutional right to be heard before a matter can be decided

in which all are equally concerned." Id. at 445. Justice

Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, after noting that it was

"hard to believe that the proposition was seriously made," id.,

rejected the due process requirement hawked by the petitioner:

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than
a few people it is impracticable that
everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption. . . . General statutes within the
state power are passed that affect the person
or property of individuals, sometimes to the
point of ruin, without giving them a chance
to be heard. Their rights are protected in
the only way that they can be in a complex
society, by their power, immediate or remote,

35

over those who make the rule.

Id. In language that we find appropriate to our case, Justice

Holmes concluded: "There must be a limit to individual argument

in such matters if government is to go on." Id.

Appellant simply ignores this line of authority. It

concentrates instead on the fact that the by-law curtailed its

licensed exhibition of films, and tries to argue that the

curtailment entitled it to the same due process guarantees as

would have obtained had Dedham revoked its entertainment license

altogether. This is an exercise in sophism that fails for at

least two reasons. In the first place, the by-law did not

constitute a revocation of the license. In the second place, the

record makes manifest that the town afforded appellant both

notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Appellant cites Derby Refining Co. v. Board of

Aldermen, 555 N.E.2d 584 (Mass. 1990), for the proposition that

Dedham could not lawfully enact Article 4 without first according

it a full-scale adjudicatory hearing. Appellant misreads the

opinion. In Derby Refining, the state court held that certain

types of licenses, once issued, "become[] a vested property right

of the licensee, and may be revoked only when due process

protections are complied with." Id. at 722. Assuming for the

sake of argument that appellant has a cognizable property

interest in its license to exhibit motion pictures, but cf.

Roslindale Motor Sales, Inc. v. Police Comm'r, 538 N.E.2d 312,

314-15 (Mass. 1989) (holding that motor vehicle dealer did not

36

have a property interest in license to deal in used cars), Derby

Refining is nonetheless inapposite because the enactment of

Article 4 cannot be considered a revocation of that license.

Unlike the revocation of a license which results in the total

cessation of previously authorized activities Article 4 does

not snatch away appellant's right to conduct the authorized

activities, but merely cuts back the hours during which those

activities may be undertaken. The entertainment license remains

intact.

Appellant's argument also founders because, in this

instance, the town afforded process equivalent to that which

would have been due at a revocation hearing. The Town Meeting

originally passed Article 40, Article 4's progenitor, in the

spring of 1989. Before putting Article 40 to a vote, town

officials contacted appellant to discuss the residents' concerns.

Various meetings were held. On April 10, Pungitore, the theater

manager, attended the Town Meeting and was given an opportunity

to speak. The desirability of the ban was reconsidered by the

Town Meeting on April 24 for the express purpose of "hear[ing]

the proponents and opponents of [the by-law]," and to "give a

fair chance to the businessmen of the community to put their side

of the story forward." During the ensuing debate, Towey, a

senior officer of National Amusements, spoke at considerable

length against the proposal. Later, after the Attorney General

sidetracked Article 40, appellant received much the same sort of

process in respect to Article 4. For example, Towey attended the

37

November 6, 1989 Town Meeting at which Article 4 was put to a

vote, participated fully in the discourse, and delivered a

lengthy speech urging rejection of Article 4. No more is

exigible.15

B. The "Unconstitutional Condition" Claim.
B. The "Unconstitutional Condition" Claim.

To the extent appellant suggests that Article 4 places

an unconstitutional condition on its entertainment license, the

suggestion is without merit. The doctrine of unconstitutional

conditions bars government from arbitrarily conditioning the

grant of a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right,

regardless of the fact that the government appropriately might

have refused to grant the benefit at all. See generally Kathleen

M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1413,

1415 (1989).

Not all conditions are prohibited, however; if a

condition is germane that is, if the condition is sufficiently

related to the benefit then it may validly be imposed. In the

final analysis, "the legitimacy of a government proposal depends

on the degree of relatedness between the condition on a benefit

and the reasons why government may withhold the benefit

altogether." Id. at 1457 (footnote omitted); see also Posadas de

15Appellant bemoans the lack of particular forensic devices,
such as cross-examination. But even in license revocation
proceedings proper, such accouterments are not constitutionally
required. See, e.g., Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36,

41-42 (1st Cir.) (holding that revocation of building permit
without affording applicants an opportunity to cross-question
witnesses is not a denial of procedural due process), cert.

denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987).

38

P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)

(upholding Puerto Rico's ban on advertising casino gambling to

Puerto Rico residents because "the greater power to completely

ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power" to

discourage gambling through the prohibition on advertising).

