February 16, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-1731
JOHN BEST,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DAVID ROME, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
and Carter,* District Judge.
Valeriano Diviacchi for appellant.
John McMahon, with whom Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle,
Wagner & Hiatt, P.C. was on brief, for appellees.
*Chief Judge, United States District Court of the District of
Maine, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. In this legal malpractice action, the
Per Curiam.
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants (a lawyer and his law firm), citing two independently
sufficient reasons. See Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 274-78
(D. Mass. 1994). Having carefully considered the parties'
briefs, perused the record, and studied the applicable law, we
share the district court's conclusion, id. at 277-78, that the
record reveals no genuine issue of material fact on the question
of malpractice. Thus, regardless of how the other issues in the
case might be resolved a matter on which we take no view the
judgment below must be upheld.
We need go no further. As we have indicated before,
when a district court produces a well-reasoned opinion that
reaches the correct result in a given case, a reviewing tribunal
should not rush to write at length merely to put matters in its
own words. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). So it is here. Because
we agree with the court below that, in this case, the summary
judgment record contains no evidence sufficient to support a
colorable claim of professional negligence, we summarily affirm
the judgment below, for substantially the reasons articulated in
the district court's alternative holding. See Best, 858 F. Supp.
at 277-78. We add only that, despite our summary affirmance of
the judgment below, we do not regard the appeal as so utterly
lacking in merit as to warrant the imposition of special
penalties. We, therefore, deny
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the defendants' request for sanctions, but award defendants
their ordinary costs.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. Costs in favor of appellees.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. Costs in favor of appellees.
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