"The more germane a condition to a benefit, the more deferential

the review; nongermane conditions, in contrast, are suspect."

Sullivan, supra, at 1457.

In this instance, Article 4 easily satisfies the

requirement of germaneness. Dedham's power to license

entertainment as a means of protecting public health and welfare

is closely related to the core purpose of Article 4, which, as we

have said, is to preserve the nighttime tranquility of the

community. Thus, while the ban on licensed entertainment between

1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. may constitute a condition on appellant's

license, it is germane and, therefore, not an unconstitutional

condition.

C. The Overbreadth Claim.
C. The Overbreadth Claim.

Appellant attempts to recast its "narrow tailoring"

argument, see supra Part III(C)(2), as an overbreadth attack. It

charges that Article 4 is overbroad because it curtails all

licensed entertainment, including entertainment that does not

produce unwelcome secondary effects. The challenge is baseless.

To be sure, appellant attempts to assert the rights of

others, but neither standing nor principles of jus tertii pose an

insuperable obstacle. First Amendment overbreadth doctrine

39

permits "an individual whose own speech or conduct may be

prohibited . . . to challenge a statute on its face because it

also threatens others not before the court those who desire to

engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from

doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the

law declared partially invalid." Board of Airport Comm'rs v.

Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (internal

quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has limited the sweep of

the overbreadth doctrine by imposing "[t]he requirement that the

overbreadth be substantial." Id.; see also Broadrick v.

Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Consequently, a "facial"

overbreadth challenge will not succeed unless "there [is] a

realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly

compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not

before the Court . . . ." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at

801.

Here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that Article

4 is overbroad, let alone substantially so. Dedham's

preoccupation with licensed entertainment bears a rational

relationship to its stated interests, see supra Part III(B)(1),

and appellant has cited no examples of other licensees who have

been harmed by the by-law despite the absence of secondary

effects. That ends the matter. Although Dedham likely would

have created overbreadth concerns had it attempted to ban all

First Amendment activity between 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., cf.

Jews For Jesus, 482 U.S. at 570-71, it did not take so bold a

40

step. Rather, Dedham chose a safer path by focusing on those

activities commercial entertainment most likely to result in

late-night disruptions. The claim of invalidity must, therefore,

perish.

D. The State Constitutional Claim.
D. The State Constitutional Claim.

Appellant's complaint contained a claim that Dedham's

by-law violated the Massachusetts Constitution. In granting

summary judgment, the district court finessed the merits of the

state constitutional claim. The court noted that, in presenting

its arguments, appellant had not drawn any distinction between

the federal and state constitutional claims,16 and ruled,

therefore, that appellant had forfeited any chance to argue that

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights offers broader freedom-

of-speech protection than the cognate provisions of the First

Amendment. See National Amusements, 846 F. Supp. at 1032 n.12.

On appeal, appellant concedes that it treated the two

constitutional provisions identically in the court below, and

tells us that it did so in the belief that the federal and state

constitutional protections for freedom of speech were coextensive

as applied to the exhibition of motion pictures. Having had

second thoughts in light of the district court's holding that the

by-law does not offend the First Amendment, appellant invites us

16Despite the fact that Dedham moved for summary judgment on
all claims, appellant relied almost entirely on federal
precedents in opposing the motion. Indeed, appellant only
mentioned Article 16 once in its memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment, citing it for the uncontroversial point that
movies are a form of protected expression.

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to consider the omitted argument. We decline the invitation.

The short of it is that appellant's change of heart

comes too late. "It is hornbook law that theories not raised

squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for the first

time on appeal." McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950

F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 112

S. Ct. 1939 (1992). We see no reason to depart from this

prudential rule in the circumstances at bar. Given the way in

which appellant elected to present its case below, Judge Young

acted appropriately in assuming, for purposes of his decision,

that the freedom-of-speech protections found in the two

constitutions were coterminous. Hence, the disputed ruling must

be upheld. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 829 n.11 (holding that a

plaintiff whose complaint contained parallel claims under federal

and state antidiscrimination statutes, but who relied exclusively

on federal precedent in unsuccessfully opposing summary judgment,

could not argue on appeal that state law was more favorably

disposed to his claims).

V. CONCLUSION
V. CONCLUSION

We need go no further.17 For the reasons discussed

above, we hold that Dedham's by-law, prohibiting the exhibition

of motion pictures at the town's only theater between the hours

of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., passes First Amendment muster. In

the bargain, it also survives appellant's other challenges.

17To the extent appellant has raised or alluded to other
grounds for appeal, we reject them by this reference. None
requires comment.

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Accordingly, the order of the district court granting summary

judgment in the town's favor must be

Affirmed.

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